# Definitions

*First published Thu Apr 10, 2008; substantive revision Wed Sep 13, 2023*

Definitions have interested philosophers since ancient times.
Plato’s early dialogues portray Socrates raising questions about
definitions (e.g., in the *Euthyphro*, “What is
piety?”)—questions that seem at once profound and elusive.
The key step in Anselm’s “Ontological Proof” for the
existence of God is the definition of “God,” and the same
holds of Descartes’s version of the argument in his
*Meditation V*. More recently, the Frege-Russell definition of
number and Tarski’s definition of truth have exercised a
formative influence on a wide range of contemporary philosophical
debates. In all these cases—and many others can be
cited—not only have particular definitions been debated; the
nature of, and demands on, definitions have also been debated. Some of
these debates can be settled by making requisite distinctions, for
definitions are not all of one kind: definitions serve a variety of
functions, and their general character varies with function. Some
other debates, however, are not so easily settled, as they involve
contentious philosophical ideas such as essence, concept, and
meaning.

- 1. Some varieties of definition
- 2. The logic of definitions
- Bibliography
- Academic Tools
- Other Internet Resources
- Related Entries

## 1. Some varieties of definition

Ordinary discourse recognizes several different kinds of things as possible objects of definition, and it recognizes several kinds of activity as defining a thing. To give a few examples, we speak of a commission as defining the boundary between two nations; of the Supreme Court as defining, through its rulings, “person” and “citizen”; of a chemist as discovering the definition of gold, and the lexicographer, that of ‘cool’; of a participant in a debate as defining the point at issue; and of a mathematician as laying down the definition of “group.” Different kinds of things are objects of definition here: boundary, legal status, substance, word, thesis, and abstract kind. Moreover, the different definitions do not all have the same goal: the boundary commission may aim to achieve precision; the Supreme Court, fairness; the chemist and the lexicographer, accuracy; the debater, clarity; and the mathematician, fecundity. The standards by which definitions are judged are thus liable to vary from case to case. The different definitions can perhaps be subsumed under the Aristotelian formula that a definition gives the essence of a thing. But this only highlights the fact that “to give the essence of a thing” is not a unitary kind of activity.

In philosophy, too, several different kinds of definitions are often
in play, and definitions can serve a variety of different functions
(e.g., to enhance precision and clarity). But, in philosophy,
definitions have also been called in to serve a highly distinctive
role: that of solving epistemological problems. For example, the
epistemological status of mathematical truths raises a problem.
Immanuel Kant thought that these truths are synthetic *a
priori*, and to account for their status, he offered a theory of
space and time—namely, of space and time as forms of,
respectively, outer and inner sense. Gottlob Frege and Bertrand
Russell sought to undermine Kant’s theory by arguing that
arithmetical truths are analytic. More precisely, they attempted to
construct a derivation of arithmetical principles from definitions of
arithmetical concepts, using only logical laws. For the Frege-Russell
project to succeed, the definitions used must have a special
character. They must be conceptual or explicative of meaning; they
cannot be synthetic. It is this kind of definition that has aroused,
over the past century or so, the most interest and the most
controversy. And it is this kind of definition that will be our
primary concern. Let us begin by marking some preliminary but
important distinctions.

### 1.1 Real and nominal definitions

John Locke distinguished, in his *Essay*, “real
essence” from “nominal essence.” Nominal essence,
according to Locke, is the “*abstract* Idea *to which
the Name is annexed* (III.vi.2).” Thus, the nominal essence
of the name ‘gold’, Locke said, “is that complex
*Idea* the word *Gold* stands for, let it be, for
instance, a Body yellow, of a certain weight, malleable, fusible, and
fixed.” In contrast, the real essence of gold is “the
constitution of the insensible parts of that Body, on which those
Qualities [mentioned in the nominal essence] and all other Properties
of *Gold* depend (III.vi.2).” A rough way of marking the
distinction between real and nominal definitions is to say, following
Locke, that the former states real essence, while the latter states
nominal essence. The chemist aims at real definition, whereas the
lexicographer aims at nominal definition.

This characterization of the distinction is rough because a zoologist’s definition of “tiger” should count as a real definition, even though it may fail to provide “the constitution of the insensible parts” of the tiger. Moreover, an account of the meaning of a word should count as a nominal definition, even though it may not take the Lockean form of setting out “the abstract idea to which the name is annexed.” Perhaps it is helpful to indicate the distinction between real and nominal definitions thus: to discover the real definition of a term \(X\) one needs to investigate the thing or things denoted by \(X\); to discover the nominal definition, one needs to investigate the meaning and use of \(X\). Whether the search for an answer to the Socratic question “What is virtue?” is a search for real definition or one for nominal definition depends upon one’s conception of this particular philosophical activity. When we pursue the Socratic question, are we trying to gain a clearer view of our uses of the word ‘virtue’, or are we trying to give an account of an ideal that is to some extent independent of these uses? Under the former conception, we are aiming at a nominal definition; under the latter, at a real definition.

See Robinson 1950 for a critical discussion of the different activities that have been subsumed under “real definition,” and see Charles 2010 for ancient views on the topic. Fine 1994 defends the conception that a real definition defines an object by specifying what the object is; in other words, a real definition spells out the essence of the object defined. Rosen 2015 offers an explanation of real definition in terms of grounding: the definition provides the ground of the essence of the object. The meaning of ‘essence’ and of ‘ground’ remain under active debate, however.

### 1.2 Dictionary definitions

Nominal definitions—definitions that explain the meaning of a term—are not all of one kind. A dictionary explains the meaning of a term, in one sense of this phrase. Dictionaries aim to provide definitions that contain sufficient information to impart an understanding of the term. It is a fact about us language users that we somehow come to understand and use a potential infinity of sentences containing a term once we are given a certain small amount of information about the term. Exactly how this happens is a large mystery. But it does happen, and dictionaries exploit the fact. Note that dictionary entries are not unique. Different dictionaries can give different bits of information and yet be equally effective in explaining the meanings of terms.

Definitions sought by philosophers are not of the sort found in a dictionary. Frege’s definition of number (1884) and Alfred Tarski’s definition of truth (1983, ch. 8) are not offered as candidates for dictionary entries. When an epistemologist seeks a definition of “knowledge,” she is not seeking a good dictionary entry for the word ‘know’. The philosophical quest for definition can sometimes fruitfully be characterized as a search for an explanation of meaning. But the sense of ‘explanation of meaning’ here is very different from the sense in which a dictionary explains the meaning of a word.

### 1.3 Stipulative definitions

A stipulative definition imparts a meaning to the defined term, and
involves no commitment that the assigned meaning agrees with prior
uses (if any) of the term. Stipulative definitions are
epistemologically special. They yield judgments with epistemological
characteristics that are puzzling elsewhere. If one stipulatively
defines a “raimex” as, say, a rational, imaginative,
experiencing being then the judgment “raimexes are
rational” is assured of being necessary, certain, and *a
priori*. Philosophers have found it tempting to explain the
puzzling cases of, e.g., *a priori* judgments, by an
appeal to stipulative definitions.

Saul Kripke (1980) has drawn attention to a special kind of stipulative definition. We can stipulatively introduce a new name (e.g., ‘Jack the Ripper’) through a description (e.g., “the man who murdered \(X, Y\), and \(Z\)”). In such a stipulation, Kripke pointed out, the description serves only to fix the reference of the new name; the name is not synonymous with the description. For, the judgment

- (1)
- Jack the Ripper is the man who murdered \(X, Y\), and \(Z\), if a unique man committed the murders

is contingent, even though the judgment

Jack the Ripper is Jack the Ripper, if a unique man committed the murders

is necessary. A name such as ‘Jack the Ripper’, Kripke
argued, is rigid: it picks out the same individual across possible
worlds; the description, on the other hand, is non-rigid. Kripke used
such reference-fixing stipulations to argue for the existence of
contingent *a priori* truths—(1) being an example.
Reference-fixing stipulative definitions can be given not only for
names but also for terms in other categories, e.g., common nouns.

See Frege 1914 for a defense of the austere view that, in mathematics
at least, only stipulative definitions should be
countenanced.^{[1]}

### 1.4 Descriptive definitions

Descriptive definitions, like stipulative ones, spell out meaning, but they also aim to be adequate to existing usage. When philosophers offer definitions of, e.g., ‘know’ and ‘free’, they are not being stipulative: a lack of fit with existing usage is an objection to them.

It is useful to distinguish three grades of descriptive adequacy of a
definition: extensional, intensional, and sense. A definition is
*extensionally adequate* iff there are no actual
counterexamples to it; it is *intensionally adequate* iff there
are no possible counterexamples to it; and it is *sense
adequate* (or *analytic*) iff it endows the defined term
with the right sense. (The last grade of adequacy itself subdivides
into different notions, for “sense” can be spelled out in
several different ways.) The definition “Water is
H_{2}O,” for example, is intensionally adequate because
the identity of water and H_{2}O is necessary (assuming the
Kripke-Putnam view about the rigidity of natural-kind terms); the
definition is therefore extensionally adequate also. But it is not
sense-adequate, for the sense of ‘water’ is not at all the
same as that of ‘H_{2}O’. The definition
‘George Washington is the first President of the United
States’ is adequate only extensionally but not in the other two
grades, while ‘man is a laughing animal’ fails to be
adequate in all three grades. When definitions are put to an
epistemological use, intensional adequacy is generally insufficient.
For such definitions cannot underwrite the rationality or the
apriority of a problematic subject matter.

See Quine 1951 & 1960 for skepticism about analytic definitions; see also the entry on the analytic/synthetic distinction. Horty 2007 offers some ways of thinking about senses of defined expressions, especially within a Fregean semantic theory.

### 1.5 Explicative definitions

Sometimes a definition is offered neither descriptively nor
stipulatively but as, what Rudolf Carnap (1956, §2) called, an
*explication*. An explication aims to respect some central uses
of a term but is stipulative on others. The explication may be offered
as an absolute improvement of an existing, imperfect concept. Or, it
may be offered as a “good thing to mean” by the term in a
specific context for a particular purpose. (The quoted phrase is due
to Alan Ross Anderson; see Belnap 1993, 117.)

A simple illustration of explication is provided by the definition of ordered pair in set theory. Here, the pair \(\langle x,y\rangle\) is defined as the set \(\{\{x\}, \{x,y\}\}\). Viewed as an explication, this definition does not purport to capture all aspects of the antecedent uses of ‘ordered pair’ in mathematics (and in ordinary life); instead, it aims to capture the essential uses. The essential fact about our use of ‘ordered pair’ is that it is governed by the principle that pairs are identical iff their respective components are identical:

\[ \langle x, y\rangle = \langle u, v\rangle \text{ iff } x = u \amp y = v. \]And it can be verified that the above definition satisfies the principle. The definition does have some consequences that do not accord with the ordinary notion. For example, the definition implies that an object \(x\) is a member of a member of the pair \(\langle x, y\rangle\), and this implication is no part of the ordinary notion. But the mismatch is not an objection to the explication. What is important for explication is not antecedent meaning but function. So long as the latter is preserved, the former can be let go. It is this feature of explication that led W. V. O. Quine (1960, §53) to extol its virtues and to uphold the definition of “ordered pair” as a philosophical paradigm.

The truth-functional conditional provides another illustration of
explication. This conditional differs from the ordinary conditional in
some essential respects. Nevertheless, the truth-functional
conditional can be put forward as an explication of the ordinary
conditional *for certain purposes in certain contexts*. Whether
the proposal is adequate depends crucially on the purposes and
contexts in question. That the two conditionals differ in important,
even essential, respects does not automatically disqualify the
proposal.

### 1.6 Ostensive definitions

Ostensive definitions typically depend on context and on experience.
Suppose the conversational context renders one dog salient among
several that are visible. Then one can introduce the name
‘Freddie’ through the stipulation “let this dog be
called ‘Freddie’.” For another example, suppose you
are looking at a branch of a bush and you stipulatively introduce the
name ‘Charlie’ thus: “let the insect on that branch
be called ‘Charlie’.” This definition can pin a
referent on ‘Charlie’ even if there are many insects on
the branch. If your visual experience presents you with only one of
these insects (say, because the others are too small to be visible),
then that insect is the denotation of your use of the description
‘the insect on that branch’. We can think of experience as
presenting the subject with a restricted portion of the world. This
portion can serve as a point of evaluation for the expressions in an
ostensive
definition.^{[2]}
Consequently, the definition can with the aid of experience pin a
referent on the defined term when without this aid it would fail to do
so. In the present example, the description ‘the insect on that
branch’ fails to be denoting when it is evaluated at the world
as a whole, but it is denoting when it is evaluated at that portion of
it that is presented in your visual experience. See Gupta 2019 for an
account of the contribution of experience to the meaning of an
ostensively defined term.

An ostensive definition can bring about an essential enrichment of a language. The ostensive definition of ‘Charlie’ enriches the language with a name of a particular insect, and it could well be that before the enrichment the language lacked resources to denote that particular insect. Unlike other familiar definitions, ostensive definitions can introduce terms that are ineliminable. (So, ostensive definitions can fail to meet the Eliminability criterion explained below; they can fail to meet also the Conservativeness criterion, also explained below.)

The capacity of ostensive definitions to introduce essentially new
vocabulary has led some thinkers to view them as the source of all
primitive concepts. Thus, Russell maintains in *Human
Knowledge* that

all nominal definitions, if pushed back far enough, must lead ultimately to terms having only ostensive definitions, and in the case of an empirical science the empirical terms must depend upon terms of which the ostensive definition is given in perception. (p. 242)

In “Meaning and Ostensive Definition”, C. H. Whiteley
takes it as a premiss that ostensive definitions are “the means
whereby men learn the meanings of most, if not all, of those
elementary expressions in their language in terms of which other
expressions are defined.” (332) It should be noted, however,
that nothing in the logic and semantics of ostensive definitions
warrants a foundationalist picture of concepts or of
language-learning. Such foundationalist pictures were decisively
criticized by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his *Philosophical
Investigations*. Wittgenstein’s positive views on ostensive
definition remain elusive, however; for an interpretation, see Hacker
1975.

Ostensive definitions are important, but our understanding of them remains at a rudimentary level. They deserve greater attention from logicians and philosophers.

### 1.7 A remark

The kinds into which we have sorted definitions are not mutually exclusive, nor exhaustive. A stipulative definition of a term may, as it happens, be extensionally adequate to the antecedent uses of the term. A dictionary may offer ostensive definitions of some words (e.g., of color words). An ostensive definition can also be explicative. For example, one can offer an improvement of a preexisting concept “one foot” thus: “let one foot be the present length of that rod.” In its preexisting use, the concept “one foot” may be quite vague; the ostensively introduced explication may, in contrast, be relatively precise. Moreover, as we shall see below, there are other kinds of definition than those considered so far.

## 2. The logic of definitions

Many definitions—stipulative, descriptive, and explicative—can be analyzed into three elements: the term that is defined \((X)\), an expression containing the defined term \((\ldots X\ldots)\), and another expression \((- - - - - - -)\) that is equated by the definition with this expression. Such definitions can be represented thus:

\[\tag{2} X: \ldots X \ldots \eqdf - - - - - - - . \](We are setting aside ostensive definitions, which plainly require a richer representation.) When the defined term is clear from the context, the representation may be simplified to

\[ \ldots X \ldots \eqdf - - - - - - - . \]
The expression on the left-hand side of ‘\(\eqdf\)’ (i.e.,
\(\ldots X\ldots)\) is the *definiendum of* the definition, and
the expression on the right-hand side is its
*definiens*—it being assumed that the definiendum and the
definiens belong to the same logical category. Note the distinction
between defined term and definiendum: the defined term in the present
example is \(X\); the definiendum is the unspecified expression on the
left-hand side of ‘\(\eqdf\)’, which may or may not be
identical to \(X\). (Some authors call the defined term ‘the
definiendum’; some others use the expression confusedly,
sometimes to refer to the defined term and sometimes to the
definiendum proper.) Not all definitions found in the logical and
philosophical literature fit under scheme (2). Partial definitions,
for example, fall outside the scheme; another example is provided by
definitions of logical constants in terms of introduction and
elimination rules governing them. Nonetheless, definitions that
conform to (2) are the most important, and they will be our primary
concern.

Let us focus on stipulative definitions and reflect on their logic.
Some of the important lessons here carry over, as we shall see, to
descriptive and explicative definitions. For simplicity, let us
consider the case where a single definition stipulatively introduces a
term. (Multiple definitions bring notational complexity but raise no
new conceptual issues.) Suppose, then, that a language \(L\), the
*ground* language, is expanded through the addition of a new
term \(X\) to an *expanded* language \(L^{+}\), where \(X\) is
stipulatively defined by a definition \(\mathcal{D}\) of form (2).
What logical rules govern \(\mathcal{D}\)? What requirements must the
definition fulfill?

Before we address these questions, let us take note of a distinction
that is not marked in logic books but which is useful in thinking
about definitions. In one kind of definition—call it
*homogeneous* definition—the defined term and the
definiendum belong to the same logical category. So, a singular term
is defined via a singular term; a general term via a general term; a
sentence via a sentence; and so on. Let us say that a homogeneous
definition is *regular* iff its definiendum is identical to the
defined term. Here are some examples of regular homogeneous
definitions:

Note that ‘The True’, as defined above, belongs to the category of sentence, not that of singular term.

It is sometimes said that definitions are mere recipes for
abbreviations. Thus, Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell say
of definitions—in particular, those used in *Principia
Mathematica*—that they are “strictly speaking,
typographical conveniences (1925, 11).” This viewpoint has
plausibility only for regular homogeneous definitions—though it
is not really tenable even here. (Whitehead and Russell’s own
observations make it plain that their definitions are more than mere
“typographical
conveniences.”^{[3]})
The idea that definitions are mere abbreviations is not at all
plausible for the second kind of definition, to which we now turn.

In the second kind of definition—call it a
*heterogeneous* definition—the defined term and the
definiendum belong to different logical categories. So, for example, a
general term (e.g., ‘man’) may be defined using a
sentential definiendum (e.g., ‘\(x\) is a man’). For
another example, a singular term (e.g., ‘1’) may be
defined using a predicate (e.g., ‘is identical to 1’).
Heterogeneous definitions are far more common than homogeneous ones.
In familiar first-order languages, for instance, it is pointless to
define, say, a one-place predicate \(G\) by a homogeneous definition.
These languages have no resources for forming compound predicates;
hence, the definiens of a homogeneous definition of \(G\) is bound to
be atomic. In a heterogeneous definition, however, the definiens can
easily be complex; for example,

If the language has a device for nominalization of
predicates—e.g., a class abstraction operator—we could
give a different sort of heterogeneous definition for *G*:

Observe that a heterogeneous definition such as (4) is not a mere
abbreviation. For one thing, we regard the expression \(x\) in it as a
genuine variable which admits of substitution and binding. So, the
definiendum *Gx* is not a *mere* abbreviation
for the definiens. Moreover, if such definitions were abbreviations,
they would be subject to the requirement that the definiendum must be
*shorter* than the definiens, but no such requirement exists.
On the other hand, genuine requirements on definitions would make
little sense. The following stipulation is not a legitimate
definition:

But if it is viewed as a mere abbreviation, there is nothing illegitimate about it. (Indeed, mathematicians routinely make use of abbreviations of this kind, suppressing variables that are temporarily uninteresting.)

Some stipulative definitions are nothing but mere devices of abbreviation (e.g., the definitions governing the omission of parentheses in formulas; see Church 1956, §11). However, many stipulative definitions are not of this kind; they introduce meaningful items into our discourse. Thus, definition (4) renders \(G\) a meaningful unary predicate: \(G\) expresses, in virtue of (4), a particular concept. In contrast, under stipulation (6), \(G\) is not a meaningful predicate and expresses no concept of any kind. But what is the source of the difference? Why is (4) legitimate, but not (6)? More generally, when is a definition legitimate? What requirements must the definiens fulfill? And, for that matter, the definiendum? Must the definiendum be, for instance, atomic, as in (3) and (4)? If not, what restrictions (if any) are there on the definiendum?

### 2.1 Two criteria

It is a plausible requirement on any answer to these questions that
two criteria be
respected.^{[4]}
First, a stipulative definition should not enable us to establish
essentially new claims—call this the *Conservativeness*
criterion. We should not be able to establish, by means of a mere
stipulation, new things about, for example, the moon. It is true that
unless this criterion is made precise, it is subject to trivial
counterexamples, for the introduction of a definition materially
affects some facts. Nonetheless, the criterion can be made precise and
defensible, and we shall soon see some ways of doing this.

Second, the definition should fix the use of the defined expression
\(X\)—call this the *Use* criterion. This criterion is
plausible, since only the definition—and nothing else—is
available to guide us in the use of \(X\). There are complications
here, however. What counts as a use of \(X\)? Are occurrences within
the scope of ‘say’ and ‘know’ included? What
about the occurrence of \(X\) within quotation contexts, and those
within words, for instance, ‘*Xenophanes*’? The
last question should receive, it is clear, the answer,
“No.” But the answers to the previous questions are not so
clear. There is another complication: even if we can somehow separate
out genuine occurrences of \(X\), it may be that some of these
occurrences are rightfully ignored by the definition. For example, a
definition of quotient may leave some occurrences of the term
undefined (e.g., where there is division by 0). The orthodox view is
to rule such definitions as illegitimate, but the orthodoxy deserves
to be challenged here. Let us leave the challenge to another occasion,
however, and proceed to bypass the complications through idealization.
Let us confine ourselves to ground languages that possess a clearly
determined logical structure (e.g., a first-order language) and that
contain no occurrences of the defined term \(X\). And let us confine
ourselves to definitions that place no restrictions on legitimate
occurrences of \(X\). The Use criterion now dictates then that the
definition should fix the use of all expressions in the expanded
language in which \(X\) occurs.

A variant formulation of the Use criterion is this: the definition must fix the meaning of the definiendum. The new formulation is less determinate and more contentious, for it relies on “meaning,” an ambiguous and theoretically contentious notion.

Note that the two criteria govern all stipulative definitions, irrespective of whether they are single or multiple, or of whether they are of form (2) or not.

### 2.2 Foundations of the traditional account

The traditional account of definitions is founded on three ideas. The first idea is that definitions are generalized identities; the second, that the sentential is primary; and the third, that of reduction. The first idea—that definitions are generalized identities—motivates the traditional account’s inferential rules for definitions. These are, put crudely, that (i) any occurrence of the definiendum can be replaced by an occurrence of the definiens (Generalized Definiendum Elimination); and, conversely, (ii) any occurrence of the definiens can be replaced by an occurrence of the definiendum (Generalized Definiendum Introduction).

The second idea—the primacy of the sentential—has its
roots in the thought that the fundamental uses of a term are in
assertion and argument: if we understand the use of a defined term in
assertion and argument then we fully grasp the term. The sentential
is, however, primary in argument and assertion. Hence, to explain the
use of a defined term \(X\), the second idea maintains, it is
necessary and sufficient to explain the use of sentential items that
contain \(X\). (Sentential items are here understood to include
sentences and sentence-like things with free variables, e.g., the
definiens of (4); henceforth, these items will be called
*formulas*.) The issues the second idea raises are, of course,
large and important, but they cannot be addressed in a brief survey.
Let us accept the idea simply as a given.

The third idea—reduction—is that the use of a formula
\(Z\) containing the defined term is explained by reducing \(Z\) to a
formula in the ground language. This idea, when conjoined with the
primacy of the sentential, leads to a strong version of the Use
criterion, called the *Eliminability* criterion: the definition
must reduce each formula containing the defined term to a formula in
the ground language, i.e., one free of the defined term. Eliminability
is the distinctive thesis of the traditional account and, as we shall
see below, it can be challenged.

Note that the traditional account does not require the reduction of
*all* expressions of the extended language; it requires the
reduction only of formulas. The definition of a predicate \(G\), for
example, need provide no way of reducing \(G\), taken in isolation, to
a predicate of the ground language. The traditional account is thus
consistent with the thought that a stipulative definition can add a
new conceptual resource to the language, for nothing in the ground
language expresses the predicative concept that \(G\) expresses in the
expanded language. This is not to deny that no new
proposition—at least in the sense of truth-condition—is
expressed in the expanded language.

### 2.3 Conservativeness and eliminability

Let us now see how Conservativeness and Eliminability can be made precise. First consider languages that have a precise proof system of the familiar sort. Let the ground language \(L\) be one such. The proof system of \(L\) may be classical, or three-valued, or modal, or relevant, or some other; and it may or may not contain some non-logical axioms. All we assume is that we have available the notions “provable in \(L\)” and “provably equivalent in \(L\),” and also the notions “provable in \(L^{+}\)” and “provably equivalent in \(L^{+}\)” that result when the proof system of \(L\) is supplemented with a definition \(\mathcal{D}\) and the logical rules governing definitions. Now, the Conservativeness criterion can be made precise as follows.

**Conservativeness criterion (syntactic formulation)**:
Any formula of \(L\) that is provable in \(L^{+}\) is provable in
\(L\).

That is, any formula of \(L\) that is provable using definition \(\mathcal{D}\) is also provable without using \(\mathcal{D}\): the definition does not enable us to prove anything new in \(L\). The Eliminability criterion can be made precise thus:

**Eliminability criterion (syntactic formulation)**: For
any formula \(A\) of \(L^{+}\), there is a formula of \(L\) that is
provably equivalent in \(L^{+}\) to \(A\).

(Folklore credits the Polish logician S. Leśniewski for
formulating the criteria of Conservativeness and Eliminability, but
this is a mistake; see Dudman 1973, Hodges 2008, Urbaniak and
Hämäri 2012 for discussion and further
references.)^{[5]}

Now let us equip \(L\) with a model-theoretic semantics. That is, we associate with \(L\) a class of interpretations, and we make available the notions “valid in \(L\) in the interpretation \(M\)” (a.k.a.: “true in \(L\) in \(M\)”) and “semantically equivalent in \(L\) relative to \(M\).” Let the notions “valid in \(L^{+}\) in \(M^{+}\)” and “semantically equivalent in \(L^{+}\) relative to \(M^{+}\)” result when the semantics of \(L\) is supplemented with that of definition \(\mathcal{D}\). The criteria of Conservativeness and Eliminability can now be made precise thus:

**Conservativeness criterion (semantic formulation)**:
For all formulas \(A\) of \(L\), if \(A\) is valid in \(L^{+}\) in all
interpretations \(M^{+}\), then \(A\) is valid in \(L\) in all
interpretations \(M\).

**Eliminability criterion (semantic formulation)**: For
any formula \(A\) of \(L^{+}\), there is a formula \(B\) of \(L\) such
that, relative to all interpretations \(M^{+}\), \(B\) is
semantically equivalent in \(L^{+}\) to \(A\).

The syntactic and semantic formulations of the two criteria are plainly parallel. However, even if we suppose that strong completeness theorems hold for \(L\) and \(L^{+}\), the two formulations need not be equivalent: it depends on our semantics for definition \(\mathcal{D}\). Indeed, several different, non-equivalent formulations of the two criteria are possible within each framework, the syntactic and the semantic.

There is another, more stringent notion of semantic conservativeness
that has been prominent in the literature on truth (Halbach 2014, p.
69). Say that an interpretation \(M^{+}\) of \(L^{+}\) is an
*expansion* of an interpretation \(M\) of \(L\) iff \(M\) and
\(M^{+}\) assign the same domain(s) to the quantifier(s) in *L,*
and assign the same semantic values to the
non-logical constants in \(L\). Then we have:

**Conservativeness criterion (strong semantic
formulation)**: Every interpretation \(M\) of \(L\) can be
expanded to an interpretation \(M^{+}\) of \(L^{+}\).

In other words, a definition is strongly semantically conservative if it does not rule out any previously available interpretations of the original language.

Observe that the satisfaction of Conservativeness and Eliminability criteria, whether in their semantic or their syntactic formulation, is not an absolute property of a definition; the satisfaction is relative to the ground language. Different ground languages can have associated with them different systems of proof and different classes of interpretations. Hence, a definition may satisfy the two criteria when added to one language, but may fail to do so when added to a different language. For further discussion of the criteria, see Suppes 1957 and Belnap 1993.

### 2.4 Definitions in normal form

For concreteness, let us fix the ground language \(L\) to be a
classical first-order language with identity. The proof system of
\(L\) may contain some non-logical axioms \(T\); the interpretations
of \(L\) are then the classical models of \(T\). As before, \(L^{+}\)
is the expanded language that results when a definition
\(\mathcal{D}\) of a non-logical constant \(X\) is added to \(L\);
hence, \(X\) may be a name, a predicate, or a function-symbol. Call
two definitions *equivalent* iff they yield the same theorems
in the expanded language. Then, it can be shown that if
\(\mathcal{D}\) meets the criteria of Conservativeness and
Eliminability then \(\mathcal{D}\) is equivalent to a definition in
normal form as specified
below.^{[6]}
Since definitions in normal form meet the demands of Conservativeness
and Eliminability, the traditional account implies that we lose
nothing essential if we require definitions to be in normal form.

The normal form of definitions can be specified as follows. The definitions of names \(a, n\)-ary predicates \(H\), and \(n\)-ary function symbols \(f\) must be, respectively, of the following forms:

\[\begin{align} \tag{7} a = x &\eqdf \psi(x), \\ \tag{8} H(x_{1},\ldots , x_{n}) &\eqdf \phi\,(x_{1},\ldots, x_{n}), \\ \tag{9} f(x_{1},\ldots,x_{n})= y &\eqdf \chi(x_{1},\ldots, x_{n}, y), \end{align}\]
where the variables \(x_{1}\), …, \(x_{n}\), \(y\) are all
distinct, and the definiens in each case satisfies conditions that can
be separated into a general and a specific
part.^{[7]}
The general condition on the definiens is the same in each case: it
must not contain the defined term or any free variables other than
those in the definiendum. The general conditions remain the same when
the traditional account of definition is applied to non-classical
logics (e.g., to many-valued and modal logics). The specific
conditions are more variable. In classical logic, the specific
condition on the definiens \(\psi(x)\) of (7) is that it satisfy an
existence and uniqueness condition: that it be provable that something
satisfies \(\psi(x)\) and that at most one thing satisfies
\(\psi(x)\).^{[8]}
There are no specific conditions on (8), but the condition on (9)
parallels that on (7). An existence and uniqueness claim must hold:
the universal closure of the formula

must be
provable.^{[9]}

In a logic that allows for vacuous names, the specific condition on the definiens of (7) would be weaker: the existence condition would be dropped. In contrast, in a modal logic that requires names to be non-vacuous and rigid, the specific condition would be strengthened: not only must existence and uniqueness be shown to hold necessarily, it must be shown that the definiens is satisfied by one and the same object across possible worlds.

Definitions that conform to (7)–(9) are heterogeneous; the definiendum is sentential, but the defined term is not. One source of the specific conditions on (7) and (9) is their heterogeneity. The specific conditions are needed to ensure that the definiens, though not of the logical category of the defined term, imparts the proper logical behavior to it. The conditions thus ensure that the logic of the expanded language is the same as that of the ground language. This is the reason why the specific conditions on normal forms can vary with the logic of the ground language. Observe that, whatever this logic, no specific conditions are needed for regular homogeneous definitions.

The traditional account makes possible simple logical rules for definitions and also a simple semantics for the expanded language. Suppose definition \(\mathcal{D}\) has a sentential definiendum. (In classical logic, all definitions can easily be transformed to meet this condition.) Let \(\mathcal{D}\) be

\[\tag{10} \phi(x_{1},\ldots,x_{n}) \eqdf \psi(x_{1},\ldots, x_{n}), \]where \(x_{1}\), …, \(x_{n}\) are all the variables free in either \(\phi\) or \(\psi\). And let \(\phi(t_{1},\ldots,t_{n})\) and \(\psi(t_{1},\ldots,t_{n})\) result by the simultaneous substitution of terms \(t_{1}\), …, \(t_{n}\) for \(x_{1}\), …, \(x_{n}\) in, respectively, \(\phi(x_{1},\ldots, x_{n})\) and \(\psi(x_{1},\ldots, x_{n})\); changing bound variables as necessary. Then the rules of inference governing \(\mathcal{D}\) are simply these:

\[\begin{align*} \frac{\phi(t_1,\ldots,t_n)}{\psi(t_1,\ldots,t_n)}\,\,&\textbf{Definiendum Elimination} \\ & \\ \frac{\psi(t_1,\ldots,t_n)}{\phi(t_1,\ldots,t_n)}\,\,&\textbf{Definiendum Introduction} \end{align*}\]The semantics for the extended language is also straightforward. Suppose, for instance, \(\mathcal{D}\) is a definition of a name \(a\) and suppose that, when put in normal form, it is equivalent to (7). Then, each classical interpretation \(M\) of \(L\) expands to a unique classical interpretation \(M^{+}\) of the extended language \(L^{+}\). The denotation of \(a\) in \(M^{+}\) is the unique object that satisfies \(\psi(x)\) in \(M\); the conditions on \(\psi(x)\) ensure that such an object exists. The semantics of defined predicates and function-symbols is similar. The logic and semantics of definitions in non-classical logics receive, under the traditional account, a parallel treatment.

Note that the inferential force of adding definition (10) to the language is the same as that of adding as an axiom, the universal closure of

\[\tag{11} \phi(x_{1},\ldots, x_{n}) \leftrightarrow \psi(x_{1},\ldots,x_{n}). \]However, this similarity in the logical behavior of (10) and (11) should not obscure the great differences between the biconditional (‘\(\leftrightarrow\)’) and definitional equivalence (‘\(\eqdf\)’). The former is a sentential connective, but the latter is trans-categorical: not only formulas, but also predicates, names, and items of other logical categories can occur on the two sides of ‘\(\eqdf\)’. Moreover, the biconditional can be iterated—e.g., \(((\phi \leftrightarrow \psi) \leftrightarrow \chi)\)—but not definitional equivalence. Finally, a term can be introduced by a stipulative definition into a ground language whose logical resources are confined, say, to classical conjunction and disjunction. This is perfectly feasible, even though the biconditional is not expressible in the language. In such cases, the inferential role of the stipulative definition is not mirrored by any formula of the extended language.

The traditional account of definitions should not be viewed as
*requiring* definitions to be in normal form. The only
requirements that it imposes are (i) that the definiendum contain the
defined term; (ii) that the definiendum and the definiens belong to
the same logical category; and (iii) the definition satisfies
Conservativeness and Eliminability. So long as these requirements are
met, there are no further restrictions. The definiendum, like the
definiens, can be complex; and the definiens, like the definiendum,
can contain the defined term. So, for example, there is nothing
*formally* wrong if the definition of the functional expression
‘the number of’ has as its definiendum the formula
‘the number of \(F\)s is the number of \(G\)s’. The role
of normal forms is only to provide an easy way of ensuring that
definitions satisfy Conservativeness and Eliminability; they do not
provide the only legitimate format for stipulatively introducing a
term. Thus, the reason why (4) is, but (6) is not, a legitimate
definition is not that (4) is in normal form and (6) is not.

The reason is that (4) respects, but (6) does not, the two criteria. (The ground language is assumed here to contain ordinary arithmetic; under this assumption, the second definition implies a contradiction.) The following two definitions are also not in normal form:

\[\begin{align*} \tag{12} Gx &\eqdf (x \gt 3 \amp x \lt 10) \amp y = y. \\ \tag{13} Gx &\eqdf [x = 0 \amp(G0 \vee G1)] \vee [x = 1 \amp ({\sim}G0 \amp {\sim}G1)]. \end{align*}\]But both should count as legitimate under the traditional account, since they meet the Conservativeness and Eliminability criteria. It follows that the two definitions can be put in normal form. Definition (12) is plainly equivalent to (4), and definition (13) is equivalent to (14):

\[\tag{14} Gx \eqdf x = 0. \]Observe that the definiens of (13) is not logically equivalent to any \(G\)-free formula. Nevertheless, the definition has a normal form.

Similarly, the traditional account is perfectly compatible with
*recursive* (a.k.a.: *inductive*) definitions such as
those found in logic and mathematics. In Peano Arithmetic, for
example, exponentiation can be defined by means of the following
equations:

Here the first equation—called the *base*
clause—defines the value of the function when the exponent is 0.
And the second clause—called the *recursive*
clause—uses the value of the function when the exponent is \(n\)
to define the value when the exponent is \(n + 1\). This is perfectly
legitimate, according to the traditional account, because a theorem of
Peano Arithmetic establishes that the above definition is equivalent
to one in normal
form.^{[10]}
Recursive definitions are circular in their format, and indeed it is
this circularity that renders them perspicuous. But the circularity is
entirely on the surface, as the existence of normal forms shows. See
the discussion of circular definitions below.

### 2.5 Conditional definitions

It is a part of our ordinary practice that we sometimes define terms
not absolutely but conditionally. We sometimes affirm a definition not
outright but within the scope of a condition, which may either be left
tacit or may be set down explicitly. So, for example, we may define
*F*(*x*, *y*) to express the notion “first
cousin once removed” by stipulating that

where it is understood that the variables range over humans. For another example, when defining division, we may explicitly set down as a condition on the definition that the divisor not be 0. We may stipulate that

\[\tag{17} (y/x = z) \eqdf (y = x . z), \]but with the proviso that \( x \neq 0 \). This practice may appear to violate the Eliminability criterion, for it appears that conditional definitions do not ensure the eliminability of the defined terms in all sentences. Thus (16) does not enable us to prove the equivalence of

\[\tag{18} \exists x F(x, 2) \]
with any *F*-free sentence because of the tacit restriction on
the range of variables in (16). Similarly (17) does not enable us to
eliminate the defined symbol from

However, if there is a violation of Eliminability here, it is a superficial one, and it is easily corrected in one of two ways. The first way—the way that conforms best to our ordinary practices—is to understand the enriched languages that result from adding the definitions to exclude sentences such as (18) and (19). For when we stipulate a definition such as (16), it is not our intention to speak about the first cousins once removed of numbers; on the contrary, we wish to exclude all such talk as improper. Similarly, in setting down (17), we wish to exclude talk of division by 0 as legitimate. So, the first way is to recognize that a conditional definition such as (16) and (17) brings with it restrictions on the enriched language and, consequently, respects the Eliminability criterion once the enriched language is properly demarcated. This idea can be implemented formally by seeing conditional definitions as formulated within languages with sortal quantification.

The second way—the way that conforms best to our actual formal practices—is to understand the applications of the defined term in cases where the antecedent condition fails as “don’t care cases” and to make a suitable stipulation concerning such applications. So, we may stipulate that nothing other than a human has first cousins once removed, and we may stipulate that the result of dividing any number by 0 is 0. Thus we may replace (17) by

\[\tag{20} (y/x = z) \eqdf [x \neq 0 \amp y = x.z] \vee [x = 0 \amp z = 0]. \]The resulting definitions satisfy the Eliminability criterion. The second way forces us to exercise care in reading sentences with defined terms. So, for example, the sentence

\[\tag{21} \exists x \exists y \exists z(x \gt y \amp x/z = y/z), \]though true when division in defined as in (20), does not express an interesting mathematical truth but one that is merely a byproduct of our treatment of the “don’t care cases.” Despite this cost, the gain in simplicity in the notion of proof may well warrant, in some contexts, the move to a definition such as (20).

See Suppes 1957 for a different perspective on conditional definitions.

### 2.6 Implicit definitions

The above viewpoint allows the traditional account to bring within its
fold ideas that might at first sight seem contrary to it. It is
sometimes suggested that a term \(X\) can be introduced axiomatically,
that is, by laying down as axioms certain sentences of the expanded
language \(L^{+}\). The axioms are then said to *implicitly*
define \(X\). This idea is easily accommodated within the traditional
account. Let a *theory* be a set of sentences of the expanded
language \(L^{+}\). Then, to say that a theory \(T^*\) is an
*implicit* (*stipulative*) *definition of X* is
to say that \(X\) is governed by the definition

where \(\phi\) is the conjunction of the members of \(T^*\). (If
\(T^*\) is infinite then a stipulation of the above form will be
needed for each sentence \(\psi\) in
\(T^*\).)^{[11]}
The definition is legitimate, according to the traditional account,
so long as it meets the Conservativeness and Eliminability criteria.
If it does meet these criteria, let us call \(T^*\)
*admissible* (*for a definition* *of X*). So, the
traditional account accommodates the idea that theories can
stipulatively introduce new terms, but it imposes a strong demand: the
theories must be
admissible.^{[12]}

Consider, for concreteness, the special case of classical first-order languages. Let the ground language \(L\) be one such, and let its interpretations be models of some sentences \(T\). Let us say that

\(T^*\) is an *implicit semantic definition of X* iff, for each
interpretation \(M\) of \(L\), there is a unique model \(M^{+}\) of
\(T^*\) such that \(M^{+}\) is an expansion of \(M\).

Then, from the normal form theorem, the following claim is immediate:

If \(T^*\) is admissible then \(T^*\) is an implicit semantic definition of \(X\).

That is, an admissible theory fixes the semantic value of the defined term in each interpretation of the ground language. This observation provides one natural method of showing that a theory is not admissible:

**Padoa’s method**. To show that \(T^*\) is not
admissible, it suffices to construct two models of \(T^*\) that are
expansions of one and the same interpretation of the ground language
\(L\). (Padoa 1900)

Here is a simple and philosophically useful application of Padoa’s method. Suppose the proof system of \(L\) is Peano Arithmetic and that \(L\) is expanded by the addition of a unary predicate \(Tr\) (for “Gödel number of a true sentence of \(L\)”). Let \(\mathbf{H}\) be the theory consisting of all the sentences (the “Tarski biconditionals”) of the following form:

\[ Tr(s) \leftrightarrow \psi, \]where \(\psi\) is a sentence of \(L\) and \(s\) is the canonical name for the Gödel number of \(\psi\). Padoa’s method implies that \(\mathbf{H}\) is not admissible for defining \(Tr\). For \(\mathbf{H}\) does not fix the interpretation of \(Tr\) in all interpretations of \(L\). In particular, it does not do so in the standard model, for \(\mathbf{H}\) places no constraints on the behavior of \(Tr\) on those numbers that are not Gödel numbers of sentences. (If the coding renders each natural number a Gödel number of a sentence, then a non-standard model of Peano Arithmetic provides the requisite counterexample: it has infinitely many expansions that are models of \(\mathbf{H}\).) A variant of this argument shows that Tarski’s theory of truth, as formulated in \(L^{+}\), is not admissible for defining \(Tr\).

What about the converse of Padoa’s method? Suppose we can show that in each interpretation of the ground language, a theory \(T^*\) fixes a unique semantic value for the defined term. Can we conclude that \(T^*\) is admissible? This question receives a negative answer for some semantical systems, and a positive answer for others. (In contrast, Padoa’s method works so long as the semantic system is not highly contrived.) The converse fails for, e.g., classical second-order languages, but it holds for first-order ones:

**Beth’s Definability Theorem**. If \(T^*\) is an
implicit semantic definition of \(X\) in a classical first-order
language then \(T^*\) is admissible.

Note that the theorem holds even if \(T^*\) is an infinite set. For a proof of the theorem, see Boolos, Burgess, and Jeffrey 2002; see also Beth 1953.

The idea of implicit definition is not in conflict, then, with the traditional account. Where conflict arises is in the philosophical applications of the idea. The failure of strict reductionist programs of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century prompted philosophers to explore looser kinds of reductionism. For instance, Frege’s definition of number proved to be inconsistent, and thus incapable of sustaining the logicist thesis that the principles of arithmetic are analytic. It turns out, however, that the principles of arithmetic can be derived without Frege’s definition. All that is needed is one consequence of it, namely, Hume’s Principle:

**Hume’s Principle**. The number of \(F\)s = the
number of \(G\)s iff there is a one-to-one correspondence between the
\(F\)s and \(G\)s.

If we add Hume’s Principle to axiomatic second-order logic, then
we obtain a consistent theory from which we can analytically derive
second-order Peano Arithmetic. (The essentials of the argument are
found already in Frege 1884.) It is a central thesis of
*Neo-Fregeanism* that Hume’s Principle is an implicit
definition of the functional expression ‘the number of’
(see Hale and Wright 2001). If this thesis can be defended, then
logicism about arithmetic can be sustained. However, the neo-Fregean
thesis is in conflict with the traditional account of definitions, for
Hume’s Principle violates both Conservativeness and
Eliminability. The principle allows one to prove, for arbitrary \(n\),
that there are at least \(n\) objects.

Another example: The reductionist program for theoretical concepts
(e.g., those of physics) aimed to solve epistemological problems that
these concepts pose. The program aimed to reduce theoretical sentences
to (classes of) observational sentences. However, the reductions
proved difficult, if not impossible, to sustain. Thus arose the
suggestion that perhaps the non-observational component of a theory
can, without any claim of reduction, be regarded as an implicit
definition of theoretical terms. The precise characterization of the
non-observational component can vary with the specific epistemological
problem at hand. But there is bound to be a violation of one or both
of the two criteria, Conservativeness and
Eliminability.^{[13]}

A final example: We know by a theorem of Tarski that no theory can be an admissible definition of the truth predicate, \(Tr\), for the language of Peano Arithmetic considered above. Nonetheless, perhaps we can still regard theory \(\mathbf{H}\) as an implicit definition of \(Tr\). (Paul Horwich has made a closely related proposal for the ordinary notion of truth.) Here, again, pressure is put on the bounds imposed by the traditional account. \(\mathbf{H}\) meets the Conservativeness criterion, but not that of Eliminability.

In order to assess the challenge these philosophical applications pose
for the traditional account, we need to resolve issues that are under
current philosophical debate. Some of the issues are the following.
(i) It is plain that some violations of Conservativeness are
illegitimate: one cannot make it true by a *stipulation* that,
e.g., Mercury is larger than Venus. Now, if a philosophical
application requires some violations of Conservativeness to be
legitimate, we need an account of the distinction between the two
sorts of cases: the legitimate violations of Conservativeness and the
non-legitimate ones. And we need to understand what it is that renders
the one legitimate, but not the other. (ii) A similar issue arises for
Eliminability. It would appear that not any old theory can be an
implicit definition of a term \(X\). (The theory might contain only
tautologies.) If so, then again we need a demarcation of theories that
can serve to implicitly define a term from those that cannot. And we
need a rationale for the distinction. (iii) The philosophical
applications rest crucially on the idea that an implicit definition
fixes the meaning of the defined term. We need therefore an account of
what this meaning is, and how the implicit definition fixes it. Under
the traditional account, formulas containing the defined term can be
seen as acquiring their meaning from the formulas of the ground
language. (In view of the primacy of the sentential, this fixes the
meaning of the defined term.) But this move is not available under a
liberalized conception of implicit definition. How, then, should we
think of the meaning of a formula under the envisioned departure from
the traditional account? (iv) Even if the previous three issues are
addressed satisfactorily, an important concern remains. Suppose we
allow that a theory \(T\), say, of physics can stipulatively define
its theoretical terms, and that it endows the terms with particular
meanings. The question remains whether the meanings thus endowed are
identical to (or similar enough to) the meanings the theoretical terms
have in their actual uses in physics. This question must be answered
positively if implicit definitions are to serve their philosophical
function. The aim of invoking implicit definitions is to account for
the rationality, or the apriority, or the analyticity of our ordinary
judgments, not of some extraordinary judgments that are somehow
assigned to ordinary signs.

The literature on neo-Fregeanism presents an interesting case study in
respect of these issues. Much of the debate concerning the neo-Fregean
thesis can fruitfully be viewed as a debate over the extent and
precise formulation of the criteria of Conservativeness and Use. For
example, the so-called *Julius Caesar objection* (due to Frege
1884) urges that Hume’s Principle cannot be a legitimate
definition of ‘the number of’ because it does not
determine the use of this expression in mixed identity contexts, such
as ‘\(\text{the number of }F\text{s} = \text{Julius
Caesar}\)’. Other classic objections (Field 1984, Boolos 1997)
focus on the non-conservativeness of Hume’s Principle. Boolos
1990 raises a particularly sharp point, known as the *Bad Company
problem.* Definitions of the same kind as Hume’s Principle
are known as *abstraction principles.* Boolos exhibits an
abstraction principle that is consistent by itself, but inconsistent
in conjunction with Hume’s Principle. This pathological
situation never arises with conservative definitions. So, the Bad
Company problem illustrates what can go wrong when the
Conservativeness requirement is violated.

Friends of neo-Fregeanism have responded to these objections in
various ways. Wright 1997 argues that abstraction principles need only
satisfy a restricted version of Conservativeness, and needn’t
satisfy Eliminability at all. (However, Wright’s proposal
suffered the revenge of the Bad Company problem: see Weir 2003.) By
contrast, Linnebo 2018 argues for much more stringent requirements on
abstraction principles. He countenances only *predicative*
abstraction principles, which satisfy both Conservativeness and
Eliminability in suitable contexts. Mackereth and Avigad (forthcoming)
defend an intermediate position. They hold that abstraction principles
must satisfy Conservativeness in an unrestricted sense, but
needn’t satisfy Eliminability. Furthermore, Mackereth and Avigad
show that in the absence of Eliminability, the precise formulation of
Conservativeness (syntactic vs. semantic, etc.) makes a big
difference. In particular, it is possible to get impredicative
versions of Hume’s Principle that are *semantically*
conservative, but the same does not appear to be true for
*syntactic* conservativeness.

For further discussion of these issues, see Horwich 1998, especially chapter 6; Hale and Wright 2001, especially chapter 5; and the works cited there.

### 2.7 Vicious-Circle Principle

Another departure from the traditional theory begins with the idea not that the theory is too strict, but that it is too liberal, that it permits definitions that are illegitimate. Thus, the traditional theory allows the following definitions of, respectively, “liar” and the class of natural numbers \(\mathbf{N}\):

- (22)
- \(z\) is a liar \(\eqdf\) all propositions asserted by \(z\) are false;
- (23)
- \(z\) belongs to \(\mathbf{N}\) \(\eqdf\) \(z\) belongs to every inductive class, where a class is inductive when it contains 0 and is closed under the successor operation.

Russell argued that such definitions involve a subtle kind of vicious circle. The definiens of the first definition invokes, Russell thought, the totality of all propositions, but the definition, if legitimate, would result in propositions that can only be defined by reference to this totality. Similarly, the second definition attempts to define the class \(\mathbf{N}\) by reference to all classes, which includes the class \(\mathbf{N}\) that is being defined. Russell maintained that such definitions are illegitimate. And he imposed the following requirement—called, the “Vicious-Circle Principle”—on definitions and concepts. (Henri Poincaré had also proposed a similar idea.)

**Vicious-Circle Principle**. “Whatever involves
*all* of a collection must not be one of the collection
(Russell 1908, 63).”

Another formulation Russell gave of the Principle is this:

**Vicious-Circle Principle (variant formulation)**.
“If, provided a certain collection had a total, it would have
members only definable in terms of that total, then the said
collection has no total (Russell, 1908, 63).”

In an appended footnote, Russell explained, “When I say that a
collection has no total, I mean that statements about *all* its
members are nonsense.”

Russell’s primary motivation for the Vicious-Circle Principle were the logical and semantic paradoxes. Notions such as “truth,” “proposition,” and “class” generate, under certain unfavorable conditions, paradoxical conclusions. Thus, the claim “Cheney is a liar,” where “liar” is understood as in (16), yields paradoxical conclusions, if Cheney has asserted that he is a liar, and all other propositions asserted by him are, in fact, false. Russell took the Vicious-Circle Principle to imply that if “Cheney is a liar” expresses a proposition, it cannot be in the scope of the quantifier in the definiens of (16). More generally, Russell held that quantification over all propositions, and over all classes, violates the Vicious-Circle Principle and is thus illegitimate. Furthermore, he maintained that expressions such as ‘true’ and ‘false’ do not express a unique concept—in Russell’s terminology, a unique “propositional function”—but one of a hierarchy of propositional functions of different orders. Thus the lesson Russell drew from the paradoxes is that the domain of the meaningful is more restricted than it might ordinarily appear, that the traditional account of concepts and definitions needed to be made more restrictive in order to rule out the likes of (16) and (17).

In application to ordinary, informal definitions, the Vicious-Circle Principle does not provide, it must be said, a clear method of demarcating the meaningful from the meaningless. Definition (16) is supposed to be illegitimate because, in its definiens, the quantifier ranges over the totality of all propositions. And we are told that this is prohibited because, were it allowed, the totality of propositions “would have members only definable in terms of the total.” However, unless we know more about the nature of propositions and of the means available for defining them, it is impossible to determine whether (16) violates the Principle. It may be that a proposition such as “Cheney is a liar”—or, to take a less contentious example, “Either Cheney is a liar or he is not”— can be given a definition that does not appeal to the totality of all propositions. If propositions are sets of possible worlds, for example, then such a definition would appear to be feasible.

The Vicious-Circle Principle serves, nevertheless, as an effective
motivation for a particular account of legitimate concepts and
definitions, namely that embodied in Russell’s Ramified Type
Theory. The idea here is that one begins with some unproblematic
resources that involve no quantification over propositions, concepts,
and such. These resources enable one to define, for example, various
unary concepts, which are thereby assured of satisfying the
Vicious-Circle Principle. Quantification over these concepts is thus
bound to be legitimate, and can be added to the language. The same
holds for propositions and for concepts falling under other types: for
each type, a quantifier can be added that ranges over items (of that
type) that are definable using the initial unproblematic resources.
The new quantificational resources enable the definition of further
items of each type; these, too, respect the Principle, and again,
quantifiers ranging over the expanded totalities can legitimately be
added to the language. The new resources permit the definition of yet
further items. And the process repeats. The result is that we have a
hierarchy of propositions and of concepts of various orders. Each type
in the type hierarchy ramifies into a multiplicity of orders. This
ramification ensures that definitions formulated in the resulting
language are bound to respect the Vicious-Circle Principle. Concepts
and classes that can be defined within the confines of this scheme are
said to be *predicative* (in one sense of this word); the
others, *impredicative*.

For further discussion of the Vicious-Circle Principle, see Russell
1908, Whitehead and Russell 1925, Gödel 1944, and Chihara 1973.
For a formal presentation of Ramified Type Theory, see Church 1976;
for a more informal presentation, see Hazen 1983. See also the entries
on
type theory
and
*Principia Mathematica*,
which contain further references.

### 2.8 Circular definitions

The paradoxes can also be used to motivate a conclusion that is the very opposite to Russell’s. Consider the following definition of a one-place predicate \(G\):

\[\tag{24} \begin{align*} Gx \eqdf x = \text{Socrates} &\vee (x = \text{Plato} \amp Gx) \\ &\vee (x = \text{Aristotle} \amp {\sim}Gx). \end{align*}\]
This definition is essentially circular; it is not reducible to one in
normal form. Still, intuitively, it provides substantial guidance on
the use of \(G\). The definition dictates, for instance, that Socrates
falls under \(G\), and that nothing apart from the three ancient
philosophers mentioned does so. The definition leaves unsettled the
status of only two objects, namely, Plato and Aristotle. If we suppose
that Plato falls under \(G\), the definition yields that Plato does
fall under \(G\) (since Plato satisfies the definiens), thus
confirming our supposition. The same thing happens if we suppose the
opposite, namely, that Plato does not fall under \(G\); again our
supposition is confirmed. With Aristotle, any attempt to decide
whether he falls under \(G\) lands us in an even more precarious
situation: if we suppose that Aristotle falls under \(G\), we are led
to conclude by the definition that he does not fall under \(G\) (since
he does not satisfy the definiens); and, conversely, if we suppose
that he does not fall under \(G\), we are led to conclude that he
does. But even on Plato and Aristotle, the behavior of \(G\) is not
unfamiliar: \(G\) is behaving here in the way the concept of truth
behaves on the Truth Teller (“What I am now saying is
true”) and the Liar (“What I am now saying is not
true”). More generally, there is a strong parallel between the
behavior of the concept of truth and that of concepts defined by
circular definitions. Both are typically well defined on a range of
cases, and both display a variety of unusual logical behavior on the
other cases. Indeed, all the different kinds of perplexing logical
behavior found with the concept of truth are found also in concepts
defined by circular definitions. This strong parallelism suggests that
since truth is manifestly a legitimate concept, so also are concepts
defined by circular definitions such as (18). The paradoxes, according
to this viewpoint, cast no doubt on the legitimacy of the concept of
truth. They show only that the logic and semantics of circular
concepts is different from that of non-circular ones. This viewpoint
is developed in the *revision theory of definitions*.

In this theory, a circular definition imparts to the defined term a
meaning that is *hypothetical* in character; the semantic value
of the defined term is a *rule of revision*, not as with
non-circular definitions, a *rule of application*. Consider
(18) again. Like any definition, (18) fixes the interpretation of the
definiendum *if* the interpretations of the non-logical
constants in the definiens are given. The problem with (18) is that
the defined term \(G\) occurs in the definiens. But suppose that we
arbitrarily assign to \(G\) an interpretation—say we let it be
the set \(U\) of all objects in the universe of discourse (i.e., we
suppose that \(U\) is the set of objects that satisfy \(G)\). Then it
is easy to see that the definiens is true precisely of Socrates and
Plato. The definition thus dictates that, under our hypothesis, the
interpretation of \(G\) should be the set \(\{ \text{Socrates},
\text{Plato}\}\). A similar calculation can be carried out for any
hypothesis about the interpretation of \(G\). For example, if the
hypothesis is \(\{\text{Xenocrates}\}\), the definition yields the
result \(\{\text{Socrates}, \text{Aristotle}\}\). In short, even
though (18) does not fix sharply what objects fall under \(G\), it
does yield a rule or function that, when given a hypothetical
interpretation as an input, yields another one as an output. The
fundamental idea of the revision theory is to view this rule as a
*revision* rule: the output interpretation is better than the
input one (or it is at least as good; this qualification will be taken
as read). The semantic value that the definition confers on the
defined term is not an extension—a demarcation of the universe
of discourse into objects that fall under the defined term, and those
that do not. The semantic value is a revision rule.

The revision rule explains the behavior, both ordinary and extraordinary, of a circular concept. Let \(\delta\) be the revision rule yielded by a definition, and let \(V\) be an arbitrary hypothetical interpretation of the defined term. We can attempt to improve our hypothesis \(V\) by repeated applications of the rule \(\delta\). The resulting sequence,

\[ V, \delta(V), \delta(\delta(V)), \delta(\delta(\delta(V))),\ldots, \]
is a *revision sequence* *for* \(\delta\). The totality
of revision sequences for \(\delta\), for all possible initial
hypotheses, is the *revision process generated by* \(\delta\).
For example, the revision rule for (18) generates a revision process
that consists of the following revision sequences, among others:

Observe the behavior of our four ancient philosophers in this process.
After some initial stages of revision, Socrates always falls in the
revised interpretations, and Xenocrates always falls outside. (In this
particular example, the behavior of the two is fixed after the initial
stage; in other cases, it may take many stages of revision before the
status of an object becomes settled.) The revision process yields a
*categorical* verdict on the two philosophers: Socrates
categorically falls under \(G\), and Xenocrates categorically falls
outside \(G\). Objects on which the process does not yield a
categorical verdict are said to be *pathological* (*relative
to* the revision rule, the definition, or the defined concept). In
our example, Plato and Aristotle are pathological relative to (18).
The status of Aristotle is not stable in any revision sequence. It is
as if the revision process cannot make up its mind about him.
Sometimes Aristotle is ruled as falling under \(G\), and then the
process reverses itself and declares that he does not fall under
\(G\), and then the process reverses itself again. When an object
behaves in this way in all revision sequences, it is said to be
*paradoxical*. Plato is also pathological relative to \(G\),
but his behavior in the revision process is different. Plato acquires
a stable status in each revision sequence, but the status he acquires
depends upon the initial hypothesis.

Revision processes help provide a semantics for circular
definitions.^{[14]}
They can be used to define semantic notions such as
“categorical truth” and logical notions such as
“validity.” The characteristics of the logical notions we
obtain depend crucially on one aspect of revision: the number of
stages before objects settle down to their regular behavior in the
revision process. A definition is said to be *finite* iff,
roughly, its revision process necessarily requires only finitely many
such
stages.^{[15]}
For finite definitions, there is a simple logical calculus,
\(\mathbf{C}_{0}\), that is sound and complete for the revision
semantics.^{[16]}
With non-finite definitions, the revision process extends into the
transfinite.^{[17]}
And these definitions can add considerable expressive power to the
language. (When added to first-order arithmetic, these definitions
render all \(\Pi^{1}_{2}\) sets of natural numbers definable.) Because
of the expressive power, the general notion of validity for non-finite
circular definitions is not axiomatizable (Kremer 1993). We can give
at best a sound logical calculus, but not a complete one. The
situation is analogous to that with second-order logic.

Let us observe some general features of the revision theory of definitions. (i) Under this theory, the logic and semantics of non-circular definitions—i.e., definitions in normal form—remain the same as in the traditional account. The introduction and elimination rules hold unrestrictedly, and revision stages are dispensable. The deviations from the traditional account occur only over circular definitions. (ii) Under the theory, circular definitions do not disturb the logic of the ground language. Sentences containing defined terms are subject to the same logical laws as sentences of the ground language. (iii) Conservativeness holds. No definition, no matter how vicious the circularity in it, entails anything new in the ground language. Even the utterly paradoxical definition

\[ Gx \eqdf {\sim}Gx \]respects the Conservativeness requirement. (iv) Eliminability fails to hold. Sentences of the expanded language are not, in general, reducible to those of the ground language. This failure has two sources. First, revision theory fixes the use, in assertion and argument, of sentences of the expanded language but without reducing the sentences to those of the ground language. The theory thus meets the Use criterion, but not the stronger one of Eliminability. Second, in this theory, a definition can add logical and expressive power to a ground language. The addition of a circular definition can result in the definability of new sets. This is another reason why Eliminability fails.

It may be objected that every concept must have an extension, that there must be a definite totality of objects that fall under the concept. If this is right then a predicate is meaningful—it expresses a concept—only if the predicate necessarily demarcates the world sharply into those objects to which it applies and those to which it does not apply. Hence, the objection concludes, no predicate with an essentially circular definition can be meaningful. The objection is plainly not decisive, for it rests on a premiss that rules out many ordinary and apparently meaningful predicates (e.g., ‘bald’). Nonetheless, it is noteworthy because it illustrates how general issues about meaning and concepts enter the debate on the requirements on legitimate definitions.

The principal motivation for revision theory is descriptive. It has been argued that the theory helps us to understand better our ordinary concepts such as truth, necessity, and rational choice. The ordinary as well as the perplexing behavior of these concepts, it is argued, has its roots in the circularity of the concepts. If this is correct, then there is no logical requirement on descriptive and explicative definitions that they be non-circular.

For more detailed treatments of these topics, see Gupta 1988/89, Gupta and Belnap 1993, and Chapuis and Gupta 1999. See also the entry on the revision theory of truth. For critical discussions of the revision theory, see the papers by Vann McGee and Donald A. Martin, and the reply by Gupta, in Villanueva 1997. See also Shapiro 2006.

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The authors would like to thank Edward Zalta and any anonymous editor for helpful suggestions for improving this entry.