Hedonism

First published Tue Apr 20, 2004; substantive revision Tue Nov 17, 2026

‘Hedonism’ comes from the ancient Greek for ‘pleasure’. Hedonism is about pleasure and pain, though some hedonist theses broaden ‘pain’ to ‘displeasure’. One influential hedonist thesis is that only pleasure and pain move us. This is psychological or motivational hedonism, an empirical psychological thesis about what actually moves us. Ethical hedonism is even more influential. It is about what basically matters in ethics. It claims that only pleasure has value or worth, and only pain or displeasure has disvalue or the opposite of worth. This entry focuses on these two types of hedonism. Both are asserted in the first two sentences of Jeremy Bentham’s An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation: “Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain, and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do”. The hedonist family has other members too, including aesthetic hedonism (Berg, Shelley, Strohl and Nguyen) and global hedonism (Crisp 2021).

Hedonism is a significant player in western philosophical debate in many centuries, through Bentham’s long life, across the nearly two centuries post-Bentham, and ongoing. Its key contributors include Plato, Aristotle, Butler, Hume, Mill, Nietzsche, Brentano, Sidgwick, Moore, Ross, Broad, Ryle, Alston, and Feldman.

Pleasure and pain are central in hedonism, and they warrant early attention. Section 1 reviews leading accounts of pleasure and pain (see the entries on pleasure and pain), and their relations to some hedonist theses. Section 2 reviews ethical hedonism. Section 3 reviews psychological hedonism.

1. Pleasure and Pain, Heterogeneity, and Hedonism

Aristotle (1095a15–22) claimed that we all agree the good is eudaimonia (roughly: flourishing or well-being), and also that there is disagreement among us about what eudaimonia is (see the entry on Aristotle). Similarly, psychological hedonists agree that only pleasure and pain move us, and ethical hedonists agree that all and only pleasure and pain have ethical significance; but there is disagreement about what pleasure and pain are. Hedonist theses need not commit to any particular account of pleasure and pain. But if they do make such commitment, they make themselves clearer and more determinate.

It is uncontroversial that pleasure and pain are mental states or events, had by mentality-capable subjects such as you and me. Phenomenal accounts claim that the nature of pleasure and pain is a matter of the way these states or events feel to their subjects. This phenomenal thought is intuitive, and has had many proponents. Attitudinal accounts of pleasure and pain claim that the nature of pleasure and pain concerns certain attitudes of the subjects of these states or events. Though less intuitive and perhaps less clear, this attitudinal thought has had many proponents also (see the entry on pleasure, section 2.3), and it too is an active field of philosophical inquiry.

Most of the rest of this introduction notes and reflects on two contributions that merit recognition for their ongoing shaping of some hedonism-related debates.

Ryle argued that all sensations have felt location. For example, one feels the pain of a toe-stubbing to be located in one’s toe. He also argued that pleasure has no felt location, and he concluded that pleasure cannot be a sensation. One candidate counterexample to the claim that pleasure has no felt location is Feldman’s man (1988: 60), clad just in swimwear at the sun-soaked beach, who is having a pleasurable sensation of whole-skin warmth. One phenomenal analysis of this case is that the sunbather has a felt sensation of warmth, felt also to be on the whole of his skin; and this sensation is also causing his distinct felt pleasure, does not have any felt bodily location. One attitudinal analysis is that the sunbather has both a certain proprioceptive attitude to his whole-skin warmth, and a pleasure attitude directed at and about his whole-skin warmth; and much the same structure goes also for the bare-foot person’s proprioception attitude and pain attitude, each directed at and about that person’s toe. Such analyses draw on attitudinal accounts of bodily sensation (e.g., Crane 2001: 78–88, Grahek, Crane 2009). Sections 1.1 and 1.2 pursue these themes further. Section 1.2 focuses especially on the attitudinal accounts of Feldman and of Heathwood. Ryle’s discussion is also a reminder that what is or is not plausible in an account of pleasure might not reliably generalise also to accounts of pain. Perhaps for this reason, or perhaps for some other, philosophical ethics has so far paid much more attention to accounts of pleasure than to accounts of pain. Bain and Brady is a valuable exception.

Scepticism about the existence of pleasure or pain or both has potential to unsettle debate about both psychological hedonism and ethical hedonism. Consider the following eliminativism. Grant psychological hedonism and ethical hedonism. Then argue that there is no such thing as pleasure, and there is no such thing as pain (see: Dennett, and critique by Flanagan). Draw the nihilist conclusion that there is nothing that has motivational or ethical significance. One response would accept the argument’s eliminativism about pleasure and pain, and its closely related rejection of motivational and ethical hedonism, and then argue that certain non-hedonic matters do exist and are credible bases for grounding motivation and ethics. One attenuation of the argument’s scope would instead target, for elimination, only phenomenal pleasure and pain, or only attitudinal pleasure and pain, or only sensational pleasure (e.g., Ryle, perhaps Sidgwick: 127, perhaps Aristotle: 1175a22f). This slightly more modest eliminativism would reject only the forms of hedonism that commit to the particular account(s) of pleasure or pain thus targeted. A third response would instead make a case to reject the argument’s key premise that there are no such things as pleasure and pain.

Eliminativist debate about pleasure and pain can also stimulate concerns related to the subject scope of hedonism. For example, from at least as early as Bentham, many philosophical ethicists have wished to recognise some non-human animals as subjects with motivationally and ethically significant capabilities. The hedonists among these people should want their accounts of the pleasure and of pain to avoid putting these mental phenomena beyond the capability of non-human subjects they wish their theories to recognise. They, and their critics, should also be alive to the possibility of there being non-human animals who have certain non-hedonic capabilities that are serious candidates to have basic psychologically and ethically significance. Such possibilities can be overlooked, especially when and because human subjects lack the capabilities in question. Consider, for example, bird capability for unaided flight, dolphin capability to swim extensively while ‘asleep’, and dogs’ capability to sense and recognize an extraordinary range and subtlety of smell (de Grazia, A. Moore).

Return now to the structure and high-level content of this Section’s two sub-sections. Section 1.1 reviews phenomenal accounts of pleasure and pain, as well as heterogeneity issues for hedonist theses that commit to a phenomenal account. Section 1.2 does the same sort of job regarding attitudinal accounts of pleasure and pain.

1.1 Phenomenal Accounts, Heterogeneity Issues

Phenomenal accounts claim that the nature of pleasure and pain is a matter of how these mental states or episodes feel to their subjects. Such feel, felt character, or phenomenology in mental phenomena is often said to be “what it is like” (Nagel 1974) for its subject to have such mental phenomena. One promising move here is to claim that pleasure and pain are feelings. At face value, this is what very many philosophers have understood pleasure and pain to be, including: Bentham, Mill, Moore: 64, Broad: 229–33, Schlick: ch. 2, Sprigge: ch. 5, Tännsjö: 84, Crisp 2006: 103–109, Bradley, Smuts, Labukt, Bramble 2013, 2015, 2016, Alwood, Crisp 2021.

Phenomenal accounts are sometimes called felt quality theories. ‘Distinctive feeling’ theories of this sort claim that there is a single determinate type of feeling, feel, felt character, or phenomenology that all pleasures have in common (e.g., Bramble 2013). Distinctive feeling theories of pain are possible too, though less investigated in philosophical ethics.

The felt quality theory of Labukt (2012) argues that not all pleasures are phenomenally alike, and that what explains every pleasure’s being a pleasure is that it has one amongst a certain plurality of felt characters (see also Alwood). One form of unification that seems to be available to such accounts is the claim that while there is no determinate respect in which all pleasures feel alike, there is a single determinable feeling or felt character that all pleasures do have in common (Crisp 2006). Similarly, Broad claimed that there is a common phenomenal character of pleasure which: “we cannot define but are perfectly acquainted with” (Broad: 229). Whether such phenomenal character of pleasure is determinate or only determinable, the present discussion tends to refer to such character as pleasantness or unpleasantness (e.g., Rachels, Crisp 2021). In at least some passages, some friends of hedonism seem to hold instead that pleasure just is pleasure, or reduces to pleasantness (e.g., Crisp 2021: 43). Some phenomenal accounts refer to the feeling or felt character of pleasure and pain as pleasurableness and painfulness, hedonic tone (Tännsjö, Kagan, Crisp 2006, Smuts, Labukt) or doloric tone, or to feels-good and feels-bad character (Smuts, de Lazari-Radek).

Heterogeneity criticism of phenomenal accounts of pleasure is arguably the most serious challenge they face. Heterogeneity arguments challenge the clarity and determinacy of phenomenal accounts, and of any hedonism that draws on such an account. They do so by arguing that there is no homogeneous felt element or character in common in all instances of pleasure (e.g., Sidgwick: 127, Alston: 344, Brandt: 35–42, Parfit: 493, Griffin: 8, Sprigge: ch. 5). Such critique could also or instead target pain or displeasure, but that track is less travelled. One frequent path of rebuttal of such heterogeneity criticism involves insisting that there is some common character or element in all instances of pleasure. Recent discussion delivers many instances of such rebuttal. This thread of thought is also discernible in some earlier discussions (e.g., Moore: 12–13, Broad: 229, Sumner: 87–91). The paragraphs immediately below canvas some varieties of heterogeneity challenge, alongside some ‘common character’ rebuttals on behalf of phenomenal accounts.

The best-known heterogeneity challenges target phenomenal claims that pleasure and pain are distinctive feelings. Such criticism typically lists candidate counterexamples; for example, that the pleasure of push-pin differs from the pleasure of poetry (see the entries on Bentham and Mill). Such critique might claim that those two sorts of pleasure also differ from the pleasure of listening to music, that of fireside chat with friends, and that of sexual orgasm, and that those further three also differ from one another in their felt character. Much the same line can run about pains, such as those of an episode of gout, and those of a death in the family. Phenomenal rebuttals can acknowledge that while there is a heterogeneity of activities here, such as playing, reading, listening, and conversing, that accompany and perhaps cause pleasure or pain, all that basically matters, motivationally or ethically, in pushpin, poetry, music, and conversation activities, and in gout and family bereavement episodes, are any homogeneous and distinctive instances of pleasure or pain in those cases.

Some heterogeneity challenges focus not on activities, but on mental phenomena that they take to be instances of sensory pleasure. As noted above, for example, Feldman has a man at the beach, pleasurably smelling the fresh salty air, while also having an all-over bodily feeling of pleasurable warmth in the beachside sun. His analysis and conclusions about these two sensory states are: “from the strictly phenomenological perspective ... they seem to be utterly unlike. ... Sensory pleasures ... are a heterogeneous collection of sensations” (Feldman 1988: 60; similarly Heathwood 2007: 35–36). One rebuttal on behalf of phenomenal accounts of pleasure (Lin 2020: 515–516) rejects Feldman’s claims that the sensation of smelling the fresh salty air, and the sun-given sensation of feeling whole-body warmth, are instances of sensory pleasure. It then argues that a sensory pleasure is a pleasure that is partly constituted by a sensation as per Feldman’s cases, and also partly constituted by pleasure or pleasantness that is distinct from the sensation. On behalf of phenomenal accounts, the rebuttal adds that while the two sensory pleasures’ sensation parts are utterly unlike phenomenally, their pleasure or pleasantness parts are utterly alike phenomenally.

Another kind of heterogeneity thesis challenges psychological and ethical hedonism directly. It does so by claiming that there is a heterogeneity of felt mental states or events, other than pleasure and pain, that have basic motivational and ethical significance. Such pleasure-adjacent candidates include: contentment, delight, ecstasy, elation, enjoyment, euphoria, exhilaration, exultation, gladness, gratification, gratitude, joy, liking, love, relief, satisfaction, schadenfreude, and tranquility. Pain-adjacent candidates include: ache, agitation, agony, angst, anguish, annoyance, anxiety, apprehensiveness, boredom, chagrin, dejection, depression, desolation, despair, desperation, despondency, discomfort, discombobulation, discontentment, disgruntlement, disgust, dislike, dismay, disorientation, disaffection, dissatisfaction, distress, dread, enmity, ennui, fear, gloominess, grief, guilt, hatred, horror, hurting, irritation, loathing, melancholia, nausea, queasiness, remorse, resentment, sadness, shame, sorrow, suffering, sullenness, throb, terror, unease, vertigo, and vexation. Heterogeneity of pleasure-adjacents and pain-adjacents that seem to have motivational and ethical significance present significant challenges to a substantial range of hedonist theses, including hedonism that commits to a phenomenal account of pleasure and pain, and hedonism that commits to an attitudinal account of pleasure and pain.

Faced with a heterogeneity of pleasure-adjacent and pain-adjacent candidates to have basic motivationally and ethically significance, hedonists might reply that each listed pleasure-adjacent and pain-adjacent feeling either reduces in full to a pleasure or a pain, or has no basic motivational or ethical significance. Nuance can be added to this line of rebuttal, by drawing on a distinction between properties of subjects, such as their delight and their anguish, and higher-order properties of subjects, such as the pleasantness of their delight, and the unpleasantness of their anguish. On this distinction between properties and higher-order properties, see, for example: Crane (2001: 77) and A. Moore (2017). Thus equipped, the rebutter can allow that there is a wide heterogeneity of pleasure-adjacent and pain-adjacent feelings, while also insisting that any of these is an instance of pleasure or pain, and perhaps has basic motivational and ethical significance, only when and because that feeling itself has a felt property of pleasantness or unpleasantness. This rebuttal can also allow there to be phenomenally high heterogeneity among some other higher-order properties of pleasure and pain. For example, it seems that while ecstasy and contentment are each pleasant, the felt floridness of ecstasy contrasts with the felt mellowness of contentment. It seems too that while toothache and vertigo are each unpleasant, the felt throbbingness of toothache differs from the felt abysmalness of vertigo.

The above paragraph outlines and then rebuts an argument from a heterogeneity of pleasure-adjacents and pain-adjacents to a rejection of core hedonist theses. Some might find the rebuttal is satisfying, on the grounds that it provides a plausible and principled basis for the thesis that many phenomenally heterogeneous kinds of feeling, not typically thought to be instances pleasure or pain, actually are instances of pleasure and pain, just when and because those feelings also have higher-order properties of pleasantness or unpleasantness. Others might instead find the rebuttal unsatisfying, on grounds that it substantially attenuates hedonism itself, by allowing a troublingly wide-ranging heterogeneity of feelings of their own kinds to be instances of pleasure or of pain.

This sub-section focused on phenomenal accounts of pleasure and pain. It reviewed heterogeneity criticisms of such accounts; arguably the most serious challenges they face. It also considered a heterogeneity criticism that focuses on pleasure-adjacents and pain-adjacents, to make direct challenges to some central hedonist theses. Contest is ongoing regarding phenomenalist accounts of pleasure and pain, and about some of their relations to hedonism.

1.2 Attitudinal Accounts, Heterogeneity, and Other Issues

Construed widely, attitudinal accounts of pleasure or pain claim that the nature of these mental states or events involves certain attitudes of their subjects. Construed more narrowly and specifically, attitudinal accounts claim that pleasure or pain are certain attitudes of their subjects. The wide interpretation seems to allow that there can be an attitudinal pleasure that is a sensation and not an attitude, as long as at least one attitude figures in the explanation of that sensation’s being an instance of pleasure. There is more about this below. On at least the wide construal, attitudinal accounts of pleasure go back many centuries in western philosophy. More recent attitudinal accounts include: Brentano, Parfit (1984, 2011), Scanlon, Feldman (2004), Heathwood (2006, 2007), and Shafer-Landau. See also the entry on pleasure §2.3. Philosophical ethics has not yet engaged much with attitudinal accounts of pain. Still, for two rather different attitudinal accounts of pain, see: Tye (1995, 1997 chs. 3–7), and Crane (2001: 78–88). On broader intentionalist or representationalist accounts of consciousness, including pleasure and pain, see: Crane (2001: ch. 3, 2009), Tye (1995, 2009), Pautz, and Lycan.

Sidgwick notes but perhaps does not endorse the following: “Pleasure… as a feeling which … is at least implicitly apprehended as desirable” (Sidgwick: 127; see also: Brandt, Sumner: 90). Rather than identifying and discussing the various roles that attitudes of apprehension as desirable might play in an account of what pleasure is, or in an explanation of what it takes for any feeling to be an instance of pleasure, this entry outlines and discusses more recent attitudinal theories of pleasure, in which similar issues arise.

An attitude is an entity that is directed at and about something. Love of one’s new-born is at least in part an attitude about that child. Desire that p is about the proposition or state of affairs p. Enjoyment of one’s swimming is about that activity. Worship of god is about god. Fear of dogs is about dogs. Delight in pi is about the irrational and transcendental number 3.1415926535... . And this is only the beginning. These examples suggest two things: attitudes themselves come in many kinds, and their objects also come in many kinds. At face value, the objects of those just noted include: people, states of affairs, activities, objects that might or might not exist, animal kinds, and abstract objects. Some claim that all attitudes are propositional attitudes, directed at and about states of affairs. Friends of that propositionalist thesis have vindicatory work to do, including about some of the attitudes just noted above. See Crane (2001: 112–114, 2009), and Montague. Some pleasure-adjacent mental states seem to be attitudes that also feel a certain way to their subjects. These include, but are not limited to: appreciation, delight, enjoyment, gratitude, liking, love, and schadenfreude. Likewise with some pain-adjacent mental states, including but not limited to: annoyance, dismay, disaffection, dread, fear, loathing, and vexation.

Even if there is attitudinal pleasure, and even if a wide domain of attitudes is heterogeneous in the several respects just sketched, it is a further question whether attitudinal pleasure is heterogeneous in one or more of those respects. Parfit (1984: 502) writes of pleasure taken in having knowledge, being engaged in rational activity, experiencing mutual love, being aware of beauty, and “many other kinds of object”. That claim seems to imply that pleasure is an attitude can have a metaphysically heterogeneous range of objects, but Parfit’s discussion is too brief for this interpretation of him to be a sure thing. However that might be, the more influential accounts of pleasure of Feldman (2004) and of Heathwood (2006, 2007) focus on attitudes that each have just one metaphysical kind of object: a proposition or state of affairs.

According to Feldman (2004), there are two sorts of attitudinal pleasure: sensory, and pleasure that is not sensory. Call the latter non-sensory attitudinal pleasure. One’s sensory pleasure is a sensation one has, on condition that one is simultaneously pleased that one is having it. One of Feldman’s examples is “the pleasurable sensations you get when you eat delicious, salty peanuts” (Feldman 1988: 60). Thus, two things together explain what it takes for any particular thing one has to be an instance of one’s sensory pleasure. These are: that thing’s being an instance of the kind sensation; and that, when one has that sensation, one is pleased that one has it. Feldman also argues that being pleased that p is a certain kind of favouring attitude that cannot be analysed in terms of any other kind of attitude. On Heathwood’s account (2006, 2007), one’s sensory pleasure is a sensation one has, on condition that while one has it, one both believes and desires that one has it. This account concurs with Feldman’s view that sensory pleasure is a sensation, but departs from Feldman by requiring also that the state of affairs that one has this sensation be an object of both one’s belief and one’s desire. On Feldman’s account, to have a non-sensory pleasure is to be pleased that p, where p is a state of affairs. On Heathwood’s account, to have non-sensory pleasure that p is simultaneously to desire that p and to believe that p.

Though heterogeneity issues are especially prominent in phenomenal accounts of pleasure, they arise too in attitudinal accounts. For example, Feldman-Heathwood accounts of attitudinal pleasure seem to imply that attitudinal pleasure is metaphysically heterogeneous. If they are interpreted correctly in the above paragraph, Feldman and Heathwood each take sensory pleasure to be a sensation, and non-sensory pleasure to be a propositional attitude. Many, though not all, think sensations are not attitudes (contrast: Crane 2001: 78–83). A different heterogeneity issue concerns phenomenal heterogeneity of attitudinal pleasure. This issue is highlighted by Feldman’s remark that attitudinal pleasures “need not have any feel” (Feldman 2004: 56; and similarly, Shafer-Landau: 20). Several interpretations suggest themselves. Mason (2007) takes this Feldman claim to be that attitudinal pleasure has no feel. On that interpretation, all pleasures are phenomenally alike, in that none has any feel. That thesis will strike friends of phenomenal accounts as a Pyrrhic achievement. Feldman might instead mean that while non-sensory attitudinal pleasures need not and perhaps do not have any feel, sensory attitudinal pleasures do need have some feel. That view is subject to the following worry: “an especially stark version of the heterogeneity problem would arise: because some pleasures don’t feel like anything at all, not all pleasures feel alike” Lin (2020: 516 n.20). A further possibility is that the issues raised in the present paragraph depend on misinterpretation of Feldman-Heathwood attitudinalism (see Lin: 2020: 516 n.20). Perhaps the correct interpretation would see Feldman-Heathwood accounts successfully through any hazards of either metaphysical or phenomenal heterogeneity. A different option that might assist, including with heterogeneity issues, is recourse to felt attitude accounts, or to phenomenal-attitudinal hybrid accounts; on which, see the entry on pleasure §2.3, Lin 2020, and Pallies.

Matters of phenomenology are in play too in claims that at least some pleasure and pain has no object and thus cannot be an attitude. That line of thought can be spelled out further, as follows: at least some instances of pleasure, and some instances of pain, are not directed at or about anything; but necessarily, any attitude has directedness and aboutness; so, contrary to attitudinalism about pleasure and pain, at least some instances of pleasure, and some instances of pain, are not attitudes. To be more concrete, for example, the argument might claim that euphoria and ecstasy are kinds of pleasure; that these states or events are objectless; and that anxiety, desolation, and melancholy are kinds of pain, and they too are objectless (e.g., Bayne: 172–174). For related work arguing that certain moods too are objectless, see: Bordini, and Buscicchi and van der Deijl. The next paragraph considers attitudinalist rebuttals of such arguments. For an attitudinal account of pain, see Crane (2001: 78–88), and for an attitudinal account of sensations including pain, and of moods, see Crane (2009: 487–490).

On behalf of attitudinalist rebuttal of ‘no object’ critique, one line of pushback is that even if all the mental states or events invoked by this critique are pleasure-adjacent or pain-adjacent, none of them, nor any other that might be called on in their place, is a kind of pleasure or pain. Another rebuttal option is to allow that at least one candidate counter-example is a pleasure or pain state or event that has no determinate object, and then to argue that pleasure and pain attitudes are among the many kinds of attitudes that can have objects that are indeterminate to some degree. The rebuttal can then add that the most that is shown by the attempted counterexamples is that some pleasure and some pain has no determinate object. To illustrate the idea of an indeterminate object of an attitude, consider Anscombe on what thinking can have, but hitting cannot: “I can think of a man without thinking of a man of any particular height; I cannot hit a man without hitting a man of any particular height, because there is no such thing as a man of no particular height” (Anscombe: 161). Drawing again on the idea of an indeterminate object, the rebuttal thought is that ecstasy, euphoria, desolation, and melancholy too, each have an object that is indeterminate, such as: one’s life in general, things in general, or everything. Another rebuttal option could grant that narrow attitudinal theses that pleasure and pain are attitudes fall to ‘no object’ criticism, while also pointing out that wide attitudinal accounts need not claim that any pleasure or pain is an attitude, and thus need not be at all exposed to the criticism under consideration. For example, friends of wide attitudinal accounts can claim that in their theory, attitudes contribute only to its explanation of what it takes for a feeling or experience or sensation to be an instance of pleasure or of pain.

One recent critique of attitudinal accounts of pleasure and pain argues that it is possible to have (un)pleasant experience yet be entirely unaware of this. It then argues that Feldman-style attitudinal accounts cannot be reconciled with this, because such experience cannot at that same time be an object of one’s de re attitude (Bramble 2013). For example, imagine you “lived with a refrigerator that often whined due to a bad bearing” (Haybron: 205), and suppose you become accustomed to the annoyance and are no longer aware of it. Still, suppose too that at times when the whining stopped you did notice a sudden and glorious silence. Haybron (205) and Bramble (2013, 2020) claim that you had an unpleasant experience but weren’t noticing it. One rebuttal on behalf of Feldman-style attitudinalism argues that one cannot have an experience one is unaware of at that same time (Feldman 2018). One different rebuttal rejects aspects of the critique’s claims regarding which objects attitudinal pleasure and pain can or cannot have (Heathwood 2017). One further, more limited initial response states that even if the critique is telling against certain formulations of Feldman-Heathwood-style attitudinal accounts, relatively small amendments of attitudinal account might resolve the trouble.

However meagre or ample the flow of water under the literal bridges, plenty is still to flow under the bridge of attitudinal accounts of pleasure and pain. Much of that will also flow on into ongoing debate about hedonism.

2. Ethical Hedonism

This section reviews arguments for and against the ethical hedonist claim that all and only pleasure has positive ethical significance, and that all and only pain has negative ethical significance. This significance is to be understood non-instrumentally; that is, independently of the significance of anything else that pleasure or pain might cause or prevent.Before engaging in the back and forth of ethical hedonists and their critics, this introductory sub-section makes clarificatory remarks regarding ‘ethical’ and ‘non-instrumental’ significance. Some things have both instrumental significance and non-instrumental significance—significance that is independent of any significance of any of its causal effects. Overall significance is then a function of both sorts of significance. These two matters can of course also pull in opposite directions. For example, your pain of being once bitten has non-instrumental negative significance, but it might have some instrumental positive significance too, by causing your shy avoidance of further pain. Instrumental significance is a contingent matter and it varies widely from case to case. For this reason, the present entry focuses on the non-instrumental significance of pleasure and pain.

Ethical hedonism can be universalist, recognising the pleasure and pain of all entities that do or can have it, whether human and non-human, individual or group, ‘natural’ or artificial. It can instead be me-and-my-near-and-dear egocentric, or simply egoistically focused just on one’s own pleasure and pain (see the entry on egoism). It can also be a claim about value, morality, well-being, rationality, reasons or aesthetics. See the entries on value theory, moral theory, well-being, reasons for action: justification, motivation, explanation, and the concept of the aesthetic. To avoid committing to any particular option on this list, the present entry instead expresses ethical hedonism in terms of the broader concept ‘ethical significance’. Ethical hedonism can be a claim about justificatory grounds for action, belief, motivation or feeling; or a claim about ought, obligation, good and bad, or right and wrong. And these are not the only possibilities. The discussion below aims for both determinacy of formulation and generality across the different forms of ethical hedonism, albeit that there is significant tension between these two aims.

Ethical hedonism can appeal to quantitative accounts of pleasure, or to qualitative accounts of pleasure. Bentham’s account suggests the quantitative hedonist idea that the non-instrumental value of pleasure is a matter just of pleasure’s quantitative features, and that these reduce just to its duration and its intensity (Bentham: ch. 4). Responding especially to the charge that a Benthamite account of the nature and value of pleasure and pain is a ‘doctrine worthy only of swine’, the alternative qualitative approach of Mill (ch. 2) is to argue that there is ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ pleasure, and its value is irreducibly a matter of its quality as well as its quantity. Mill argued that of two sorts of pleasures, if one is preferred at least a majority of those who have experienced both, then that one is the more desirable. The present entry returns to this distinction in the fifth paragraph of section 2.2.2.

2.1 Arguments For Ethical Hedonism

For economy of expression, most of the arguments and rebuttals about ethical hedonism are stated below in simple and stark forms, and in terms of ethical hedonism about value and disvalue. The relevant literature referenced in this section engages with complexities and nuances that cannot be canvassed here.

The present sub-section outlines and reviews some of the main forms of argument for hedonism about value: motivational, scientific naturalist, doxastic, epistemic, phenomenal, explanatory, and causal arguments.

Here is a motivation-based argument for ethical hedonism: the basic objects of our motivation are always and only pleasure and pain; all and only the basic objects of our motivation have value or disvalue; therefore all and only pleasure is valuable, and all and only pain is disvaluable. This argument appeals to a motivational hedonist thesis that the only objects of our basic motives are pleasure and pain. As Section 3 discusses, motivational hedonism is a controversial thesis. Motivational hedonism is also most plausible as a claim about the role of pleasure and pain as objects of our motives, whether or not these objects actually exist or are true. But hedonism about value is most plausible as a view just about real states or properties or events of pleasure and pain. This motivation argument also depends on a pro-attitude or motivation theory of value, and such subjectivist accounts of value are controversial too. On an alternative interpretation of the motivation argument, its first premise is the pleasure-motive identity thesis that some of our desires just are our pleasures (see Heathwood 2006, 2007). Such theses too are somewhat controversial.

One scientific naturalist argument for hedonism is this: in the value domain we should be scientific naturalists in our methods of inquiry; hedonism is the best option in respect of scientific naturalism; therefore, we should be hedonists about value. Various issues arise. Both premises of the argument need support. First, what are scientific naturalist forms of inquiry into value, and why think they should be adopted in the value domain? One broadly scientific rationale for adopting such methods is the claim that their empirical track record is superior to that of philosophical theorising about value. But the thesis that naturalistic methods have a superior empirical track record or prospect is easier to assert than to vindicate. A case also needs to be made that hedonism does do better than its rivals in the scientific naturalist respect. Why think it has better naturalistic credentials, for example, than the numerous non-hedonic and extra-hedonic mental states and properties and events, and the various forms of agency, cognition, and personal relationships, that are objects of desire-fulfilment, preference-fulfilment, or value-fulfilment (e.g., Tiberius) in various subjectivist theories of value?

Consider this doxastic argument for ethical hedonism: all or most of us believe hedonism about value, even if some of us suffer from self-deception about that; and this state of our beliefs supports hedonism itself. One response is that even if the premise is true it fails to support the conclusion. Consider a structurally similar case. Even if we all believe we have free will, that seems to be a rather weak justification of belief that we have free will. Suppose instead that a strong general form of belief involuntarism is true, according to which we are not free to have any beliefs other than those we do in fact have. Again, this would not have any tendency to establish the truth of any of these beliefs of ours, however robustly it might permit our having these beliefs. Any convincing form of the doxastic or belief-based argument would need to overcome such difficulties.

Some doxastic arguments for hedonism can be honed into epistemic arguments for hedonism (e.g., Sinhababu, Crisp 2022). Epistemic arguments for hedonism about value claim that pleasure clearly or obviously has value (c.f. Crisp 2006: 124, 2021; Feldblyum), and that nothing else clearly does. They conclude that this justifies belief in hedonism about value. One somewhat nuanced argument of this sort is: “Few serious thinkers have argued that (innocent) pleasure is valueless or even bad, or that pain is valueless or even good”, and “Few serious thinkers have argued that (innocent) pleasure is valueless or even bad, or that pain is valueless or even good. The very fact of continuous disagreement on the value of non-hedonic goods such as [deep personal relationships] puts them ... on a significantly weaker footing, at least as far as western philosophy is concerned” (Crisp 2022).

Two epistemic doubts merit notice here. Note first that western culture is distinctively individualistic. More specifically in the present context, for example, on western philosophy’s most influential accounts of pleasure, hedonism’s claim that the good is pleasure allows that the good need not have any relation to anyone or anything beyond its simply being “something of one’s own” (Aristotle, 1095b25–26). In contrast, most candidate non-hedonic goods do require some further relation. For example, knowledge requires a relation to its object, and any relationship requires at least one relation that connects its relata to one another. Note too that the scope of western philosophy’s hedonist claims extends at least to all humans. In this context, it is epistemically important to take account of the prevalence and persistence levels of ethical hedonist and non-hedonist doxa in the worldwide range of non-western practices of systematic ethical thought. If the soundscape of our listening on this topic is too narrow, we might not be giving the world’s sounds a fair hearing.

A second epistemic frailty, not confined to western systematic ethical thought, starts by noting that practitioners of such thought have predominantly been male over the millennia so far. Alongside this, dominant social acculturation in the various locales of systematic ethical inquiry worldwide has tended to assign to females the jobs of recognising, prioritising, and attending to relationships. It is not fanciful to wonder whether such deep-rooted and persistent social practices play substantial explanatory roles in (at least) western philosophy’s tepidity about any thesis that certain relationships are basic goods. Even if the global testimony of the systematic ethical inquirers does favour hedonism over its rivals, those data might still not carry much epistemic weight. In short, doxastic and epistemic arguments for hedonism need further refinement.

Phenomenal arguments for hedonism move from some aspect of the felt character of pleasure or pain to a thesis about the value of pleasure or pain. Some argue that pain and pleasure each have felt character or felt quality that generates good reason to avoid or alleviate or minimize the pain, and to seek or prolong or maximise the pleasure (e.g., Nagel 1986: 156–162). Such phenomenal considerations can also be deployed in arguments for ethical hedonism. One overall point is that the most that such phenomenal arguments can show is the sufficiency of pleasure for value, and of pain for disvalue. Even if the relevant phenomenal character is unique to pleasure and pain, this can establish at most that pleasure is necessary to phenomenal arguments for value, and that pain is necessary to phenomenal arguments for disvalue. It cannot show that pleasure and pain alone have non-instrumental value. Phenomenal arguments also need to avoid appeal to any equivocation on ‘quality’. From the fact that pain or pleasure has a certain felt quality in the sense of ‘felt character’, it does not immediately follow that it has any felt quality in the sense of ‘value’ or ‘disvalue’.

Can phenomenal arguments be strengthened? First, one might conjoin the premise that pleasure has a certain felt character with the premise that all or most of us believe this felt character to be good. But this is just a doxastic argument again, plus a phenomenal account of the nature of pleasure. Second, one might instead appeal to the epistemic thesis that the felt character of pain and pleasure gives us direct awareness, perception or apprehension of the badness of pain and the goodness of pleasure. One construal of this idea is that pleasure is an attitudinal feeling or felt attitude that has its own goodness or value as its object. Even granting this thesis, however, it is arguably a general feature of attitudinal states that their objects might or might not exist or be true. Even if the object of pleasure attitudes is their own goodness, and the object of pain attitudes is its own badness, the path from that situation to the conclusion that pleasure is good or that pain is bad is still not clear. A third way to interpret the phenomenal argument is as claiming that pleasure and pain are properties or events that have feels-to-be-good and feels-to-be-bad character, respectively. But again, even if pleasure and pain do have evaluative phenomenal character, in the ‘feels-to-be-good’ character of pleasure, and in the ‘feels-to-be-bad’ character of pain, the sound paths to ‘is good’ or ‘is bad’ still need to be spelled out.

Causal arguments for hedonism about value move from premises about pleasure’s causal relations to conclusions that pleasure alone is valuable. One thing to note about the particular causal arguments for hedonism that are discussed below (c.f. Crisp 2006: 120–122) is that they are in tension with doxastic arguments for hedonism (and with epistemic arguments, on which see below). This is because they counsel caution or even skepticism about the epistemic credentials of our hedonism-related beliefs.

One causal argument for hedonism is that autonomy, achievement (Hooker 1996), friendship (Hooker 2021), honesty, and so on, generally produce pleasure, and this makes us tend to think they have value of their own; in this way the valuable pleasure produced by these non-pleasures tends to confound our thinking about what has value. However, even granting that achievement, friendship, and the like, tend to cause pleasure, why think this merely instrumental consideration also causes us to think these non-hedonic matters have their own non-instrumental value? Is there any empirical evidence for this claim? And even granted both causal claims, why think these are the only causes of belief in non-hedonism? Even granted that these are the only causes of non-hedonist belief, why think these causes of belief justify it, and why think they are its only justifiers? Perhaps these questions all have good hedonism-friendly answers, but that needs to be shown. Or perhaps this causal argument for hedonism is instead roughly as good as the parallel causal argument from the thesis that pleasure generally produces autonomy, achievement, and the like, to the opposite conclusion that hedonism is false.

Another causal argument for hedonism is that anti-hedonism about value is pleasure-maximizing; this tends to cause anti-hedonist belief; and it also justifies our having anti-hedonist belief without our needing to think such belief true. As it stands, this argument is weak. The issue is whether anti-hedonism is true, and this causal argument fails even to address that issue. Even if anti-hedonist belief has good or ideal consequences, and even if such consequences tend to produce such belief, this does not tend to establish either the truth or the falsehood of anti-hedonism.

Explanatory arguments for hedonism about value invite us to make lists of the things that we regard as good or valuable, and of what we regard as bad or disvaluable. If we then ask ‘why is it good?’ or ‘what explains its being good?’, we might agree that all the goodness or value of all but one such listed item is best explained by its generation of pleasure, or by its reduction of pain, or both. We might also agree that no satisfactorily explanatory answer can be given to such questions as ‘why is pleasure good?’ or ‘what explains pleasure’s being good?’. Proponents of the explanatory argument then conclude that hedonism about value is the best explanation of these matters.

Those already sympathetic to hedonism about value should find such explanatory arguments congenial. It is a good question, partly empirical in nature, how the explanatory argument will strike those not already inclined either for or against hedonism about value. Those already sympathetic to non-hedonist pluralism about value, however, can reasonably respond with some scepticism to such explanatory arguments for hedonism. They can hold that the non-instrumental value of each instance of pleasure, knowledge, autonomy, friendship and achievement - for example - is best explained by its own non-instrumental features. Subjectivists will add that these non-instrumental features that have the explanatory heft here are matters of each item’s being an object of a relevant favouring stance, such as desire or preference. Some pluralist objectivists will instead claim that it is certain non-instrumental features of each instance of pleasure, achievement, friendship, knowledge, and autonomy that explain its value, independently of their being any object of any pro-stance. All parties can of course also agree that at least part of the instrumental goodness or value of pleasure, knowledge, autonomy, friendship and achievement is best explained by its generation of pleasure.

This sub-section has outlined and reviewed some of the main forms of argument for hedonism about value: motivational, scientific naturalist, doxastic, epistemic, phenomenal, causal, and explanatory. Closely related arguments of each of these sorts could also be made for other forms of ethical hedonism. Each argument is problematical, but perhaps one or more of them can be made robust. Perhaps other promising arguments for ethical hedonism might also be developed. Even if all such arguments fail, this would still not in itself be a convincing overall case against hedonism. The next sub-section examines arguments against ethical hedonism.

2.2 Arguments Against Ethical Hedonism

There are many and varied arguments against ethical hedonism. Some are, at least in part, arguments about the nature of pleasure and pain. Some arguments of this sort are reviewed in Section 1. Further arguments against ethical hedonism could be constructed that broadly parallel the motivation, scientific naturalist, doxastic, phenomenal, explanatory, causal, and epistemic arguments for ethical hedonism that are reviewed in Section 2.1. This entry does not pursue that task. The following sub-sections instead review other objections to ethical hedonism.

2.2.1 Not-Necessary objections to Ethical Hedonism

At its broadest, ethical hedonism is the thesis that all and only pleasure and pain is ethically significant. Not-necessary objections target for rejection ethical hedonism’s claim that only pleasure and pain have ethical significance. Their rival claim is that pleasure and pain are not necessary for value or for ethical significance. These objections typically argue that something other than pleasure or pain has ethical significance. Any two cases that are equals in hedonic terms but unequals in ethical significance would deliver what not-necessary objections need.

Many well-known criticisms of hedonism can be expressed as not-necessary objections. A short survey of some of the more significant of these follows.

Plato pointed out that if your life is just one of pleasure then it would not even include any recollection of pleasure; nor any distinct thought that you were pleased, even when you were pleased. His conclusion was that “your life would be the life, not of a man, but of an oyster” (Philebus 21a). Similarly, on J.S. Mill’s account of him at least (Mill: ch. 2), Carlyle held that hedonism is a “doctrine worthy only of swine”.

Nozick (1971) and Nagel (1970) present schematic descriptions of lives that have all the appearance but none of the reality of self-understanding, achievement, loving relationships, self-directedness, and so on, alongside close comparator lives that have all these appearances and also the corresponding realities. On the face of it, ethical hedonism is committed to the broadly hedonic equality of these two lives, and thus also to these lives going equally well. Commenting on his own more fantastical and more famous ‘experience machine’ case, Nozick added further detail, claiming that it is also good in itself “to do certain things, and not just have the experience [as if] of doing them”, “to be a certain way, to be a certain sort of person” and not just to be an “indeterminate blob” floating in a tank, and “to make a difference in the world” rather than merely to appear to oneself to do so. He concluded: “something matters to us in addition to experience” (Nozick 1974: 43–44). There is ongoing and lively debate about what, if anything, the experience machine can illuminate about hedonism. For example, see: Weijers, Hawkins, and Lin 2016.

In a famous case description, Moore argued that a world with beauty but without its contemplation, and indeed without any mental states whatever, is better than a world that is “simply one heap of filth” (G. Moore: sec. 50; contrast Sidgwick: 114). If Moore is right about his ‘beauty and the filth’ case, then pleasure is not necessary for value.

W.D. Ross (138) considered two worlds that are equals both hedonically and in character terms. In one world, the virtuous have the pleasure and the vicious have the pain, while in the other, the vicious have the pleasure and the virtuous have the pain. Pleasure and pain are each equal across these two worlds, but Ross argues that the well-matched world is better than the mis-matched world. If he is right, then this is a case of ‘same pleasure and pain, different ethical significance’, and thereby also a case in which difference of pleasure or of pain is not necessary for difference of ethical significance.

Imagining oneself to have a hedonically perfect life, a non-necessity objector is apt to respond along the lines of the sometime popular Paul Jabara / Jo Asher song: ‘Something’s missing in my life’. One way to fill out the detail is with some variant of that song’s second premise: ‘Baby it’s you’. In more cumbersome philosophy-speak, the objectors’ claim is that there is something sufficient for further value and ethical significance, which is missing from the life of perfect pleasure and no pain. If the objection stands, then pleasure and pain are not necessary for ethical significance.

There is a range of possible hedonist responses to non-necessary objections. One rebuttal is that the allegedly non-hedonic item on which the objector focuses just is an instance of pleasure or of pain, so its being valuable or significant is just what a hedonist would expect. Stated in broader terms, this rebuttal is that any item to which the objector points is sufficient for value or significance only insofar as and because it is an instance of pleasure or of pain. A second closely related rebuttal allows that the item in question is or includes some non-pleasure or non-pain that has ethical significance, but then argues that this is merely instrumental value or significance. A third and more concessive reply is that the item in question might be a non-pleasure and a non-pain, and might be sufficient for value or significance of some sort, but just not of the ethical sort. For example, it might be claimed that self-sacrifice that protects the non-sentient environment has aesthetic significance but not ethical significance. An option that is yet more concessive is for hedonists to agree that pleasure and pain are not necessary for ethical significance, but they are sufficient for ethical significance.

2.2.2 Not-Sufficient objections to Ethical Hedonism

As noted above, the simplest ethical hedonism claims that all and only pleasure is good non-instrumentally, and all and only pain or displeasure is bad non-instrumentally. Not-sufficient objections reject the ethical hedonist claim that all pleasure is good, or that all pain is bad, or both claims. Their thesis to the contrary is that pleasure is insufficient for good, and/or that pain is insufficient for bad; that some pleasure has no value, and/or that some pain has no disvalue. Any pair of cases that are value equals but hedonic unequals would deliver what not-sufficient objectors seek.

Several not-sufficient objections are outlined below. Each aims to show that some pleasure is worthless or worse and is thus insufficient for good or value. Some focus on the bad as a cause of pleasure, others on the bad as an object of pleasure. A third possible focus is on pleasure understood as a property or a part of something bad, such as a sadistic thought or act, rather than as an effect of something bad.

Aristotle (Book x, ch. 3) argued that some pleasure is disgraceful or base. Brentano (1889/1969: 90) argued that “pleasure in the bad” both lacks value and has disvalue. Moore (sec. 56) expressed similar thoughts in a bracingly concrete manner by imagining the pleasures of “perpetual indulgence in bestiality” and by claiming such pleasures to be not good but bad. Self-destructive or masochistic pleasure, pleasure with a non-existent or false object, and contra-deserved pleasure are some other targets of insufficiency objections to hedonism about value. On such pleasures, and on forms of hedonism that might accommodate them, see Feldman (2004) on altitude-adjusted, truth-adjusted, and desert-adjusted forms of attitudinal hedonism.

Hedonists can respond in various ways to insufficiency objections. Some are canvassed below.

One sort of hedonist response to a not-sufficient objection is to accept that the objector’s case is an instance of pleasure, but then to claim that it is sufficient for value. This response can be underpinned by insistence on the wider thought that any pleasure is sufficient for value. Consistent with this, but rather concessively, it could also be claimed that pleasure is sufficient for only very little value, and that substantial or major value is present only if further conditions are met. Such further conditions might concern the qualitative nature of the pleasures, that is, the extent to which the pleasure is ‘higher’ rather than ‘lower’. The standard criticism of such qualitative hedonism is that pleasure’s quality reduces in full to either to its quantity, or to some anti-hedonist claim about value. The best sort of response for qualitative hedonists is to present a reply that does not suffer from either such reduction or such collapse. One strategy for friends of qualitative hedonism is to argue that all instances of pleasure have a property in common that explains their being instances of pleasure, as well as having a heterogeneity of other properties that explain there being both different kinds of pleasure, and certain quality variations among pleasures. And likewise with all instances of pain. Some issues of homogeneity and heterogeneity have been reviewed in section 1.

A second possible hedonist response is to accept that the not-sufficient objector has indeed found a case that is insufficient for value, but then to claim that it is not an instance of pleasure. This sort of response can be underpinned by the hedonist’s insistence on the wider thought that anything insufficient for value is not pleasure.

A third available hedonist response is somewhat concessive. It distinguishes at least two basic kinds of value, and continues to insist that pleasure is sufficient for one of these, while also accepting the objector’s thesis that there is at least one other sort of value for which pleasure is not sufficient (Feldman 2019). One instance of this response is the claim that sadistic pleasure adds prudential value for the sadist but also lacks moral value and indeed has moral disvalue. But such a move is more awkward in other cases, including those of pleasure that is self-destructive or masochistic.

A fourth response on behalf of hedonism is concessive. It abandons altogether the thesis that pleasure is sufficient for value, while also continuing to insist that pleasure is necessary for value. Consistent with this response, one could claim that pleasure is conditionally valuable; that is, sufficient for value when and only when certain further conditions are met. These conditions could be specified negatively; for example: pleasure is valuable only when it does not arise from and is not directed at a bad deed or character state or state of affairs. The relevant conditions could instead be specified positively; for example: the good consists of “pleasurable experiences of objectively appropriate activities and relationships” (Regan: 210). Modified forms of Feldman-style altitude-adjusted, truth-adjusted, and desert-adjusted attitudinal hedonism would have this structure (see Feldman 2004).

3. Psychological Hedonism

Psychological hedonism comes in many forms. This section reviews a modest psychological hedonist thesis: the motivational hedonist claim that only pleasure or pain motivates us (for a review of various hedonist theses, see Bain and Brady). This modest claim can be contrasted with Bentham’s bolder claim that pain and pleasure determine what we do. Bentham’s claim is a form of psychological hedonism about the determination of action. Bentham’s bolder claim faces challenges that do not face the more modest psychological hedonism explored here. One problem is that in various circumstances, weaknesses in our agency-related states, such as our motivation, intention, and decision, fail to generate or to determine our action (entry: weakness of will). A second problem is that in our assessments of which options for our action will or won’t deliver pleasure or pain, we are notably fallible cognisers and agents. The related ‘paradox of hedonism’ is the plausible claim that some of our hedonically motivated or determined action in fact delivers less pleasure or more pain than we would otherwise have got (e.g., Sidgwick: 48f). Rather than attempting to defend Bentham’s thesis about the determination of action, this entry focuses on the more modest thesis about motivation. The modest thesis is clearly hedonist, and it helpfully allows that some of our hedonic motivations fail to determine our action, some of our actions are determined by non-hedonic matters, and some of our hedonically determined actions fail to deliver pleasure or to avoid pain.

3.1 Arguments For Psychological Hedonism

Why believe even the relatively modest motivational form of psychological hedonism? One argument infers it from a combination of the motivational egoist claim that each of us is always motivated to maximize what we take to be our own good, and the claim that we each accept that our good is our maximal or sufficient balance of pleasure over pain. But motivational egoism is at best controversial (entry: egoism). Also controversial is the psychological thesis that each of us accepts hedonism about our own good. For one thing, that psychological thesis ungenerously implies that those who think they reject hedonism about their own good do not even know their own minds on this matter.

Another argument for motivational hedonism is this: every case of motivation can be accounted for by an appeal to pleasure; the more unified or simpler the account of motivation the better, and hedonism is the most unified or simple account (arguments from unification and simplicity are also made for ethical hedonism, for example: Moen). Even if this argument is persuasive, it only shows that in the unification respect, hedonism is the best account of our motivation. But unification is not the only feature that it is desirable for theories of motivation to have, and the argument is silent on how motivational hedonism scores on any other desirable feature. It consequently does not establish the overall plausibility of motivational hedonism, let alone the thesis that it is the most plausible theory of motivation. In addition, rival accounts of our motivation can be argued for in just the same way: sometimes we are motivated by M (M could be self-improvement, survival, attentiveness to our near-and-dear, a life of integrity, and so forth); every case of motivation can be accounted for by an appeal to M; therefore, the M theory of motivation is the most unified.

A third argument for motivational hedonism claims that it is a truth of everyday meaning that the words ‘is motivated’ just mean some such thing as ‘aims for the greatest balance of pleasure over pain’. The core trouble here is that motivational hedonism is not a truth of everyday meaning. Even if it were such a truth, the main issue of substance would remain. Rivals would simply re-state the ongoing central issue using neighbouring concepts; for example: ‘however it might be with the narrower concept “motive”, the claim that we are always moved by pleasure is false’. Nor would it help motivational hedonists to make a Humpty Dumpty move here (see Carroll: ch. 6): ‘when I use the words “is motivated”, said Humpty Dumpty, they mean just what I choose them to mean, namely “is aimed at pleasure”’. Such stipulation does not identify any good reason for anyone to join Humpty Dumpty in his eccentric word usage.

Even if all of the above arguments for motivational hedonism fail, other arguments for it could be made. This entry briefly discusses scientific research that can be used to argue for motivational hedonism. Even if every argument for motivational hedonism fails, failure of a positive is not success of a negative. What then of the arguments against this relatively modest form of psychological hedonism?

3.2 Arguments Against Psychological Hedonism

Some criticisms of motivational hedonism can be quickly rebutted by its friends. One such criticism is that we are often motivated by things that in fact give us neither pleasure nor the best available pleasure-pain balance. One example occurs when we step under a shower that we take to be suitably warm but find instead to be scaldingly hot. Still, this could be accounted for by the claim that one is always and only motivated by what one thinks to be one’s maximal or sufficient pleasure or pleasure-pain balance. A second criticism is that the idea of maximal pleasure, or of the best feasible pleasure-pain balance, assumes a common measure that arguably cannot be had (for a brief overview of the scientific research on the commensurability of pleasure and pain, see de Lazari-Radek). But perhaps being motivated by what one takes to be one’s maximal pleasure-pain balance is possible even if the idea of pleasure maximization in such settings does not ultimately make sense. A third criticism is that not every pleasure or pain in prospect motivates us. However, hedonism does not imply that one is motivated by every pleasure or pain prospect.

Although the above criticisms can be easily dismissed, many others have more bite. One category of these bitey criticisms is populated by demands for motivational hedonism to be made more determinate. First, is it about every instance of motivation; or is it only about motives of ours that predominate, with exceptions when little pleasure or pain is at stake and/or when much else is at stake (c.f. Kavka: 64–80 on ‘predominant egoism’)? The present entry takes motivational hedonism to be the first of these views. Second, is it about all motivational entities, including all desires, wants, preferences, inclinations, intentions, decisions, and choices; or is it instead a claim about only an incomplete subset of these? The present entry treats it as a claim just about desires (see the entries on desire and egoism). Third and relatedly, is it a pair of claims, one about desires for pleasure and the other about aversions to pain; or is it instead a single claim about desires for a sufficient or maximal net pleasure-pain balance? The present entry generally treats it as the latter; acknowledging that this seems to require some form of symmetry or commensurability thesis, wherein pleasure and pain can be weighed against one another on the same scale, a thesis that is not without problems. Fourth, is it a claim about every desire whatever, or just a claim about every human desire? The present entry treats it as the latter, though it is a good question why human desirers might be thought to be distinctively pleasure/pain-oriented. Fifth, is it the egoistic claim that one desires only one’s own pleasure, or the egocentric claim that one desires only the pleasure of oneself and one’s near–and–dear, or is it instead a non-egoistic claim? When it makes a difference, the present entry tends to treat motivational hedonism as being the first of these claims. Sixth, is it the production-based claim that we are motivated to cause pleasure, or does it allow, for example, that being moved to laugh might be being motivated to express rather than to produce pleasure? The present entry considers production-based claims, plus the distinct idea that our desire only ever has pleasure as its object, whether or not that object exists or is true. Importantly, each clarificatory step the motivational hedonist takes in making the theory more determinate also resources further and more specific vulnerabilities to criticism.

Consider now the more precise thesis that each of one’s desires or passions or appetites has one’s own pleasure and only this as its object, as that at which alone it is aimed or is directed or is about. This thesis was a target of Bishop Joseph Butler in his 1729 work Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel. Butler noted in his Preface that there are: “such passions in mankind as desire of esteem, or of being beloved, or of knowledge”. All of these have objects other than pleasure. Drawing on Butler’s critique, David Hume added further examples: that people have bodily appetites such as hunger and thirst; that mental passions drive them to attain such things as fame, power, and vengeance; and that many of us also: “feel a desire of another’s happiness and good” (Hume: Appendix 2, 12–13). All these appetites too have objects other than just one’s own pleasure or pain. By appeal to such cases, Butler and Hume arguably refuted the strong motivational hedonist thesis that one’s every desire has one’s own pleasure and that alone as its object. This point is revisited below, in discussion of basic and non-basic motivations.

Even a modest motivational hedonism would be undermined by a single case of an individual who is motivated otherwise than by pleasure or pain. Here are some standard candidate counterexamples that seem to be true to experience: the parent who, at his hedonic expense, seeks to give his child good early years and a good start in life for that child’s sake, the walker who kicks a small stone ‘just for the hell of it’, the soldier who opts for a painful death for herself to save her comrades, and the dying person who fights to keep a grip on life despite fully grasping that their short future will have much pain and little or no pleasure (Griffin: 8).

The standard style of hedonist response to candidate counterexamples is to offer rival motivational stories: the soldier was really motivated only by an underlying belief that her dying would secure her a joyful afterlife or at least a half-second’s sweet pleasure of hero’s self-sacrifice; the parent was actually motivated only by his own pleasurable intention to give the child a good start or by his expectation that his now having this intention will somehow cause him to have pleasure later; the dying non-believer in any afterlife in fact hangs on only because they really believe that in their life there is still pleasure for them. And so on.

Two problems, at least, arise from hedonist retellings of the motivational stories in proposed counterexamples. First, these retellings are often challenged in the manner of an ‘incredulous stare’ (after Lewis: 86). We direct our richly various mental lives – our beliefs, musings, intentions, enthusiasms, hopes, aspirations, and so on and on – at massively plural and diverse items in ourselves, in others, in myriad aspects of the non-human world, and in the infinities of contingent future possibility. In keeping with this overall psychological picture, our motivations too seem to have objects that are massively plural and diverse. In the light of such facts, motivational hedonism merits an incredulous stare, or at the very least a burden of evidence-connected rebuttal to discharge. Why would anyone believe that all human motivation takes as its object just one sort of item? On this point, some go beyond incredulity to contempt. Thus Nietzsche: “Man does not strive for pleasure; only the Englishman does” (Nietzsche: ‘Maxims and Arrows’ #12). Still, the hedonist can defend against such challenge too. Perhaps the most promising motivational hedonist response, about all humans, including Englishmen, is to say that all our basic motives are directed at pleasure and all our non-basic motives are pleasure-centred too, just less directly so. Some relevant literature in this area expresses the issues more narrowly, in terms of ‘desire’. This entry too shifts to this narrower construal below.

Take a desire to be basic if one has it independently of any thought one has about what else this will or might cause or bring about. A desire is non-basic if one’s having it does depend on one’s having such further thought. Equipped with this distinction, motivational hedonists can claim that one’s every basic desire has one’s own pleasure as its object, and one’s every non-basic desire depends on one’s thinking this will or might bring one pleasure. Revisiting the Butler and Hume examples above, a hedonist can claim that everyone in every case has only non-basic desire for esteem or knowledge or to be beloved. This hedonist can add that in all such cases these things motivate us only because we think it will or might give us pleasure. This tactic can be universalized to our appetite for food or drink, our mental passion for fame or power or vengeance, and our desire for the happiness or good of any other, and to every other instance of motivation.

The wide range of ways in which one’s desire for non-pleasure could bring one pleasure include: by this desire’s itself being an instance of pleasure (e.g., by appeal to a desire-pleasure identity thesis; see Heathwood 2007), by the desire’s having a property of pleasantness (e.g., deploying the thought that pleasantness is a higher-order property of every desire), by the desire’s causing one pleasure independently of whether its object obtains (e.g., a fan’s desire to be a vampire or a hobbit might cause him pleasure even though this desire of his is never fulfilled); or by the desire’s causing its object to obtain, where this object is an instance of one’s pleasure, or has pleasure as one of its properties, or causes one pleasure. Even so, and unfortunately for hedonists, telling a hedonic story as to our motives does not in itself generate any reason to think such a narrative true. To escape refutation by counterexample, motivational hedonists need to tell the tale of every relevant motive in hedonic terms that are not merely imaginative but are also in every case more plausible than the anti-hedonist lessons that our experience seems repeatedly to teach some of us about many of our motives.

If motivational hedonism is an empirical psychological thesis, and hedonism can provide a retelling of every seeming counterexample, then it will be vulnerable to a further objection, in the vein of Karl Popper’s complaints about psychoanalysis. Motivational hedonism may be “simply non-testable, irrefutable” (Popper: 37. See also entry: Karl Popper). According to Popper’s account of empirical hypotheses, a motivational hedonist empirical hypothesis should yield testable predictions about our day-to-day motivation. In many cases where people seem to be motivated by non-hedonic factors, it is difficult, if not impossible, to transform the face value motivational story into hedonic terms that are empirically testable and falsifiable. Consider a decision between something I expect to be downright painful, and something that I expect will be pleasurable: going to wrestling training that I think will damage my knees, or staying at home and eating linguine. No matter the choice I make, motivational hedonism can re-imagine my motive in hedonic terms that are difficult, at best, to falsify. Such inaccessibility to falsification is generally held to be a negative feature of empirical hypotheses (Williams: 58). Alternatively, if friends of motivational hedonism do manage to offer up falsifiable motivational hypotheses, then cases that seem to be counterexamples are legion.

The dilemma presented for the motivational hedonist above relies on motivational hedonism’s being an empirical psychological thesis. This is a further determination that is not necessarily built into the theory. Rather, it is one choice among rivalrous options: is motivational hedonism a contingent claim about an aspect of our psychology that could have been otherwise; or does it posit a law of our psychological nature; or is it a necessary truth about all metaphysically or conceptually or logically possible motivations? The answers to such questions also bear on the sorts of evidence and argument we need if we are fully to appraise motivational hedonism. If it is an empirical psychological thesis, as it seems to be, then it is reasonable to expect application of systematic methods and evidence of empirical psychology, social inquiry, and perhaps also biological science, to do considerable work in appraising it. The mechanisms and plausibility of motivational hedonism have been and are currently being tested by researchers in neuroscience and psychology.

It would not be possible in this entry to distill the knowledge produced by scientific fields relevant to motivational hedonism (these fields include but are not limited to the study of behavioral science, pleasure and pain, affective states, emotions, sensations, and feelings); however, as philosophers, ignoring them entirely would suggest an even greater hubris than would attempting to summarise them here. For an excellent and philosophically-minded overview of the state of research regarding pleasure see de Lazari-Radek. For an argument relying heavily on the psychological and neuroscientific research in favour of a version of motivational hedonism, see Williams. Driven by empirical research and the above philosophical dilemma for motivational hedonism, Williams argues for a theory according to which there are two motivational pathways in the brain, one accounted for by hedonic motivation, and based on psychological hedonism, and a higher-order pathway that relies on cognitive processes that fall outside of the scope of psychological hedonism, namely reflective motivation (Williams: 65).

Philosophical work will continue to be needed too, to weed out incoherent ideas, to separate out the numerous distinct motivational hedonist theses; and to scrutinize whether, and if so with what significance, various empirical findings actually do bear on these various hedonist theses. For instance, even the feasibility of a research design that is capable of empirically separating out our basic from our non-basic motives would be a serious challenge. Philosophical work can also identify the various features that it is desirable for theories of motivation to have and to be appraised against. Unification, determinacy, and being supported by and aligning with cases are treated above as desirable. Other desirable features might include consistency and maximal scope. Philosophers and others can systematically appraise theories of motivation in such terms, including through pairwise comparative assessments of rival theories in terms of those desirable features.

This section has critically reviewed motivational hedonism and has found weaknesses in some central arguments for the view, together with some significant problems of determinacy and disconfirmation. It has also found that there are arguments against motivational hedonism that have some force. Ongoing philosophical and empirical inquiry is continuing to assess whether such troubles for motivational hedonism can be overcome, and whether any of its rivals fare any better overall than it does.

4. Concluding Remarks

On one influential view that John Rawls attributes to Henry Sidgwick, justification in ethics ideally proceeds against “standards of reasoned justification… carefully formulated”, and “satisfactory justification of any particular moral conception must proceed from a full knowledge and systematic comparison of the more significant conceptions in the philosophical tradition” (Sidgwick, editor’s foreword). This entry has not attempted any such systematic comparative examination of psychological hedonism and ethical hedonism against their main rivals. Psychological hedonism and ethical hedonism remain worthy of serious philosophical attention. Each also has broader philosophical significance, especially but not only in utilitarian and egoist traditions of ethical thought, and in empiricist and scientific naturalist philosophical traditions.

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