Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Supplement to The Problem of Evil
An Alternate Formulation of the Argument
One feature of the above formulation of the argument is that the
predicate PreventsExistence introduces intensional contexts,
since PreventsExistence(x,y) entails the
non-existence of y. One might very well prefer to avoid
this. If so, the argument could be recast by talking instead of
preventing the existence of states of affairs of a given type. The
argument might then be formulated as follows:
- There exist states of affairs in which animals die agonizing
deaths in forest fires, or where children undergo lingering suffering
and eventual death due to cancer.
- Any state of affairs in which animals die agonizing deaths in
forest fires, or where children undergo lingering suffering and
eventual death due to cancer is (a) intrinsically bad or undesirable,
and (b) such that an omniscient and omnipotent person could have
prevented the existence of that state of affairs without thereby
either allowing an equal or greater evil, or preventing an equal or
greater good.
- Any omniscient and morally perfect person
prevents the existence of any state of affairs that is both (a)
intrinsically bad or undesirable, and (b) such that he could prevent
its existence without either allowing an equal or greater evil, or
preventing an equal or greater good.
- If a person prevents the existence of all states of affairs of
type S, and all states of affairs of type T are also
states of affairs of type S, then that person also prevents the
existence of all states of affairs of type T.
Therefore:
- Any omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect person prevents
the existence of any state of affairs in which animals die agonizing
deaths in forest fires, or where children undergo lingering suffering
and eventual death due to cancer.
- If a person prevents the existence of states of affairs of type
S, then there are no states of affairs of type
S.
Therefore:
- If there is an omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect person,
there are no states of affairs in which animals die agonizing deaths
in forest fires, or where children undergo lingering suffering and
eventual death due to cancer.
Therefore:
- There is no omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect
person.
- If God exists, then he is an omniscient, omnipotent, and morally
perfect person.
Therefore:
- God does not exist.
This alternative formulation seems to me preferable. But it does
require quantifiers that range over both individuals and types of
states of affairs.
Return to Footnote 2 to The Problem of Evil
Copyright © 2002
Supplement to The Problem of Evil
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy