Philosophy of History and Historiography

First published Wed Nov 18, 2026

[Editor’s Note: The following new entry by Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen replaces the former entry on this topic by the previous author.]

Traditionally, philosophy of history—often called speculative or substantive philosophy of history—concerned itself with the meaning, direction, intelligibility, or law-governed character of history. In this entry, the term ‘philosophy of history’ is used to denote this approach. During the twentieth century, however, philosophical attention increasingly shifted toward the nature of historical inquiry itself. This approach, often called philosophy of historiography, examines the conceptual and epistemic conditions of the study of history and may therefore be regarded as a branch of philosophy of science. Its central questions concern historical knowledge, explanation, causation, laws, interpretation, narrative, representation, and the ethics of history writing. Much twentieth-century work was shaped by the analytical philosophy of history, while more recent discussions have expanded in multiple directions, including narrativist, postnarrativist, humanist and posthumanist, realist and irrealist, pragmatist as well as probabilistic and evidential approaches. Substantive philosophy of history has also seen renewed interest.

Philosophy of history and philosophy of historiography are significant for at least two reasons. First, conceptions of history shape how individuals and societies orient themselves toward the future: commitments to progress, decline, or cyclical recurrence carry different practical implications. This point pertains specifically to the concerns of philosophy of history. Second, historical understanding is central to human self-understanding, since people and communities situate themselves through interpretations of their past. Understanding the past may also be valued for its own sake. Historical inquiry raises questions about how historical knowledge and understanding are possible, what kinds of evidence support historical claims, and how alternative historical explanations should be evaluated. Philosophy of historiography addresses these questions and therefore bears directly on broader issues in epistemology and philosophy of science.

The entry begins with the major traditions in philosophy of history and historiography, proceeds to discuss key concepts, and concludes with recent and emerging approaches.

1. Terminological disambiguations

The term history is ambiguous. It is commonly used to refer both to the historical subject matter studied by historians and to the study of that subject matter. This ambiguity can easily generate confusion, since questions about historical events, processes, practices, ideas, institutions, and societies differ from questions about how they should be investigated and written about. For the sake of clarity, it is therefore useful to distinguish between history and historiography. In this entry, history refers to the historical subject matter investigated by historians, while historiography refers to the study of history, including both the research and the writing of history.

The term history is also sometimes used synonymously with the past. These notions do not fully coincide. History itself is not confined to what is already past. What is now future becomes present, and what is present becomes past; accordingly, past, present, and future may all be regarded as temporally indexed aspects of history. Future historians may therefore study events that still lie in our future. Nevertheless, the ambiguity between history and the past rarely causes serious confusion, since in most contexts history refers to past events and processes.

This terminological disambiguation also clarifies the scope of philosophical inquiry. In this entry, philosophy of history refers to what is traditionally known as speculative or substantive philosophy of history: philosophical reflection on the nature, direction, or structure of historical processes themselves. Because it addresses the nature of historical reality, it has a significant metaphysical dimension, and may even be regarded as a form of metaphysical inquiry. By contrast, philosophy of historiography refers to the philosophical examination of the study of history. In this respect it is comparable to other branches of philosophy of science, such as philosophy of biology, philosophy of chemistry, or philosophy of economics, each of which addresses both general philosophical and conceptual issues as well as questions specific to a particular field of inquiry.

Further Reading: Day 2008; Paul 2015; Tucker 2009a, 2009b; Walsh 1958.

2. Main traditions

Three traditions have been particularly influential in philosophy of history and philosophy of historiography: speculative or substantive philosophy of history, analytical philosophy of history, and narrativism, or narrativist philosophy of historiography. Speculative or substantive philosophy of history is the oldest and most traditional approach. It seeks to understand the overall direction, meaning, intelligibility, or structure of historical development. Analytical philosophy of history emerged in the twentieth century and was largely defined in opposition to its predecessor. Rather than seeking the meaning or direction of history as a whole, it focused on the conceptual and epistemological conditions of historical inquiry. Narrativism was formulated partly in reaction to the analytical tradition. It argued that analytical philosophers of history had neglected the narrative, literary, and representational dimensions of historiography. Drawing on literary theory and theories of narration, narrativists shifted attention from explanation and justification to the ways historians construct meaningful narrative accounts of the past.

2.1 Philosophy of history

Substantive or speculative philosophy of history focuses on studying the nature and significance of history. This entry adopts the term ‘philosophy of history’ for the reasons outlined above and below. It typically presupposes that history exhibits some kind of pattern, structure, or goal-directed course. Some versions attempt to explain history in terms of underlying laws, principles, or regularities; others attribute to it a meaning, telos, or purpose; and many combine these elements. History has accordingly been conceived in many different ways: as linear and progressive or regressive, cyclical, rational or otherwise purposive, law-governed, necessary or contingent, determined or open-ended, and so on. In this sense, philosophy of history has been taken to go beyond ordinary historical inquiry by attempting to uncover underlying patterns, structures, or principles of history and to articulate the significance of history in general.

Many of the most celebrated figures in the history of philosophy can be classified as philosophers of history, including Immanuel Kant, Giambattista Vico, Johann Gottfried Herder, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Karl Marx, and Auguste Comte. Other figures associated with this tradition include Reinhold Niebuhr, Oswald Spengler, and Arnold J. Toynbee. More recently, Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis has often been regarded as a form of philosophy of history.

A canonical example is Hegel’s conception of history as the progressive realization of human freedom through a rational, dialectical process (1837 [1975]). This view incorporates several characteristic features of philosophy of history, including a commitment to historical purposiveness, the intelligibility of historical development, and the idea that history unfolds according to a necessary, internally structured progression. Hegel characterizes the ancient “Oriental” world as recognizing the freedom of only a single ruler, the classical Greek and Roman worlds as extending freedom to some, and the modern European world as advancing toward the recognition of freedom as universal. Marx offered another influential model of large-scale historical development. He interpreted history through successive modes of production and class struggle, often identified as primitive communism, slavery, feudalism, capitalism, and ultimately socialism and communism (Marx and Engels 1848; Marx 1859). History is driven by contradictions between productive forces and relations of production in these societies.

It has been typical for speculative philosophies of history to posit some kind of developmental path for humankind, often understood in progressive terms, as in Enlightenment thought. However, not all such approaches are progressive. Some conceptions are cyclical, as in Vico, who represents history as an intelligible process characterized by recurring stages of development and renewal. Others emphasize decline or degeneration, as in Spengler’s (1926–1928) account of the fate of Western civilization.

The widely used term speculative philosophy of history itself was introduced by later philosophical traditions, drawing on C. D. Broad’s (1924) distinction between speculative and critical philosophy. An alternative designation is substantive philosophy of history. The term “speculative” may suggest conjectural or insufficiently grounded theorizing. As Fain (1970, 216) notes, the term has often carried a pejorative connotation. Tucker (2004, 4) similarly characterizes it as a term of abuse within analytic philosophy. Critics such as Gardiner have indeed charged speculative approaches with disregarding or overriding facts, relying on vague and tautological hypotheses and presupposing unexamined a priori assumptions (1974a, 2). The term “substantive” in turn emphasizes engagement with the content of history itself.

These considerations suggest that the category is shaped in part by disciplinary demarcation rather than purely by intrinsic philosophical differences. As Dray (1964) observed, it encompasses a wide variety of different approaches, including explicitly metaphysical systems, theological interpretations, and also large-scale empirical studies of historical development. What unifies them is less a shared method, approach or principles than a common ambition to articulate large-scale patterns, meanings, or structures of history, an ambition generally absent from analytical philosophy of history.

Two further observations are in order. First, in empirically oriented cases such as Toynbee’s comparative study of civilizations, it is not always clear how philosophy of history differs from large-scale historical inquiries such as global history or Big History. The difference may be one of degree or scope rather than of kind. As Fain (1970, 231) suggests, there is no sharp boundary between “ordinary” and “philosophical” history; rather, the distinction may depend on whether interpretative principles are made explicit.

Second, some forms of philosophy of history may be understood as engaging in metaphysical inquiry. In seeking to identify the meaning, structure, or direction of history as a whole, they address questions about the nature of historical reality at a fundamental level. As Walsh (1958, 27; similarly Danto 1965, 8) notes, if the philosopher has a distinctive concern with history, it is with the course of history as a whole. In cases where such claims are advanced independently of empirical support and derived primarily from general philosophical principles, they take on a distinctly a priori character.

Further Reading: Fukuyama 1992; Hegel 1837 [1975]; Vico 1744 [1984]; Spengler 1926–1928; Toynbee 1934–1961; Walsh 1958.

2.2 Analytical philosophy of history

The analytical philosophy of history rose to prominence after World War II in the English-speaking philosophical world, although one of its foundational texts, C. G. Hempel’s “The Function of General Laws in History”, had already been published in 1942. It is also worth noting Maurice Mandelbaum’s earlier doctoral dissertation and subsequent book The Problem of Historical Knowledge: An Answer to Relativism (1938). Analytical philosophy of history developed partly out of dissatisfaction with (speculative or substantive) philosophy of history, but also in close connection with logical empiricism. In contrast to its predecessor, it can be understood as a second-order study: its focus is not on historical reality itself but on historiography. It analyses explanatory patterns and other conceptual presuppositions of historical inquiry.

Key representatives of the analytical philosophy of history include Hempel, Arthur C. Danto, Alan Donagan, William H. Dray, W. B. Gallie, Leon Goldstein, Louis Mink, Mandelbaum, William H. Walsh, and Morton White. At the time, philosophy of historiography was institutionally well represented in philosophy departments, and many of these authors contributed to broader philosophical debates. A central topic in analytical philosophy of history was explanation, but related issues included causation, knowledge, understanding, objectivity, determinism, and narrative in historiography.

In the spirit of logical empiricism and the unity of science movement, Hempel aimed to identify a common explanatory model for all sciences. Against the background of earlier debates about nomothetic and idiographic inquiry, exemplified by Wilhelm Windelband’s (1894 [1988]) distinction between sciences seeking general laws and sciences concerned with singular historical facts, historiography posed a particular challenge to such a common model because of its focus on singular events rather than general patterns. Hempel proposed that a covering-law model of explanation applies to historiography just as it does to the natural sciences: “general laws have quite analogous functions in history and in the natural sciences” (1942, 35). He rejected the view that sharply separates the social from the natural sciences and assigns to historiography a distinctive “method of empathetic understanding” (1942, 42; cf. Retz 2018), arguing instead that such methods are at best heuristic devices. Critics later argued that these debates often focused on forms of explanation irrelevant to the concerns of practicing historians. As Richard T. Vann remarks, philosophical discussions frequently relied on artificial examples involving burst radiators or cases of indigestion (1995, 41).

A sustained debate developed between empiricist and hermeneutically oriented approaches (Gardiner 1974a, 6). The latter, drawing on Hans-Georg Gadamer and R. G. Collingwood, emphasized that historical explanation concerns human action and must therefore appeal to reasons, intentions, and motivations. Dray reformulated this view in analytic terms as a rational-action model of explanation (1963). Hempel (1974), however, maintained that even explanations of particular actions presuppose some form of law-like generalization, such as those supplied by psychology. Mandelbaum offered qualified support, whereas Peter Winch (1958, 19) and others rejected the assumption of invariant laws governing human behaviour. A common objection to the covering-law model was that the laws it invokes are either too general to be explanatorily informative or too specific to qualify as genuine laws. Some also remarked that historians are not primarily concerned with explanation but with what happened, that is, with establishing historical facts (Goldstein 1996, 84).

Closely related to these debates was the question whether historiography is a science comparable to others. Hermeneutically oriented authors denied this, emphasizing the distinctive features of historical explanation. Separately, an important strand of discussion concerned the role of narrative. Danto and Mink argued that narrativity is a defining feature of historiography, a view subsequently developed by Hayden White. Danto introduced the notion of “narrative sentences”, which can be formulated only retrospectively. His well-known example is “The Thirty Years’ War began in 1618”, a statement that could not have been known at the time of the event itself. Mink, in turn, described narrative as a cognitive instrument through which historians integrate disparate events into a meaningful whole, remarking that “stories are not lived but told” (1987, 60).

The debate extended to the question whether narrative itself can be explanatory. Some argued that narrative is primarily descriptive and therefore distinct from explanation (Mandelbaum 1967; McCullagh 1969). C. B. McCullagh maintained that describing a sequence of events does not explain why the events occurred, and that explanation must involve generalization and predictive capacity. By contrast, Danto argued that narrative constitutes a distinctive and irreducible form of explanation in historiography, a view that has been further developed by later authors (see 4.1.1).

Finally, these discussions raised broader questions about the possibility of historical knowledge. Against relativist positions, Mandelbaum (1938) defended the possibility of objective historical knowledge by appealing to a distinction between facts and values. Danto, however, pointed out that complete factual descriptions of historical events would require reference to future developments and thus involve a kind of retrospective, seemingly “prophetic” perspective. Walsh (1942) applied William Whewell’s (1847) notion of colligation to historiography, emphasizing the active role of thought in organizing historical data into meaningful wholes. For Walsh, to explain in historiography is to trace connections between an event and others with which it stands in an “inner relationship” (1958, 23). The idea of colligation has been interpreted as supporting a form of constructivism, though this interpretation has also been subject to significant criticism (see 3.5.).

Further Reading: Hempel 1942; Dray 1957; Danto 1965; Gardiner 1974b; Mink 1970; Mandelbaum 1938; Walsh 1942; M. White 1965.

2.3 Narrativism

The analytical philosophy of history changed its shape after the decline of logical empiricism, and many of its central debates lost their topicality. In particular, the covering-law model was increasingly regarded as problematic, not only in historiography but also in the philosophy of science more generally. While analytical philosophy of history (in the terminology used below, as analytic philosophy of historiography; see 4.1) continued in the decades immediately following (e.g. Goldstein 1976; Gorman 1982, 1992; Raymond Martin 1989; Rex Martin 1977; Murphey 1973), a new narrativist orientation, associated especially with Hayden White and subsequent scholarship, emerged in the 1970s and came to dominate discussions for several decades. This shift was accompanied by institutional changes, as narrativism was predominantly pursued outside philosophy departments, especially in history and literature departments.

Although analytical philosophers of history had already addressed the role of narrative, White’s Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (1973) marks a turning point in the transformation of the field (cf. Ankersmit 1986, 18; Fay 1998, 2; Mink 1987, 22). It placed narrative at the centre of philosophical discussion. Narrative came to be treated as the main unit of historiography and of philosophical analysis.

The central concern of analytical philosophy of history had been to determine the scientific status of historiography and its relation to other sciences. With the emergence of narrativism, this orientation shifted. Narrativists emphasized instead the affinities between historiography and literature. The status of historiography as a science was thereby questioned and, in some cases, rejected. Narrativists also argued that analytical philosophers had focused too narrowly on individual statements or fragments of text, whereas the proper object of analysis is the historical work as a whole—its structure, organization, and narrative form. This shift toward the text reflects the fact that historians’ most characteristic scholarly products have been, and often still are, extended written works, typically book-length studies.

Another landmark publication is Frank Ankersmit’s Narrative Logic: A Semantic Analysis of the Historian’s Language (1983). Ankersmit argues that narrative sentences are paradigmatic of historical writing: historians state facts in order to relate them to other facts within a broader narrative structure. He develops the notion of a “narrative substance”, referring to the image or representation constructed by a historian’s text. Ankersmit also suggested that the analysis of historical texts should become an integral part of the philosophy of language; without this, it remains “a mere theoretical torso” (Ankersmit 2001, 283).

Three features can be taken to characterize narrativism. The first is a form of representationalism: historiography produces representations of the past, though not in the sense of simple copying or mirroring. The second is constructivism: narratives are constructed by historians from available traces or facts, often through literary techniques, rather than discovered as ready-made structures in the past. Narrativists accordingly draw on tools from literary theory, such as tropes, plots, and rhetorical structures. This is particularly evident in White’s Metahistory, which analyzes metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony as fundamental modes through which historians structure their accounts. The third feature is holism: historical narratives are treated as structured wholes, comparable in some respects to works of art, and cannot be reduced to their individual components without a loss of meaning (Kuukkanen 2015, 29–50).

Some forms of narrativism, especially those associated with White and Ankersmit, are often described as linguistic, since they focus on the linguistic and textual conditions of historiography (Kalela 1990, 90; Kuukkanen 2015, 25). White’s project has also been interpreted as having a political dimension, insofar as it emphasizes the freedom to configure the past in different ways. On this view, the past does not possess a fixed meaning independently of narrative interpretation (Paul 2011a, 116; see 3.6.).

In addition to these approaches, there are also phenomenological forms of narrativism, associated with Paul Ricoeur (1984–1988) and David Carr (1986), which understand narrativity as a condition of human experience and temporality. These approaches draw explicitly on phenomenological traditions, including Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and extend narrativist insights beyond historiography to human experience more generally.

Further Reading: White 1973; Ankersmit 1983; Ricoeur 1984–1988; Carr 1986; Paul 2011a.

3. Key concepts in philosophy of historiography

Contemporary philosophy of historiography is structured around a number of recurring concepts or conceptual problems. The following sections examine several of the most important of these. They both establish what is distinctive for the philosophy of historiography and highlight the connections to other philosophical areas and broader philosophical discussions.

3.1 Explanation and understanding

Explanation has been one of the central organising topics in philosophy of historiography. A classic point of reference is Hempel’s covering-law model, which framed mid-twentieth-century debates about whether historical explanation requires general laws. Although the covering-law model is no longer a live orthodoxy in either philosophy of science or philosophy of historiography, later discussions of historical explanation often remain intelligible against the contrast it established between law-based explanation and approaches emphasizing action, narrative, or causation.

Hempel’s goal is to provide a causal explanation for an event of a certain kind E. The basic idea is that if an event of the kind E is regularly preceded by a set of events C1, C2,…, Cn, these antecedent events may be regarded as causes of E and incorporated into a general explanatory schema. An explanation consists of:

  1. a set of statements asserting the occurrence of certain events C1, … , Cn at certain times and places;
  2. a set of universal hypotheses, such that
    1. the statements of both groups are reasonably well confirmed by empirical evidence;
    2. from the two groups of statements the sentence asserting the occurrence of E can be logically deduced. (1942, 38)

Group (1) specifies the determining conditions of the event to be explained, whereas group (2) contains the relevant general law. The same explanatory schema is therefore said to apply to all sciences, including historiography. A more concise formulation states that an explanation of a singular event is a deductive argument in which the explanandum is derived from initial conditions C1 … Cn together with law statements L1, …, Ln (Hempel 1942, 36; Hempel and Oppenheim 1948, 207–209). The model applies to both deterministic and probabilistic laws.

The pivotal feature of Hempel’s model is thus its appeal to general laws. This is significant because historiography is often understood to deal with particular events, persons, and processes rather than law-like regularities. Historical phenomena appear to require case-based explanations. Collingwood and his followers emphasized this point particularly forcefully (see 3.1.1 and 4.2.1). The particularity of historical phenomena has recently received renewed philosophical attention in the philosophy of the historical sciences, although for rather different purposes (see 4.1.2).

According to Hempel, explanations in historiography rely on various kinds of psychological, economic, sociological, and other regularities. Historical explanations may even presuppose laws from physics, chemistry, and biology. For example, explanations of institutional continuity may appeal to regularities concerning human behaviour, such as resistance to change, attachment to established practices, or reluctance to relinquish positions of power (Hempel 1942, 40).

Although the covering-law model has been the most influential theory of explanation in philosophy of historiography, it has largely fallen out of favour. Philosophers of science have identified a number of difficulties with the model, casting doubt on its suitability as a general theory of scientific explanation. There are also historiography-specific objections. The covering laws invoked risk being either too general and therefore explanatorily weak or too specific and therefore not genuinely law-like. Many historians have also regarded such laws as largely irrelevant to their explanatory concerns (Carr [1961] 1987; Vann 1995, 41).

Nevertheless, the question whether explanation in historiography is fundamentally similar to explanation in the sciences, or whether it requires its own distinctive theory, remains central. Contemporary accounts of historical explanation may be grouped into three broad approaches. Two maintain that explanation in historiography differs fundamentally from explanation in the sciences: (1) anti-causalist and rational-action theories, drawing on the German Verstehen tradition and British Idealism, especially Collingwood; and (2) narrativist theories, which develop Danto’s insight that narrative itself may be explanatory. The third approach aligns historiography more closely with the sciences: (3) causal theories that reject Hempel’s model but apply contemporary accounts of scientific explanation, such as Woodward’s interventionist theory. Each of these approaches is introduced in turn.

Further Reading: Gardiner 1974b; Hempel 1942; Dray 1957; entry on Carl Hempel.

3.1.1 Rational-action and anti-causalist theories of explanation

Anti-causalist accounts maintain that historical explanation differs fundamentally from explanation in the natural sciences (Schuman 2024). They are not opposed to the use of the term of “causation” as such, but insist that causation in historiography is unlike causation in the natural sciences. The object of historical explanation is human action, which means understanding the reasons underlying action rather than identifying external causal mechanisms. Historical explanation therefore attends to the thoughts, intentions, and purposes that make action intelligible. In this sense, anti-causalist approaches connect the theory of historiography with philosophical action theory. Dray developed this approach as a rational-action theory of historical explanation (1957). Others have continued this line, emphasizing the autonomy of action explanation and its irreducibility to causal or nomological explanation (D’Oro 2004, 2018; Ahlskog 2023).

In these approaches, cause and effect are not understood as wholly distinct, since an intention to do X is internally connected with the act intended. Actions are manifestations of intentions and reasons and are therefore internally or conceptually, rather than causally, related to them. Further, intentional ascriptions are context-dependent, presupposing, for example, the absence of external obstacles preventing the intended action. Historical explanations are thus characteristically purpose-related or teleological. (Schuman 2024)

Intentional explanation is not psychological explanation in the sense of identifying hidden mental causes; rather, it consists in connecting reasons with actions. Rational-action theories differ from narrativist approaches in that they locate explanation in the reconstruction of agents’ reasons rather than in retrospective narrative organization of the past. One potential criticism is that intentions appear too individualized to explain collective action, such as social change or the practices of groups. Anti-causalists respond that intentional explanation applies equally to collective action, the latter being constituted by interrelated intentional actions.

Rational-action theory presupposes that historians are able to reconstruct the reasons of historical actors. These reasons may be regarded as appropriate, rational, or justified, and historical explanation therefore contains an irreducibly normative dimension. Historians are consequently interested in details because they help reconstruct intentions, goals, beliefs, purposes, and states of mind from the available records.

History may accordingly be understood as a succession of intentional actions in which earlier actions transform the circumstances confronting subsequent actors, forming what Georg Henrik von Wright described as a “zigzag-model” of iterative intentional acts (1971). Anti-causalists use this idea to explain why historical accounts are typically presented as sequences of meaningful actions in the form of a narrative rather than as statements of general laws.

Further Reading: D’Oro 2004; Dray 1957; Martin 1977; Schuman 2024; von Wright 1971.

3.1.2 Narrativist theories of explanation

Although narrativism as a broader tradition was introduced above, narrativist theories of explanation form a more specific debate about how, and in what sense, narratives explain; the two do not fully coincide, since earlier narrativism was often directed against covering-law models of explanation and drew extensively on literary theory.

The narrativist theories of explanation continue a line of reasoning developed by certain analytical philosophers of history. Many emphasized both the indispensability of narrative sentences in historiography and the idea that narrative form is itself explanatory. The most vocal early defender of this approach was Danto (1965), while its main contemporary advocate is Paul Roth (2020). In a manner reminiscent of Mink (1970), Roth argues that narrative is an essential cognitive instrument for making sense of the world, including the past. Roth also defends a Whitean constructivist approach to historiography while maintaining that narrative does not preclude rational evaluation.

The narrative sentences characteristic of historiography entail a retrospective perspective, leading to a Dantoesque view: there are statements true of a particular time t that cannot be known at t, not even by Danto’s omniscient “Ideal Chronicler”, who perceives simultaneously everything occurring at that moment. Such truths become available only retrospectively. As new events and descriptions emerge, historiography moves not closer to an Ideal Chronicle but ever farther away from it. On this view, there are no pure events; events exist only under descriptions provided through narrative construction. What counts as historically significant emerges only retrospectively.

Narrativist explanations in historiography can be said to have three key features. The first is the nonstandardization thesis: unlike the natural sciences, historiography does not operate within a single standardized theoretical framework. In this sense, there is no equivalent of “normal science” or “normal history”. New perspectives, approaches, and redescriptions emerge continually, such as feminist historiography and critical race theory (Roth 2020, 9–14; Mink 1987, 139).

The second is the nondetachability thesis: narrative constructs both the explanans and the explanandum. What is explained cannot be detached from the narrative through which the explanation is articulated, since explanans and explanandum belong to the same narrative configuration (Roth 2020, 13–14; Mink 1987, 79).

The third is the nonaggregativity thesis: narratives in historiography do not cumulate towards one final universal history. New events, descriptions, and perspectives emerge continually. The past is therefore not a fixed object either, but something repeatedly remade through historiographical practice (Roth 2020, 14–15; Mink 1987, 194, 197).

What, then, is explanation in historiography? On the narrativist view, explanation consists in using narrative to display the unfolding, significance, and interconnections of events. Explanation is achieved not by subsuming events under laws but by situating them within a retrospective narrative structure. As Roth puts it, “historical explanation qua narrative explanation concerns itself with a developmental process that emerges only in retrospect” (2020, 20). Roth grounds this position in irrealism, originally formulated by Nelson Goodman (1978).

Irrealism in the philosophy of historiography explains why the past can be known only retrospectively: the past has no fixed form independently of the categories and descriptions through which it is organized. Since no organizing scheme can claim primacy, different historically constituted “worlds” or “pasts” are possible. This does not imply that all narratives are equally acceptable, since narratives remain subject to rational and evidential evaluation.

Further Reading: Danto 1965; Mink 1970, 1987; Roth 2020.

3.1.3 The causal theories of explanation

The causal theory of explanation is probably the most traditional form of explanation, at least in the sense that historians frequently refer to causes in explaining events. Causes and their effects are assumed to lie in the past, to be external to the human mind, and to be decipherable by the historian. Yet historians cannot be expected to be interested in all imaginable causes. The historian and theorist of history E. H. Carr ([1961] 1987) distinguishes between accidental and significant causes. The difference, however, does not concern the causal relation itself but rather the extent to which causes fit a historian’s pattern of generalizable rational explanation and understanding.

Carr imagines a case in which an intoxicated Jones, returning from a party, drives over Robinson. Potential causes of Robinson’s death include Jones’s intoxication, defective brakes, a blind corner, Robinson’s urge to buy cigarettes, and so on. The main criterion for a significant or “real” cause is that it contributes to a broader explanatory understanding and can be connected to other relevantly similar contexts and conditions. In the case of Robinson’s death, it is not generalizable that traffic accidents can be reduced by preventing smoking. Similarly, the “real” causes of the struggles of the Soviet Union in the 1920s may be debates over the rate of industrialization or over the problem of inducing the peasantry to grow grain for the towns, but not the premature death of Lenin (Carr [1961] 1987, 104–107).

Contemporary causal theories seek not merely to identify causes but to distinguish explanatorily relevant causes from background conditions. They receive a new formulation in James Woodward’s (2003) interventionist and counterfactual theory, which provides useful conceptual tools for analysing causal explanation in historiography as well (e.g. Virmajoki 2023). Woodward’s central claim is that causal explanations identify patterns of dependency between variables and thereby answer what-if-things-had-been-different questions (Woodward 2003, 201). More specifically, they show how changes in the explanatory factors would have made a difference to the explanandum (Woodward 2003, 11). Although historians cannot intervene experimentally in the past, the interventionist framework can still function as a conceptual tool for distinguishing explanatorily relevant causal factors from background conditions (Woodward 2003, 132; Virmajoki 2023).

A relevant counterfactual scenario may be identified by imagining contrastive situations to what actually happened—in effect, by asking what-if-things-had-been-different questions. This means varying antecedent conditions and testing whether the event would still have occurred had some conditions been different. If a putative cause C had not occurred, would E still have happened? Since there is a dependency relation between explanans and explanandum, manipulating counterfactual scenarios is thought to help identify explanatory causes and distinguish them from causally irrelevant background conditions.

A different set of effective causal factors may therefore be identified than in Carr’s examples. Relevant questions are whether Robinson would still have died had he not gone out to buy cigarettes and whether the Soviet Union would still have faced severe difficulties in the 1920s had Lenin remained alive.

More generally, if a cause or set of causes C can be identified such that altering C would have changed E, then C counts as causally explanatory of E. This kind of reasoning belongs to the broader family of counterfactual theories of causation, associated especially with Lewis and later interventionist approaches (Collins, Paul and Hall 2004; Lewis 1973; Woodward 2003). For example, if Archduke Franz Ferdinand had not been assassinated in Sarajevo in 1914, would World War I still have broken out? Such reasoning necessarily relies on historical thought experiments, since historians have neither experimental access to the past nor any way to manipulate antecedent conditions directly, unlike in laboratory sciences.

At the same time, it is necessary to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant causal factors. In explaining the assassination of Franz Ferdinand and the outbreak of World War I, the presence of oxygen in the air or the appropriate air pressure for the bullet to travel are undeniably part of the total causal conditions, yet they are not explanatorily relevant factors in the inquiry. A contrastive explanation therefore does not identify every causal factor involved in an event. Rather, it singles out those causes that are relevant to a particular explanatory question. Explanations are consequently selective and interest-relative (Ylikoski 2001, 20–21).

Counterfactual theories of explanation do not therefore attempt to provide what Hempel called “the complete description of an individual event”, which “would require a statement of all the properties exhibited by the spatial region or the individual object involved, for the period of time occupied by the event in question” (1942, 37). The relevance of causal factors depends on the specific research interest. A physicist, detective, and historian may all single out different causes of the same event. In this respect, counterfactual theories of explanation connect unexpectedly with Collingwood’s logic of question and answer: explanations are meaningful only relative to the questions to which they respond (see 4.2.1).

Further Reading: Carr [1961] 1987; Virmajoki 2023; Woodward 2003; Ylikoski 2001.

3.2 Narrative

Narrative may be regarded as the form most characteristic of historiography, although the concept is also widely used in numerous other fields in the humanities and beyond. In ordinary language, narrative often refers simply to a story. However, many philosophers of historiography, especially narrativists, typically reject this ordinary-language understanding. There is broad consensus that narrative should instead be understood as a structuring device organizing historians’ presentations of the past.

It is uncontroversial that historians deal with events and processes unfolding in time, although they investigate them indirectly through evidence and traces. The most basic way to organize events temporally is chronological ordering, as in a chronicle. However, although a chronicle orders events chronologically, it is not normally understood to constitute a narrative (cf. White 1980), because narrative is taken to possess a more complex structure. The minimal conception of narrative consists in a temporal sequence of events displaying a beginning-middle-end structure, showing how connected events unfold over time. Early narrativists, such as Danto (1962, 1965) and Mandelbaum (1967), indeed linked narrativity with this type of temporal ordering. Narrative is also sometimes taken to entail a causal structure, that is, cause-and-effect relations between events in temporal succession. The richest and most developed conception of narrative is found in narrativism. Narrativists understand narrative as a complex, holistic and culturally meaningful literary device possessing various rhetorical structuring features. A narrative integrates disparate elements into a unified text, creating a narrative whole that confers meaning and moral significance on historical events.

In addition to the question of what narratives are, narrative has prompted at least three kinds of questions: (i) Are narratives explanatory or descriptive? (ii) Are narratives essential for historiographical presentations? (iii) Are narratives impediments to acquiring objective knowledge?

The question whether narratives are explanatory (i) was already discussed above. Most analytical philosophers of history denied this, with some notable exceptions, in particular Danto. Some contemporary philosophers have continued to argue that narrative itself is a form of explanation (Roth 2020; see 4.1.1).

Another key question (ii) concerns whether narrative is an essential component of historiography. Roth argues that narrative is a uniquely suitable explanatory form for an epistemic practice focused on temporally unfolding events understood retrospectively (2020). Without narrative sentences, there is no historiography. Narrativists and postmodernists likewise commit to the essentiality of narrative, although they do not necessarily understand it primarily as an explanatory cognitive form. Postmodernists (e.g. Jenkins 2003) instead emphasize the literary features through which historians configure the past and human life, often for emancipatory purposes.

However, not all philosophers regard narrative as an essential cognitive tool of historiography. For Goldstein (1976), narrative is merely a superstructure in historiography, presenting the results of evidential and inferential research practices that constitute its deeper infrastructure. According to Goldstein, philosophers have paid too much attention to narrative presentation at the expense of epistemically more significant research practices. Tucker (2004) adopts this Goldsteinian distinction in contemporary philosophy of historiography. Postnarrativism (Kuukkanen 2015) regards narrative as one possible, but not essential, mode of historiographical presentation. More general criticisms of narrativity and narrative in historiography have also been developed by Strawson (2004) and Rosenberg (2018).

Are narratives impediments to acquiring objective knowledge (iii)? One’s response to Mink’s dictum that “stories [narratives] are not lived but told” (1987, 60) marks a central dividing line. A common view in philosophy of historiography is that the past itself is not narratively organized; narrative organization is instead introduced through historiographical narrative or representation. If historiography nevertheless relies on narrative in the production of historical knowledge, then such knowledge cannot be understood as a purely object-sided representation of the past.

Many have therefore suggested that narrative is needed to organize inherently meaningless events or what is sometimes described as a “myriad of facts” (1983, 78). Ankersmit has suggested that narrative—or, in his later writings, representation (e.g. Ankersmit 2024, 25)—is a transcendental condition for the possibility of historical knowledge. Structures, meanings, and morals are imposed on the past, which is devoid of them prior to the historian’s constructive act.

Ankersmit contrasts narrative idealism with narrative realism (1983). The former denies that a narrative is a picture or image of the past, whereas the latter accepts this and posits a correspondence relation between narrative and past reality. One way to formulate narrative idealism is to say that there are no truth-makers for narratives because the past is not itself narratively structured in a way that could make a narrative true (Kuukkanen 2015, 133, 142).

White likewise attributes a transcendental cultural function to narrative. He maintains that “real events do not offer themselves as stories” (White 1980, 8; cf. White 1978, 1–25), which makes their narrativization difficult. Nevertheless, narrativity functions as “a metacode, a human universal on the basis of which transcultural messages about the nature of a shared reality can be transmitted” (White 1980, 9).

Nevertheless, some philosophers have argued that the past itself possesses an underlying narrative structure, typically understood as a causal structure connecting events. In this case, a true historical narrative would constitute a faithful depiction of this underlying narrative structure (e.g. Carr 1986; Gangl 2023, 120–121; Currie 2023; cf. McCullagh 1998, Ch 7).

Further Reading: Danto 1965; Kuukkanen 2015; Mink 1987; White 1973; Ankersmit 1983; Roth 2020.

3.3 Representation

Representation is arguably one of the most traditional ways of understanding the relation between the historian’s account of the past and the past. In its traditional sense, representation may be seen as setting the standard both for historical knowledge and for historiographical practice: to produce as accurate an image of the past as possible. In Richard Rorty’s words, an ideal representation of its object would be indistinguishable from that object. It would function as a mirror image of it (1979, 376). Naturally, more abstract expressions of representationalism are necessary, because the form of representation most commonly used in historiography is textual. A text cannot be a mirror image of a non-textual past consisting of objects, people, and their practices.

Semantically, the term “representation”, with its “re-” prefix, implies that something is presented again: re-presented. The past or objects of the past must therefore already be given and then represented in a historian’s text. Ankersmit calls this the copy theory of representation. The connection to realism—with its conviction that historians describe the past “as it really happened”, or as Leopold von Ranke’s phrase wie es eigentlich gewesen has often been understood—is obvious. Realists often use related metaphors such as “latching onto”, “recapturing”, “recovering” and “reconstructing” the past. All imply that historiography aims to establish a match or correspondence between representation and represented reality.

Representation understood within this realist framework has also been a major target of criticism, narrativists and postmodernists being among its most vocal critics. If historians’ texts contain literary tropes and are saturated with meanings and morals, how could they constitute faithful representations of the past? If historians impose these structures on the past, then they are arguably not found in the past itself and therefore cannot be literally represented either. White suggested that we should not conceive of the relation between historical text and past reality as anything like a scale model, map, or photograph of the past (1978, 88).

A contemporary representationalist might nevertheless insist on a less metaphorical understanding of representation, drawing instead on the semantic and referential frameworks of contemporary analytic philosophy. On this view, representation concerns the referential relation between linguistic entities, such as statements and texts, and the non-linguistic objects to which they refer. Yet it remains unclear whether this move avoids the narrativist objection that textual structures, narratives, and configurations of the past are not discovered but imposed by historians relying on the conceptual and cultural resources available to them.

Notably, however, even many critics of representationalism retain the notion of representation while giving it a different meaning. According to White, historians still confront the problem of how to represent and re-create the past, although this cannot be done straightforwardly because narrative qualities such as coherence, integrity, fullness, and closure are imposed by historians themselves. Ankersmit likewise employs representational vocabulary extensively. According to him, “there can be no historical writing outside historical representation” (Ankersmit 2012, 47). Significantly, however, a different conception of representation emerges here. A historical text should be understood as a representation in much the same way as “a work of art is a representation of what it depicts” (Ankersmit 2001, 80). The relation between historical text and historical reality is thus understood aesthetically rather than epistemologically.

Naturally, the notion of artistic representation differs remarkably from the concept of representation found in analytic philosophy and realist philosophy of historiography. This understanding also has a long history in philosophy itself. For example, Benedetto Croce understood historiography as a type of artistic representation having real events as its object (Croce [1893] 2012, 500). Ankersmit draws on Gottfried Leibniz and proposes a distinction between “reference” and “representation”. Both stand in a relation to reality, but whereas descriptions may refer to reality through subject terms and predicates, representations can only be said to be “about” reality (2001, 41; see Ankersmit 2024). Artistic representations, akin to pictures, do not refer to entities and their properties in the same way as linguistic descriptions do. Historical representations instead form wholes that cannot be decomposed into independent parts.

Ankersmit calls this the substitution theory of representation because representation does not attempt to copy the past but to substitute for the absent past, typically in textual form. Yet it remains unclear whether such substitution can adequately relate to past reality itself. To address this issue, Ankersmit (2012) develops a tripartite account. There is (1) a representation, such as a text, which offers (2) an aspect of (3) represented reality. For example, a biography of Napoleon Bonaparte does not represent Napoleon in his entirety but presents one aspect of him. This approach places aesthetics prior to hermeneutics: understanding representation becomes a prerequisite for understanding the past.

There are therefore two very different notions of representation in philosophy of historiography, and they should be kept distinct. One is a resemblance or copy theory of representation, which seeks to provide as faithful a copy of the represented object as possible. The second is an aesthetic or substitution theory of representation, which conceives representation aesthetically, as an artistic presentation of the past.

Some philosophers remain skeptical whether the notion of representation should be applied to historiography at all and seek either to deflate or abandon it entirely. If the arguments against realist representation succeed, postnarrativism argues that retaining representationalist vocabulary keeps historiography tied to what John Dewey called the spectator theory of knowledge, seeking illusory matches between subject and object. In the spirit of Rortyan anti-representationalism, postnarrativism proposes replacing the vocabulary of “re-presentation” with that of presentation (Kuukkanen 2015, 67).

Further Reading: Ankersmit 2001, 2012; White 1978, 1980; Rorty 1979.

3.4 Knowledge and truth

Almost all contemporary orientations in philosophy of historiography assume that historiography produces knowledge, although some postmodernist approaches have cast doubt on this assumption. Naturally, conceptions of what constitutes historical knowledge vary considerably. It is therefore necessary to focus both on how knowledge is understood and on what kinds of epistemic objects historiographical inquiry should be taken to concern. The section then introduces some main conceptions of truth as applied to historiography.

A commonsense view is that historiography produces knowledge about a fixed and given past. For the epistemological realist, knowing consists in producing an accurate representation of, or correspondence between, a historian’s text and the past. Von Ranke’s nineteenth-century ideal of writing history “as it really happened” is perhaps the most recognizable formulation of this realist approach, although Ranke himself also expressed doubts whether this ideal can ever be fully achieved. The famous phrase wie es eigentlich gewesen is qualified by the following words: “One tries, one strives, but in the end it is not attained. Let none be impatient with this!” (1981, 58–59). Likewise, the twentieth-century historian Geoffrey Elton maintained that there is always a truth to be discovered. Because “historical matter is in the past”, it is “beyond being altered for any purpose”, although Elton also acknowledged the practical difficulties involved in recovering how the past actually was (1967, 53–54). Mandelbaum likewise defended the objectivity of historical knowledge on similar grounds (1938). Contemporary realists such as McCullagh (1998; see 4.3) and Murray G. Murphey (1973, 1994, 2009) continue to defend this broadly representationalist conception of historical knowledge, according to which historians can know the past insofar as their accounts accurately represent an independently existing past.

The answer to what can be known depends on how the field of epistemic objects is configured. Traditionally, epistemological inquiry has focused on what can be known about past events, processes, and persons. However, the scope of epistemological inquiry into historiography should also encompass interpretations, narratives, colligations, intentions, and other synthetic products. These may perhaps count as knowledge as well (cf. Ohara 2026). If so, the conception of knowing itself may also need to change.

On most realist conceptions of historiography, historical knowledge depends on accounts that accurately represent, correspond to, or otherwise fit an independently existing past. It is sometimes questioned because there are no clear criteria for determining when the correspondence relation holds in historiography, such as between a text and the past. A more serious challenge emerges on the grounds that the past does not appear to possess the kinds of literal qualities and structures typically found in historians’ texts. Colligatory concepts, such as the Cold War or the Renaissance, pose a particular challenge. They are colligations, which do not seem to refer to any specific object. Nevertheless, some understand them as referring to the historian-independent objects and structures (McCullagh 1998; Timmins 2022).

Narrativists commit to a form of constructivism, emphasizing that the past is not narratively structured prior to historians actively configuring it into narrative form. As discussed in the previous section on representation, this may be expressed by saying that there are no truth-makers for historians’ texts or narratives, although narratives themselves may still function as potential truth-bearers. This is epistemological anti-realism. Constructivism leads to ontological anti-realism only if knowledge is understood representationally. In that case, there would be nothing for historians to re-present or re-construct, at least at the level of narrative configurations.

Much of the debate on historical knowledge has also revolved around whether constructivist and anti-realist approaches inevitably lead to relativism or skepticism. For example, Lorenz argues against narrativism and what he calls the metaphorical turn, which says that narratives have no truth-value. According to him, narratives refer to a “real past” and therefore convey the knowledge about the past (1998, 326). Historians attempt to produce a true story. Truth-tracking epistemic criteria, such as scope, explanatory power and comprehensiveness, guide in this endeavour. (Lorenz 1998)

There are also other conceptions of knowing, such as pragmatist conceptions (e.g. Goering 2013; Gorman 2007; Kuukkanen 2015; Viola 2020; Piercey 2017). Knowing consists in successful participation in a practice of historiography, such as knowing how to produce a rationally persuasive argument to see the past in a certain light. Yet another option is Putnamian internal realism in historiography, where factuality, reality and truth are understood in relation to some framework. Lorenz has applied internal realism to the German Historikerstreit (1994).

The rejection of the realist conception of knowledge and the entailed correspondence theory of truth has led many to alternative theories of truth, such as the coherence theory of truth (see Kuukkanen 2021). It is open to typical challenges of coherentism, such as that a connection to the external reality is lost. Kuukkanen (2021, 2025) has also advocated a form of pragmatist conception of truth in historiography, such as Sellarsian conception of truth as assertability. Yet another option is to avoid talking about truth and focus on the role of justification in historiography (Paul 2015).

An additional difficulty concerns the accessibility of the research object itself, since the past appears inaccessible to historians studying it. This epistemological challenge is nevertheless often accompanied by a commitment to the reality of the past. Yet it remains unclear in what sense the past exists and in what form.

Doubts concerning whether the past is directly given and accessible may lead to anti-realist conceptions of historical knowledge, although usually not to skepticism. Instead, anti-realism typically shifts the epistemological focus toward the justification of historians’ epistemic products and the practices through which historians acquire epistemic credibility (Paul 2015). Yet even constructivist and anti-representationalist approaches typically insist that historiography remains constrained by facts. White (1973), for example, denied that narratives mirror the past while nevertheless maintaining that historical narratives must remain factually grounded. Roth (2020) denies that the past is simply given but still holds both that facts exist and that historical knowledge is possible, although he characterizes his own position as irrealist rather than anti-realist.

Historiographical knowledge is typically understood as indirect and inferential, mediated through traces, documents, testimony, and other forms of historical evidence. In agreement with Goldstein (1976), Tucker (2004) argues that historiographical knowledge is necessarily inferential because its object is unobservable. Tucker models historiographical reasoning on Bayesian principles and on the transmission of information through evidential channels linking past events to present traces, such as documents, artefacts, testimony, and other remains. The aim is to identify common historical origins of coherent and independent items of evidence. On Tucker’s Bayesian account, the more improbable their agreement would be in the absence of a common historical source, the more strongly that agreement supports the hypothesis of such a common origin (2004, 2014).

Postnarrativism (Kuukkanen 2015) suggests that the key epistemological notion in historiography should be epistemic authority: what features make an account of the past epistemically credible or belief-worthy. Knowing the past is understood as a rational and argumentative achievement. In this respect, postnarrativism offers a pragmatist conception of historiography. Knowledge is not defined through usefulness but through rule-governed and discipline-specific argumentative and interpretative practices, without treating representation as their ultimate end goal.

Further Reading: Goldstein 1976; Lorenz 1998; Mandelbaum 1938; McCullagh 1998; Roth 2020; Tucker 2004.

3.5 Colligation

As mentioned in 2.2, Walsh’s suggestion is that historiography colligates: it traces non-obvious connections between events that stand in an inner relationship. He borrowed the term from Whewell, who understood colligation as an “act of thought” which brings a number of empirical “facts” together by “superinducing” upon them a conception that integrates them. It provides the “true bond of Unity by which the phenomena are held together” (Whewell 1847, 46–48; see also Snyder 2023). An example could be the known data points of the orbit of Mars and their colligation under the conception of an elliptical curve.

For Walsh, colligations are “appropriate conceptions” (1942, 133), which form intrinsically related coherent wholes, such as the “Industrial Revolution” and the “Enlightenment”. We may note that similar integrative or synthesizing notions can be found in many authors, such as Danto’s narrative sentences or temporal wholes (Danto 1965, 142, 248, 255), Mink’s configurational modes, Morton White’s central subject (M. White 1965, 221), Ankersmit’s related notions of images or pictures of the past, colligatory concepts, and narrative substances (1983, 93), and Hayden White’s text-unifying tropes (1973).

The main idea behind all these notions is that they integrate units of information to form something new and thus create novel historiographical information. An interesting question is how they are (i) constructed and (ii) justified. Whewell thought that they are chosen through a “special process in the mind” that involves some kind of inference or inferences (Snyder 2023). Danto implied that their construction involves an “inexpungible subjective factor” (Danto 1965, 142). Cebik argued that colligation adds something, but not new empirical information: rather, it adds “a conceptual framework, a kind of discourse” (1969, 45).

Two main lines of interpretation open up again: constructivist and realist. The former say that colligations cannot be thought to have existed before the constructive act of creation (Ankersmit 1983; Kuukkanen 2015, ch. 6; Walsh 1974). The latter understand them as representing historian-independent objects and structures (McCullagh 1998; Timmins 2022).

Constructivist about colligation emphasizes the inferential and interpretative process of the historian, in which the historian is confronted with a mass of material that seems unconnected at first sight. Constructivists argue that several colligations can always be constructed out of the same data, making the view in effect analogous to the Quine-Duhem thesis of the underdetermination of theory by data. Realists maintain that colligations are inherent structurations of the past and can be discovered.

Constructivists argue that the high number of colligations in the history of historiography, and their often metaphorical and creative nature, seem to support the constructivist view. Examples of colligations include notions such as “Antiquity”, “Renaissance”, the “Cold War”, “Enlightenment”, the “Scientific Revolution”, and the “Industrial Revolution”, to name just some of the most well-known. Notably, some well-established colligations at one time, such as the Scientific Revolution, are often later given up (Shapin 1996; Cunningham and Williams 1993). At the same time, a consensus regarding the suitability of a colligation might be understood as a fallible sign that it gets the past uniquely right. A probabilistic and evidentialist approach, such as Tucker’s, might be used to argue that an uncoerced and sufficiently heterogeneous consensus among historians indicates an epistemically justified account whose convergence has a common origin in the past (Tucker 2004, 2014). More generally, however, consensus as such may also be explainable by groupthink, lack of imagination, coercion, and other factors.

For the realist, the ultimate justification of a colligation is that it represents the past as it is and is therefore objectively given independently of the historian. However, it is not clear what this means in terms of criteria: how are we to assess their correctness? Some have developed ways to assess the viability of colligations without implying that any is necessarily uniquely correct, although some more justified than others. Kuukkanen suggests that epistemic values, such as exemplification, coherence, comprehensiveness, scope, and originality, could be used to provide rational but non-algorithmic justifications for colligations, showing some untenable and some more tenable than others (Kuukkanen 2015, chs. 6 and 7).

Colligatory concepts might perhaps be compared to natural kinds. Some have also suggested that they are comparable to theoretical or general concepts (White 1978, 272; Tucker 2004, 138). However, these comparisons are in tension with two features of colligatory concepts. First, colligatory concepts are not taxonomic. For example, the Renaissance does not create a taxonomic, genus-species category of things of the kind “Renaissance” in the way that taxonomies of biological species or chemical elements are created. Secondly, colligatory concepts are not general concepts, but individuals in themselves, which nevertheless organize and subsume other individuals, such as events, objects, and people, under them, as in the case of “Renaissance” paintings, sculptures, practices, scholars, etc. Colligatory concepts may therefore be distinctive philosophical notions in their own right, not reducible to natural kinds or theoretical terms, and especially characteristic of historiography.

Further Reading: Whewell 1847; Walsh 1942; Cebik 1969; McCullagh 1978; Kuukkanen 2015; Timmins 2022.

3.6 Ethics and politics

While the emphasis on the scientific status of historiography has been a strong current, many have emphasized that historiography does not produce ethically and politically innocent knowledge about the past. From this perspective, the aim of writing objective history, wie es eigentlich gewesen, is illusory. There seem to be three key premises behind this approach: (a) the narrativist idea that the past is not given but must be narratively constituted; (b) the political idea that everyone has a right to write their own history; and (c) the assumption that there is no uniquely correct interpretation of the past.

White may be read as arguing for “an existentialist-inspired understanding of human flourishing” (Paul 2011a). Humans are not only able to exercise their freedom of interpretation, but are also unable to escape their responsibility to endow the inherently meaningless past with meaning. The most vocal analysts of the political and ethical dimensions of historiography are postmodernist and narrativist scholars (Jenkins 1991, Munslow 2007; Pihlainen 2017). They are mostly concerned with how the writing of history can be used for emancipation from oppressive traditions, conventions, and power.

Interestingly, postmodernists typically commit to the existence of historical facts but maintain that these facts alone are insufficient to determine historical meanings and values. Meanings and values are imposed on history through historians’ interpretations. Because history has no inherent meaning and there are no uniquely correct values by which it must be interpreted, the writing of history is radically open. Keith Jenkins writes that we can “see history as being (logically) anything you want it to be” (Jenkins 1991, 13). On this view, historiographical interpretation should be directed toward emancipation and liberation, making emancipatory and material differences in the present.

History writing therefore means, in effect, passing moral judgment on the past and affecting how the potentials and politics of the future are seen. Postmodernists typically criticize institutional history as maintaining the status quo and prevailing power structures. An important influence here is also Rorty’s (1989) view of philosophy as edifying rather than concerned with epistemology and getting things right about the past. We can also detect influences from Foucauldian research programmes, according to which knowledge is power and means using power. “Objectivity” is seen as an attempt to solidify one’s inherently political, and often dominant, account of history as uniquely correct.

Postmodernism is typically seen as relativist, advocating the view that “anything goes” in historiography. However, Pihlainen (2017, 38–62) replies to this charge by arguing that objectivist research paradigms commit to the principle of “nothing changes”, that is, to the conservative maintenance of the status quo. In any case, postmodernists downplay, and sometimes discount, epistemological evaluation of historiography as impossible or misplaced. It would nevertheless be inaccurate to characterize most postmodernists as global relativists insofar as value principles and their implementation matter. Interpretations that advance genocide or racial segregation would arguably not be acceptable. Nevertheless, neither the relation of moral philosophy and politics to interpretation, nor the acceptable kinds of values and politics, are normally spelled out.

It is also possible to emphasize the ethical and political dimensions of historiography without any explicit commitment to postmodernism. An example could be postcolonial history writing, which critiques the legacy of European colonialism and re-examines the past from the perspectives of the colonized rather than the colonizers (Chakrabarty 2000; Rothberg 2009). Further, recognizing the value-laden character of historiography does not necessarily disqualify the role of epistemological evaluation. It is possible to see values as part of a more comprehensive palette of historiographical evaluation. An older precedent is the Neo-Kantian view, associated especially with Rickert (1986), that historical inquiry is value-related: historians select and individuate their objects of study in relation to values or cultural significance, without thereby abandoning claims to objectivity. Contemporary ethical discussions also address questions of historical injustice, collective memory, apology, reparations, and the responsibilities that present generations may bear toward the past (Bevernage 2012; Lorenz and Bevernage 2013)

Further Reading: Bevernage 2012; Chakrabarty 2000; Jenkins 1991; Pihlainen 2017; Rorty 1989; White 2014.

3.7 Time and temporality

Discussions of time and temporality in philosophy of historiography should not be confused with the philosophy of time. Instead of metaphysical questions concerning the existence or nature of time, the former focuses mainly on two questions: (a) how time is experienced by different people and in different cultures and societies; and (b) what kinds of alternative temporal rhythms, layers, and forms of synchronization there are. Temporality matters philosophically because different conceptions of time imply different understandings of historical change, continuity, causation, and human agency.

The starting point is often modern unilinear time, which provides a single temporal continuum extending from the past through the present toward the future, as in a standard calendar, and is presupposed in much historiography. This framework has often been connected with progressive conceptions of historical development. The Newtonian conception of absolute time forms one important background for the idea of a uniform temporal continuum.

In a classic article, Fernand Braudel (1958) remarked that temporality in historiography does not concern only events. He distinguished between the short time of events, the slower time of social and economic conjunctures, and the longue durée of geographical and environmental structures. Reinhart Koselleck (1979), approaching the issue from the perspective of conceptual history, argued that the survival of historiography requires developing a theory of historical times. According to him, every concept has its own internal temporality. There are always alternative and competing times that cannot be fully synchronized. Koselleck argued that historical actors orient themselves between a space of experience inherited from the past and a horizon of expectation directed toward the future.

Some contemporary authors have diagnosed a crisis of the modern temporal regime (Hartog 2003; Lorenz and Bevernage 2013). Hartog describes this condition as presentism, a situation in which the present increasingly dominates relations to the past and future. Whereas modernity was characterized by a strong orientation toward the future and expectations of progress, presentism weakens the horizon of expectation and makes it difficult to imagine long-term futures. Historical consciousness becomes increasingly centred on memory, heritage, and the management of the present. Related discussions have examined how contemporary societies negotiate the boundaries between past, present, and future, particularly in relation to memory, trauma, and historical injustice (Lorenz and Bevernage 2013).

The assumption of a single, homogeneous historical time has also been challenged by accounts of multiple temporalities. On this view, historical processes do not unfold at one uniform pace: political events, economic conjunctures, social practices, technological change, and environmental structures may follow different rhythms, durations, and rates of change (Jordheim 2014, 505).

In order to manage different “temporal regimes”, involving variable rhythms and organizations of time, humans have adopted various temporal devices and media, such as calendars, clocks, narratives, encyclopedias, and mobile phones. These considerations have also contributed to new periodizations, such as “the Anthropocene”, and to renewed reflection on the plurality of historical times and regimes of historicity (Tamm and Olivier 2019). The Anthropocene has challenged the assumption that human and geological timescales can be clearly separated. It can now also be argued that the horizon of expectation has become particularly opaque because of the possibility of “unprecedented” environmental, technological, and political changes (Simon 2019).

Further Reading: Braudel 1958; Koselleck 1979; Hartog 2003; Jordheim 2014; Tamm and Olivier 2019.

4. Contemporary approaches

This section turns to contemporary approaches in philosophy of historiography. Some of these approaches have already acquired a recognizable profile and typically concentrate on one or a few key concepts. Others are less established but address topics likely to become increasingly important in future debates.

4.1 Analytic philosophy of historiography

Analytic philosophy of historiography, as the term is used here (cf. Kosso 2009), is influenced by analytical philosophy of history (see Section 2.2) and by contemporary analytic philosophy, especially the philosophy of science, the philosophy of language, and epistemology. Much like the analytical philosophy of history, which was influential from the 1940s to the 1970s, analytic philosophy of historiography attempts to advance philosophical understanding of historiography. Nevertheless, there is no single common doctrine or fixed set of shared commitments among its practitioners beyond a general respect for the kind of philosophical argumentation associated with analytic philosophy. Different approaches have also drawn on a number of other intellectual orientations.

For present purposes, analytic philosophy of historiography may be divided into three broad approaches: (a) analytic narrativism, (b) the philosophy of the historical sciences, and (c) postnarrativism. All three are discussed briefly, and only insofar as their topics have not already been examined above.

4.1.1 Analytic narrativism

Analytic narrativism integrates the insights of two earlier traditions in philosophy of historiography: analytical philosophy of history and narrativism. The latter focused on the narrative features of historiography and even defined the nature of historiography through narrative properties. However, narrativism often downplayed questions of explanation and epistemology in historiography.

Analytic narrativism addresses these concerns. Narratives are understood as cognitive and explanatory tools. On this view, narrativity does not undermine the scientific and epistemic status of historiography, nor its capacity to generate understanding and knowledge of the past. The most influential contemporary representative is Roth, whose thinking has been influenced by Danto. The influence of H. White, W. V. O. Quine, and Donald Davidson is also apparent.

Chiel van den Akker (2018) is another contemporary philosopher of historiography who draws on Danto as well as on Goodman. He defends the view that historians “see” something in the past that was not there, such as Burckhardt’s idea that modern man was born in the Renaissance. The past is indeterminate and always open to retrospective redescriptions, constrained by the conceptual and descriptive resources available to historians. According to van den Akker, a narrative expresses a historical thesis, while the past exemplifies this thesis. He suggests that we should not speak of justification but of the exemplification of a thesis, because there is no empirical evidence for or against it. Yet, on this account, the thesis can be both credible and true about the past.

Analytic narrativism also suggests that historical and retrospective perspectives can be applied more generally to the self-understanding of various disciplines. One may consider, for example, the history of analytic philosophy. There may be multiple rival, evidentially constrained narratives about how it emerged and unfolded, since narrative explanations need not be either standardizable or aggregative in the way required by a single final account of the past (Roth 2020).

Further Reading: Roth 2020; Van den Akker 2018.

4.1.2 The philosophy of the historical sciences

The philosophy of the historical sciences rejects the association of historiography with the study of the human past alone. It suggests an alternative way to categorize the sciences. Instead of the distinction between the natural sciences and the human and social sciences, as exemplified by the neo-Hegelian tradition extending from Croce to Collingwood and beyond, it proposes a distinction between historical and non-historical, or theoretical, sciences. This breaks the customary divide by identifying both natural and human fields, such as geology, paleontology, cosmology, evolutionary biology, historiography, historical linguistics, and archaeology, as historical sciences. According to this approach, historical sciences seek to identify specific, unique past events, or token events, while theoretical sciences, such as physics and chemistry, focus on discovering universal regularities and repeatable laws, or event types.

The historical sciences also contrast with experimental sciences because the research objects and phenomena of the latter are typically available for direct observation or intervention, whereas historical inquiry typically proceeds from present traces to past events. The central epistemological problem of the historical sciences is therefore how present traces can justify claims about unobservable past causes. Historical sciences are fundamentally inferential in that they necessarily infer past entities, processes, and events from information preserved from the past. Knowledge of the past thus emerges through historiographical inferences. Historical sciences identify information-preserving receivers, such as fossils, strata, genetic markers, or historical documents, and decode the signals in order to infer their origins.

Tucker argues that this kind of historiographical reasoning requires probabilistic, Bayesian forms of inference, which cannot be fully reduced to general scientific models, let alone to mere storytelling. A key indicator is that the wider the agreement among uncoerced and uniquely heterogeneous group of historians about what happened, the more probable it is that there is a common origin of information for this agreement (Tucker 2004; 2014). Agreement functions as evidence when independent and mutually coherent items of information are most plausibly explained by a common origin. The philosophy of historical sciences has recently emerged as its own research programme in philosophy of historiography. It can also be said to provide a philosophically principled justification for Big History and similar attempts, such as so-called deep history.

Further Reading: Cleland 2002; Currie 2018; Kosso 2001; Tucker and Černín 2025; Tucker 2004; Turner 2007

4.1.3 Postnarrativism

Postnarrativism was initially formulated in Postnarrativist Philosophy of Historiography (Kuukkanen 2015). It takes on board the so-called narrativist insight: historians’ comprehensive texts, typically presented in book form, constitute the most important knowledge contributions of historiography. However, postnarrativism does not take narrative as the most pivotal theoretical unit of historiography. Nor does it see the production of narratives as the main rationale of the field. These two assumptions explain the suffix ‘post’ in “postnarrativist philosophy”.

According to postnarrativism, the central theoretical unit in historiography is a thesis about the past, put forward by a historian in her book. Historiography is understood as a rational practice aiming to provide the best argument and proposal for how to view the past. Historical works are therefore understood primarily as argumentative interventions rather than as narratives. Although the historian’s thesis does not possess truth-makers in the past, being a colligatory and constructive product, it can nevertheless be rationally evaluated through three dimensions of evaluation. Two of them are internal to historians’ scholarly output: the epistemological dimension, referring to epistemic values such as exemplification, coherence, consistency, scope, comprehensiveness, and originality; and the rhetorical dimension, referring to the argumentative qualities of a text. The third one is the discursive dimension, which refers to success of a historian’s thesis as an argumentative intervention in the relevant argumentative context.

Since historiography is perspectival, postnarrativism denies that historical inquiry will converge on one ultimate view of the past. It also emphasizes that philosophy of historiography should be understood as a subfield of philosophy of science. Other scholars have also adopted the label “postnarrativist”, although their approaches diverge from the original formulation. Berger, Brauch, and Lorenz understand postnarrativism as a general label for non-representationalism, which rejects the idea that texts are representations of the past but still retains the evidential standards or factual component of history writing (2021, 6–11). In this reading, postnarrativism applies to authors such as Tamm and Pihlainen. Jansen (2019) attempts to find a middle way between narrativism and postnarrativism, calling Kuukkanen’s postnarrativism weak. Jansen supports the postnarrativist emphasis on research infrastructure and argumentation, but wishes to preserve what he sees as the key narrativist contribution: narratives or representations are indivisible wholes, which may nevertheless be true representations of the past.

Further Reading: Kuukkanen 2015.

4.2 Humanistic and posthumanist approaches

The humanistic philosophy of historiography is an older, traditional approach. Posthumanist approaches seek to displace the human from the centre of both the past and historiography and have emerged only relatively recently. One posthumanist approach, the philosophy of the historical sciences, has already been discussed above (see 4.1.2)

4.2.1 Humanistic philosophy of historiography

Historiography has typically focused on studying the human past and producing written accounts of it. The traces of human life, including documents, artefacts, monuments, inscriptions, and other remains, have traditionally constituted the primary raw material of historiography. A fundamental distinction has been that between the human sciences and the natural sciences, or between the humanities and the sciences. A classical formulation of this distinction is found in Dilthey (1883 [1989]): the former require understanding (Verstehen), while the latter may be explained causally and on the basis of the laws of nature. A related but methodologically more explicit distinction was developed by Neo-Kantians such as Windelband (1894 [1998]) and Rickert (1986), who distinguished historical or individualizing inquiry from law-seeking forms of inquiry.

This hermeneutical approach was developed and applied to historiography by Gadamer and Collingwood in particular. Collingwood emphasized that although many other fields deal with the past, such as geology, evolutionary biology, and cosmology, historiography focuses on the normative structures and cultural significance of human practice. The historian does not merely describe acts but attempts to understand the intentionality behind those acts. As Collingwood famously stated, “all history is the history of thought” (1946, 215). Collingwood’s re-enactment theory has also been associated with the tradition of historical empathy (Retz 2018).

In the Collingwoodian framework, a description of physical processes and facts in the past amounts only to external history. Genuine human historiography requires an internal perspective on the minds of people. Different fields answer different questions, and all questions rest on inquiry-specific underlying presuppositions. Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon can be described as a set of bodily movements, but such a description does not explain the reasons for, or the significance of, his doing so. Humanistic historiography therefore treats meaning, intention, and normativity as irreducible dimensions of historical inquiry.

Collingwoodian philosophy, British idealism, and the defense of humanistic scholarship have been reinvigorated in recent years, partly in response to naturalistic and posthumanist approaches that seek to decentre human agency in historiography (Ahlskog 2021, 2023; D’Oro 2020, 2023, 2025; D’Oro and Connelly 2025; Retz 2018).

Further Reading: Ahlskog 2021; Collingwood 1946; Dilthey 1883 [1989]; D’Oro 2020, 2023.

4.2.2 Non-human and more-than-human history

Recently, the long-held conviction that historiography concentrates on the human past has thus been questioned, and the scope of historiography has been expanded beyond the human. A prominent approach in this direction is so-called Big History. Although it is not primarily a philosophical project, it is consequential with regard to the understanding of historiography. Big History attempts to situate human beings within a historical trajectory on a cosmic scale, beginning from the Big Bang and extending to present-day events. It seeks to identify patterns and recurring themes in this 13.7-billion-year development, such as cosmic evolution and energy flows. The human becomes its subject only at the very end.

Big History is an interdisciplinary project that draws on numerous disciplines in constructing a large-scale account of the past. Chaisson (2014) describes it as linking a wide range of academic disciplines, including physics, astronomy, geology, chemistry, biology, anthropology, social studies, and the humanities. A key idea in Christian’s account is that new levels of complexity emerge at different thresholds in cosmic, biological, and human history. According to Christian, “human history marks the sudden and unexpected emergence of a new level of complexity”, comparable to the first appearance of stars, of life on Earth, or of multicell organisms (2004, 139). These forms of complexity emerge locally and precariously, requiring energy flows that allow such systems to climb “entropy’s remorseless down escalator” (2004, 510).

This decentering of the human from history is clearly inconsistent with how historiography, including archaeology, has traditionally been perceived. Big History’s idea of cosmic evolution can also be interpreted as a master narrative, in the sense discussed by both narrativism and postmodernism. It is presented as a unified and typically uniquely correct account of both cosmic and human evolution.

Scholars working in the theory and philosophy of history have also argued that the human-centered conception of history is now archaic (Tamm and Simon 2020). The new conception of history may include studying animals’ experience of being with humans, for example, and possibly even writing history from the perspective of animals (Domańska 2017). This more-than-human history means widening historical horizons far beyond the human horizon, both in relation to the past and the future (Simon 2020). What unites all these approaches is the rejection of the assumption that humans constitute the exclusive or primary subject matter of history.

Further Reading: Christian 2004; Domańska 2017; Tamm and Simon 2020; Simon 2020.

4.3 Realism vs anti-realism

The analytical philosophers of history were generally not interested in the realism–anti-realism dispute, although they were interested in knowledge and the justification of beliefs. This attitude may in part have been inherited from logical positivism and empiricism, both of which often regarded such debates as metaphysical pseudo-problems. Nevertheless, after the arrival of narrativism, the pendulum swung towards anti-realism, both in ontological and epistemological senses.

Several authors have in recent years initiated a concerted defense of realism in historiography (Currie 2023; Currie and Swaim 2021; Førland and Mitrovic 2023; Timmins 2022). Nevertheless, it is not easy to spell out what this new realism is and against whom exactly it is formulated (Kuukkanen 2026b; Dewulf and Roth 2022; Ohara 2026). Perhaps the clearest conceivable target would be a radical idealism denying that there ever was a past in the sense of people, material objects, interactions, and events before our time. But it is unclear who in philosophy of historiography actually holds such a view. No one appears to believe that the world did spring into existence five minutes ago, as Bertrand Russell famously suggested as a sceptic’s challenge (1921, 159–160; Ohara 2026). The claim that there still is a past, or pasts, opens up a different debate, invoking the philosophy of time, such as the dispute between presentism and eternalism.

Ohara (2026) suggests that historical realism should be delineated specifically, rather than treated simply as a version of realism in general or of scientific realism. He understands it as a local metaphysical thesis committed to the mind-independent existence of some historical entities, independently of perception, cognition, language, and concepts. On this account, the anti-realist does not deny the existence of the external world or of entities in general, but only of certain historical objects. Epistemological realism and anti-realism, in turn, concern the problem of historical scepticism. Ohara argues that there are various conceptual options ranging from weaker to stronger forms of realism, anti-realism, and scepticism, depending on the objects under investigation; scholars may therefore be realists about some historical objects and anti-realists or sceptics about others.

Perhaps the most interesting topic concerns whether the past is given and has some specific form or structure. Naturally, this question has implications for its knowability. The anti-realist approach holds that the past has no pre-ordained structure. It follows that reconstruction or re-presentation is not possible, if these notions are taken literally. In Putnam’s words, this can be expressed by saying that there are no self-identifying objects independent of all our conceptual choices (Putnam 1981, 53–54).

By contrast, the realist holds that the structure and objects of the past are given and exist independently of our descriptions. For example, some appear to believe that the past is composed of a definite event ontology. Currie (2023) defends a realist view of historical narratives and events, arguing that attention to historical practice and archival work puts pressure on Mink-style anti-realism. He compares historiography to paleontology, where extinct organisms are identified on the basis of bones and other relics. Roth has indeed called this kind of view the “woolly mammoth” view of the past, because it seems to make an analogy between something like arctic explorers finding this entire frozen mammoth preserved intact and being readily identifiable, and the historian discovering the past constituted of similar fixed configurations (2012, 314).

A related debate in philosophy of science concerns natural kinds. Anti-realist approaches often tend toward nominalism: conceptual schemes are treated as choices made for pragmatic and other reasons. Realists, by contrast, speak of “latching onto” human-independent reality. As noted above, some approaches in philosophy of historiography argue that the dichotomy between realism and anti-realism is not especially useful or interesting, Roth’s irrealism being one example (see Section 3.1.2.). Pragmatism also attempts to overcome this dichotomy and to focus attention on questions with more practical relevance for historians.

Further Reading: Currie 2018; Currie and Swaim 2021; Dewulf and Roth 2022; Putnam 1981; Ohara 2026; Roth 2012.

4.4 The revival of the substantive philosophy of history

After the emergence of analytical philosophy of history, (substantive or speculative) philosophy of history was firmly rejected in academic studies of history. Popper (1945; 1957) had also linked it with totalitarian inclinations because many philosophers, such as Plato, Hegel, and Marx, saw history as directed towards a utopian end state. If the course of history is guided by unconditional laws of history, a certain future seems inevitable, and opposition can be suppressed as regressive or contrary to progress.

However, since the 1990s, philosophy of history has experienced a moderate revival, at least in general culture and the popular imagination. The most important catalyst for this revival was Fukuyama and his thesis of the end of history in The End of History and the Last Man (1992). More recently, popular works such as Yuval Noah Harari’s Sapiens (2014) have further contributed to renewed interest in large-scale narratives about the development and future of humanity.

Drawing on Hegel and Kojève, Fukuyama uses philosophy of history to explain and justify a development quite opposite to Popper’s fears. The end of history thesis states that Western liberal democracy had emerged as the final form of human government after its main ideological rivals had been defeated, exhausted, or had lost their claim to provide viable alternatives (Fukuyama 1989, 1992). Economic development, which Fukuyama associates with capitalism, forms one part of his explanation of historical convergence towards liberal democracy. Yet it does not by itself explain this historical trajectory. For Fukuyama, the movement towards liberal democracy depends on two desires: the desire for dignity, and the desire for economic betterment, prosperity, and a higher standard of living.

Recent political events, such as the failure of U.S. led democratic nation-building in Iraq and specifically in Afghanistan in the 2000s, the rise of authoritarian China, and the rise of populism, have challenged the idea that history moves linearly towards increased freedom and liberal democracy. Naturally, they may also be perceived as mere setbacks on the progressive path. Nevertheless, insofar as these events represent a failure of the liberal-democratic project in some sense, and presuppose an alternative view of future history, they show the significance of philosophy of history for informing and guiding practical and political action.

Some contemporary scholars (Simon 2019; Tamm and Simon 2020) also regret the turn away from philosophy of history to philosophy of historiography. This shift narrowed the scope of inquiry to discipline-specific issues, whereas, in their view, the focus ought to be on historical change, involving agents and perspectives beyond human beings. This can be regarded as a contemporary form of (substantive) philosophy of history because it seeks to understand the development of history as a whole, on a planetary or even species-wide scale, although not necessarily as driven by strict laws of history. Contemporary (substantive) philosophy of history is generally future-oriented and possibility-oriented rather than law-oriented.

A key premise is that our current condition may prompt unprecedented technological, ecological, and socio-political changes, such as anthropogenic climate change, artificial intelligence, and other existential risks. These authors suggest that historical thinking is in crisis because of unforeseen changes and radically discontinuous forms of historical development. They therefore urge us to engage in “quasi-substantive philosophy of history” (Simon 2016) with the aim of mapping possible future paths.

Further Reading: Fukuyama 1992; Popper 1957; Simon 2020.

5. Emerging approaches

This section discusses topics that have recently emerged in philosophy of historiography and philosophy of history and may become increasingly significant in future research. In some cases, the connection to philosophy of historiography may not even be explicitly recognized by the scholars involved.

5.1 Pragmatist philosophy of historiography

One traditional way to understand historiography is as a craft or practice (Bloch 1949 [1953]; Ginzburg 1989). Despite this, pragmatism has not been comprehensively applied to historiography, although there are some pragmatist versions of historiography or closely related fields (Binder 2023; Goering 2013; Grigoriev 2025; Kuukkanen 2015, 2017; Pihlström 2022; Piercey 2017; Viola 2020). This is not to say that their understanding of pragmatism is necessarily shared. An earlier example is Gorman (2007), who develops a form of pragmatic holistic empiricism, drawing especially on Quine, to analyse historiographical judgement, choice, truth, and factual synthesis.

What would pragmatist philosophy of historiography be? Perhaps the most general expression is to say that pragmatists prioritize doing over thinking, practice over theory, and action over contemplation. More pointedly, pragmatists assume that the notions of practice, doing, or action are among the most fundamental philosophical notions. Other philosophical notions can be defined by reference to them. Further, pragmatists are also typically although not always disinclined to engage in metaphysics.

Historians produce claims about the past in the form of books and other contributions. Their practices also include source criticism, contextualization, comparison, interpretation, argumentation, writing, publication, and participation in scholarly debates. Pragmatist philosophy of historiography focuses on how warrant is produced in historians’ practices. Sellars-Brandom inferentialism provides one possible framework (Goering 2013; Kuukkanen 2015; Piercey 2017). A broader pragmatist framework for understanding knowing as correct doing, and warrant as internal to rule-governed practices, is developed in Kuukkanen (2026a). One needs to identify the kinds of, perhaps field-specific, inferences that historians draw in achieving their conclusions. The practice of drawing inferences produces justification and warrant for what is claimed.

An important part of historians’ practice is to show their entitlements, both textually and in public defenses, to their discursive commitments. Naturally, discursive practice takes place in a community. This practice is guided by rules, which provide the grounds for normativity: what kind of practice is correct or incorrect. A particularly fruitful area of research focuses on outlining the rules that guide historians’ inferential and scholarly activity. Some studies have also investigated values and virtues, as well as vices, guiding historians’ practices (Day 2008; Paul 2011b). Values can be understood as rule-like norms. For example, the epistemic value of coherence can be formulated as the rule that historians should provide coherent accounts of the past and prefer more coherent over less coherent ones.

Further Reading: Bloch 1949 [1953]; Ginzburg 1989; Goering 2013; Kuukkanen 2026a; Paul 2011b; Pihlström 2022; Viola 2020.

5.2 Interdisciplinary Connections: History and Philosophy of Science

The history and philosophy of science (HPS) has been a flourishing field at least since the heyday of the great historical philosophers of science, such as Stephen Toulmin, Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, Imre Lakatos and others. Although historians and philosophers of science have actively debated whether history of science is progressive and how the history of science should be written, they have rarely linked these studies to the philosophy of history and the philosophy of historiography. It can be argued that there is a significant overlap between the scholarly topics of HPS and both these approaches.

5.2.1 Philosophy of the historiography of science

Historiography of science is historiography. This truism has an important implication: there can also be a philosophy of the historiography of science, that is, philosophy of historiography in the context of HPS. This means that the key questions discussed above regarding explanation, narration, representation, knowledge and truth, as well as ethical and political questions, are relevant also for the philosophy of the historiography of science.

While philosophical reflection on the historiography of fields such as art history, economic history, and military history is normally regarded as falling within the scope of philosophy of historiography, reflection on the historiography of science is typically treated separately, within history and philosophy of science. Indeed, HPS has discussed the challenges of history writing for decades. Despite this, there are very few general philosophical reflections on the historiography of science (Golinski 1998; Kragh 1987; Zammito 2004). A notable recent project is narrative science, although it focuses more on the use of narrative in scientific research than on the historiography of science (Morgan and Hajek 2022).

There may of course be features that are unique to the historiography of science. For example, in many sciences, the research object is nature or some aspect of it. In objectivist accounts, this was often treated as an invariable and ahistorical element in the history of science. Indeed, the default option prior to historical philosophy of science was some kind of objectivism, according to which nature, observations of nature, and scientific reasoning determine scientific theories (e.g. Gillispie 1960). Objectivist and cumulativist accounts of scientific progress, which Kuhn called a textbook view of science (1970, e.g. 1–3), are still written (e.g. Weinberg 2015).

Historical philosophers of science, and in particular Kuhn (1970), established that there are radical theory changes, including scientific revolutions, challenging the idea of linear and cumulative scientific development and suggesting that scientific accounts depend on temporally variable conceptual schemes. This questioned the objectivist image of the history of science. It also motivated an examination of how science should be explained if we cannot assume that it automatically progresses, if undisturbed, like a train moving on rails unless an accident strikes (Bloor 1991, 8). Some philosophers have nevertheless sought to understand scientific progress as an approach towards the truth. Popper’s original formal attempt (1963) to account for revolutionary scientific progress through verisimilitude, or truthlikeness, failed (Miller 1974; Tichý 1974), although others have subsequently developed the notion of truthlikeness (e.g. Oddie 1981; Niiniluoto 1987).

On a more general level, this question concerns the kinds of factors that influence the development of science and should be taken into account when writing the history of science. A non-exhaustive list of explanatory factors includes nature, phenomenal stimuli, reasoning, methods, and various kinds of social factors. Some have seen this list as more or less open-ended (Pickering 1995; Solomon 2001).

Some of the most well-known explanatory models and conceptualizations of the dynamics of science are: problem-solving and other epistemic values (Kuhn 1970), rationality as internal history as opposed to external history (Lakatos 1971), rational and progressive through increased problem-solving (Laudan 1977), evolutionary approach (Hull 1988; Kuhn 2000; Toulmin 1972), the natural-causal explanation and symmetry principles of the strong programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge (Bloor 1991), and actor-network theory with its various theoretical notions, such as actants and immutable mobiles (Latour 1987). Finally, Chang’s historical-philosophical pluralism suggests that the historiography of science can be more than a retrospective account of science. It can also contribute to science itself by recovering neglected alternatives and showing how different systems of practice and knowledge may remain epistemically productive (Chang 2012).

Although a philosophy of the historiography of science exists implicitly, it has rarely been developed as a distinct and explicit field of inquiry.

Further Reading: Chang 2012; Golinski 1998; Kragh 1987; Zammito 2004; Kuhn 1970; Lakatos 1971.

5.2.2 Philosophy of the history of science

HPS can also be understood as contributing to the philosophy of the history of science. The debate on scientific progress is perhaps its most common discussion. Typical questions concern: (i) convergence and teleology: does science approach some goal over time, such as truth?; (ii) the nature of historical development: is the development of science characterized by steady accumulation, problem-solving, revolutionary change, or something else?; and (iii) the drivers of historical change: is the history of science ultimately shaped by rational and epistemic considerations, or by social, political, and material factors?

Although this has not always been recognized, these are genuine questions in philosophy of history. They deal with the nature of a historical process, attempting to understand what it is like, and focusing on history as a whole. Typical questions concern the direction, structure, and driving forces of a historical process, namely the development of science. For example, if the history of science is shown to be an inherently rational process, or if it is established that science approximates truth about the world ever more closely in the course of history, this will also apply to science that is yet to come. These questions have generated a number of competing models of scientific development and progress.

Kuhn’s Structure, for example, can be read as a book in philosophy of history insofar as it gives an account of historical change, focuses on the whole history of science, and stipulates a structure of the history of science to explain historical events (Kuukkanen 2021). Question (iii) also belongs to the philosophy of the historiography of science, as discussed above.

The celebrated historical philosophers of science, such as Kuhn (1970), Feyerabend (1975), Lakatos (1970, 1971), and Laudan (1977, 1981), were all interested in questions of progress. This discussion continues today (Bird 2007; Shan 2022). There are also newer topics, such as whether the development of science is contingent or inevitable. This debate concerns the extent to which scientific discoveries, theories, and practices depend on historically specific circumstances, or whether scientific development would eventually converge on broadly similar outcomes despite differences in historical origins and trajectories (Soler et al. 2015; Soler and Sankey 2008; Radick 2008). The explanatory models of scientific change discussed in the previous section (5.2.1.) not only stipulate how historians of science explain scientific change, but also imply rival conceptions of the overall development of science. Recently, it has also been argued that scientific change is a law-governed process and that it is possible to develop a general theory of scientific change (Barseghyan 2015).

Further Reading: Kuhn 1970; Laudan 1977; Hull 1988; Bird 2007; Shan 2022; Soler and Sankey 2008; Radick 2008; Soler, Trizio, and Pickering 2015.

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