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Supplement to Dynamic Epistemic Logic

Appendix C: Properties of binary relations

Below are the definitions of various adjectives that may be used to describe a binary relation R on a set W (of “worlds”): this is a set RW for which we write wRv to mean that (w,v)R.

  • Reflexive: xRx for each xW.
    “Each world has an R-arrow pointing from that world right back to that world.”
  • Transitive: xRy and yRz implies xRz for each x,y,zW.
    “Every sequence of worlds connected by R-arrows gives rise to an R-arrow going directly from the first world to the last.”
  • Symmetric: xRy implies yRx for each x,yW.
    “Every R-arrow going in one direction gives rise to another R-arrow going in the opposite direction.”
  • Equivalence relation: R is reflexive, transitive, and symmetric.
  • Euclidean: xRy and xRz implies yRz for each x,y,zW.
    “Two R-arrows leaving from the same source world give rise to R-arrows going between their destinations in both directions.”
  • Serial: for every xW, there is a yW such that xRy.
    “Every world has a departing R-arrow.”
  • Connected: for each partition of W into two disjoint nonempty sets S and T, there is an xS and a yT such that xRy or yRx.
    “All worlds are linked to the same R-arrow network.”
  • Complete (or Total): for any two different elements xW and yW, we have xRy or yRx.
    “Every pair of distinct worlds is ‘R-comparable’.” (Think of xRy as saying, “x is less than y.”)
  • Well-founded: every nonempty set SW has an xS such that for no yS is it the case that yRx.
    “Every nonempty set of worlds has an ‘R-minimal’ element.”
  • Converse well-founded: the converse relation R (defined by xRy iff yRx) is well-founded.
    “Every nonempty set of worlds has an ‘R-maximal’ element.”
  • Preorder: R is reflexive and transitive.

For information on the role of some of these properties in modal logic, we refer to the reader to our Appendix D or the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Modal Logic.

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Copyright © 2016 by
Alexandru Baltag <a.baltag@uva.nl>
Bryan Renne <bryan@renne.org>

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