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Søren Kierkegaard
Søren Aabye Kierkegaard (b.1813, d. 1855) was a profound and
prolific writer in the Danish "golden age" of intellectual and
artistic activity. His work crosses the boundaries of philosophy,
theology, psychology, literary criticism, devotional literature and
fiction. Kierkegaard brought this potent mixture of discourses to
bear as social critique and for the purpose of renewing Christian
faith within Christendom. At the same time he made many original
conceptual contributions to each of the disciplines he employed. He
is known as the "father of existentialism", but at least as important
are his critiques of Hegel and of the German romantics, his
contributions to the development of modernism, his literary
experimentation, his vivid re-presentation of biblical figures to
bring out their modern relevance, his invention of key concepts which
have been explored and redeployed by thinkers ever since, his
interventions in contemporary Danish church politics, and his fervent
attempts to analyse and revitalise Christian faith. Kierkegaard burned
with the passion of a religious poet, was armed with extraordinary
dialectical talent, and drew on vast resources of erudition.
Kierkegaard led a somewhat uneventful life. He rarely left his
hometown of Copenhagen, and travelled abroad only three times - to
Berlin. His prime recreational activities were attending the theatre,
walking the streets of Copenhagen to chat with ordinary people, and
taking brief carriage jaunts into the surrounding countryside. He was
educated at a prestigious boys' school (Borgedydskolen), then
attended Copenhagen University where he studied philosophy and
theology. His teachers at the university included F.C. Sibbern, Poul
Martin Møller, and H.L. Martensen.
Sibbern and Møller were both philosophers who also wrote
fiction. The latter in particular had a great influence on
Kierkegaard's philosophico-literary development. Martensen also had a
profound effect on Kierkegaard, but largely in a negative manner.
Martensen was a champion of Hegelianism, and when
he became Bishop Primate of the Danish People's Church, Kierkegaard
published a vitriolic attack on Martensen's theological views.
Kierkegaard's brother Peter, on the other hand, was an adherent of
Martensen and himself became a bishop in the church.
Another very important figure in Kierkegaard's life was
J.L. Heiberg, the doyen of Copenhagen's literati. Heiberg, more than
any other person, was responsible for introducing Hegelianism into
Denmark. Kierkegaard spent a good deal of energy trying to break into
the Heiberg literary circle, but desisted once he had found his own
voice in The Concept of Irony. Kierkegaard's first major
publication, From the Papers of One Still Living, is largely an
attempt to articulate a Heibergian aesthetics -
which is a modified version of Hegel's aesthetics. In From the
Papers of One Still Living, which is a critical review of Hans
Christian Andersen's novel Only A Fiddler, Kierkegaard attacks
Andersen for lacking life-development (Livs-Udvikling) and a
life-view (Livs-Anskuelse) both of which Kierkegaard deemed
necessary for someone to be a genuine novelist (Romandigter).
Kierkegaard's life is more relevant to his work than is the case
for many writers. Much of the thrust of his critique of Hegelianism
is that its system of thought is abstracted from the everyday lives of
its proponents. This existential critique consists
in demonstrating how the life and work of a philosopher contradict one
another. Kierkegaard derived this form of critique from the Greek
notion of judging philosophers by their lives rather than simply by
their intellectual artefacts. The Christian ideal,
according to Kierkegaard, is even more exacting since the totality of
an individual's existence is the artefact on the basis of which s/he
is judged by God for h/er eternal validity. Of course a writer's work
is an important part of h/er existence, but for the purpose of
judgement we should focus on the whole life not just on one part.
In a less abstract manner, an understanding of Kierkegaard's
biography is important for an understanding of his writing because his
life was the source of many of the preoccupations and repetitions
within his oeuvre. Because of his existentialist orientation,
most of his interventions in contemporary theory do double duty as
means of working through events from his own life. In particular
Kierkegaard's relations to his mother, his father, and his fiancée
Regine Olsen pervade his work.
Kierkegaard's relation to his mother is the least frequently
commented upon since it is invisible in his work. His mother does not
rate a direct mention in his published works, or in his diaries - not
even on the day she died. However, for a writer who places so much
emphasis on indirect communication, and on the
semiotics of invisibility, we should regard this absence as
significant. Johannes Climacus in Concluding Unscientific
Postscript remarks, "... how deceptive then, that an omnipresent
being should be recognisable precisely by being invisible."
Kierkegaard's mother, who was not well educated, is represented in his
writings by the mother-tongue (Danish). Kierkegaard was deeply
enamoured of the Danish language and worked throughout his writings to
assert the strengths of his mother-tongue over the invasive,
imperialistic influences of Latin and German. With respect to the
former, Kierkegaard had to petition the king to be allowed to write
his philosophy dissertation On the Concept of Irony with constant
reference to Socrates in Danish. Even though permission was
granted he was still required to defend his dissertation publicly in
Latin. Latin had been the pan-European language of science and
scholarship. In Denmark, in Kierkegaard's time, German language and
culture were at least as dominant as Latin in the production of
knowledge. In defiance of this, Kierkegaard revelled in his
mother-tongue and created some of the most beautifully poetic prose in
the Danish language - including a paeon to his mother-tongue in
Stages On Life's Way. In Repetition Constantin
Constantius congratulates the Danish language on providing the word
for an important new philosophical concept, viz. Gjentagelse
(repetition), to replace the foreign word
"mediation". In general, the Danish language is Kierkegaard's
umbilical attachment to the mother whereas Latin and German represent
the law of the father, especially when employed in systematic
scholarship (Videnskab).
The influence of Kierkegaard's father on his work has been
frequently noted. Not only did Kierkegaard inherit his father's
melancholy, his sense of guilt and anxiety, and his
pietistic emphasis on the dour aspects of Christian
faith, but he also inherited his talents for
philosophical argument and creative imagination. In addition
Kierkegaard inherited enough of his father's wealth to allow him to
pursue his life as a freelance writer. The themes of sacrificial
father/son relationships, of inherited sin, of the
burden of history, and of the centrality of the
"individual, human existence relationship, the old
text, well known, handed down from the fathers" (Postscript)
are repeated many times in Kierkegaard's oeuvre. The father's sense
of guilt was so great (for having cursed God? for having impregnated
Kierkegaard's mother out of wedlock?) that he thought God would punish
him by taking the lives of all seven of his children before they
reached the age of 34 (the age of Jesus Christ at his crucifixion).
This was born out for all but two of the children, Søren and his
older brother Peter, both of whom were astonished to survive beyond
that age. This may explain the sense of urgency that drove
Kierkegaard to write so prolifically in the years leading up to his
34th birthday.
Kierkegaard's (broken) engagement to Regine Olsen has also been the
focus of much scholarly attention. The theme of a young woman being
the occasion for a young man to become "poeticized" recurs in
Kierkegaard's writings, as does the theme of the sacrifice of worldly
happiness for a higher (religious) purpose. Kierkegaard's infatuation
with Regine, and the sublimated libidinal energy it lent to his poetic
production, were crucial for setting his life course. The breaking of
the engagement allowed Kierkegaard to devote himself monastically to
his religious purpose, as well as to establish his
outsider status (outside the norm of married bourgeois life). It also
freed him from close personal entanglements with women, thereby
leading him to objectify them as ideal creatures, and to reproduce the
patriarchal values of his church and father.
Kierkegaard's central problematic was how to become a Christian in
Christendom. The task was most difficult for the well-educated,
since prevailing educational and cultural institutions tended to
produce stereotyped members of "the crowd" rather than to allow
individuals to discover their own unique identities. This problem was
compounded by the fact that Denmark had recently and very rapidly been
transformed from a feudal society into a capitalist society.
Universal elementary education, large-scale migration from rural areas
into cities, and greatly increased social mobility meant that the
social structure changed from a rigidly hierarchical one to a
relatively "horizontal" one. In this context it became increasingly
difficult to "become who you are" for two reasons: (i) social
identities were unusually fluid; and (ii) there was a proliferation of
normalizing institutions which produced pseudo-individuals.
Given this problematic in this social context Kierkegaard perceived
a need to invent a form of communication which would not produce
stereotyped identities. On the contrary, he needed a form of rhetoric
which would force people back onto their own resources, to take
responsibility for their own existential choices, and to become who
they are beyond their socially imposed identities. In this
undertaking Kierkegaard was inspired by the figure of
Socrates, whose incessant irony
undermined all knowledge claims that were taken for granted or
unreflectively inherited from traditional culture. In his
dissertation On the Concept of Irony with constant reference to
Socrates Kierkegaard argued that the historical Socrates used his
irony in order to facilitate the birth of subjectivity in his
interlocutors. Because they were constantly forced to abandon their
pat answers to Socrates' annoying questions, they had to begin to
think for themselves and to take individual responsibility for their
claims about knowledge and value.
Kierkegaard sought to provide a similar service for his own
contemporaries. He used irony, parody, satire,
humor, and deconstructive techniques in order to
make conventionally accepted forms of knowledge and value untenable.
He was a gadfly - constantly irritating his contemporaries with
discomforting thoughts. He was also a midwife - assisting at the
birth of individual subjectivity by forcing his contemporaries to
think for themselves. His art of communication became "the art of
taking away" since he thought his audience suffered from too
much knowledge rather than too little.
Hegelianism promised to make absolute knowledge available by virtue
of a science of logic. Anyone with the capacity to follow the
dialectical progression of the purportedly transparent concepts of
Hegel's logic would have access to the mind of God (which for
Hegel was equivalent to the logical structure of
the universe). Kierkegaard thought this to be the hubristic attempt
to build a new tower of Babel, or a scala paradisi - a
dialectical ladder by which humans can climb with ease up to heaven.
Kierkegaard's strategy was to invert this dialectic
by seeking to make everything more difficult. Instead of seeing
scientific knowledge as the means of human redemption, he regarded it
as the greatest obstacle to redemption. Instead of seeking to give
people more knowledge he sought to take away what passed for
knowledge. Instead of seeking to make God and Christian faith
perfectly intelligible he sought to emphasize the absolute
transcendence by God of all human categories. Instead of setting
himself up as a religious authority, Kierkegaard used a vast array of
textual devices to undermine his authority as an author and to place
responsibility for the existential significance to be derived from his
texts squarely on the reader.
Kierkegaard distanced himself from his texts by a variety of
devices which served to problematize the authorial voice for the
reader. He used pseudonyms in many of his works (both overtly
aesthetic ones and overtly religious ones). He partitioned the texts
into prefaces, forewords, interludes, postscripts, appendices. He
assigned the "authorship" of parts of texts to different pseudonyms,
and invented further pseudonyms to be the editors or compilers of
these pseudonymous writings. Sometimes Kierkegaard appended his name
as author, sometimes as the person responsible for publication,
sometimes not at all. Sometimes Kierkegaard would publish more than
one book on the same day. These simultaneous books embodied
strikingly contrasting perspectives. He also published whole
series of works simultaneously, viz. the pseudonymous works on
the one hand and on the other hand the Edifying Discourses
published under his own name.
All of this play with narrative point of view, with contrasting
works, and with contrasting internal partitions within individual
works leaves the reader very disoriented. In combination with the
incessant play of irony and Kierkegaard's predilection for
paradox and semantic opacity, the text becomes a
polished surface for the reader in which the prime meaning to be
discerned is the reader's own reflection. Christian faith, for
Kierkegaard, is not a matter of learning dogma by rote. It is a
matter of the individual repeatedly renewing h/er passionate
subjective relationship to an object which can never be known, but
only believed in. This belief is offensive to reason, since it only
exists in the face of the absurd (the paradox of
the eternal, immortal, infinite God being incarnated in time as a
finite mortal).
Kierkegaard's "method of indirect communication" was designed to
sever the reliance of the reader on the authority of the author and on
the received wisdom of the community. The reader was to be forced to
take individual responsibility for knowing who s/he is and for knowing
where s/he stands on the existential, ethical and religious issues
raised in the texts.
Kierkegaard's "inverted Christian dialectic" was designed not to
make the word of God easier to assimilate, but to establish more
clearly the absolute distance that separates human beings from God.
This was in order to emphasize that human beings are absolutely
reliant on God's grace for salvation.
Kierkegaard presents his pseudonymous authorship as a dialectical
progression of existential stages. The first is the aesthetic, which
gives way to the ethical, which gives way to the religious. The
aesthetic stage of existence is characterized by the following:
immersion in sensuous experience; valorization of possibility over
actuality; egotism; fragmentation of the subject of experience;
nihilistic wielding of irony and scepticism; and flight from boredom.
The figure of the aesthete in the first volume of Either-Or
is an ironic portrayal of German romanticism, but it also draws on
medieval characters as diverse as Don Juan, Ahasverus (the wandering
Jew), and Faust. It finds its most sophisticated form in the author
of "The Seducer's Diary", the final section of Either-Or.
Johannes the seducer is a reflective aesthete, who gains
sensuous delight not so much from the act of seduction but from
engineering the possibility of seduction. His real aim is the
manipulation of people and situations in ways which generate
interesting reflections in his own voyeuristic mind. The aesthetic
perspective transforms quotidian dullness into a richly poetic world
by whatever means it can. Sometimes the reflective aesthete will
inject interest into a book by reading only the last third, or into a
conversation by provoking a bore into an apoplectic fit so that he can
see a bead of sweat form between the bore's eyes and run down his
nose. That is, the aesthete uses artifice, arbitrariness, irony, and
wilful imagination to recreate the world in his own image. The prime
motivation for the aesthete is the transformation of the boring into
the interesting.
This type of aestheticism is criticized from the point of view of
ethics. It is seen to be emptily self-serving and
escapist. It is a despairing means of avoiding commitment and
responsibility. It fails to acknowledge one's social debt and
communal existence. And it is self-deceiving insofar as it
substitutes fantasies for actual states of affairs.
But Kierkegaard did not want to abandon aesthetics altogether in
favor of the ethical and the religious. A key concept in the Hegelian
dialectic, which Kierkegaard's pseudonymous authorship parodies, is
Aufhebung (sublation). In Hegel's dialectic, when
contradictory positions are reconciled in a higher unity (synthesis)
they are both annulled and preserved (aufgehoben). Similarly
with Kierkegaard's pseudo-dialectic: the aesthetic and the ethical are
both annulled and preserved in their synthesis in the religious stage.
As far as the aesthetic stage of existence is concerned what is
preserved in the higher religious stage is the sense of infinite
possibility made available through the imagination. But this no
longer excludes what is actual. Nor is it employed for egotistic
ends. Aesthetic irony is transformed into religious humor, and the
aesthetic transfiguration of the actual world into the ideal is
transformed into the religious transubstantiation of the finite
world into an actual reconciliation with the infinite.
But the dialectic of the pseudonymous authorship never quite
reaches the truly religious. We stop short at the
representation of the religious by a self-confessed humorist
(Johannes Climacus) in a medium which, according to Climacus's own
account, necessarily alienates the reader from true (Christian) faith.
For faith is a matter of lived experience, of constant striving within
an individual's existence. According to Climacus's metaphysics, the
world is divided dualistically into the actual and the ideal.
Language (and all other media of representation) belong to the realm
of the ideal. No matter how eloquent or evocative language is it can
never be the actual. Therefore, any representation of faith is
always suspended in the realm of ideality and can never be
actual faith.
So the whole dialectic of the pseudonymous authorship is
recuperated by the aesthetic by virtue of its medium of
representation. In fact Johannes Climacus acknowledges this
implicitly when at the end of Concluding Unscientific
Postscript he revokes everything he has said, with the
important rider that to say something then to revoke it is not the
same as never having said it in the first place. His presentation of
religious faith in an aesthetic medium at least provides an
opportunity for his readers to make their own leap of faith, by
appropriating with inward passion the paradoxical religion of
Christianity into their own lives.
As a poet of the religious Kierkegaard was always preoccupied with
aesthetics. In fact, contrary to popular misconceptions of
Kierkegaard which represent him as becoming increasingly hostile to
poetry, he referred increasingly to himself as a poet in his later
years (all but one of over ninety references to himself as a poet in
his journals date from after 1847). Kierkegaard never claimed to
write with religious authority, as an apostle. His works represent
both less religiously enlightened and more religiously enlightened
positions than he thought he had attained in his own existence. Such
representations were only possible in an aesthetic medium of imagined
possibilities like poetry.
Like the terms "aesthetic" and "religious", the term "ethics" in
Kierkegaard's work has more than one meaning. It is used to denote
both: (i) a limited existential sphere, or stage, which is superseded
by the higher stage of the religious life; and (ii) an aspect of life
which is retained even within the religious life. In the first sense
"ethics" is synonymous with the Hegelian notion of
Sittlichkeit, or customary mores. In this sense "ethics"
represents "the universal", or more accurately the prevailing social
norms. The social norms are seen to be the highest court of appeal for
judging human affairs - nothing outranks them for this sort of
ethicist. Even human sacrifice is justified in terms of how it serves
the community, so that when Agamemnon sacrifices his daughter
Iphigenia he is regarded as a tragic hero since the sacrifice is
required for the success of the Greek expedition to Troy (Fear and
Trembling).
Kierkegaard, however, does recognize duties to a power higher than
social norms. Much of Fear and Trembling turns on the notion
that Abraham's would-be sacrifice of his son Isaac is not for the sake
of social norms, but is the result of a "teleological suspension of
the ethical". That is, Abraham recognizes a duty to something higher
than both his social duty not to kill an innocent person and his
personal commitment to his beloved son, viz. his duty to obey God's
commands.
But in order to arrive at a position of religious faith, which
might entail a "teleological suspension of the ethical", the
individual must first embrace the ethical (in the first sense). In
order to raise oneself beyond the merely aesthetic life, which is a
life of drifting in imagination, possibility and sensation, one needs
to make a commitment. That is, the aesthete needs to choose the
ethical, which entails a commitment to communication and decision
procedures.
The ethical position advocated by Judge Wilhelm in "Equilibrium
Between the Aesthetic and the Ethical in the Composition of
Personality" (Either-Or II) is a peculiar mix of cognitivism
and noncognitivism. The metaethics or normative ethics are
cognitivist, laying down various necessary conditions for ethically
correct action. These conditions include: the necessity of choosing
seriously and inwardly; commitment to the belief that predications of
good and evil of our actions have a truth-value; the necessity of
choosing what one is actually doing, rather than just responding to a
situation; actions are to be in accordance with rules; and these rules
are universally applicable to moral agents.
The choice of metaethics, however, is noncognitive. There is no
adequate proof of the truth of metaethics. The choice of normative
ethics is motivated, but in a noncognitive way. The Judge seeks to
motivate the choice of his normative ethics through the avoidance of
despair. Here despair (Fortvivlelse) is to let one's life
depend on conditions outside one's control (and later, more radically,
despair is the very possibility of despair in this first sense). For
Judge Wilhelm, the choice of normative ethics is a noncognitive choice
of cognitivism, and thereby an acceptance of the applicability of the
conceptual distinction between good and evil.
From Kierkegaard's religious perspective, however, the conceptual
distinction between good and evil is ultimately dependent not on
social norms but on God. Therefore it is possible, as Johannes de
Silentio argues was the case for Abraham (the father of faith), that
God demand a suspension of the ethical (in the sense of the socially
prescribed norms). This is still ethical in the second sense, since
ultimately God's definition of the distinction between good and evil
outranks any human society's definition. The requirement of
communicability and clear decision procedures can also be suspended by
God's fiat. This renders cases such as Abraham's extremely
problematic, since we have no recourse to public reason to decide
whether he is legitimately obeying God's command or whether he is a
deluded would-be murderer. Since public reason cannot decide the
issue for us, we must decide for ourselves as a matter of religious
faith.
Kierkegaard styled himself above all as a religious poet. The
religion to which he sought to relate his readers is Christianity.
The type of Christianity that underlies his writings is a very serious
strain of Lutheran pietism informed by the dour values of sin, guilt,
suffering, and individual responsibility. Kierkegaard was immersed in
these values in the family home through his father, whose own
childhood was lived in the shadow of the severe Indre Mission
(Inner Mission) - a pietistic cult from Jutland. Kierkegaard's father
subsequently became a member of the Moravian Brethren congregation in
Copenhagen.
For Kierkegaard Christian faith is not a matter of regurgitating
church dogma. It is a matter of individual subjective passion, which
cannot be mediated by the clergy or by human artefacts. Faith is the
most important task to be achieved by a human being, because only on
the basis of faith does an individual have a chance to become a true
self. This self is the life-work which God judges
for eternity.
The individual is thereby subject to an enormous burden of
responsibility, for upon h/er existential choices hangs h/er eternal
salvation or damnation. Anxiety or dread (Angest) is the
presentiment of this terrible responsibility when the individual
stands at the threshold of momentous existential choice. Anxiety is a
two-sided emotion: on one side is the dread burden of choosing for
eternity; on the other side is the exhilaration of freedom in choosing
oneself. Choice occurs in the instant (Øjeblikket), which
is the point at which time and eternity intersect - for the individual
creates through temporal choice a self which will be judged for
eternity.
But the choice of faith is not made once and for all. It is
essential that faith be constantly renewed by means of repeated
avowals of faith. One's very selfhood depends upon this repetition,
for according to Anti-Climacus, the self "is a relation which relates
itself to itself" (The Sickness Unto Death). But unless this
self acknowledges a "power which constituted it," it falls into a
despair which undoes its selfhood. Therefore, in order to maintain
itself as a relation which relates itself to itself, the self must
constantly renew its faith in "the power which posited it." There is
no mediation between the individual self and God by priest or
by logical system (contra Catholicism and Hegelianism
respectively). There is only the individual's own repetition
of faith. This repetition of faith is the way the self relates itself
to itself and to the power which constituted it, i.e. the repetition
of faith is the self.
Christian dogma, according to Kierkegaard, embodies paradoxes which
are offensive to reason. The central paradox is the assertion that
the eternal, infinite, transcendent God simultaneously became
incarnated as a temporal, finite, human being (Jesus). There are two
possible attitudes we can adopt to this assertion, viz. we can have
faith, or we can take offense. What we cannot do, according to
Kierkegaard, is believe by virtue of reason. If we choose faith we
must suspend our reason in order to believe in something higher than
reason. In fact we must believe by virtue of the absurd.
Much of Kierkegaard's authorship explores the notion of the absurd:
Job gets everything back again by virtue of the absurd
(Repetition); Abraham gets a reprieve from having to sacrifice
Isaac, by virtue of the absurd (Fear and Trembling);
Kierkegaard hoped to get Regine back again after breaking off their
engagement, by virtue of the absurd (Journals); Climacus hopes
to deceive readers into the truth of Christianity by virtue of an
absurd representation of Christianity's ineffability; the Christian
God is represented as absolutely transcendent of human categories yet
is absurdly presented as a personal God with the human capacities to
love, judge, forgive, teach, etc. Kierkegaard's notion of the absurd
subsequently became an important category for twentieth century
existentialists, though usually devoid of its religious associations.
According to Johannes Climacus, faith is a miracle, a gift from God
whereby eternal truth enters time in the instant. This Christian
conception of the relation between (eternal) truth and time is
distinct from the Socratic notion that (eternal) truth is always
already within us - it just needs to be recovered by means of
recollection (anamnesis). The condition for realizing
(eternal) truth for the Christian is a gift (Gave) from God,
but its realization is a task (Opgave) which must be repeatedly
performed by the individual believer. Whereas Socratic recollection
is a recuperation of the past, Christian repetition is a "recollection
forwards" - so that the eternal (future) truth is captured in time.
Crucial to the miracle of Christian faith is the realization that
over against God we are always in the wrong. That is, we must realize
that we are always in sin. This is the condition for faith, and must
be given by God. The idea of sin cannot evolve from purely human
origins. Rather, it must have been introduced into the world from a
transcendent source. Once we understand that we are in sin, we can
understand that there is some being over against which we are always
in the wrong. On this basis we can have faith that, by virtue of the
absurd, we can ultimately be atoned with this being.
Kierkegaard is sometimes regarded as an apolitical thinker, but in
fact he intervened stridently in church politics, cultural politics,
and in the turbulent social changes of his time. His earliest
published essay, for example, was a polemic against women's
liberation. It is a reactionary apologetic for the prevailing
patriarchal values, and was motivated largely by Kierkegaard's desire
to ingratiate himself with factions within Copenhagen's intellectual
circles. This latter desire gradually left him, but his relation to
women remained highly questionable.
One of Kierkegaard's main interventions in cultural politics was
his sustained attack on Hegelianism. Hegel's philosophy had been
introduced into Denmark with religious zeal by J.L. Heiberg, and was
taken up enthusiastically within the theology faculty of Copenhagen
University and by Copenhagen's literati. Kierkegaard, too, was
induced to make a serious study of Hegel's work. While Kierkegaard
greatly admired Hegel, he had grave reservations about Hegelianism and
its bombastic promises. Hegel would have been the greatest thinker
who ever lived, said Kierkegaard, if only he had regarded his system
as a thought-experiment. Instead he took himself seriously to have
reached the truth, and so rendered himself comical.
Kierkegaard's tactic in undermining Hegelianism was to produce an
elaborate parody of Hegel's entire system. The pseudonymous
authorship, from Either-Or to Concluding Unscientific
Postscript, presents an inverted Hegelian dialectic which is
designed to lead readers away from knowledge rather than towards it.
This authorship simultaneously snipes at German romanticism and
contemporary Danish literati (with J.L. Heiberg receiving much acerbic
comment).
This intriguing pseudonymous authorship received little popular
attention, aimed as it was at the literary elite. So it had little
immediate effect as discursive action. Kierkegaard sought to remedy
this by provoking an attack on himself in the popular satirical review
The Corsair. Kierkegaard succeeded in having himself
mercilessly lampooned in this publication, largely on personal grounds
rather than in terms of the substance of his writings. The suffering
incurred by these attacks sparked Kierkegaard into another highly
productive phase of authorship, but this time his focus was the
creation of positive Christian discourses rather than satire or
parody.
Eventually Kierkegaard became more and more worried about the
direction taken by the Danish People's Church, especially after the
death of the Bishop Primate J.P. Mynster. He realized he could no
longer indulge himself in the painstakingly erudite and poetically
meticulous writing he had practised hitherto. He had to intervene
decisively in a popular medium, so he published his own pamphlet under
the title The Instant. This addressed church politics directly
and increasingly shrilly.
There were two main foci of Kierkegaard's concern in church
politics. One was the influence of Hegel, largely through the
teachings of H.L. Martensen; the other was the popularity of
N.F.S. Grundtvig, a theologian, educator and poet who composed most of
the pieces in the Danish hymn book. Grundtvig's theology was
diametrically opposed to Kierkegaard's in tone. Grundtvig emphasized
the light, joyous, celebratory and communal aspects of Christianity,
whereas Kierkegaard emphasized seriousness, suffering, sin, guilt, and
individual isolation. Kierkegaard's intervention failed miserably
with respect to the Danish People's Church, which became predominantly
Grundtvigian. His intervention with respect to Hegelianism also
failed, with Martensen succeeding Mynster as Bishop Primate.
Hegelianism in the church went on to die of natural causes.
Kierkegaard also provided critical commentary on social change. He
was an untiring champion of "the single individual" as opposed to "the
crowd". He feared that the opportunity of achieving geniune selfhood
was diminished by the social production of stereotypes. He lived in
an age when mass society was emerging from a highly stratified feudal
order and was contemptuous of the mediocrity the new social order
generated. One symptom of the change was that mass society
substitutes detached reflection for engaged passionate commitment.
Yet the latter is crucial for Christian faith and for authentic
selfhood according to Kierkegaard.
Kierkegaard's real value as a social and political thinker was not
realized until after his death. His pamphleteering achieved little
immediate impact, but his substantial philosophical, literary,
psychological and theological writings have had a lasting effect.
Much of Heidegger's very influential work, Being And Time, is
indebted to Kierkegaard's writings (though this goes unacknowledged by
Heidegger). Kierkegaard's social realism, his deep psychological and
philosophical analyses of contemporary problems, and his concern to
address "the present age" were taken up by fellow Scandinavians Henrik
Ibsen and August Strindberg. Ibsen and Strindberg, together with
Friedrich Nietzsche, became central icons of the
modernism movement in Berlin in the 1890s. The
Danish literary critic Georg Brandes was instrumental in conjoining
these intellectual figures: he had given the first university lectures
on Kierkegaard and on Nietzsche; he had promoted Kierkegaard's work to
Nietzsche and to Strindberg; and he had put Strindberg in
correspondence with Nietzsche. Taking his cue from Brandes, the
Swedish literary critic Ola Hansson subsequently promoted this
conjunction of writers in Berlin itself. Berlin modernism
self-consciously sought to use art as a means of political and social
change. It continued Kierkegaard's concern to use discursive action
for social transformation.
- 1813 born May 5 in Copenhagen (Denmark)
- 1830 matriculated to the university of Copenhagen
- 1834 mother died
- 1837 met Regine Olsen
- 1838 father died
- - From the Papers of One Still Living. Published against his Will by S. Kierkegaard (Af en endnu Levendes Papirer - Udgivet mod hans Villie af S. Kierkegaard)
- 1840 passed final theological examination
- - proposed to Regine Olsen, who accepted him
- 1841 broke off his engagement to Regine Olsen
- - defended his dissertation On the Concept of Irony with constant reference to Socrates (Om Begrebet Ironi med stadigt Hensyn til Socrates)
- - trip to Berlin, where he attended lectures by Schelling
- 1842 returned from Berlin
- 1843 Either-Or: A Fragment of Life edited by Victor Eremita (Enten-Eller. Et Livs-Fragment, udgivet af Victor Eremita)
- - second trip to Berlin
- - Two Edifying Discourses by S. Kierkegaard (To opbyggelige Taler)
- - Fear and Trembling: A Dialectical Lyric by Johannes de Silentio (Frygt og Bven. Dialektisk Lyrik af Johannes de Silentio)
- - Repetition: A Venture in Experimenting Psychology by Constantin Constantius (Gjentagelsen. Et Forsøg i den experimenterende Psychologi af Constantin Constantius) (published the same day as Fear and Trembling)
- - Three Edifying Discourses by S. Kierkegaard (Tre opbyggelige Taler)
- - Four Edifying Discourses by S. Kierkegaard (Fire opbyggelige Taler)
- 1844 Two Edifying Discourses by S. Kierkegaard (To opbyggelige Taler)
- - Three Edifying Discourses by S. Kierkegaard (Tre opbyggelige Taler)
- - Philosophical Fragments or a Fragment of Philosophy by Johannes Climacus, published by S. Kierkegaard (Philosophiske Smuler eller En Smule Philosophie. Af Johannes Climacus. Udgivet af S. Kierkegaard)
- - The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically-Oriented Reflection on the Dogmatic Problem of Original Sin by Vigilius Haufniensis (Begrebet Angest. En simpel psychologisk-paapegende Overveielse i Retning of det dogmatiske Problem om Arvesynden af Vigilius Haufniensis)
- - Prefaces: Light Reading for Certain Classes as the Occasion may Require by Nicolaus Notabene (Forord. Morskabslsning for enkelte Stnder efter Tid og Lejlighed, af Nicolaus Notabene) (published on the same day as The Concept of Anxiety)
- - Four Edifying Discourses by S. Kierkegaard (Fire opbyggelige Taler)
- 1845 Three Addresses on Imagined Occasions by S. Kierkegaard (Tre Taler ved tnkte Leiligheder)
- - Stages On Life's Way: Studies by Various Persons, compiled, forwarded to the press, and published by Hilarious Bookbinder (Stadier paa Livets Vej. Studier af Forskjellige. Sammenbragte, befordrede til Trykken og udgivne af Hilarius Bogbinder)
- - third trip to Berlin
- - Eighteen Edifying Discourses by S. Kierkegaard (a collection of the remaindered Edifying Discourses from 1843 and 1844)
- - in an article in Fdrelandet Frater Taciturnus (a character from Stages on Life's Way) asked to be lambasted in The Corsair
- 1846 Kierkegaard lampooned in The Corsair
- - Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments: A Mimetic-Pathetic-Dialectic Compilation, An Existential Plea, by Johannes Climacus, published by S. Kierkegaard (Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift til de philosophiske Smuler. - Mimisk-pathetisk-dialektisk Sammenskrift, Existentielt Indlg, af Johannes Climacus. Udgiven af S. Kierkegaard)
- - A Literary Review: "Two Ages" - novella by the author of "An Everyday Story" - reviewed by S. Kierkegaard (En literair Anmeldelse af S. Kierkegaard)
- 1847 Edifying Discourses in Different Spirits by S. Kierkegaard (Opbyggelige Taler i forskjellig Aand af S. Kierkegaard)
- - Works of Love: Some Christian Reflections in the Form of Discourses by S. Kierkegaard (Kjerlighedens Gjerninger. Nogle christelige Overveielser i Talers Form, af S. Kierkegaard)
- - Regine marries Fritz Schlegel
- 1848 Christian Discourses by S. Kierkegaard (Christelige Taler, af S. Kierkegaard)
- - The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress by Inter et Inter (Krisen og en Krise i en Skuespillerindes Liv af Inter et Inter)
- - The Point of View for my Work as an Author: A Direct Communication, A Report to History (Synspunktet for min Forfatter-Virksomhed. En ligefrem Meddelelse, Rapport til Historien, af S. Kierkegaard) (unpublished)
- 1849 second edition of Either-Or
- - The Lilies of the Field and the Birds of the Air: Three devotional discourses by S. Kierkegaard (Lilien paa Marken og Fuglen under Himlen. Tre gudelige Taler af S. Kierkegaard)
- - Two Ethico-Religious Treatises by H.H. (Tvende ethisk-religieuse Smaa-Afhandlinger. Af H.H.)
- - The Sickness Unto Death: A Christian psychological exposition for edification and awakening by Anti-Climacus, edited by S. Kierkegaard (Sygdommen til Døden. En christelig psychologisk Udvikling til Opvkkelse. Af Anticlimacus. Udgivet af S. Kierkegaard)
- - "The High Priest" - "The Publican" - and "The Woman taken in Sin": three addresses at Holy Communion on Fridays by S. Kierkegaard (,,Yppersteprsten" - ,,Tolderen" - ,,Synderinden", tre Taler ved Altergangen om Fredagen. Af S. Kierkegaard)
- 1850 Training in Christianity by Anti-Climacus, Nos. I, II, III, edited by S. Kierkegaard (Indøvelse i Christendom. Af Anti-Climacus - Udgivet af S. Kierkegaard)
- - An Edifying Discourse by S. Kierkegaard (En opbyggelig Tale. Af S. Kierkegaard)
- 1851 On My Activity As A Writer by S. Kierkegaard (Om min Forfatter-Virksomhed. Af S. Kierkegaard)
- - Two Discourses at Holy Communion on Fridays by S. Kierkegaard (To Taler ved Altergangen om Fredagen)
- - For Self-Examination: Recommended to the Contemporary Age by S. Kierkegaard (Til Selvprøvelse, Samtiden anbefalet. Af S. Kierkegaard)
- - Judge For Yourselves! Recommended to the present time for Self-Examination. Second series, by S. Kierkegaard (Dømmer Selv! Til Selvprøvelse Samtiden anbefalet. Anden Rkke, af S. Kierkegaard) (published posthumously 1876)
- 1854 Bishop Mynster died
- - Martensen appointed bishop
- - "Was Bishop Mynster 'a witness to the truth,' one of 'the true witnesses to the truth' - is this the truth?" by S. Kierkegaard in Fdrelandet (,,Var Biskop Mynster et "Sandhedsvidne", et af "de rette Sandhedsvidner", er dette Sandhed?" Af S. Kierkegaard) (the first of 21 articles in Fdrelandet)
- 1855 This Must Be Said, So Let It Be Said, by S. Kierkegaard (Dette skal siges; saa vre det da sagt. Af S. Kierkegaard)
- - The Instant by S. Kierkegaard (Øjeblikket. Af S. Kierkegaard)
- - Christ's Judgement on Official Christianity by S. Kierkegaard (Hvad Christus dømmer om officiel Christendom. Af S. Kierkegaard)
- - God's Unchangeability: A Discourse by S. Kierkegaard (Guds Uforanderlighed. En Tale - Af S. Kierkegaard)
- - Kierkegaard died November 11.
- Adorno, Theordor W., Kierkegaard: Construction of the
Aesthetic,trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor, Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1989.
- Agacinski, Sylviane, Aparté: Conceptions and Deaths of
Søren Kierkegaard, trans. Kevin Newmark, Tallahassee: Florida
State University Press, 1988.
- Bigelow, Pat, Kierkegaard & The Problem Of Writing,
Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1987.
- Billeskov Jansen, F.J., Studier i Søren Kierkegaards
litterre Kunst, Copenhagen: Rosenkilde & Bagger, 1951.
- Brandes, Georg, Søren Kierkegaard. En kritisk
Fremstilling i Grundrids, Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1877.
- Derrida, Jacques, The Gift of Death, trans. David
Wills, Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1995.
- Ferguson, Harvie, Melancholy and the Critique of Modernity:
Søren Kierkegaard's Religious Psychology, London & New York:
Routledge, 1995.
- Ferreira, M. Jamie, Transforming Vision: Imagination and
Will in Kierkegaardian Faith, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991.
- Garff, Joachim, Den søvnløse: Kierkegaard lst
stetisk/biografisk, Copenhagen: C.A.Reitzels Forlag, 1995.
- Hall, Ronald L., Word and Spirit: A Kierkegaardian Critique
of the Modern Age, Bloomington: Indiana State University Press,
1993.
- Hannay, Alastair, Kierkegaard, London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1982.
- Henriksen, Aage, Kierkegaards Romaner, Copenhagen:
Gyldendal, 1954.
- Kirmmse, Bruce H., Kierkegaard in Golden Age Denmark,
Bloomington: Indiana State University Press, 1990.
- Lowrie, Walter, Kierkegaard, 2 volumes, New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1962.
- Mackey, Louis, Points of View: Readings of Kierkegaard,
Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1986.
- Malantschuk, Gregor, Frihed og Eksistens. Studier i
Søren Kierkegaards tnkning, Copenhagen: C.A.Reitzels
Forlag, 1980.
- Matutík, Martin J., Postnational Identity: Critical
Theory and Existential Philosophy in Habermas, Kierkegaard, and
Havel, New York & London: The Guilford Press, 1993.
- Nordentoft, Kresten, Kierkegaard's Psychology,
trans. Bruce H. Kirmmse, Pittsburgh, Pa.: Duquesne University Press,
1978.
- Pattison, George, Kierkegaard: The Aesthetic and the
Religious, London: Macmillan, 1992.
- Pojman, Louis, The Logic of Subjectivity, University of
Alabama Press, 1984.
- Roos, Carl, Kierkegaard og Goethe, Copenhagen: Gads
Forlag, 1955.
- Schleifer, Ronald & Markley, Robert (eds), Kierkegaard and
Literature: Irony, Repetition, and Criticism, Norman: University
of Oklahoma Press, 1984.
- Taylor, Mark C., Journeys to Selfhood: Hegel &
Kierkegaard, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of
California Press, 1980.
- Viallaneix, Nelly, Écoute, Kierkegaard: Essai sur la
communication de la parole, 2 volumes, Paris: Éditions du Cerf,
1979.
- Walsh, Sylvia, Living Poetically: Kierkegaard's Existential
Aesthetics, University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1994.
aesthetics |
ethics |
Hegel, G. W. F. |
individual |
paradox |
self |
Socrates
Copyright © 1996, 1998 by
William McDonald
wmcdonal@metz.une.edu.au
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Table of Contents
First published: December 3, 1996
Content last modified: May 26, 1998