Emily Elizabeth Constance Jones

First published Fri Mar 25, 2011; substantive revision Sun Nov 15, 2026

Emily Elizabeth Constance Jones (1848–1922), a contemporary of Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore at Cambridge University, worked primarily in philosophical logic and ethics. Widely regarded as an authority on philosophical logic by figures as diverse as F. C. S. Schiller and G. F. Stout on the one hand and C. S. Peirce on the other, Jones appeared in published symposia alongside such eminent contemporaries as W. E. Johnson and Bernard Bosanquet. Among her contributions to philosophical logic is her “law of significant assertion,” which maintains that predication consists in “an identity of denotation” combined with “diversity of intension.” She here anticipates, in rough outline, Frege’s distinction between sense and reference—although her own distinction is grafted onto a conception of logical form entirely alien to Frege’s. Her major publication, A New Law of Thought and its Logical Bearings (Cambridge University Press, 1911), contains an enthusiastic preface by Stout and was received favorably in Mind. In the same year, Russell delivered a paper to the Cambridge Moral Sciences Club, subsequently published as “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description,” responding to a critical paper by Jones, itself delivered to the same society some months earlier. In ethics, Jones was widely respected as a defender and expositor of the views of her teacher and mentor, Henry Sidgwick (Sidgwick regarded Jones as one of his prize students), and took part in published debates on “rational hedonism” with F. H. Bradley and J. S. Mackenzie. Yet, despite the fact that she published numerous articles, a monograph and several textbooks (some going into multiple editions), and was a very visible member of the English philosophical community from the 1890s until her retirement in 1916, her work was entirely forgotten until almost a century after her death.

Following a biographical sketch (section 1), sections 2–4 focus on Jones’s work in philosophical logic—in particular, her law of significant assertion and her criticisms of Russell; section 5 is devoted to Jones’s contributions to ethical theory.

1. Biographical Sketch

Born in Herefordshire, England, in 1848, Emily Elizabeth Constance Jones entered Girton College, Cambridge University’s recently established women’s college, in 1875. (Her brothers’ education took priority over her own, delaying her entry into the academy and occasioning subsequent interruptions.) Although Girton did not award degrees to women students (full University membership would not be granted until 1948), Jones nonetheless appears to have received a rigorous education: she studied for the Moral Sciences Tripos under Henry Sidgwick, James Ward, and John Neville Keynes, receiving a “First Class,” with Sidgwick among her examiners. As she would recollect, many years later, “I was in a magic world of thought— of great thinkers, of unrivalled teachers—a new heaven and a new earth” (1922, 54). It was due to the interventions of Sidgwick and Ward that Jones, fluent from childhood in both German and French, was offered to complete, upon graduation, the remaining half of a translation of Hermann Lotze’s massive Mikrocosmos, left unfinished by Elizabeth Hamilton (the recently deceased daughter of Sir William Hamilton). Jones later went on to become Sidgwick’s literary executor. Her research in philosophical logic dates from 1884, when she began her career at Girton College as Resident Lecturer in Moral Sciences and was called upon to teach courses in logic; she later became Vice-Mistress and, subsequently, Mistress of Girton. During this period, Jones wrote two treatises in logic as well as a short primer, the latter going through several printings. In her Elements of Logic as a Science of Propositions (1890), whose main philosophical themes are summarized in “The Import of Categorical Propositions” (1893a), Jones developed her “law of significant assertion”—the “new law of thought” which would become the focus of her subsequent work in philosophical logic, culminating in the eponymously-titled monograph, published by Cambridge University Press in 1911. During the same period Jones also published numerous papers, as well as an introductory text in ethics (Jones 1909). While her writings in this area were primarily devoted to the exposition, interpretation and defense of Sidgwick’s work, she ably defended her hedonistic interpretation of The Methods of Ethics and arguably broke new ground in her treatment of a problem the book left unresolved—what Sidgwick referred to as the “dualism of practical reason.” Jones was also a capable administrator. When she became Mistress of Girton in 1903, the college was £43,000 in debt (equivalent to £4,650,656.76 in 2026); at the time of her retirement in 1916, the debt had been paid off, and funds had been raised to finance several fellowships. In addition, undergraduate enrollment increased and new buildings were added. Her death in 1922 was marked by the appearance of substantial obituaries in Mind, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society and The International Journal of Ethics (now Ethics).

2. A New Law of Thought

2.1 The Problem of Predication

In her autobiography, Jones wrote of an early fascination with the nature and structure of content:

This unsettled question—what is asserted when you make a statement, and what is the proper form of statement?—had deeply interested me from the time when I was a student and puzzled over Mill’s and Jevons’ accounts of propositions. (Jones 1922, 71; emphasis added)

Hermann Lotze formulated the problem as a paradox. This paradox, well known to Jones, provides a helpful entry point to Jones’s central contribution to philosophical logic:

This absolute connection of two concepts S and P, in which the one is unconditionally the other, and yet both stand over against each other as different, is a relation quite impracticable in thought; by means of this copula, the simple ‘is’ of the categorical judgment, two different contents cannot be connected at all; they must either fall entirely within one another, or they must remain entirely separate, and the impossible judgment, ‘S is P’, resolves itself into three others, ‘S is S’, ‘P is P’, ‘S is not P.’ (Lotze 1888, 79)

To predicate P of S is either to say of S what it is not, or it is to say of S what it is. That is, it is to say that S is not S (because it is P), or it is to say that it, S, is S. We either get a contradiction—we say, in effect, that S is not S—or an instance of the law of identity—we say that S is S. Neither option is satisfactory.

For Lotze, the upshot of the paradox is that, grammatical appearances notwithstanding, the basic form an assertion takes is that of an identity statement or its negation. This renders him incapable of making sense of what Jones called “significant assertion.” The content of an assertion, if it is not to be an absurdity (A is not A), must be a triviality (A is A). (Lotze vaguely hints at a pragmatic account of the apparent significance of what he counts as trivialities, remarking that, perhaps, “what we mean by them will eventually justify itself.”) As we shall see, Jones does not depart from Lotze’s austere conception of logical form: an affirmative proposition S is P states an identity, and is true just in case the extension of S = the extension of P. However, she is able to graft a notion of intensional content onto Lotze’s logical skeleton, thus avoiding the paradoxical consequences of his claim that all positive assertion is to be analyzed in terms of A is A.

The debate surrounding this paradox was not marginal, but at the center of contemporary discussion. The notorious “regress” argument developed in the second chapter of Bradley (1893)—well known to Russell and Moore—is a more sophisticated variant of the argument presented by Lotze. (See the entry on Bradley’s Regress.)

The paradox highlights what Donald Davidson called “the problem of predication.” He states it in bracingly simple terms:

In English, ‘John mortal’ is not a sentence. It becomes one if the word ‘is’ is inserted between noun and adjective. This is a fact of syntax or grammar. But what is the semantic role of the copula? This question and related questions about the nature of predication have been evident since Plato. Yet despite the earnest regard which the semantics of natural languages has attracted over the years, no one who was aware of the problem has come up with a satisfactory account of predication. (2005, 76–77; emphasis added)

Davidson emphasized the centrality of the problem: “if we do not understand predication, we do not understand how any sentence works, nor can we account for the structure of the simplest thought that is expressible in language.” Thus, however “niche” the problem may look to contemporary readers, we cannot pretend to understand the nature of linguistic meaning unless we solve it.

While Lotze’s solution to the problem of predication will strike contemporary philosophers of language as implausible, something like Lotze’s approach has approach has been adopted by certain philosophers working on the metaphysics of predication. Here, the problem concerns what it is for a particular—this leaf, say—to have, or instantiate, the universal, greenness. (This contrasts with the Lotzean concern, which focuses on what it is for the leaf to be said to instantiate greenness.) Baxter (2001), for example, holds that what it is for the leaf to instantiate greenness is for there to be an identity between an aspect of the universal and an aspect of the particular (see also Armstrong 2004, 46–48).

2.2 Identity Propositions and Significant Assertion

The distinction between the intension (or connotation) and extension (or denotation) of names, which traces back to the Port Royal Logic, was widely acknowledged by nineteenth century logicians. The distinction was applied, as a rule, to general names, not proper names. With regard to proper names, logicians generally sided with John Stuart Mill in holding that they lack connotation. Keynes, for example, maintained that proper names are “non-connotative”—that is, “their application is not determined by a conventionally assigned set of attributes” (Keynes 1906, 42; see also Bosanquet 1888, 48–9). As I will argue, Jones seems to have sided with these logicians.

Jones’s “New Law of Thought”—the law of significant assertion—incorporates the distinction as follows:

The Law of Significant Assertion:
Any Subject of Predication is an identity of denotation in diversity of intension. (Jones 1890, 46; 1910–11, 169; 1911b, 2)

The general idea is quite straightforward: when we predicate a property of an individual or collection x, we first identify x via an intension f and then assert its identity with an individual or collection y, where y is itself identified via a distinct intension, g. We thus combine “identity of denotation” or “denotational oneness” with “diversity of intension”. As she puts it as early as 1893, “the very essence of Categorical statements… is the reference (in affirmatives) of two terms to one object, in such a way as to indicate that the object (or group) pointed out by the one term has also the characteristics signified by the other…” (1893a, 219). Or, as Stout writes in his Preface to Jones (1911b), “every affirmative proposition asserts, and every negative proposition denies, the union of different attributes within the unity of the same thing” (Stout 1911, v).

Note that, for Jones, singular sentences (‘Socrates is mortal’) as well as quantified sentences (‘All humans are mortal’) are both of the subject-predicate (S is P) form. As we will see in 2.3, her conception of logical form is equally austere: S is P always asserts an identity. Accordingly, she takes the terms of ‘All humans are mortal’ to be the quantifier phrase ‘All humans’ and the predicate ‘mortal’. (“I understand the terms to include the whole of any proposition except the copula” [1893–94, 36].) This departs from the then-standard view, which distinguishes, in addition to the copula, subject term (‘humans’), predicate term (‘mortal’) and quantifier or “term indicator” (‘all’). It also departs from the Fregean view of the logical forms of quantified sentences, on which a quantifier phrase does not function as a grammatical subject.

There are thus only two propositional forms that can properly be referred to as logical forms for Jones—identities and their negations. While Jones holds that S is P asserts an “identity of denotation” in “diversity of intension,” S is not P asserts “difference of denotation” in “intensional diversity”. (As an early critic, Augusta Klein (1911) noted, for a statement of the latter form to be informative more is required than Jones indicates: the intensions must overlap to a significant degree for the claim of their diversity to be informative.)

Jones thus solves a problem that must be faced by anyone espousing the view that predication is, at root, identity. If assertively uttering a sentence exemplifying S is P is construed as asserting a proposition of the form A is A, then we fail to capture the point of the assertion. The assertion appears significant and informative; yet the content is trifling—something about which we can hardly be “informed.” If we take the general form of assertion to be an informative identity—to be “an identity of denotation in diversity of intension”—then the problem disappears.

The solution applies to cases of the kind that interested Frege—sentences that are explicitly of the form A = A. For Frege, ‘George Eliot is Mary Ann Evans’ is the model of an identity statement: the sentence is true just in case the individual referred to by ‘George Eliot’ bears the identity relation to the individual referred to by ‘Mary Ann Evans.’ Moreover, it is informative because ‘George Eliot’ presents its referent in a manner that differs from the way in which ‘Mary Ann Evans’ presents the same referent. (See the entry on Frege—in particular, the section Frege’s Philosophy of Language.)

While it might seem that Jones and Frege are pointing to the same phenomenon, there are two important differences. First, Jones, like Mill, denies that proper names have connotations in the way that common nouns do. As she writes, “the proper name of a person… must be allowed… to have only a minimum of connotation, while a class-name… may convey a maximum of connotation” (Jones 1890, 35–36; see also Jones 1905/1912, 13). While she acknowledges that there is conventional information associated with a proper name, it is, as she also notes, too minimal to determine an extension. The information she has in mind is metalinguistic in nature: ‘bearer of the name N.’

Second, the cases in which Jones does apply her paradigm—the law of significant assertion—are precisely the ones where Frege deems it inapplicable. Jones, for example, takes a generalization like ‘All lions are mammals’ to assert an identity between the lions and (a subset of) the mammals, and invokes her law to explain the informativeness of the statement. But Frege denied that this statement is an identity. While Frege did hold that common nouns like ‘lion’ and ‘mammal’ have a sense, he construed these as functions, and not as singular terms referring to a class.

Thus, while there are superficial similarities, it’s hard to disagree with Frege’s own assessment that there is “no broad agreement” between their views (Frege [BW], 108). See also Peijnenburg and Schaar (2025), who conclude that “the two distinctions differ in important aspects. Frege’s Bedeutung is not the same as Jones’s extension, and his Sinn is not the same as Jones’s intension.” Green (2023) also emphasizes the disanalogies.

Caplan (forthcoming) is an important dissenting voice. He argues, however, that the analysis of identity sentences in Jones (1892) is in fact a variant of the metalinguistic theory of identity sentences developed in Frege’s Begriffsschrift (Frege 1879), not the more well-known theory of Frege (1892), described above. On the metalinguistic theory, ‘Cicero = Cicero’ and ‘Cicero = Tully’ convey different metalinguistic propositions and thus differ in information content. See also Janssen-Lauret (2024), (2025), who argues that Jones anticipates the theory of Frege (1892).

2.3 Applying the Analysis

As we have seen, Jones analyses affirmative propositions as identity statements. Applying the analysis can be less than straightforward, however. Consider (1):

  1. All lions are carnivores.

Which identity statement does (1) assert? On Jones’s view, (1) is true just when ‘all lions’ and ‘carnivores’ have the same extension; it is informative just when the identity holds and the terms convey distinct intensions (Jones 1893–94, 36). But to turn (1) into an identity would seem to require that we take all lions and carnivores as arguments of the identity relation. The result, however, is a clearly false proposition, in contrast to (1), which is true. In fact, Jones, takes (1) to assert a relation between all lions and some carnivores, where the latter is understood to be an arbitrary subset of the set of carnivores. The result is that (1) receives what is in effect the following truth condition, which is adequate:

  1. The set of lions = X, for some subset X of the set of carnivores.

She goes on to apply the analysis to a variety of statement forms (see 1911b, 48–53), although nothing like a translation algorithm is provided.

There are also foundational worries. As W. E. Johnson objected in an early exchange with Jones, the analysis seems to presuppose the very notion it seeks to eliminate (Johnson 1892, 23). Consider (3):

  1. Socrates is mortal.

On Jones’s analysis, (3)’s logical form is given by ‘Socrates is identical to some mortal.’ Using contemporary notation, this becomes (4) (recall that, for Jones, ‘some mortal’ refers to a class):

  1. \(\exists y (y\in \{x | \textit{Mortal}(x)\}\amp \textit{Socrates}=y)\)

As Johnson notes, in thus specifying the set of mortals (‘the set of things x such that x is a mortal’), we are invoking the relation of predication—the very notion that Lotze, and by implication Jones, rejected as unintelligible. (Jones responds in Jones 1893a; see Ostertag 2023 and 2025, 12–14, for discussion; see also Ladd–Franklin 1890, 562, for related criticisms.)

2.4 Significant Assertion and Existence Claims

Jones’s analysis delivers puzzling results when applied to attributions of non-existence and impossibility. Consider (5) and (6).

  1. Dragons are non-existent.
  2. Round squares are impossible.

These are analyzed as (7) and (8), respectively:

  1. The set of dragons = X, for some subset X of the set of non-existent things.
  2. The set of round squares = Y, for some subset Y of the set of impossible things.

As (7) indicates, for (5) to be true, the extension of ‘dragons’ must belong to a given set—the set of non-existent things. But then this extension must exist—in some sense. In response, Jones invokes a “region of supposition” a subset of what exists in the broadest sense of that term. Accordingly, (5) states that the set of dragons, which exists in a region of supposition, is a subset of those things not existing in “the region of physical nature.” Similarly, (6), as shown by (8), states that the set of round squares, which exists in this special region, is a subset of those things not existing in “the region of space (or space-imagination)” (1893b, 454).

What Jones saw is that for (5) and (6) to be true (or even false), their subject terms must have an extension. Since the terms have no extension in the physical or imaginable universes, respectively, she invokes a special realm of entities to serve as the universe of discourse: a region of supposition. But then what (5) asserts cannot be that dragons are non-existent in this region. Rather, what it asserts is a different sort of non-existence—namely, the kind of non-existence applicable to physical objects. Similar remarks hold for (8). Thus, the thesis that claims like (5) and (6) presuppose a special universe of discourse comes packaged with an implicit thesis concerning predicates like ’non-existent‘ or ‘impossible’—namely, that their sense is determined by the nature of the subject term.

As Caplan (2023) notes, in claiming that negative existential claims presuppose a more restricted sense of existence, Jones follows Brentano, whom she cites as holding that “the mind in every judgment accepts some object as existent, and regards the proposition expressing the judgment as true” (Jones 1892b, 277; cited in Caplan 2023: 12).

While Jones’s proposals did not attract the attention of commentators, she was working on topics on the agenda of her leading contemporaries, including Russell. Caplan (2023) is a detailed study of Jones’s views on non-existent objects and impossibilia; Caplan (2022a) presents her views on fictional reference.

2.5 The Laws of Thought

The title of Jones’s final book, A New Law of Thought, is doubly misleading.

First, the laws of thought were then commonly understood to be the following: the law of identity, the law of non-contradiction, and the law of excluded middle. These can be thought of as schemata or templates (Jones 1911b). But Jones does not state a new schema in addition to these three; nor does she intend the new “law” to supplant the law of identity. The law of identity asserts that A is A, whereas the new law of thought asserts that such an identity, to count as a predication, must present the successive occurrences of the referent under distinct connotations.

What then is the status of her law, vis-à-vis the other laws? The following passage provides some help:

If we genuinely accept A is A as the expression of a fundamental and primary logical principle, the difficulty is, how theoretically to get beyond it. If we reject it, what we need, and what we find, to put in its place, is a principle of significant assertion of the form S is P. The laws of contradiction and excluded middle are laws of the relations of assertions, and they cannot be expressed in satisfactory and unambiguous form without the use of S is P, S is not P, propositions. So even for them we require a prior principle, explaining and justifying the S is P proposition itself. Such a logical principle, based on a new analysis of S is P, I think I can provide. (1911b, 10–11; emphasis added)

For Jones, the laws of contradiction and excluded middle apply exclusively to contentful assertions. Jones’s worry is that the conception of content inherited from Lotze, on which S is P is, effectively, A is A, is a poor model not only for ordinary assertions, but also of instances of the laws of contradiction and excluded middle. These laws tell us, respectively, that it can’t be the case, for example, both that Socrates is mortal and that he is not, and that it must be the case that either Socrates is mortal or he is not. In short, they tell us, of a significant assertion Φ, that either Φ or its negation obtains, and that Φ and its negation cannot both obtain.

Although Jones calls her law a “prior principle,” this does not mean that she takes her law to be logically prior to the other laws. What she is claiming is that, in effect, it is pragmatically prior. The other laws provide us with logical forms that cannot have false instances. Jones’s law does something else: it places a constraint on significant assertion, telling us what conditions an assertion has to meet for it to be a significant instance, not only of identity, but also of contradiction and excluded middle.

The other way in which the label is misleading is that, for Jones, logic is the study of the laws governing the objects of thought, not thoughts themselves. “Apprehension and Judgment, considered as mental processes, are the concern of Psychology [whereas] Logic is concerned with what we ought to think” (1890, 45; see also vi, 2).

Still, while she sees clearly that the laws of logic are normative, and thus not a species of psychological law, she does not take logic to be the purely formal enterprise Frege would make it (Peijnenburg and Schaar 2025). For Jones, logic “implies a knower” (1890, 2; quoted in Peijnenburg and Schaar). If so, we have not moved decisively from the traditional conception.

Nor is it clear that she has taken the decisive step to a realm of objective contents, in the manner of Moore, Russell, and Frege. Janssen-Lauret (2024) maintains that Jones “made a clear and noticeable advance on her contemporaries.” But, as Preti (2024, 210) points out, terminology was in flux at that point, so we can’t take claims about the objectivity of logic at face value. Admittedly, Jones does write: “Logic is objective; for it relates objects of thought”. But this is just to make the act-object distinction; it is not yet to suggest a metaphysics of the objects of thought, let alone confer on them mind– or language–independence.

That said, there is no doubt that Jones moved the needle in the direction of the mind-independence of content; but just how far is unclear.

2.6 Observations on Intension and Extension

Although the concept of intension plays an important role in Jones’s theory, she recognizes that grasping the intension of a name is neither necessary nor sufficient for grasping its extension. One may grasp the intension of a term and not grasp its extension, or conversely, grasp its extension but not its intension. Although undeveloped, her observations here are remarkably prescient.

Concerning the possibility that grasping an expression’s extension does not require grasping its intension, she writes:

I know that metal in extension denotes gold, silver, copper, iron, lead, tin, mercury, aluminium, etc., and I know these when I see them, but I am not able to give a satisfactory statement of the intension which they have in common… I may know real diamonds from paste, or one disease from another, and always apply the names rightly, and yet be unable to set out even to myself the connotation or intension. (1911b, 13)

The point applies to the intensions of natural kind terms. What these considerations suggest, as similar considerations later suggested to Saul Kripke (1980) and Hilary Putnam (1975), is that natural kind terms do not pick out their referents descriptively: mastery of a natural kind term does not require that we associate with it any reference-determining description. Jones, however, refrains from drawing this bold conclusion. In fact, she thinks the observation is harmless, since, on her view, the intension of a term can be reconstructed by reflecting on its extension:

What I insist on is that all the names we use have both extension and intension; and either of these may be a guide to the other. I may have the things to which a name applies put before me… and from examination of them reach the intension; or have intension given, and go out and by means of it determine extension. (1911b, 14)

It doesn’t appear, however, that Jones is committing herself to any strong thesis here—that, contra Russell, there is a “backward road” from referent to sense; only that, in practice, a term’s intension can often be gleaned from examination of its extension.

One point Jones fails to register is that her observations threaten to undermine a key aspect of her proposal—that natural kind terms have intension, or sense. The traditional view is that one identifies the extension of a kind term like ‘gold’ by grasping its intension. If it can be shown that I can grasp the extension of a use of ‘gold’ even though I fail to grasp its intension—either I draw a blank or I get it wrong—then the traditional view would seem to be incorrect: intensional mediation is unnecessary for reference determination.

3. Comparison with Frege and Russell

Jones’s analysis of identity sentences has obvious affinities with analyses advanced in Frege (1892) and Russell (1903). While Jones denied that ordinary proper names have a reference–determining connotation (see 2.2, above), she saw clearly how her distinction between denotation and connotation could be put to use by those who held otherwise. Jones, once made aware of his views, thus sided with Frege, who held that proper names have sense. In addition, there are parallels between her analysis of identity sentences involving definite descriptions and that of Principles–era Russell.

In light of the centrality of the issue to the history of early analytic philosophy, it is worthwhile to review briefly how Frege and Russell argue for their respective analyses and compare their arguments with Jones’s own.

3.1 Comparison with Frege

In the opening paragraph of “On Sense and Reference” (Frege 1892), Frege argues that a theory that identifies the semantic value of a name with its referent—the naïve theory—cannot differentiate between the contents of ‘Hesperus = Hesperus’ and ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus.’ Given the plausible assumption that the proposition expressed by a sentence is a function of the semantic values of its constituent expressions together with their mode of combination, it seems inevitable that what the latter sentence says is just what the former sentence says—assuming, with the naïve theory, that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ possess the same semantic value. Of course, the latter sentence is potentially informative, whereas the former sentence is not. This leads Frege to reject the naïve theory. He also rejects, for reasons that need not detain us, a view according to which identity is a relation between the names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus.’ The view he settles on is that the contribution that ‘Hesperus’ makes to the propositions expressed by the above-quoted identity sentences is a sense—a way of thinking of the referent.

Jones’s argument is similar, but not identical, to Frege’s. She argues that a theory that assimilates all assertion to A is A must fail to account for cases of significant assertion—cases in which we go beyond “pure tautology.” Frege’s argument is more sophisticated, making implicit appeal to a principle of compositionality, and considering alternative theories of the semantic contents of singular terms. Still, both are concerned to correct a similar mistake. Indeed, it might be conjectured that Jones’s and Frege’s interest in identity derive from a common source, namely Lotze. (See Gabriel 2002 and Heis 2013 for assessments of Lotze’s role in the development of Frege’s thought.) In addition, Frege held that the sense of a term contributes to the semantic content of the sentence in which it occurs. But it is at best unclear whether Jones holds that connotation is a component of semantic content—of what is said. For discussion, see Caplan (forthcoming, §4), and Ostertag (2025, 22–23).

3.2 Comparison with Russell

Russell’s analysis of identity sentences in Principles §64 falls out of his theory of denoting concepts—concepts that, like intensions, determine an extension. In this section Russell shows how the theory of denoting concepts can explain “why it is ever worthwhile to affirm identity”:

The question is answered by the theory of denoting. If we say “Edward VII is the King,” we assert an identity; the reason why this assertion is worth making is, that in the one case the actual term occurs, while in the other a denoting concept takes its place… Often two denoting concepts occur, and the term itself is not mentioned, as in the proposition “the present Pope is the last survivor of his generation.” When a term is given, the assertion of an identity with itself, though true, is perfectly futile, and is never made outside the logic-books; but where denoting concepts are introduced, identity is at once seen to be significant. In this case, of course, there is involved, though not asserted, a relation of the denoting concept to the terms, or of the two denoting concepts to each other. But the is which occurs in such propositions does not itself state this further relation, but states pure identity. (Russell 1903; note omitted)

This bears a striking similarity to Jones’s proposal, where that is recast as a theory of identity statements. When an identity statement relates two “terms”, or individuals, it is trivial and “is never made outside the logic-books”; but when at least one denoting concept is involved, the statement is significant. While these cases “involve” a relation of co-reference between the denoting concepts, or between one denoting concept and the term denoted, this relation is not part of what is stated: the one relation asserted to obtain between the terms remains “pure identity.” Thus, even in the case of an identity statement involving a denoting concept, such as “the present Pope is the last survivor of his generation,” we nonetheless assert an identity involving the individual determined by the denoting concept.

4. Jones and Russell

4.1 Russell’s Recognition of Jones

As we have seen, Jones’s and Russell’s respective analyses of identity statements are similar and, moreover, similarly motivated. This raises a question: did Russell, prior to their public exchange (discussed below), have any awareness of Jones’s work? Complete ignorance on Russell’s part seems unlikely, considering that her teachers at Cambridge, Ward and Stout, were also Russell’s teachers.[1] It seems plausible that they would have attempted to interest Russell in the work of someone whose concerns overlapped with his so significantly. Moreover, Russell was a reader of the journals to which Jones regularly contributed, with the two appearing in the same issue (of Mind and of the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society) on several occasions. (In fact, Jones’s contribution to The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society for 1906–07, which occurs in the same issue as Russell’s “On the Nature of Truth”, is in part a commentary on Russell’s paper.) But then we have another question—why, with a notable exception, does he not cite her distinction? Surely his audience, in particular readers of Mind, members of the Aristotelian Society and members of the Moral Sciences Club (see below), could be expected to be acquainted with it. If so, then it would make sense to mention it, if only to show how his (or Frege’s) version of the distinction is markedly different. Even if there is disagreement with the framework in which the distinction is grounded, Russell’s total silence demands an explanation. After all, in “On Denoting” Russell cites approvingly Bradley’s account of universal generalizations in terms of conditionals, even though he has decisively parted ways with Bradley’s logic. So he was clearly capable of separating a valuable idea from the framework in which it is expressed.

Of course, there may have been non-philosophical reasons for this differential treatment. Bradley, lifetime fellow of Merton College and author of three widely-studied volumes, was a hugely important figure in philosophy at the time, whereas Jones, although at Cambridge, was squarely in the margins. While Girton and Newnham were technically colleges of Cambridge University, students at the women’s colleges were not officially members of the university and thus not eligible to receive degrees at the time (Schuringa 2025, 29). The lack of formal recognition certainly had an effect on how the women at the colleges—both students and faculty—were perceived. (This is illustrated by an incident related by Virginia Woolf in A Room of One’s Own, where she is reprimanded by a “beadle” for straying onto the grass outside one of the men’s colleges—a privilege extended only to male students and faculty.) As Jones wrote in her autobiography: “The examination of women students at Girton was quite informal, and depended entirely on the good will of the examiners; no examiner need look over the papers of a woman student unless he chose, and our results were not announced with the men’s” (1922, 55). The tone of Jones’s letters to Russell similarly conveys the sense that Russell and his colleagues occupied a different world.

One document of interest concerning the question of influence is a letter to Philip Jourdain, dated September 5, 1909. Jourdain had sent Russell the draft of a long survey article on Frege’s work, in which he mentions Jones’s distinction, in Jones (1890) and (1892a), between intension and denotation—a distinction endorsed, as he noted in the published version of the article, by Keynes in the fourth (and final) edition of his influential text, Studies and Exercises in Formal Logic (Jourdain, 1911–12, 201–2, footnote 153). Although Jourdain’s letter is now lost, it appears he is querying Russell about the relation between Jones’s distinction and Frege’s (and, quite possibly, Russell’s related distinction between meaning and denotation). Here Russell responds:

It would seem, from what you say in your letter, that Miss Jones’s distinction of signification and denotation must be much the same as Frege’s Sinn and Bedeutung. But of course some such distinction is a commonplace of logic, and everything turns on the form given to the distinction. I have neither Keynes nor Miss Jones here, or I would look up the point. (Grattan-Guinness 1977, 119)

The note displays a remarkable lack of charity. Russell, instead of expressing interest in the possibility that Jones anticipated Frege on sense and reference, dismisses the distinction as “a commonplace of logic.” Going by what he writes here, how the distinction is made, and not the distinction itself, is what is crucial. It is unclear what Russell means by giving the distinction “form,” however, so it is hard to see what, if anything, Russell is getting at here.

One explanation of Russell’s dismissal of Jones’s distinction has to do with his correspondent. Jourdain, a former student of Russell’s, was quite conversant with the developing mathematical logic, had published informed survey articles on Frege, Boole, Jevons, MacColl, and Peano, and had written on Russell’s earlier work on the principles of mathematics. It’s conceivable that Russell resented the fact that Jourdain, expert in both the traditional Oxbridge logic and mathematical logic, took Jones to be touching on a point that he and Frege had already laid claim to—perhaps even beating them to a crucial insight. Matters are made worse by the suggestion that Jones had—however casually and indirectly—influenced Russell. (While Russell did not claim that proper names have sense or connotation, we have seen that his analysis of ‘Edward VII is the King’ does invoke a connotation-like entity—a denoting concept.) Any indication either that he was influenced by Jones, or that she anticipated him in some small way, would be seen by Russell as detracting from the significance of his own contribution. It is one thing to acknowledge a debt to a Frege or to a Peano. Russell saw these men not only as intellectual giants, but also as introducing genuinely revolutionary ideas and techniques into the study of logic and the foundations of mathematics. In contrast, Russell perceived Jones as manifestly not of their caliber and, in any event, thought her contributions to be philosophically quite retrograde. (There is also the fact, already mentioned, that the two, although at the same university, occupied different worlds.) For Russell, mindful of both of the figures he was allying himself with and of the innovation in thought that they were introducing, acknowledging that Jones had anticipated some of his ideas may have been repugnant. Small wonder, then, that he had thus far kept silent on the matter in his published work and correspondence. As it turns out, Jones was subsequently quickly to take credit (in print) for first giving expression to the distinction (see Jones 1910–11), although she refrained from suggesting that her work influenced Russell.

None of this is to deny that there may have been entirely intellectual reasons for Russell’s dismissal. As indicated, Russell clearly saw Jones as a throwback to an earlier period. Thus, even if there was some recognition that she had come upon a distinction quite similar to that between sense and reference, Russell’s indifference could quite easily be attributed to the fact that the insight was presented in the context of a system of logic that he rejected.[2]

4.2 The Exchange

While Russell did not acknowledge being influenced by Jones, it is significant that he took her work seriously enough to merit a public response, one that would be recorded in one of his most influential papers. The paper in question is “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description,” which Russell delivered to the Cambridge Moral Sciences Club on March 10, 1911. Russell was responding to a paper by Jones, “Categorical Propositions and the Law of Identity,” delivered to the same society three months earlier, on December 2, 1910 (Pitt 1981–82, 112). (Jones’s paper was published, under a different title, as Jones 1911a.)

The main point of their exchange concerns the following well-known passage in “On Denoting”:

If a is identical with b, whatever is true of one is true of the other, and either may be substituted for the other in any proposition without altering the truth or falsehood of that proposition. Now George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverley; and in fact Scott was the author of Waverley. Hence, we may substitute Scott for the author of ‘Waverley’, and thereby prove that George IV wished to know whether Scott was Scott. Yet an interest in the law of identity can hardly be attributed to the first gentleman of Europe. (Russell 1905, 420)

Of this passage, Jones writes:

When George IV asked whether Scott was the author of Waverley, what he wanted to know was, whether the intension (‘meaning’, connotation) of Author of ‘Waverley’ could be assigned to Scott—i.e.,—whether identity of denotation could be asserted between Scott and Author of ‘Waverley’. The “first gentleman of Europe” did not want to know whether Scott was Scott … No doubt, ‘if a is identical [in denotation] with b,’ whatever is true of the thing denoted by a is true of the same thing denoted by b—with the obvious reservation that a is a does not convey the information that a has the intension (or connotation) b. (Jones 1910a, 379–80; the insertion is Jones’s)

Russell responded:

Miss Jones argues that ‘Scott is the Author of Waverley’ asserts identity of denotation between Scott and the author of Waverley. But there is some difficulty in choosing among alternative meanings of this contention. In the first place, it should be observed that the Author of Waverley is not a mere name, like Scott. Scott is merely a noise, or shape conventionally used to designate a certain person; it gives no information about that person, and has nothing that can be called meaning as opposed to denotation. (I neglect the fact, considered above, that names, as a rule, really stand for descriptions.) But the author of Waverley is not merely conventionally a name for Scott; the element of mere convention belongs here to the separate words, the and author and of and Waverley. Given what these words stand for, the author of Waverley is no longer arbitrary. When it is said that Scott is the author of Waverley, we are not stating that these are two names for one man, as we should be if we said ‘Scott is Sir Walter’. A man’s name is what he is called, but however much Scott had been called the author of Waverley, that would not have made him be the author; it was necessary for him to actually write Waverley, which was a fact having nothing to do with names. (Russell 1910–11, 27–28)

This passage expands on a point made in “On Denoting,” where Russell writes:

Now the relation of meaning and denotation is not merely linguistic through the phrase: there must be a logical relation involved, which we express by saying that the meaning denotes the denotation. (Russell 1905, 421)

In his response, Russell explains why it is that the relation between a name and its referent is “merely linguistic through the phrase,” whereas the relation between a description and its denotation must be “logical.” The relation between a name ß and what it stands for is (merely) linguistic in that it is acceptable to specify what ß stands for with the phrase ‘the referent/denotation of ß.’ The reason that it is acceptable is because ß has its reference or denotation determined conventionally. Thus, since no analysis is possible, all we can do is state the brute fact captured by the schema ‘ß stands for the referent/denotation of ß.’ In contrast, the relation between a description and what it denotes is logical—the denotation relation is constrained by the meanings of the constituents of the description and their mode of combination. Thus, if ß is a description, ‘ß stands for the referent/denotation of ß’ does not state a brute fact about our use of ß. Rather, it states a fact that holds in virtue of other facts—facts about the meanings of ß’s constituents and their mode of combination.

A bit later, he continues:

If we are to say, as Miss Jones does, that ‘Scott is the author of Waverley’ asserts an identity of denotation, we must regard the denotation of ‘the author of Waverley’ as the denotation of what is meant by ‘the author of Waverley’. Let us call the meaning of ‘the author of Waverley’ M. Thus M is what ‘the author of Waverley’ means. Then we are to suppose that ‘Scott is the author of Waverley’ means ‘Scott is the denotation of M’. But here we are explaining our proposition by another of the same form, and thus have made no progress towards a real explanation. ‘The denotation of M’, like ‘the author of Waverley’¸ has both meaning and denotation, on the theory we are examining. If we call its meaning M′, our proposition becomes ‘Scott is the denotation of M′’. But this leads to an endless regress. Thus the attempt to regard our proposition as asserting identity of denotation breaks down, and it becomes imperative to find some other analysis. When this analysis has been completed, we shall be able to reinterpret the phrase ‘identity of denotation’, which remains obscure so long as it is taken as fundamental. (Russell 1910–11, 28–29)

Let’s unpack this. Russell is here evaluating a hypothesis according to which a description such as ‘the author of Waverley’ is, contrary to his own view, meaningful in isolation.[3] To assume that this description is meaningful in isolation is to assume that, for some M, ‘the author of Waverley’ means M. Let’s call this meaning M*. Since we accept the following:

The denotation of ‘the author of Waverley’ = the denotation of what is meant by ‘the author of Waverley’

we also accept

The denotation of ‘the author of Waverley’ = the denotation of M*

Now the meaning-in-isolation theorist might suggest that our original sentence, ‘Scott is the author of Waverley,’ means that Scott is the denotation of M*. But, as Russell observes, all this does is to replace one description with another. Since the theorist fails to tell us what ‘the author of Waverley’ means in terms that don’t involve an expression equally in need of analysis, we have been given no evidence that this, or any, description is meaningful in isolation.

Jones responds:

I do not see from the fact of one proposition being explained by another of the same form… it follows that we “have made no progress towards a real explanation.” This would seem to involve that one categorical proposition cannot be explained by other categorical propositions. (Jones 1910–11, 183–184)

Jones here objects to the regress argument’s conclusion that no real explanation of the meaning of denoting phrases can be achieved if we explain a proposition containing such a phrase with another proposition containing a phrase of the same form. While the point is undeveloped, it is nonetheless implied that a categorical proposition can indeed be explained by another categorical proposition, so from the fact that p and q share the same form it does not follow that (e.g.) q fails to explain p (in the relevant sense of ‘explain’). (Recall that she takes all categorical propositions to possess the same form.) In a similar vein, R. M. Sainsbury writes: “it is unclear what sort of explanation is needed, and why the circularity is vicious. This objection [i.e., Russell’s] must be regarded as therefore inconclusive” (Sainsbury 1979, 105). (Broad (1912) responds similarly.) Hylton (1990, 252–53), on the other hand, argues quite persuasively that there is a vicious regress here (Hylton’s remarks are concerned specifically with the passage in “On Denoting,” however).

The point is developed further in Jones’s reply to Broad (1912), responding to Jones (1910–11); see Jones (1913, 528) and Ostertag (2025, 44–45).

4.3 Related Criticisms of Russell

An important related criticism, not acknowledged by Russell in subsequent writings (it appeared after his response to Jones in “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description”) is a critique of a famous passage in Principia Mathematica. In arguing that descriptions are incomplete symbols and have no meaning in isolation, Russell claims that although ‘Scott is the author of Waverley’ expresses an identity, ‘the author of Waverley’ cannot be a name. If it were, then it would be a value of c in the propositional function ‘Scott is c’. But this would mean that ‘Scott is the author of Waverley’ expresses what ‘Scott is Scott’ expresses, which is absurd:

The “author of Waverley” cannot mean the same as “Scott,” or “Scott is the author of Waverley” would mean the same as “Scott is Scott” which it plainly does not; nor can the “author of Waverley” mean anything other than “Scott” or “Scott is the author of Waverley” would be false. Hence the “author of Waverley” means nothing. (Whitehead and Russell 1910, 67)

Jones observes that the argument “seems to depend on a double use of the word meaning”:

[W]hen it is said that the author of Waverley cannot mean the same as Scott, meaning signifies intension or connotation; plainly intension (or connotation) of the author of Waverley and of Scott, cannot be the same. But when it is said that the author of Waverley cannot mean anything other than Scott, or Scott is the author of Waverley would be false, “mean anything other than Scott” must be understood of denotation; if Scott and the author of Waverley are two distinct persons, clearly Scott is the author of Waverley must be false. (My identity-in-diversity theory removes the difficulty at once.) (Jones 1910–11, 175–76)

We can summarize her argument as follows. When Russell argues that ‘author of Waverley’ cannot mean the same as ‘Scott’ because this would imply that ‘Scott is the author of Waverley’ and ‘Scott is Scott’ express the same proposition, he uses ‘meaning’ in an intensional sense: “plainly intension (or connotation) of the author of Waverley and of Scott, cannot be the same.” But when he argues that ‘the author of Waverley’ must mean the same thing as ‘Scott’, he uses ‘meaning’ in the denotational sense. Russell’s premises, disambiguated, can be recast as follows: ‘the author of Waverley’ and ‘Scott’ cannot have the same intension; ‘the author of Waverley’ and ‘Scott’ must have the same denotation. From these, it does not follow that ‘the author of Waverley’ has neither denotation nor connotation—that it lacks meaning.

Jones seems to be perfectly correct here. The Principia argument intending to show that descriptions such as ‘the author of Waverley’ have no meaning in isolation assumes that an expression can only possess one kind of meaning—and thus that sameness of meaning is either sameness of intension or sameness of denotation—and Jones is quite right to challenge this.

Perkins (2011) provides an alternative reading of the text as well as a useful history of the debate surrounding its interpretation. See also Green (2023).

5. Ethics and Moral Psychology

In addition to her writings in philosophical logic, Jones’s work in ethics and moral psychology “was also of considerable value,” as the idealist philosopher J. S. Mackenzie noted in a memorial notice (1923, 228). These writings center on the interpretation and defense of Sidgwick’s views. Jones showed, against a popular interpretation of The Methods of Ethics (ME), that Sidgwick’s commitment to the irreducibility of normative vocabulary was fully compatible with his hedonistic utilitarianism. She also grappled with the dualism of the basic principles – of benevolence and prudence – that Sidgwick failed to resolve to his satisfaction.

5.1 Practical Hedonism

Shortly after Sidgwick’s death in 1900, a debate arose between F. H. Hayward and Jones in the pages of The International Journal of Ethics. Hayward, in his study of ME, read Sidgwick as an heir to Kant, a moral rationalist for whom “reason is a motive to the will” (1901, 361). In contrast, Jones read Sidgwick as a “rational hedonist”—i.e., as espousing the view that practical rationality has as its sole end maximizing pleasure.

The controversy centered on Sidgwick’s claim that “the notion which these terms [‘ought’ and ‘right’] have in common is too elementary to admit of any formal definition” (ME, 31). The fact that we cannot formulate the logical or conceptual connections between ‘ought’ and ‘right’ suggests that our normative vocabulary cannot be further analyzed. At issue is whether Sidgwick’s position is consistent with rational hedonism. While the idea that the sui generis nature of our normative concepts is compatible with—perhaps implied by—moral rationalism, it seems incompatible with the hedonist’s imperative of maximizing pleasure or happiness.

According to Hayward, Sidgwick, in admitting “that the notion of ‘oughtness or ‘rightness’ must be taken as ‘ultimate and unanalyzable’… breaks with hedonism.” As he elaborates:

No consistent Hedonist would admit that the notion is “ultimate”, and the few who would admit it to be “unanalyzable” would only do so on the ground that a meaningless notion is no notion at all, and therefore certainly unanalyzable. Hedonists contend that, if there is any validity in the notion of “oughtness”, the notion is capable of further analysis into “conduciveness to happiness or to absence of misery”. Sidgwick, therefore, in identifying “oughtness” or “rightness” with “reasonableness”, and maintaining that the notion represented by these words is fundamental to ethics, is far removed from the position of a consistent Hedonism. (1901a, 179)

Hayward poses the question, concerning an action pursued to advance pleasure: “What is the motive to such action? Does the motive lie in the end, or in the reasonableness? If in the former, then Sidgwick is a Hedonist; if in the latter, he is not” (1901a, 181).

On Hayward’s interpretation of ME, the motive lies in the reasonableness. But Jones demurs:

[T]he recognition that the ethical end, method and criterion must be reasonable, however fully admitted or strongly emphasized, can no more furnish a code of maxims, a rule of procedure, or even a criterion of right action, than the full admission that some statements are true, and an emphatic announcement that we seek the truth, can furnish a standard of truth, or concrete laws of science. We are still left asking, in the one case, What is it that it is reasonable to do? in the other, Which are the statements that are to be believed?

It is the answer to this question which shows whether an ethical thinker is an intuitionist or perfectionist, or egoist, or utilitarian, as the case may be. (Jones 1901, 355)

Hayward claims that one cannot be a hedonist and at the same time claim that our moral vocabulary is resistant to further analysis. But Jones responds with a powerful analogy. Consider, she suggests, the theorist who takes ‘true’ to be primitive and unanalyzable. Here, the parallel challenge—“How can you tell us not to accept as true a proposition without adequate evidence and yet take ‘true’ to be unanalyzable?”— falls flat. Surely such a theorist can maintain that ‘true’ is basic and yet tell us, without loss of consistency, which statements are reasonable to believe—i.e., are likely to be true. But then the challenge from ultimacy falls flat as well.

5.2 The Dualism of Practical Reason

A central goal of ME is to determine the rules guiding practical rationality and to present these as “methods”—“rational procedures for determining right conduct in any particular case” (78). ME argues at length for the rationality of benevolence: that our actions should have “Universal Good or Happiness” as their goal (507). But, alongside this primary rule or method, Sidgwick also recognizes a secondary rule of self-love, or egoism. The latter rule, he is forced to acknowledge, is equally rational:

[E]ven if a man admits the self-evidence of the principle of Rational Benevolence, he may still hold that his own happiness is an end which it is irrational for him to sacrifice to any other; and that therefore a harmony between the maxim of Prudence and the maxim of Rational Benevolence must be somehow demonstrated, if morality is to be made completely rational. (498; emphasis added)

The dualism of practical reason is precisely this fact, that practical reason is guided by two distinct but potentially incompatible rules. This incompatibility will not always rise to the surface, but there is the possibility that the two methods give divergent results. As Sidgwick writes, in such a case, “practical reason, being divided against itself, would cease to be a motive on either side” (508). This would be unacceptable for a moral rationalist like Sidgwick, who, in requiring self-evidence of his methods would surely also require that their conjunction meet the same requirement.

Sidgwick’s dissatisfaction with this state of affairs was not simply intellectual. As Schultz notes in his biography:

The gloomy last line of the first edition of the Methods rang out like an English version of the “crisis of the Enlightenment”, warning that practical reason might be reduced to a “chaos.” (2004, 15; note removed)

Sidgwick rejected a “metaphysical” resolution of the dualism, wherein selfless actions are rewarded in the afterlife, with God or some other force guaranteeing that self-interest and benevolence coincide. He similarly dismissed the view that the methods coincide due to facts about our evolutionary history—that selectional pressures have seen to it that what we desire for ourselves is precisely what benefits the species as a whole. In each case, we are asked to believe that the circumstances in which the methods deliver conflicting results will simply not arise, either due to “the moral government of the universe” or to the contingencies of natural selection.

Sidgwick’s rationalism had him set a high bar for ethical propositions—that they have the certainty of “any axiom in Arithmetic or Geometry” (507). Since the above resolutions fall far short of these standards, he could not accept them.

Jones addressed the dualism throughout her career (Jones 1894, 1894–95, 1895, 1909, 1917–18, 1920), and a full survey of these discussions is not possible here. This section will focus on her most considered response to the dualism, her late publication “Practical Dualism” (Jones 1917–18), occasionally making reference to her final publication, the entry on Sidgwick for the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (Jones 1920)—a work that reveals as much about Jones’s own views as Sidgwick’s.

Jones’s stated aim in “Practical Dualism” is to “deduce” the rule of prudence (or rational self-interest) from benevolence (Jones 1917–18, 323): “The reasonableness of benevolence implies the reasonableness of self-love” (1920, 504). The upshot is that we have reduced our fundamental principles to one, thus solving the problem of the dualism of two methods.

The claim that benevolence entails self-love might strike us as puzzling. At least since The Republic, the thought has been that, if there is an entailment, it should go in the opposite direction: self-love entails benevolence, and, accordingly, it is in my interest to promote the happiness of others. But as the following makes clear, Jones’s point is slightly different:

It would thus appear that Benevolence implies Self-Love, and Rational Benevolence irresistibly leads us back to the rationality of Self-Love as our starting-point. Similarly, in the precepts “Do unto others as ye would (reasonably would) they should do unto you,” “Love your neighbour as yourself,” it is implied that the love of self is logically prior to, and sets the standard for, love of our neighbour. (1917–18, 324; see also 1920, 504)

What Jones is claiming here is that the very formulation of benevolence presupposes the rationality of self-love. If we had no independent conception of the value of happiness, then neither self-love nor benevolence would be rationally binding. But the only way that I can come to grasp the value of happiness is by grasping it in my own case. If I grasp the value of your happiness for you, it is only because I already grasp the value of my happiness for me:

Now, a man cannot experience, cannot directly know, any happiness but his own. It must, therefore, be on the ground that his own happiness is to himself ultimately and intrinsically valuable, valuable in itself, that he can logically regard the happiness of others as ultimately and intrinsically valuable to them. His reasoned belief in the value for others of their own happiness must be based, it can only be based, on his recognition of the value for himself of his own happiness. (1917–18, 323; final emphasis added)

My appreciation of the intrinsic value of others’ happiness to them is grounded in my appreciation of the intrinsic value, to me, of my happiness. What this means logically is that the principle presupposes self-love. That is, the principle of benevolence is neither true nor false if the principle of self-love is false.

Thus it appears that when Jones writes that “rational benevolence implies or includes the rationality of self-love” (328; emphasis added) she does not have logical implication in mind but rather the relation of presupposition. Moreover, this claim is itself far more plausible on the face of it than the claim of logical entailment.

One might challenge Jones’s response in two ways. One might question her assumption that the rule of benevolence presupposes self-love in precisely the way that the Golden Rule presupposes self-love. Broad (1930, 158-9), for example, held that benevolence has no such presupposition. On his view, the ethical hedonist (who advocates benevolence) and the rational egoist (who does not) have different conceptions of the good—“my Good [says the egoist] and your Good… are not parts of a total Good.” Since they involve distinct conceptions of the good, the formulation of the one position cannot presuppose the truth of the other. Nonetheless, since they make conflicting commands regarding certain conceivable situations, we cannot rationally subscribe to both.

The other concern is that she has, at best, shown that one who embraces benevolence cannot consistently reject self-love. But this does not give us a positive argument for the rational egoist to accept benevolence. Jones does argue, in “Practical Dualism,” that as humans we are by nature empathetic, often, through an innate impulse, identifying our happiness with the happiness of others. While it may be possible to argue, on such a basis, that the mere possession of the concept of happiness makes us value it in others as much as we value it in ourselves, it remains the case that this is a psychological fact. It is one thing to claim that we are by nature drawn to value happiness in others because we value it in our own case, quite another to claim that we rationally ought to value happiness in others simply because we value it in our own case.

Ostertag and Favia (2020) and Ostertag (2025) provide more comprehensive accounts of Jones’s responses. See Soames (2014, 263–69) and the entries on Henry Sidgwick and Bertrand Russell’s Moral Philosophy for more on the Sidgwickian background.

6. Conclusion

Jones was not the only woman writing in the Anglo–American tradition during this period: C. S. Peirce’s student, Christine Ladd–Franklin (1847–1930), made significant contributions to logic and psychology, and the writings of Victoria Welby (1837–1912) on meaning were widely read. Later figures include Dorothy Wrinch (1894–1976), a Girton student during Jones’s tenure who went on to study under Russell, and Susanne Langer (1895–1985), who wrote a dissertation under Alfred North Whitehead at Radcliffe in 1926. Wrinch, who published papers in Mind on, among other things, Russell’s theory of judgment and the theory of relativity, later abandoned philosophy for chemistry, teaching for many years at Smith College. (Senechal’s masterful biography (Senechal 2012) traces Wrinch’s evolution as a scientist.) Langer, who would achieve prominence in the philosophy of art in the 1940s, published several technical articles on type theory and judgement early in her career. Possibly the most prominent woman analytic philosopher of the first half of the twentieth century, however, was another Girton student, Susan Stebbing (1885–1943), Professor of Philosophy at Bedford College, London, and co-founder of the journal Analysis. Jones’s administrative savvy provided a jump-start to Stebbing’s career—a grant enabling Stebbing to complete her first book, Pragmatism and French Voluntarism (Stebbing 1914, vi). Jones also wrote a letter, unearthed and now published by Emily Thomas (Thomas 2026), in support of Stebbing’s application for her position at Bedford College. The fact that Stebbing, through her most successful student, Max Black, is responsible for one of the largest “families” in Josh Dever’s Philosophy Tree (see Other Internet Resources), shows Frederique Janssen-Lauret’s metaphor of Jones and Stebbing as “grandmothers of analytic philosophy” to be quite apt.

On historiographical matters, Connell and Janssen-Lauret (2022) discuss the exclusion of women from histories of analytical philosophy. On the larger question of the erasure of women from the history of philosophy, from antiquity to the French Revolution, Eileen O’Neill’s essay, “Disappearing Ink” (O’Neill 1998), remains indispensable.

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  • 1904, Letter to the Editor, The Saturday Review, 97: 782.
  • 1905a, A Primer of Logic, New York: E.P. Dutton. Third Edition, 1927
  • 1905b, “Lewis Carroll’s Logical Paradox,” Mind, 14: 576 – 578.
  • 1906, “Mr. Moore on Hedonism,” International Journal of Ethics, 16: 429–464.
  • 1906–07, “Logic and Identity in Difference,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 7: 81–92
  • 1908a, “Import Of Propositions and Inference,” Mind, 17: 527 – 534.
  • 1908b, “Precise and Numerical Identity,” Mind, 17: 384 – 393.
  • 1909, A Primer of Ethics, London: John Murray.
  • 1909–11, Four Letters to Bertrand Russell, The Bertrand Russell Archives, McMaster University, RA1 710; published in Thomas (2026)
  • 1910a, “Mr. Russell’s Objections to Frege’s Analysis of Propositions,” Mind, 19: 379 – 386.
  • 1910b, “Prefatory Note,” in Thoughts on Some Questions Relating to Women, Emily Davies (ed.), Cambridge: Bowes and Bowes.
  • 1910–11, “A New Law of Thought,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 11: 166–186.
  • 1911a, “A New ‘Law Of Thought’ and Its Implications,” Mind, 20: 41 – 53.
  • 1911b, A New Law of Thought and Its Logical Bearings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • 1912–13, “A New Logic,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 13: 92–109.
  • 1913, “Analysis of Categorical Propositions,” Mind, 22: 526 – 531.
  • 1914–15, “Symposium: the Import of Propositions” (with Bernard Bosanquet and F. C. S. Schiller) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 15: 353–427.
  • 1915a, “Analysis of Categorical Propositions,” Mind, 24: 60–64.
  • 1915b, “Correspondence on Mr. Russell’s Suggestion,” Cambridge Review, February 17, 201–2.
  • 1917–18, “Practical Dualism,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 18: 317–328
  • 1920, “Henry Sidgwick,” in James Hastings (ed.) Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Volume 11, 505–06, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.
  • 1922, As I Remember: An Autobiographical Ramble, London: A. & C. Black.

Works Discussing Jones

  • Anonymous, 1921–22, “In Memoriam: Miss E. E. Constance Jones,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 22: 224–225.
  • Bradley, F. H., 1895, “‘Rational Hedonism’—Note by Mr. Bradley,” International Journal of Ethics, 5(3): 383–84.
  • Broad, C.D, 1912, Review of the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1910–1911, Mind, 21: 260–287.
  • Caplan, B., 2022a, “E. E. Constance Jones on Existence in Fiction and Imagination,” Studia Semiotyczne (Semiotic Studies), 36(1): 175–191. doi:10.26333/sts.xxxvi1.11
  • –––, 2022b, “E. E. Constance Jones on Unique Existence,” Asian Journal of Philosophy, 1: 20. doi:10.1007/s44204-022-00022-6
  • –––, 2023, “E. E. Constance Jones on Existence in a Region of Supposition,” Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy, 11(7): 1–26.
  • –––, forthcoming, “E. E. Constance Jones on the Import and Significance of Categorical Sentences,” in Vagnetti and Vrahimis (eds.) forthcoming.
  • Connell, S. M. and F. Janssen-Lauret, 2022, “Lost Voices: Women in Philosophy 1870–1970,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 30(2): 199–210. doi:10.1080/09608788.2021.1984201
  • –––, 2023,“‘Bad philosophy’ and ‘Derivative Philosophy’: Labels that Keep Women out of the Canon,” Metaphilosophy, 54(2–3): 238–53. doi:10.1111/meta.12613
  • Elkind, L., and A. M. Klein (eds.), 2024, Bertrand Russell, Feminism, and Women Philosophers in his Circle, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
  • Frege, G., [BW], Wissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel, Gottfried Gabriel, Hans Hermes, and Friedrich Kaulbach (eds.), Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1976.
  • –––, 1980, Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence, G. Gabriel, et al. (eds.), H. Kaal (trans.), Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1980.
  • Gilliland, M. H., 1895, “‘Rational Hedonism’ Again,” International Journal of Ethics, 5(3): 376–77.
  • Green, K., 2023, “On E. E. Constance Jones’s Account of Categorical Propositions and Her Defense of Frege,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 101(4): 863–875. doi:10.1080/00048402.2022.2063352
  • –––, 2026, “E. E. Constance Jones and Hermann Lotze,” in Nikolay Milkov and Michele Vagnetti (eds.), The Philosophy of Rudolph Hermann Lotze, New York: Routledge, 92–102.
  • Hayward, F. H. 1901a, “The True Significance of Sidgwick’s Ethics,” International Journal of Ethics, 11(2): 175–87
  • –––, 1901b, “Mr. Hayward’s Evaluation of Professor Sidgwick’s Ethics: A Reply,” International Journal of Ethics, 11(3): 360– 65
  • Heis, J., 2013, “Frege, Lotze, and Boole,” in Erich H. Reck (ed.), The Historical Turn in Analytical Philosophy, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 133–8.
  • Hicks, L.E., 1913, “Identity as a Principle of Stable Values and as a Principle of Difference,” Philosophical Review, 22: 375–394.
  • Janssen-Lauret, F., 2024, “Grandmothers and Founding Mothers of Analytic Philosophy: Constance Jones, Bertrand Russell, and Susan Stebbing on Complete and Incomplete Symbols,” in Elkind and Klein (eds.) 2024, pp. 207–39. doi:10.1007/978-3-031-33026-1_8
  • –––, 2025, “Constance Jones, Christine Ladd-Franklin, and Victoria Welby: Grandmothers of analytic philosophy in Mind,” in The Early Years of Mind: Making Contemporary Philosophy and Psychology, Lukas M. Verburgt (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 347–69. doi:10.1093/oso/9780192869296.003.0017
  • Jourdain, P. E. B., 1911–12, “The Development of the Theories of Mathematical Logic and the Principles of Mathematics,” The Quarterly Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics, 43: 219–314; page references are to the reprint in Frege 1980.
  • Keynes, J. N., 1906, Studies and Exercises in Formal Logic, London: Macmillan and Co., 4th edition.
  • Klein, A., 1911, “Negation Considered as a Statement of Difference in Identity,” Mind, 20: 521–29.
  • Ladd-Franklin, C., 1890, Review of Elements of Logic as a Science of Propositions, Mind, 15: 559–563.
  • Mackenzie, J. S., 1895, “Rational Hedonism,” International Journal of Ethics, 5(2): 218–31
  • Mackenzie, J. S., 1923, “The Late Miss E. E. Constance Jones, Litt. D,” International Journal of Ethics, 33(2): 228.
  • Mercier, C., 1914, “Some Fundamentals of Logic,” Mind (N.S.), 92: 550–557.
  • Ostertag, G., 2023, “E. E. Constance Jones on Identity and Predication,” in Jeanne Peijnenburg and Sander Verhaegh (eds.), Women in the History of Analytic Philosophy, Cham: Springer, pp. 49–66. doi:10.1007/978-3-031-08593-2_3
  • –––, 2025. E. E. Constance Jones. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781009411110
  • Ostertag, G. and A. Favia, 2020, “E. E. Constance Jones on the Dualism of Practical Reason,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 29(2): 327–42. doi:10.1080/09608788.2020.1749828
  • –––, forthcoming, “E. E. Constance Jones on Moore and the Naturalistic Fallacy,” in Vagnetti and Vrahimis (eds.) forthcoming.
  • Peijnenburg, J. and M. van der Schaar, 2025. “E. E. Constance Jones and the Law of Significant Assertion,” in Lydia Moland and Alison Laura Stone (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of American and British Women Philosophers in the Nineteenth Century, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197558898.013.20
  • Pitt, J., 1981–82, “Russell and the Cambridge Moral Sciences Club,” Russell, 1: 103–118.
  • Peirce, C. S., 1902, “Material Fallacy,” in Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, J.M. Baldwin (ed.), New York: Macmillan
  • Putnam, H., 1975, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’,” in H. Putnam, Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers (Volume 2), New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 215–271.
  • Russell, B., 1910–11, “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 11: 108–128; page reference is to the reprint in Russell 1992.
  • –––, 1992. The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell (Volume 6: Logical and Philosophical Papers: 1909–13), J. G. Slater (ed.), London: Routledge.
  • Schiller, F. C. S., 1912, “Review of A New Law of Thought and Its Logical Bearings,” Mind (N.S.), 21: 246–250.
  • Stebbing, L. S., 1914, Pragmatism and French Voluntarism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Stout, G.F., 1911, “Preface” to Jones (1911).
  • –––, 1922, “The Late Miss E. E. Constance Jones,” Mind (N.S.), 31: 383–384.
  • Thomas, E. 2026, Letters of English Women Philosophers 1902–1951, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Vagnetti, M., and A. Vrahimis. (eds.), forthcoming, Women in the History of Philosophy of Science and Analytic Philosophy, Cham: Springer.
  • Waithe, M. E. and S. Cicero, 1995, “E. E. Constance Jones,” in Waithe 1995.
  • Waithe, M. E., 1995, A History of Women Philosophers, Volume 4, Dordrecht: Kluwer.
  • Warnock, M., 2004, “Jones, (Emily Elizabeth) Constance,” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Other Works Cited

  • Armstrong, D. M., 2004, Truth and Truthmakers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Baxter, D., 2001, “Instantiation as partial identity,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79: 449–64.
  • Bosanquet, B., 1888, Logic, or the Morphology of Knowledge, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  • Broad, C.D., 1930, Five Types of Ethical Theory, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
  • Davidson, D., 2005, Truth and Predication, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
  • Frege, G. 1879 [1967], “Begriffsschrift, a Formula Language, Modeled upon that of Arithmetic, for Pure Thought,” trans. Stefan Bauer-Mengelberg, in Jean van Heijenoort (ed.), From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879–1931, 5–82, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
  • –––, 1892, “Über Sinn und Bedeutung,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 100: 25–50; translated as “On Sense and Reference” by Max Black in Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, Peter Geach and Max Black (eds. and trans.), Oxford: Blackwell, third edition, 1980.
  • Gabriel, G., 2002, “Frege, Lotze, and the Continental Roots of Early Analytic Philosophy,” in From Frege to Wittgenstein, E. Reck (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 39–52. doi:10.1093/0195133269.003.0002
  • Grattan-Guinness, I., 1977, Dear Russell, Dear Jourdain, New York: Columbia University Press.
  • Hylton, P., 1990, Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy, New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Jevons, W. S., 1877, The Principles of Science, Second Edition, London: Macmillan and Company.
  • Johnson, W. E., 1892, “The Logical Calculus. I. General Principles,” Mind (N.S.), 1(1): 3–30.
  • Kripke, S. A., 1980, Naming and Necessity, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
  • Lotze, H., 1874, Logik: Erstes Buch. Vom Denken (reine Logik), Leipzig: S. Hirzel.
  • –––, 1888, Logic, in Three Books: Volume One, Bernard Bosanquet (trans.), Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  • O’Neill, E., 1998, “Disappearing Ink,” in Philosophy in a Feminist Voice, J. Kourany (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  • Perkins, R., 2011, “Incomplete Symbols in Principia Mathematica and Russell’s ‘Definite Proof’,” Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies (N.S.), 31: 29–44. doi:10.1353/rss.2011.0008
  • Preti, C., 2024. “Russell and the Women,” Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies, 44(2): 202–214. doi:10.1353/rss.2024.a947341
  • Russell, B., 1903, The Principles of Mathematics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • –––, 1905, “On Denoting,” Mind, 14: 479–493; reprinted in Russell 1994, 414–427.
  • –––, 1906–7, “On the Nature of Truth,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 7: 28–49.
  • –––, 1994, The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell (Volume 4: Foundations of Logic: 1903–05), A. Urquhart (ed.), London: Routledge.
  • Sainsbury, R. M., 1979, Russell, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
  • Schultz, B., 2004, Henry Sidgwick, Eye of The Universe: An Intellectual Biography, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Schuringa, C., 2025, A Social History of Analytic Philosophy, London/New York: Verso. doi:10.1080/10848770.2026.2722752
  • Senechal, M., 2012, I Died for Beauty: Dorothy Wrinch and the Cultures of Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199732593.001.0001
  • Sidgwick, H., 1906 [1981], The Methods of Ethics, 7th edition, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
  • Soames, S., 2014, The Analytic Tradition in Philosophy (Volume 1: The Founding Giants), Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  • Whitehead, A. N., and B. Russell, 1910, Principia Mathematica (Volume 1), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Other Internet Resources

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Ray Buchanan, Ben Caplan, and Consuelo Preti for their helpful comments on the current version of this entry. I remain indebted to friends and colleagues who commented on the previous versions.

Copyright © 2026 by
Gary Ostertag <gostertag@gc.cuny.edu>

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