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Peirce's Logic
Charles Peirce's contributions to logical theory are numerous and
profound. His work on relations building on ideas of De Morgan
influenced Schroder, and through Schroder, Peano, Russell, Lowenheim
and much of contemporary logical theory. Although Frege anticipated
much of Peirce's work on relations and quantification theory, and to
some extent developed it to a greater extent, Frege's work remained out
of the mainstream until the twentieth century. Thus it is plausible
that Peirce's influence on the development of logic has been of the
same order as Frege's. Further discussion of Peirce's influence can be
found in Dipert (1995).
In contrast to Frege's highly systematic and thoroughly developed
work in logic, Peirce's work remains fragmentary and extensive, rich
with profound ideas but most of them left in a rough and incomplete
form. Three of the Peirce's contributions to logic that are not as
well-known as others are described below:
Among Peirce's other contributions to logic are: (i) quantification
theory (see Peirce (1885) and Berry (1952)), (ii) propositional logic
(see Berry (1952)), (iii) Boolean algebra (see Lewis (1918)), and (iv)
“Peirce's Remarkable Theorem” (see Herzberger (1981) and
Berry (1952)).
In three unnumbered pages from his unpublished notes written before
1910, Peirce developed what amounts to a semantics for three-valued
logic. This is at least ten years before Emil Post's dissertation,
which is usually cited as the origin of three-valued logic. A good
source of information about these three pages is Fisch and Turquette
(1966), which also includes reproductions of the three pages from
Peirce's notes.
In his notes, Peirce experiments with three symbols representing
truth values: V, L, and F. He associates
V with “1” and “T”,
indicating truth. He associates F with “0” and
“F”, indicating falsehood. He associates
L with “1/2” and “N”,
indicating perhaps an intermediate or unknown value.
Peirce defines a large number of unary and binary operators on these
three truth values. The semantics for the operators is indicated by
truth tables. Two examples are given here. First, the bar operator
(indicated here by a minus sign) is defined as follows:
Applied to truth the bar operator yields falsehood, applied to
unknown it yields unknown and applied to falsehood it yields truth.
The Z operator is a binary operator which Peirce defines as
follows:
|
|
V |
L |
F |
|
|
V |
| |
V |
L |
F |
L |
| |
L |
L |
F |
F |
| |
F |
F |
F |
Thus, the Z operator applied to a falsehood and anything else
yields a falsehood. The Z operator applied to an unknown and
anything but a falsehood yields an unknown. And the Z operator
applied to a truth and some other value yields the other value.
The bar operator and the Z operator provide the essentials
of a truth-functionally complete strong Kleene semantics for
three-valued logic. In addition to these two strong Kleene operators,
Peirce defines several other forms of negation, conjunction, and
disjunction. The notes also provide some basic properties of some of
the operators, such as being symmetric and being associative.
Building on ideas of De Morgan, Peirce fruitfully applied the concepts
of Boolean algebra to relations. Boolean algebra is concerned with
operations on general or class terms. Peirce applied the same idea to
what he called “relatives” or “relative terms.”
While his ideas evolved continually over time on this subject, fairly
definitive presentations are found in Peirce (1870) and Peirce (1883).
The calculus of relatives is developed further in Tarski (1941). A
history of work on the subject is Maddux (1990).
Given relative terms such as “friend of” and
“enemy of” (more briefly “f” and
“e”), Peirce studied various operations on these
terms such as the following:
(union) |
friend of or enemy of |
A pair <a, b> stands in this relation if and
only if if stands in one or both of the relations. In symbols
“f + e”.
(intersection) |
friend of and enemy of |
A pair <a, b> stands in this relation if and
only if if stands in both of the relations. In symbols
“f . e”.
(relative product) |
friend of an enemy of |
A pair <a, b> stands in this relation if and
only if there is a c such a is a friend of c
and c is an enemy of b. In symbols “f ;
e”.
(relative sum) |
friend of every enemy of |
A pair <a, b> stands in this relation if and
only if a is the friend of every object c that is the
enemy of b. In symbols “f , e”
(Peirce uses a dagger rather than a comma)
(complement) |
is not a friend of |
A pair <a, b> stands in this relation if and
only if <a, b> does not stand in the friend-of
relation. In symbols “-f” (Peirce places a bar
over the relative term).
(converse) |
is one to whom the other is friend |
A pair <a, b> stands in this relation if and
only if b is a friend of a. In symbols
“~f” (Peirce places an upwards facing semi-circle
over the relative term).
Peirce presented numerous theorems involving his operations on
relative terms. Examples of the numerous such laws identified by Peirce
are:
~(r + s) |
= |
~r + ~s |
-(r ; s) |
= |
-r , -s |
(r . s) , t |
= |
(r , s) . (r , t) |
Peirce's calculus of relations has been criticized for remaining
unnecessarily tied to previous work on Boolean algebra and the
equational paradigm in mathematics. It has been frequently claimed that
real progress in logic was only realized in the work of Frege and later
work of Peirce in which the equational paradigm was dropped and the
powerful expressive ability of quantification theory was realized.
Nevertheless, Peirce's calculus of relations has remained a topic of
interest to this day as an alternative, algebraic approach to the logic
of relations. It has been studied by Lowenheim, Tarski and others.
Lowenheim's famous theorem was originally a result about the calculus
of relations rather than quantification theory, as it is usually
presented today. Some of the subsequent work on the calculus of
relations is outlined in Maddux (1990).
Following his development of quantification theory, Peirce developed a
graphical system for analyzing logical reasoning that he felt was
superior in analytical power to his algebraic and quantificational
notations. A large portion of this material is reprinted as volume 4,
book 2 of Peirce (1933) and is discussed, for example, in Roberts
(1964), Roberts (1973), Zeman (1964) and Hammer (1996). This system of
“existential graphs” encompassed propositional logic,
first-order logic with identity, higher-order logic, and modal logic.
The “alpha” portion of the system of existential graphs
is concerned with propositional logic. Conjunction is indicated by
juxtaposing graphs next to one another. Negation is indicated by
enclosing a graph within an enclosed circle or other closed figure,
which Peirce calls a “cut.” Here (and occasionally in
Peirce's writings) cuts will be indicated by matching parentheses.
So
(P)
is equivalent to “not P”, and
(P(Q))
is equivalent to “if P then Q”. Observe
that this is the same graph as
((Q)P)
because order is irrelevant. Juxtaposition and enclosure are the only
relevant logical operations. Peirce provides five elegant rules of
inference that form a complete set. The rules are Insertion in Odd,
Erasure in Even, Iteration, Deiteration, and Double Cut.
Insertion in Odd
Any graph can be added to an area enclosed within an odd number of
cuts.
The following table gives some examples of this rule:
((B)) |
(A (B (C))) |
(A) |
((B)A) |
(A (B (C D))) |
((B)A) |
In the first case from “not not B”, “If
A then B” is obtained. In the second case from
“If A, then if B then C”,
“If A, then if B then both C and
D” is obtained. In the third case from “not
A”, “If A then B” is
obtained.
Erasure in Even
Any graph can be erased that occurs within an even number of
cuts.
The following table gives some examples of this rule:
(A(B)) |
(A (B (C))) |
B(A) |
(A( )) |
(A ( (C))) |
B |
In the first case from “if A then B”,
“if A then true” is obtained. In the second case
from “If A, then if B then C”,
“if A, then not C” is obtained. In the
third case from “not A and B”,
“B” is obtained.
Iteration
Any graph can be recopied to any other area that occurs within all the
cuts the original occurs within.
Here are some examples of Iteration:
(A(B)) |
( (A) (B) ) |
B(A) |
(A(AB)) |
( (A) (B(A)) ) |
B(A)B(A) |
In the first case from “if A then B”,
“if A then both A and B” is
obtained. In the second case from “If not A then
B”, “if not A then both B and
not A” is obtained. In the third case from
“B and not A”, “B and not
A and B and not A” is obtained.
Deiteration
Any graph that could have been obtained by iteration can be
erased.
Here are some examples of Deiteration:
(A(AB)) |
( (A) (B(A)) ) |
B(A)B(A) |
(A(B)) |
( (A) (B) ) |
B(A) |
These are just the exact converses of the examples of Iteration.
Double cut
Two cuts can be put immediately around any graph, and two cuts
immediately around any graph can be erased.
Here are some examples of Double Cut:
(A(B)) |
(A) |
((B))(A) |
(((A))(B)) |
(((A))) |
B(A) |
From “if A then B”, “if not not
A, then B” is obtained. From “not
A”, “not not not A” is obtained.
From “not not B and not A”,
“B and not A” is obtained.
A proof of modus ponens:
P |
(P(Q)) |
premises: (i) if P then Q. (ii)
P |
P |
( (Q)) |
Deiteration |
P |
Q |
Double Cut |
|
Q |
Erasure in Even |
A proof of “if A, then if B then
A”:
(( )) |
Double Cut |
(A( )) |
Insertion in Odd |
(A( A )) |
Iteration |
(A( ((A)) )) |
Double Cut |
(A( (B(A)) )) |
Insertion in Odd |
A proof of “if not B then not A” from
“if A then B”:
(A(B)) |
premise |
( ((A)) (B)) |
Double Cut |
Finally, a proof of “if A then C” from
“if A then B” and “if B
then C”:
(A(B)) (B(C)) |
premises |
(A( B (B(C)) )) (
B(C)) |
Iteration |
(A( B (B(C)) )) |
Erasure in Even |
(A( B ( (C)) )) |
Deiteration |
(A( B C )) |
Double Cut |
(A(C)) |
Erasure in Even |
The “beta” portion of Peirce's system of existential
graphs is equivalent to first-order logic with identity. It does not
use variables to fill the argument places of predicates. Instead, the
argument places are filled by drawn lines. Two or more such argument
places can be identified (analogous to filling them with the same
variable) by connecting them with a drawn line. These “lines of
identity” play the role of quantifiers as well as variables. The
order of interpretation of the various lines of identity and cuts of a
beta graph is determined by the portions of lines of identity that are
enclosed within the fewest cuts. Elements enclosed by fewest cuts are
interpreted before more deeply embedded elements. Rules of inference
for the beta portion are generalizations of the rules for the alpha
portion. They allow lines of identity to be manipulated in various
ways, such as erasing portions of lines connecting loose ends,
extending loose ends, and retracting loose ends. More information about
the beta portion of the system of existential graphs can be found in
Roberts (1973).
- Berry, George D. W. (1952) “Peirce's Contributions to the
Logic of Statements and Quantifiers.” In P. Wiener and F. Young
(Eds.) Studies in the Philosophy of Charles S. Peirce
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Burch, Robert W. (1991) A Peircean Reduction Thesis. Texas
Tech University Press.
- Dipert, Randall (1995) “Peirce's Underestimated Role in the
History of Logic.” In Kenneth Ketner (Ed.) Peirce and
Contemporary Thought. New York: Fordham University Press.
- Fisch, Max and Atwell Turquette (1966) “Peirce's Triadic
Logic.” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society
11: 71 - 85.
- Hammer, Eric M. (1998) “Semantics for Existential
Graphs.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 27: 489 -
503.
- Herzberger, Hans (1981) “Peirce's Remarkable Theorem.”
In L. W. Sumner, J. G. Slater, and F. Wilson (Eds.) Pragmatism and
Purpose: Essays Presented to Thomas A. Goudge Toronto: University
of Toronto Press.
- Lewis, C. I. (1918) A Survey of Symbolic Logic. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
- Maddux, Roger D. (1990) “The Origin of Relation Algebras in
the Development and Axiomatization of the Calculus of Relations.”
Studia Logica 3: 421 - 55.
- Peirce, Charles S. (1870) “Description of a Notation for the
Logic of Relatives, Resulting from an Amplification of the Conceptions
of Boole's Calculus of Logic.” Memoirs of the American
Academy of Sciences 9: 317 - 78. Reprinted in Peirce (1933).
- Peirce, Charles S. (1883) “Note B: The Logic of
Relatives.” In Studies in Logic by Members of the Johns
Hopkins University Boston: Little Brown and Co. Reprinted in
Peirce (1933).
- Peirce, Charles S. (1885) “On the Algebra of Logic; A
Contribution to the Philosophy of Notation.” American Journal
of Mathematics 7: 180 - 202. Reprinted in Peirce (1933).
- Peirce, Charles S. (1933) “Collected Papers.” Edited by
Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
In Edward Moore and Richard Robin (Eds.) Studies in the Philosophy
of Charles S. Peirce., Amherst, University of Massachusetts
Press.
- Roberts, Don (1964) “The Existential Graphs and Natural
Deduction.” In Edward Moore and Richard Robin (Eds.) Studies
in the Philosophy of Charles S. Peirce, Amherst, University of
Massachusetts Press.
- Roberts, Don (1973) The Existential Graphs of Charles S.
Peirce. Mouton and Co.
- Tarski, Alfred (1941) “On the Calculus of Relations.”
Journal of Symbolic Logic 6: 73 - 89.
- Zeman, J. Jay (1964) The Graphical Logic of C. S. Peirce.
Ph.D. Diss., University of Chicago.
Peirce, Charles Sanders
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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy