Supplement to Aristotle’s Psychology

D. Psychic Mereology

When identifying the capacities (dunameis) of the soul, Aristotle sometimes refers to them as ‘parts’ (so, e.g., in speaking of mind (nous) at DA iii 4, 429a10–13). This seems reasonable enough, given that his words for part (meros and morion) are about as flexible as the English word ‘part’, sometimes referring to a physical part (as a column is a part of a building) and sometimes referring more loosely to any property or aspect something has (just as we say that a tendency to grow angry is a part of a person’s personality or that dealing with angry customers is a part of the job of being a customer service representative). So, some of Aristotle’s interpreters have found it easy to gloss over his tendency to refer to the capacities of the soul as its parts: “The language of parts need not trouble us: morion is used interchangeably with dunamis [capacity] and archē [principle], without any substantialist implications” (Barnes 1971, 105).[2]

Barnes is surely right to suggest that Aristotle can call a capacity of the soul a part without implying that these capacities are somehow substantial. Even so, invoking the language of ‘parts’ in connection with capacities is not altogether innocent. To begin, in settling on just the capacities of soul as he does, Aristotle evidently treats the capacities as privileged parts of some sort; after all, human beings are able to sing and to laugh and to grow embarrassed, but none of these abilities earns the status of being termed ‘the singing capacity (or faculty)’ or ‘the laughing capacity (or faculty)’ or the ‘embarrassment capacity (or faculty).’ Moreover, in the agenda-setting first chapter of De Anima, Aristotle himself calls attention to the question of whether the soul has parts, and, if so, whether one should investigate the parts of the soul before tackling the soul as a whole or the other way around, and then, again on the assumption that the soul does have parts, how one ought to individuate its parts from one another (DA i 1, 402b9–14). Although, as we have seen, he sometimes himself speaks of the soul’s parts, even in some cases calling the soul’s capacities parts (DA ii 2, 413a32–b8, 413b24–29, iii 4, 429a10–15), Aristotle shows greater circumspection in other contexts, even to the point of expressing some modest hesitation about whether we should regard the soul as having parts at all (DA i 5, 411b5–14, iii 9, 432a22–b7). This need not introduce any tension into his thought; he may simply be thinking of parts in different ways in different contexts.

That said, on the assumption Aristotle’s soul does have parts, several questions immediately present themselves. First, how many parts? Several? Many? An indefinite number? Different numbers if we are thinking of its parts differently in different contexts? Aristotle himself expresses some concern on this score: ‘For those who distinguish parts of the soul, there will turn out to be a great many, if they distinguish and separate them in accordance with their potentialities: the faculties of nutrition, perception, thought, and deliberation, and, further, a faculty of desire’ (DA iii 10, 433b1–4). Second, connected with this first question is the question already mooted as to whether some parts are privileged, and, if so, as to the criterion which privileges those which are. Third, a commitment to a plurality of parts carries in its wake a metaphysical question concerning the unity of the soul. Given that the soul is itself a principle of unity, if it too has parts, then one would expect this principle of unity itself to have some grounding principle of unity. What might that be? Finally, fourth, if we accept the capacities of soul as privileged and discrete, there arises a question regarding their integration and functional relation to one another. That is, if a human being has distinct capacities of nutrition, perception, and rationality, then alongside the question of the unity of the soul as a whole, a separate question regarding the interfunctioning of its capacities emerges. One way of asking this question is this: if a human being and a cow both have perceptual faculties, is the activity of perception in a human being altered by the additional presence of rationality? Here it is worth noting that appearance (or imagination, phantasia), discussed in De Anima iii 3, is later said to admit of two forms, one perceptual (aisthêtikê) and the other rational (logistikê) (DA iii 10, 433b29). This suggests that in rational creatures, the faculties of perception and mind, like the capacities of mind and appearance, interpenetrate one another in ways requiring some elaboration.

Scholars have accordingly turned their attention to the question of how Aristotle arrives at his divisions of the soul, and how, more importantly, he conceives of them vis-à-vis the soul’s unity.[3] On the question of unity, at one extreme we find the suggestion that the soul simply is its capacities. So, e.g. Sorabji (1974, 64): ‘Aristotle’s statement that the most appropriate account of the soul is the one which picks out these capacities, already suggests the thought that perhaps the soul just is these capacities’ [italics as found]. Taken at face value, this contention implies that the soul is exhausted by its faculties, that the soul is simply a collection of capacities and nothing more. Such a view might offer various advantages in terms of simplicity; but it sits ill with Aristotle’s contention that the soul is a primary substance as form; it also at best postpones the question of how the parts of the soul come together to form a unity. It moreover neglects Aristotle’s contention that the soul is the source or principle (archê) of its faculties:

For now let just this much be said: the soul is the principle of the things mentioned and is delimited by them, namely, nourishment, perception, thought, and motion. In some cases, it is not difficult to see whether each of these is a soul or a part of a soul, and if a part, whether in such a way as to be separable in account alone or also in place; but in other cases there is a difficulty (DA ii 2, 413b12–17).

While a soul, as substance, might somehow be the source or principle of its own parts, it is difficult to appreciate how it could also, at the same time, simply be identical with the collection of those parts whose source it is. In treating the soul as a source (an archê), Aristotle seems to accord to the soul a kind of priority we would not normally associate with an entity simply regarded as an aggregate of its parts. We do not say, for instance, that a pile of marbles is the source or principle of those marbles; in speaking of the soul as a source, Aristotle is evidently offering it more by way of causal and unifying efficacy.

Partly for these reasons, other scholars have paid special attention to Aristotle’s coupled contentions that in a soul lower faculties are teleologically subordinated to higher faculties and the lower capacities are present only in potentiality in souls with higher capacities (DA ii 3, 414b30–31, iii 12); on which see Shields (2016, 195, 369–373) and Ward (1996). Although this way of thinking affords some ground of unity, namely teleological unity, Aristotle’s appeals to the modalities of potentiality and actuality in this connection do not lend themselves to any easy explication. After all, Socrates, who has a rational soul, seems to have a perfectly actual faculty of perception, not a merely potential one.[4]

Questions of these sorts remain open and pressing: we lack a clear picture of the unity of the soul if we do not first have a clear conception of the nature of its parts; and we lack a clear conception of its parts if we do not have an account of the criteria by virtue of which certain parts and not others are elevated to the status of capacities (dunameis). An understanding of Aristotle’s psychic metrology adequate to this task in turn requires an understanding of the question of whether, and if so, how, the soul is to be regarded as more than a mere collection of its parts, and so further how the soul is to be understood, as Aristotle says it is to be understood, as the source or principle of its capacities. Presumably if the soul (archê) is a source of its capacities (dunameis), then the soul in some sense grounds and explains the activities of this faculties. The glass in a window is fragile, we say, by which we mean that it has the (passive) capacity of being easily shattered. The ground of source of this capacity in a pane of glass is its having a crystalline molecular structure. What, in Aristotle’s conception of the soul, plays the role of the crystalline molecular structure in a pane of glass? One might reasonably expect Aristotle to treat the capacities and faculties of the soul in an analogous way, as grounded in some manner of categorial feature of the soul itself; but we do not find a direct discussion of this topic in De Anima.[5] If that is right, then an investigation of Aristotle’s psychic mereology must look past the faculties of the soul when characterizing its parts and towards their relation to the soul as a unified whole as their seat, which in the end returns us to the question of the soul’s metaphysics of unity, posed first in terms of the soul’s own internal unity as a form and then also in terms of its being the source of unity for the body whose soul it is (on which see Supplement to §4, A Question about the Metaphysics of Souls).

Copyright © 2026 by
Christopher Shields <cjshields@ucsd.edu>

Open access to the SEP is made possible by a world-wide funding initiative.
The Encyclopedia Now Needs Your Support
Please Read How You Can Help Keep the Encyclopedia Free