Privacy in Health Care and Research

First published Tue Nov 17, 2026

[Editor’s Note: The following new entry by Leslie Francis replaces the former entry on this topic by the previous author.]

This entry treats “privacy” as used in health care and health research. “Privacy” itself is conceptually protean, used to encompass interests in information, bodily integrity, mental privacy, personal spaces, and choice about intimate matters. Medical privacy in each of these related areas is highly valued and deeply contested. Although medical information is ubiquitous in the world of the Internet and social media, this entry treats medical privacy in health care and health research.

Section 1 contains essential background about how medical privacy has been conceptualized and valued. Second 2 outlines protections for medical privacy in professional codes of ethics, in international law, and in the laws of many countries. Information confidentiality treated in Section 3. Bodily integrity, personal space, mental privacy, and freedom of thought are the topic of section 4. Section 5 considers privacy and ownership. Decisional privacy over intimate medical matters such as reproduction, end of life care, or vaccination is discussed in Section 6. Section 7 considers the privacy of public figures and health care providers. Section 8 briefly concludes.

1. Conceptualizing and Valuing Medical Privacy

This section presents essential background about how privacy has been conceptualized and valued. It discusses how privacy has been understood in many different contexts (Allen 2016, 2026), including not only information, but also bodily integrity, mental privacy, personal spaces, and choice about intimate matters (Francis and Francis 2017). Medical privacy in each of these related areas is both important to people and the subject of philosophical and political contestation (Citron 2022; Presidential Commission 2012; Beauchamp and Childress 2008).

1.1 Conceptualizing Privacy

In a much-cited article published over fifty years ago, Judith Jarvis Thomson (1975) defended privacy reductionism, that privacy is not a separate right such as a “right to be let alone” (Warren & Brandeis 1890), but a conjunction of other rights over persons and property. If Thomson were correct, “medical privacy” would understood as a cluster, including rights to confidentiality, property rights such as ownership of bodily tissues, and personal rights such as freedom from unwanted observation or interference with choices about intimate matters.

Thomson’s critics, however, contend that this reductionism misses the “common foundation” of these rights “in the special interests we have in being able to be free from certain kinds of intrusions” (Scanlon 1975). Control over information, for example, may guard against forced access to the self or interference with choices; conversely, individuals may object to examinations of the body from fear that information gained may be inadequately protected (Francis 2008). Although much contemporary discussion of privacy concerns information, defining privacy in terms of information control is too narrow as it ignores myriad other ways in which access to the person can gain moral significance. Anita Allen (2026) has recently argued that a focus on privacy conceptualization can distract from the very real assertions of political power that lie behind different prescriptive accounts.

1.2 Why Privacy?

At the heart of justifications for privacy is the idea of self-determination, primarily with respect to access or control of access: to information, bodies and minds, personal spaces, and choices about intimate matters. James Rachels characterized the value of privacy as not just protection of different interests but as “based on the idea that there is a close connection between our ability to control who has access to us and to information about us, and our ability to create and maintain different sorts of social relationships…” (Rachels 1975, 326; see also Richards 2022, Introduction). Privacy gives individuals power over themselves and how they are perceived by others (Marmor 2015, Véliz 2020). Without privacy, bodily integrity, freedom of thought, and identity and personality formation may be threatened. Privacy is also judged valuable in its own right, as an aspect of human dignity and respect for persons. These values may manifest differently depending on the type of privacy at issue and the harms that may be caused by privacy violations.

2. Medical Privacy in Professional Codes of Ethics and in Law

This section describes the institutionalization of privacy in medical codes of ethics. It also contains brief discussions of how medical privacy is protected in international law and in the laws of many countries.

2.1 Medical Privacy in Professional Codes of Ethics

Since the time of Hippocrates in the 5th century BCE, confidentiality has been recognized as a value in health care. In one translation, the Hippocratic Oath expresses a qualified commitment to confidentiality: “Whatever I see or hear in the lives of my patients, whether in connection with my professional practice or not, which ought not to be spoken of outside, I will keep secret, as considering all such things to be private.” A core principle of the Code of Ethics of the World Medical Association, adopted in 1949, provides a stronger commitment: the “physician must respect the patient’s privacy and confidentiality, even after the patient has died…” The Code stipulates that disclosure is only permissible with the patient’s informed consent, or “in exceptional cases, when disclosure is necessary to safeguard a significant and overriding ethical obligation to which all other possible solutions have been exhausted…” The World Medical Association’s Declaration of Helsinki, on research ethics, likewise stipulates protection of the “life, health, dignity, integrity, autonomy, privacy, and confidentiality of personal information of research participants…”

Codes of ethics for health care professionals also reflect the commitment to privacy and confidentiality, albeit with qualifications such as the duty to comply with laws. In the US, the American Medical Association’s Principles of Medical Ethics require the physician to “safeguard patient confidences and privacy within the constraints of the law.” The American Psychological Association’s Ethical Principles of Psychologists state that psychologists have a “primary obligation” and should “take reasonable precautions to protect confidential information.” Psychologists also must discuss with their patients any relevant limits to confidentiality and foreseeable uses of the information generated through treatment. US social workers are required by their Code of Ethics to respect clients’ right to privacy and protect the confidentiality of information “except for compelling professional reasons.” This expectation does not hold “when disclosure is necessary to prevent serious, foreseeable, and imminent harm to a client or others.” Like psychologists, social workers are expected to have discussions with their clients about when confidential information may be requested or legally required. These codes of ethics for mental health professionals recognize that many US jurisdictions have adopted a reasonable professional duty to warn others of immediate danger from patients (Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 551 P. 2d 334 (1976)).

In the UK, the Core Ethics Guidance of the British Medical Association § 10 states that “confidentiality is essential to the relationship between doctors and patients.” Unless patients expect that confidentiality is protected, they may be reluctant to seek treatment. Without adequate governance, information also may not be available for approved research or health services planning. Protected health information includes not only medical information but also demographic and identifiable contact information received during care. Disclosure is only permissible when the patient consents, it is legally required, it is permitted or required under National Health Service regulations, or there is an overriding public interest such as preventing serious harm to the patient or others. The UK has adopted eight “Caldicott principles” (named after Dame Fiona Caldicott, chair of a committee reviewing the National Health Service’s patient data protections) to govern information sharing by health and social care organizations, including for research. These principles limit information use to the minimum necessary and require transparency about how information will be used. Institutions providing care or services must have “Caldicott guardians,” senior officials to ensure that information is used legally and ethically.

2.2 Medical Privacy in International Law

Internationally, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) Article 12 provides that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence” and Article 18 provides that everyone “has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.” The European Convention on Human Rights Article 8 likewise prescribes the right to respect for private and family life and Article 9 stipulates the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. As discussed in Section 4.4, the right to freedom of thought has been interpreted to include the right to mental privacy with respect to neurotechnology and neurodata (United Nations 2025; Bublitz and Blitz eds. 2021, 2026).

2.3 Medical Privacy in the Laws of Selected Countries

Many nations also have constitutional privacy provisions or privacy laws mirroring those in the UDHR. Freedom of thought is now enshrined in the constitutions or laws of many countries (O’Callaghan and Shiner eds., 2025). Constitutional or statutory provisions safeguarding family relationships and health care decisions are also widespread, despite the US retrenchment of protection for reproductive liberty after Dobbs.

Rights to informational privacy have gained significant protection in the digital age. Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs), first proposed in an advisory committee report to the US Department of Health Education and Welfare in 1973, have been highly influential in the development of data privacy practices. FIPPs include purpose specification and use limitation, minimization of data collections, transparency, and accountability for data use.

The EU GDPR governs all collection and processing of personal data about living individuals and sets specific conditions for lawful data processing. Unlike privacy laws in the US, the GDPR applies the same standards to any information processing, including information gained in medical care, in online purchases, and in participation in social media. Binding on all EU member states, the GDPR allows data to be collected and processed with consent of the data subject, in compliance with legal obligations, or to protect the vital interest of the data subject or another natural person (Article 6). Consent for much information processing may cover a wide range of possible uses; this is true for information shared in making purchases over the Internet, for example. However, specific and explicit consent is required for processing particular forms of sensitive information, such as genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of unique identification, data concerning health (including online pharmacy purchases, see European Court of Justice Case C-21/23), or data concerning a person’s sex life or sexual orientation (Article 9 § 1). Such specific consent, however, is not required for use of data in health care, scientific research, or public health, as long as appropriate safeguards are in place (Article 89).

In the United States, medical information receives differing protections depending on the jurisdiction, type of information, and type of holder of the information. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)—notably an acronym not standing for either information or privacy, as the statute was enacted to further electronic billing—is the federal law authorizing the HIPAA privacy rule governing identifiable information about persons possessed by health care providers who maintain any information in electronic form. HIPAA protections for individually identifiable health information extend for 50 years after an individual’s death (45 C.F.R. § 164.502(f)). HIPAA requires patient authorization (or authorization by a lawfully recognized personal representative) for many uses of health care information, including for research, fundraising, or marketing. HIPAA does not require patient authorization for use for treatment, payment or health care operations. Nor does it require authorization for information used or disclosed for public health purposes as required by law, for law enforcement, or for other authorized legal processes. Once de-identified, information is beyond the scope of HIPAA.

Political controversies in the US impact medical privacy protections. One example is reproductive information after the Dobbs decision (2022) rejecting a federal constitutional right to abortion. Another is protection of information regarding immigrants, as the second Trump Administration has sought obtain medical records and to enforce immigration laws at hospitals.

HIPAA is federal law, applicable in all US jurisdictions. States may have their own privacy laws that guarantee greater protections than the federal. California, for example, has a Consumer Privacy Act that gives consumers control over the information businesses collect about them, including the right to request removal of their data; this statute would protect California residents who share information in social media platforms. California also has a Confidentiality of Medical Information Act with stronger protections than HIPAA, including a requirement of written consent for most disclosures. Some states also allow patients to sue for for damages for negligent violations of the HIPAA standards.

In the US, there is a complex interplay between protections of confidentiality in health care and in medical research. Under HIPAA, identifiable information obtained in patient care cannot, be used in research without patient authorization, 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(a). But HIPAA does not limit research using deidentified information (that is, information from which identifying information has been removed), “limited data sets” (data sets from which most identifiers have been removed), or research receiving a waiver of explicit consent from an appropriate review committee, 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i). On research specifically, use of living human particiants in research funded by many federal agencies must meet standards for adequately protecting privacy and data confidentiality, 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a). For research approved after 2018, participants may give blanket consent for continuing storage, maintenance, and secondary research uses, 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a). Universities typically apply these federal standards to all research they conduct. The National Institutes of Health may also provide a “certificate of confidentiality” for research meeting specified qualifications. However, certificates of confidentiality have not been fully tested in court (Whelan 2024, 51; Wolf et al. 2024). Researchers are concerned that these certificates may not give full protection of reproductive information such as the results of pregnancy tests or the possibility of an abortion.

In many legal systems, disclosing a private medical fact or breaching medical confidentiality also can result in civil liability (Allen and Rotenberg 2016; Solove 2004, 2008; Prosser 1960). In one well known case, a physician revealed the identity of a birth mother to her adult child who had been adopted; the adult child contacted her mother, who was “not pleased” and recovered damages for the confidentiality breach (Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, 696 P.2d 527 (1985)). Disclosures of HIV status outside of public health reporting requirements have also been the basis for damage remedies (Lin and Liang 2005). However, many jurisdictions have court cases or statutes shielding professionals from liability for exercising a reasonable duty to warn of immediate danger from patients.

Yet privacy is not everything in the eyes of the law, nor is it an absolute ethical good (Allen 2003). In the context of emergencies and public health crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, symptom checking, disclosures, surveillance and contact tracing that diminish privacy may be encouraged and legally permitted or mandated. To protect public trust, however, these uses must be carefully scrutinized and transparent (Francis and Francis 2021). Medical research and assessments of trends in public health may benefit greatly from the information in otherwise confidential medical records, again subject to constraints to protect privacy. The remaining sections of this entry treat ethical issues about medical privacy as they arise for information, bodily and mental integrity, personal spaces, intimate decisions, and the special case of public figures and health care providers.

3. Privacy in Medical Information

This section highlights philosophical issues relating to informational privacy and medicine. Insofar as “privacy” involves information, “confidentiality” is the more common term of art (Terry and Francis 2007; DeCew 2000). The section begins with an overview of the ethical justifications for protecting health information confidentiality, then considers data security and anonymization, and challenges brought by new forms of data analytics and artificial intelligence. Distributive justice issues are apparent throughout in how medical information is collected and used.

3.1 Why Medical Confidentiality?

People say they value confidentiality of their information. Deciding whether to share information is how people create public-facing identities. It is also how people bring others closer and establish intimate relationships. Information known to others can change attitudes towards the individual, generating concern, sympathy, pity, blame, disgust, or anger, or more. Sharing information may create significant risks of shaming, stigmatization, discrimination, or worse—as well as affording benefits for individuals or others. Many of these arguments for protecting confidentiality also extend after the individual’s death, rooted not in the interests of the dead but in the interests of the living: those who were close to others who have died and those whose choices while alive may be compromised by fear of revelations after their death (Allen and Rothman 2024). Losing control of information can create even greater risks, especially when the individual is unaware of who has access to the information or how it may be used. Information is valuable, the metaphorical “new oil” (Farronato 2025); and corporate uses or abuses of information may treat individuals or groups unjustly (Zuboff 2019).

Yet a “privacy paradox” seemingly also describes behavior about health information. Individuals who say they value privacy may share highly sensitive personal information with only a click of an “I agree” button on an Internet site. One explanation is poor understanding of the risks of sharing, especially among younger people (Hoofnagle et al. 2010). Another is that people want services the Internet provides (Whittington and Hoofnagle 2012). People may also feel they lack meaningful control over their personal information so they might as well share. The rise of social media, smart phones, bluetooth technology, wearable health monitoring devices, the Internet of Things, electronic health records, direct to consumer medical testing, and precision medicine represent diverse opportunities for intended and unintended disclosures. Still, evidence suggests that many people employ context-related and culturally appropriate discretion and reserve about information sharing (Nissenbaum 2009; Goffman 1959, 1963).

Individuals’ practical ability to protect health information depends on effective data security, their knowledge of contemporary medical data management practices, and their social-economic privilege (Bridges 2017; Marx 2007). Children, along with those in active military service, judged mentally incompetent, dependent on government entitlement programs, or incarcerated, may also lack substantial control over their medical privacy (Annas et al. 2013).

Confidentiality of records held by health care providers has high stakes. One reason is that medical records contain treasure troves of information about individuals. Much of this information is unalterable: dates of birth, Social Security numbers, genotypes, or scans. Even apparently innocuous information such as addresses or phone numbers may subject individuals to stalking or intrusion. Medical records have thus been a particular target for fraud or identity theft. Medical information likely is unique to individuals, allowing identification even with efforts at anonymity. Medical information may also be revealing about family members who are genetically related to the individual or about people who have been similarly exposed to infections or environmental toxins. Genetic information has identified crime victims or suspects but this use may result in mistrust (Dahlquist et al. 2025).

In addition, much about medical records is beyond individual control. Individuals cannot get medical care without medical records being generated. Entry of information into records is largely performed by providers rather than patients. Individuals may not even get access to their records without making special requests. Certainly, individuals may avoid creation of medical records by refraining from receiving medical care or by withholding information from their providers, but these options potentially have significant costs for individuals, others close to them, or public health.

Moreover, much information in medical records is highly sensitive. Information about abortions, assisted reproduction, mental health, genetic characteristics, contagious disease diagnoses, or many other matters may result in shame, stigma, discrimination, or worse forms of harm (Calo 2011). Genetic information is considered especially sensitive because of its possible implications about future conditions or for family members (Chadwick et al. eds. 2014). The US Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff et seq., prohibits basing employment or health insurance decisions on information about a person’s DNA or genetic predispositions. A leading argument for genetic data exceptionalism is that genetic data conveys uniquely detailed information about a person and her biological family that a person might have a right whether or not to know (Laurie 2002; Rothstein ed. 1997).

Defenses of medical confidentiality may rest on utilitarian or other consequentialist grounds (Frey 2000; Freedman 1978) or on deontological grounds such as respect for persons (McGraw et al. 2015). Consequentialist justifications typically begin with the assumption that individuals are less likely to reveal information to their providers, or visit providers at all, if they cannot be assured that their records will not be shared without their consent. This assumption is widely shared in the ethics of professions, but difficult to test directly because randomizing people to receive confidential or non-confidential professional consultations would not be regarded as ethically acceptable. Attitudinal surveys do indicate that patient willingness to share information with their providers may depend on whether they believe they can trust provider confidentiality (Lott et al. 2020).

If individuals are less than forthcoming with caregivers, resulting care limitations may have lifelong consequences. Consequentialists argue that preventive medicine, early diagnosis, and prompt treatment save human lives and money. Failures to seek care may also affect the health of others or the public if untreated infected individuals spread disease (Battin et al. 2021). Contemporary philosophers generally hold that a just society will be committed to securing the material and political bases of public health (Powers and Faden 2008), and this may include protecting confidentiality.

Scholars have also offered deontological grounds for protecting informational privacy (Pierce 2018). Medical confidentiality promotes the individual’s medical autonomy by sheltering individuals seeking care from outside criticism and interference (Dworkin et al. 2007; Englehardt 2000). Patients obtaining cosmetic, obesity, or infertility treatments might not wish others to know their plans. Patients seeking abortion or gender affirming care, or those acting on their behalf, may face criminal charges in some US jurisdictions. Véliz (2020a) argues that providers should not be able to obtain behavioral information that is not directly relevant to care because disapproval might result in criticizing or deprioritizing patients. Privacy theorists caution that involuntary deprivation of privacy can amount to subordination, injustice and inhumanity (Gandy 2021, Skinner-Thompson 2020). Theorists have begun also to consider the harms that stem from voluntary self-disclosure or public exposure of aspects of the body (Allen 2011).

Fairness and justice support confidentiality too. Since “knowledge is power,” special concerns have been raised about governments holding personal medical information and about profiteering by private corporations. Fair information practices require that personal data collected about individuals be limited, accurate, secure and disclosed to third parties only with consent. Some patients believe they own personal information about themselves, and that is it only fair that they, not others, control its release (McGuire et al. 2019). Ownership of data and materials drawn from the body are discussed more fully in Section 5.

A further concern is that data may be more inclusive of people from some demographic groups than others, with implications for justice in patient care, research, and public health. Data collected primarily from patients of some origins may be less informative about patients from other origins. Selectively collected data may yield inappropriately skewed results if used in patient care, research, or public health. If patients from less privileged groups predominantly seek care in emergency rooms or do not seek care at all, data drawn from them may overemphasize some conditions but be completely uninformative about others.

Virtue ethics suggests additional grounds for health information privacy (van der Sloot 2017). Jennifer Radden (2004) has argued that the special vulnerability of mental health patients and the stigma attached to their problems turns confidentiality into a particular brand of excellence for mental health care practitioners. She contends that the demand for confidentiality in psychiatric medicine is inadequately accounted for by theories that fail to take into account the virtues of trust and reserve that are hallmarks of mental health care. Ari Ezra Waldman has also defended trust as a critical virtue for understanding the normative grounds of informational privacy (Waldman 2018).

Philosophers also have suggested that confidentiality should be understood relationally rather than individualistically. Mohapatra and Wiley (2020) defend moving from the imperative of individual patient autonomy to a relational understanding that welcomes families and support networks into a confidential circle with patients and caregivers. Battin and colleagues (2021) see people as intertwined as victims and vectors in networks of disease transmission. Allen (2011) has proposed that traditional physician-patient confidentiality laws and tort liability may adversely affect provider/patient relations by imposing unwanted burdens of silence on physicians.

Nonetheless, health privacy has justifiable exceptions to protect others from harm. These include reporting requirements. Health care providers and responsible adults should be obligated to report evidence of abuse or neglect of minor children, such as unexplained fractures. While confidentiality decisions are left to individuals or their guardians in most instances, minor children are a defensible exception due to their undeveloped cognitive and moral capacities and risks that their guardians are abusers who would benefit from confidentiality. Requirements for reports of abuse of elderly or vulnerable adults have been defended, too, although mandating these reports is more controversial. Older adults with declining capacities, for example, may choose to remain in their homes even if safety risks have increased. Moreover, evidence is lacking that reporting requirements achieve their intended protective goal (Kohn et al. 2025). Also to prevent harm as in the Tarasoff case described above, mental health providers have an ethical duty to warn police or potential victims of mentally ill patients’ violent imminent intentions. These exceptions reflect a belief that avoiding physical injury to third parties is more important than deferring to patients’ preferences, sparing their feelings and preserving their trust in relationships.

The public may also have the right to know some medical information. This information includes highly infectious contagious diseases with high rates of mortality and morbidity, such as Ebola, COVID-19, HIV/AIDS, hepatitis and measles. More controversially, newsworthy events such as dramatic medical rescues may understandably be of interest to the public. It has been argued that the public has a right to know about public officials’ medical conditions, including their genetic information (Brown 2008); this is the topic of Section 7. In the United States, plaintiffs in personal injury lawsuits are asked to submit to medical examination; and lawyers and grand juries have the authority to subpoena medical information for use in legal proceedings and investigations, placing highly sensitive medical information at risk of public disclosure (Wolf and Zandecki 2006).

Health information may also be sought for use in criminal investigations to identify victims or perpetrators. Genetic information has identified notorious offenders such as the Golden State killer or the alleged murderer of students at Idaho State University. Although use of genetic information to solve crimes draws approval for serious offenses such as murder or rape, wider use for offenses such as theft does not (Brown, Duesning, and Wong 2024). Justice is an issue here: the US CODIS data base of individuals who have been arrested or convicted and thus sampled involuntarily overrepresents individual from less privileged socioeconomic groups. Voluntary data bases also may not have fully informed participants that the data they submit could be used for forensic purposes (Dahlquist et al. 2025). Most controversially, in the US the Trump administration has sought access to health information for immigration enforcement (Pillai et al 2026).

Protection of health information confidentiality thus invites consideration of many different values. Anita Allen (2015a) has argued, however, that resolutions must not simply balance but must prioritize privacy and its equitable recognition.

3.2 Secrecy and Accountability for Information

Sissela Bok defined secrecy as intentional concealment (Bok 1982). Medical care may involve concealment of surgical wounds and scars or reconstructive surgery. The lure of minimally invasive laparoscopic procedures is not only reducing the length of hospital stays and the risk of infection, but also leaving less prominent and visible scars.

Patients also can try to promote privacy about their health information through deliberately not revealing information, even to their healthcare providers. Some people do not share medical symptoms even with their closest friends or family members, hiding the likelihood that they are ill before admitting it to others or consulting a physician. People may wish to be especially secretive about sensitive medical information, such as HIV status, genetic conditions, abortion, or fertility treatments. Reluctance may stem from fear of disability or death; avoidance of discrimination in insurance, employment and education; dread of social stigma, shame, abuse, and embarrassment; or rejection from family members or friends (Røseth et al. 2024; Rosenberg 2000; Westin 1967). People may be concerned about consequences for others who have helped them in receiving care or who may be upset by finding out about the care they have received. People may also keep secrets for less admirable reasons, such as personal resentment, estrangement from family members, or satisfaction of their own desires despite risks to others.

Physicians may also keep secrets by paternalistically withholding medical knowledge from patients. A common, but arguably inaccurate, view in bioethics is that paternalistic secrecy historically has been a major feature of western medical practice (McCullough 2011). Moral ideals of autonomy and agency argue for informing patients of their medical conditions, truthfully and fully (Macklin 1998). These commitments, common in western bioethics, may lie in tension with cultural and religious practices in many societies where paternalism is more common (Marshall and Koenig 2004).

Patient-centered care argues that providers should attempt to ascertain their patients’ views about receiving information. Some patients may prefer more information than others. Some may prefer that information be conveyed to family members, who then may decide about when and how to share. Family members may disagree about keeping information from patients, however; and these disagreements may be especially difficult when the patient’s desires for information are not fully known. The situation may be even more complex for providers when family members insist on silence or even deception in the face of requests from patients, arguably violating the patient’s choices (Zhang 2025).

Particularly acute conflicts about secrecy occur when patients are adolescents. Adolescent patients may wish to understand their diagnoses and have the understanding to participate in their care. Depending on the jurisdiction, they may also have legal rights to access and limit access to their medical records. At the same time, parents may have ethical and legal rights over the care of their children who are not yet adults and may want to protect their children from disturbing information. Health care providers describe the distress caused by trying to keep secrets from seriously ill adolescents who may guess their prognoses and wish for support (McArdle et al. 2024).

Another controversy about secrecy concerns “incidental and secondary findings,” findings that were not the subject of study but that could be relevant to the patient. Genome sequencing for precision medicine has prompted many such concerns (Winkler and Knoppers 2022). Incidental findings may provide important clinical information but could also lead to unnecessary tests or procedures. If they are not clinically actionable, incidental findings may generate anxiety. Misattributed genetic paternity may be an incidental finding; its disclosure may be ethically relevant to the care of patients or to future reproductive decisions, but highly disruptive to family relationships. Care providers have adopted different strategies for handling this situation, including advance consent from those undergoing genetic testing, non-disclosure policies, or disclosure requirements for cases of clear medical benefit (Prero et al. 2019). Participants in research may be told in advance that incidental findings will not be returned to them until validity and clinical utility have been established (Keogh et al. 2014).

Genetic information presents further problems about medical secrecy. Individuals may not wish to know their own genetic information. Or they may not wish to share genetic information with family members, even when that information could provide uniquely important warning about the need for preventive care. Parents may choose not to receive information about their children’s risks for adult onset genetic conditions out of concern for their children’s future autonomy or their relationships with their children, although continued concealment may have deleterious impacts on their children’s later health care (Pereira et al. 2023). Rosamond Rhodes (1998) has argued that family members have duties to one another to learn and share genetic information that could have important health benefits. Meaghann Weaver (2016) has argued that an ethics of care can support the duty to warn genetic relatives. In the U.S., several legal decisions have held that health care providers have a duty to warn relatives about genetic risks (Safer v. Pack, 677 A.2d 1188 (N.J. 1996)), or at least to tell patients that they should warn their relatives (Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1995)); Schleiter 2009).

The COVID-19 pandemic brought stark reminders of the need for information; in the short run, increased information accountability gained public acceptance. International travelers were required to report symptoms of illness to officials and had their body temperatures scanned for fever automatically in some airports. Workers were asked about symptoms as a condition of entering workplaces. Mandatory testing, reporting, contact tracing and the use of prescribed symptom-checking apps, all illustrate health information accountability. Beyond accountability for health information, the COVID-19 pandemic initially made people accountable for mask wearing, hand washing, self-isolation, vaccination and other behaviors once considered purely personal. By 2025, however, resentment of COVID restrictions had given rise to significant backlash (Oberlander and Gollust 2026).

3.3 Data Security

Data security refers to methods to keep information safe, maintain its integrity, and ensure that it is managed and used as intended. In an era of paper medical records, security required protections against physical damage or destruction and against unauthorized access. During Hurricane Katrina, paper medical records stored in hospital basements were destroyed by flooding, with devastating consequences for patient care. This experience of data insecurity was a major impetus for electronic health records that can be stored or accessed remotely.

Electronically stored and produced medical information is mobile, raising complex security problems. A data breach can result from the theft of a laptop or storage device, fraudulent or accidental access to data; sabotage by dishonest or disgruntled employees, or cyberattacks. Major hospitals, health agencies and insurers have experienced highly publicized data breaches affecting millions of consumers whose names, addresses, health identification numbers and other data were compromised. These may result in immediate harms to individuals: medical identity theft and public disclosure of private facts. People also may be alarmed by the possibility that information drawn from them may be available for sale on the dark web and resurface as identity theft years later. These are very real harms but not easy to quantify (Calo 2011).

Data security has three primary aspects: physical, technical, and administrative. As with paper records, physical security requires that information is not corrupted or destroyed. Cloud storage shifts the focus away from the physical protection of particular computers to the need for technical and administrative safeguards to lessen risks of cyberattacks. Technical safeguards include password complexity, multifactor identification, and encryption. Administrative safeguards include risk assessments, security policies, personnel training, and plans for identifying and addressing potential breaches.

3.4 Anonymity and De-identification

Methods for obtaining and using information without compromising privacy include avoiding identifiers so that people cannot connect information to individuals. Anonymity refers to data collection without any identifying information. In research, survey data are frequently collected anonymously. Under both the GDPR and US regulations, information collected without identifiers is considered not to be human subjects research and thus not to require informed consent. Even when individuals are not identified, however, the research may yield information about groups that their members might regard as distressing or that might be harmful to them.

Data sets may also be de-identified by removing specified forms of identifying information such as address, social security number, or date of birth. AI large language models present new strategies for de-identifying medical records (Wiest et al. 2025). In the US, appropriately de-identified patient medical records may be used in research without patients’ knowledge or consent, as with de-identification these are no longer considered protected health information.

One ethical problem with the collection of anonymous or de-identified information is that inferences may be drawn about individuals even when their identities are not known. For example, if combinations of data sets reveal that individuals with a given set of characteristics have a specific health condition, it could be inferred that any particular individual with these characteristics has that condition, even if the individual’s data were not included in the initial data sets. Syndromic surveillance, the use of statistical techniques to identify unusual or emerging health patterns from data sets such as internet searches, electronic health records generated in emergency departments, or school absenteeism rates, can yield unexpected information about populations. Public health surveillance such as assessment of levels of viral shedding in wastewater also are conducted anonymously but could yield information about individuals living near the source of the wastewater. These developments pose significant ethical challenges to possibilities for informed consent to data use (Francis et al. 2009).

A further ethical problem with anonymous data collection or de-identification is that neither anonymity nor deidentification may be adequate to protect fully against small chances of identifying individuals, given “big data” (Allen 2016), combinations of data sets, and contemporary statistical techniques (Caulfield et al. 2020).

Re-uses of deidentified data may also be objectionable to the persons who were the original sources of the information. In one notorious example, members of the Havasupai tribe in Arizona consented to the collection and use of blood samples for research on diabetes, a condition of importance to the health of tribal members. Researchers at Arizona State University later repurposed the genetic information to study mental illness and tribal migrations that contradicted the tribe’s traditional origin stories. Members of the tribe were understandably outraged and sued, seeking both damages and an order preventing employees of Arizona State University from entering tribal lands. The University settled for $700,000 and other assistance. This cultural harm (Tsosie 2007) fueled widespread suspicion about participation in genetics studies (Mello and Wolf 2010).

Anonymity may also matter in clinical care when people wish to obtain information about their health without revealing their identity. Anonymous testing for many conditions has become widely available over the Internet. In the heyday of the HIV/AIDS crisis in North America, anonymous testing sites were established to encourage people to get tested and know their infection status. These sites were controversial among bioethicists and policy makers who were concerned their availability might increase risky practices (Fairchild et al. 2007b; Burr 1999). Anonymous testing of pregnant women or newborns without patient notice or consent also occurred but was criticized as violating choices of vulnerable patients about privacy (de Zulueta 2000). Although HIV is no longer regarded as exceptional, controversies about anonymous testing have not fully faded, for example in harm reduction programs such as needle exchanges. (Henderson et al. 2025).

3.5 AI and Medical Privacy

AI technology is rapidly developing and presents both benefits and risks for medical privacy. Beneficially, large language models may be helpful in stripping patient records of identifiers. These models could also single out and remove sensitive types of information from records to be used in research.

In clinical care, AI analytic techniques are increasingly being used. These techniques may augment diagnostic accuracy in fields such as radiology and pathology. However, if the data used in training AI models are not representative of patient subgroups, these methods may yield inaccurate predictions and thus lead to harm. Such predictive inaccuracies are particularly notable in patients with darker pigmentation (Coyner et al. 2023). Predictive bias was of particular concern during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic when ventilators were scarce and life and death decisions were being made (Gallifant et al. 2022). One proposed temporary solution is to deploy AI selectively in patient populations where its accuracy has been validated (Vandersluis and Savulescu 2024). AI may also be helpful in watching or communicating with patients in declining health or with dementia, although such increased surveillance may trade off safety for autonomy (Ho 2023).

Chatbots are also being used in behavioral and mental health, with mixed results for patients. Beneficially, chatbot therapy may increase access for patients with limited means or otherwise lacking access to care. Chatbots may be effective reminders for patients with conditions such as diabetes that require regular monitoring. Yet chatbots have also given notoriously hallucinated recommendations for care or affirmative responses to patients voicing suicidal thoughts, with tragic results (Nelson 2025). And chatbots may encourage patients to share more information than they otherwise would. Finally, laws in some jurisdictions may hold that information conveyed through third party vendors does not have the confidentiality protections applicable to health records kept by providers.

3.6 Recording Patient Encounters

Photographs and recordings, common in medical specializations including dermatology and plastic surgery, raise concerns about ethical uses of images of patients’ faces and bodies. At a minimum, informed consent would appear to be required for making or disclosing photographs that could identify individuals. Notorious examples of confidentiality violations have involved physicians making illicit recordings: it came to light in 2013 that a physician affiliated with Johns Hopkins University Hospital secretly videotaped hundreds of his obstetrics and gynecology patients with pornographic intent (2015b). As important legal background, well over half of US jurisdictions permit recording with “one party” consent, which could be consent by the person doing the recording, while others require consent from all parties being recorded. Any recorded information must also comply with legal protections such as the US HIPAA privacy rule. Informed consent for recording is required by the code of ethics of the American Association for Marriage and Family Therapy and by Ethics Opinion 3.1.3 of the American Medical Association.

Physicians and bioethicists are debating whether to increase the use of video and audiotaping in routine clinical practice, surgery and research (Blaauw et al. 2014; Makary 2013). On the one hand, recordings would supplement faulty memory and incomplete encounter notes. This could be especially helpful in therapy sessions where more than one person is involved. Recordings could document informed consent procedures, memorialize advance directives, avoid misunderstandings, or provide relevant evidence in malpractice suits. Recordings also may be useful for teaching. On the other hand, recordings could inhibit patients and increase their discomfort. Knowledge that they could review the recording might encourage physicians to be less attentive to the patients in front of them.

4. Physical and Mental Privacy

Patients may bring strong expectations of physical privacy to their health care encounters. Patients’ expectations that they will not be needlessly observed, crowded, touched, secretly filmed, or recorded, relate to needs for psychological comfort, security, and dignity. Technologies such as remote imaging or brain implants raise novel questions about neuro-privacy, identity, and freedom of thought.

4.1 Solitude

Solitude – being alone – is a form of physical privacy that patients may value. Studies show that personality factors, cultural differences, and stage of life all may affect how solitude is valued (Ren et al. 2025). Patients may want time alone and find that solitude has value as a context for quiet reflection about the significance of illness and injury and the reality of impending death. In company, they may feel guilty about the burdens they impose on family or friends. Implicit social norms validate deferring to wishes of the sick or dying for seclusion and solitude (Nissenbaum 2009). Respect for choices about solitude or company is an important component of human dignity. These wishes may be violated not only in hospital, hospice or nursing home settings, but also in mental hospitals and prisons, where panoptic policies of monitoring and surveillance prevail (Foucault 1977).

On the other hand, dying alone may cause great anguish, as for so many during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic. The American College of Physicians has issued ethical guidance for family caregivers and visitation during public health emergencies, insisting that restrictions be evidence based, revised frequently, and cognizant of the value of loved ones for patient wellbeing (Dugdale et al. 2023). During the COVID-19 pandemic, strict visitation limitations were especially difficult for children and for people with disabilities dependent on consistent support from caregivers.

4.2 Modesty

Physical modesty presents conflicts for medical ethics. Many patients value bodily modesty and may be reluctant to accept care that subjects them to unwanted exposure. For religious traditions such as those of Muslims, Orthodox Jews and the Amish, physical modesty is a requirement of faith, especially for women; nonetheless, religious traditions are themselves diverse and patients must not be stereotyped because of their religious traditions (Shahawy et al. 2024). If patients are to receive accurate examination and evaluation, they may need to expose their bodies to medical personnel. Health care settings such as busy emergency rooms or neighborhood clinics present challenges for maintaining modesty (Moskop et al. 2019, 359). Teaching hospitals may diminish physical modesty if medical students and researchers accompany attending physicians and participate in care. Telehealth, by contrast, may protect physical modesty if it can occur in a private setting (Carnes et al. 2025), but with limits to the care that can take place and privacy concerns of information transfer over the Internet.

Health care providers respond to the modesty values of their patients in several ways. They provide special modesty garments and sheeting to minimize nudity. They ask patients to uncover only those portions of the body which must be exposed, and then only for the time necessary. Shared hospital rooms in more affluent settings are typically dividable by curtains that grant patients some degree of physical seclusion and associational intimacy with visitors but that may not prevent conversations being overheard. Some health care providers maintain staffing policies sensitive to modesty and preferences of patients for caregivers aligned with their gender. Yet providers may be reluctant to honor preferences for same-sex or same-race providers when that are impractical, discriminatory, or unfairly burden other providers (Appel 2022).

4.3 Bodily Integrity

Another aspect of physical privacy is bodily integrity. Mandatory testing, evaluation, and treatment offend bodily integrity by forcing persons to submit their bodies to unwanted touching and visual inspection (Wright 2022, Allen 2014). Certainly, law-based constraints exist, but so too do principle-based and other moral constraints on government or individuals to sidestep persons’ preferences about the handling of their bodies, body fluids, or tissue samples (Faden et al. 1986).

Bodily integrity for decedents is also generally respected. Harvesting organs for transplantation without consent is one area of bioethical controversy. Utilitarian defenses of presumed consent to donation are met with the objection that this practice would violate bodily integrity. An alternative model that allows individuals to opt out of a policy of routine organ salvage may respect individual autonomy while increasing the availability of organs (e.g., Metzger et al. 2025).

Post-mortem sperm donation or the use of cryopreserved gametes also implicate bodily integrity. While spouses, partners, or parents of a decedent may desperately wish to recover sperm in the hopes of later offspring, allowing them to do so without prior consent could violate the decedent’s wishes about whether to become a parent posthumously. An ethics opinion of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine would permit posthumous gamete retrieval or use with written consent of the gamete donor and discourages any posthumous assisted reproduction without clear evidence that it would have comported with the decedent’s wishes (ASRM 2026).

Mandated testing for public safety also may occur. (Mandated treatment is discussed in Section 6.4, on decisional privacy.) Policy makers and the courts have generally permitted nonconsensual urine drug screening of drivers in accidents, school children, and people in jobs tied to public safety, public service, or crime control. Body cavity searches by emergency department personnel may be authorized in cases of suspected drug smuggling. Prisoners may be subjected to mandatory HIV testing and immigrants in detention may be unable to receive care in privacy (Gutierrez et al. 2020). US federal law mandates collection of DNA samples from anyone who has been convicted of a qualifying offense and permits the attorney general to establish rules about collection of samples from anyone detained under authority of the US (34 U.S. Code §40702). States also collect DNA samples from anyone who has been arrested. As discussed in Section 3.2, use of these data raises significant questions of justice. Concerns also persist that safety justifications may be exaggerated and that authorities may overreach.

4.4 Mental Privacy and Freedom of Thought

Along with impressive therapeutic potential, developments in neuroscience, neurotechnology, and neurodata processing bring novel questions about privacy and invasion of the mind. The identifiable, intensely personal, and sensitive nature of neurodata and their connection to choice and identity have led to strong calls for protection (United Nations 2025). Deep brain stimulation (DBS), in use to treat conditions such as Parkinson’s disease, raises complex ethical issues about agency (Goering 2015). Philosophers have argued that in implanted neurotechnology research, participants and researchers become morally entangled through access to information that would otherwise be private (Goering et al. 2024). Use of DBS for psychiatric disorders such as depression presents challenges for identity; persons may wish to counter depressive symptoms but feel like they cannot recognize themselves afterwards. Brain-computer interfaces record brain activity; assisted by machine learning, patterns can be identified that indicate intentions and thoughts. These can be put into words for patients locked in by paralysis or into actions by exoskeletons supporting people who cannot move.

Brain implants or wearable sensors with computer interfaces are the primary technologies in current use, but remote monitoring of brain activity may also be possible (Segal et al. 2025). These can be combined with other data such as facial expressions, heart rate variability, or activity on social media. With or without remote monitoring, it is not science fiction to suggest that people’s mental states could be known without their awareness. “Mind-reading,” while presenting significant questions of accuracy today, is rapidly developing as a more realistic possibility. Brain scanning can suggest political viewpoints, sexual orientation, or whether someone is lying or telling the truth and thus may be sought after for persuasion, sales, or criminal law enforcement (Magee et al. 2024). Experiments with non-human animals have suggested the possibility of altering memories or present thoughts (O’Callaghan and Shiner 2021). Big Brother really could be watching—or trying to change—anyone’s full stream of consciousness before too long.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 18 provides that “everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.” The right to freedom of thought as a right separate from the free exercise of religion has been interpreted to include four attributes: not being forced to reveal thoughts, not being punished for thoughts, not having thoughts altered impermissibly, and living in a state that fosters an enabling environment for freedom of thought (O’Callaghan et al. 2024). International human rights practitioners and scholars have begun to discuss the importance of shielding the inner forum of unmanifested mental activity from interference through protections of mental privacy (Bublitz and Blitz, 2021, 2026; Farahany 2023; O’Callaghan and Shiner, eds., 2025; United Nations 2025). The GDPR Article 9 treats data revealing political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or sexual orientation as among categories of especially sensitive information requiring explicit, real-time consent for collection or use. Several US jurisdictions have enacted special privacy laws protecting at least some cognitive biometric data (Magee et al. 2024).

The concern that thoughts might be impermissibly altered is a central reason advanced for the protection of mental privacy. One understanding of impermissible alteration relies on the concept of manipulation, harking back to earlier discussions in political theory about the covert influence of ideology or more recent discussions of microtargeted advertising as threats to autonomy (Aylsworth 2022). Ligthart (2025) argues that exploitation presents a normatively preferable frame for distinguishing between acceptable persuasion and impermissible coercion. Ligthart’s discussion explores various ways in which mind interventions could exploit cognitive weaknesses for others’ gain. Conceptualizing this aspect of mental privacy that constitutes impermissible alteration of thoughts is an ongoing area of philosophical exploration.

Another area of exploration of mental privacy concerns the use of neurodata obtained through fMRI in criminal law to assess issues such as the accuracy of a witness’s memory or the honesty of a defendant (Farahany 2023, 2012). Proponents argue that this information is far more accurate than traditional polygraphs and can enhance trial reliability. Critics question claims about accuracy; one study considers whether deceptive processes can be validly distinguished from selfish choice processes and attempts to develop a machine learning method that can distinguish confounding behaviors (Lee et al. 2024). Critics also argue that compelled use of brain imaging technology is a violation of mental privacy that undermines human dignity (Kilbride and Iuliano 2015).

Neuroscience researchers have also considered privacy concerns about the use of data obtained in research. While regarding therapeutic advances as an admirable goal, research participants express concerns that neuroscience data might be reidentified and used to discriminate against them (Guerrini et al. 2025). Other distributive justice issues include the data used to train algorithms for translating brain activity into thoughts, the potential for algorithmic bias discussed in Section 3.6, and the recognition that any predictions of this kind are probabilistic only.

Bioethics scholars have also considered whether neurodata might reveal care preferences or obtain informed consent from persons otherwise incapable of expressing their wishes. Poppe and Elger (2024) ask whether persons in locked in states should be enabled through brain-computer interfaces to make end of life decisions, including about medical aid in dying. Initiating such efforts perforce must occur without knowledge of patient preferences but could be ended if inquiry indicates that the patient would not want the interface to be used to infer choices.

5. Property and Privacy

Moral and legal philosophers have defended significant connections between ownership and privacy. In addition to ownership over health information, discussed in Section 3.1, these include both ownership over the body or mind and use of property such as the home to protect privacy. John Locke is often said to understand the relationship between a person and her body as self-ownership; similarly, in medical contexts, individuals may claim rights of ownership over parts and products of their bodies. Ownership of private space has also been used to protect solitude, as discussed in Section 4.

An ownership-based privacy argument was advanced in the California case Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479 (1990). Without his knowledge or consent, research physicians developed a commercial cell line from tissue removed from leukemia patient John Moore. Moore and an appellate court argued that in taking his DNA-laden tissue for unrevealed research and development purposes unrelated to Moore’s cancer care, UCLA doctors had appropriated Moore’s identity in a manner analogous to advertisers using a person’s photograph without consent for commercial gain, a kind of claim that had gained legal recognition since at least the time of Warren and Brandeis’s seminal article eliciting the right to privacy (1890). The California court held that Moore’s doctors ought to have obtained his informed consent to the use of his tissues but would not commodify human tissue as private property (Radin 1987). In another property case, family members sued scientific companies that had profited from the use of cells taken from Baltimore resident Henrietta Lacks to create immortal HeLa cells immensely valuable for health care research. Here, the allegation was racial and economic injustice: Lacks’s tissues had been used to the great benefit of others while her family remained impoverished (Skloot 2010). Some companies have made settlement payments to family members of Lacks.

Ownership claims have also been asserted in infertility medicine over cryopreserved gametes or embryos. Although property rights in embryos have been generally rejected as wrongful claims to persons, some courts in the England, Australia, and the US have recognized property interests in gametes as body parts (Maddox 2017). In contested cases, some courts have awarded ownership to embryos in accord with prior contracts entered into by the parties, while the state of Arizona has a statute awarding ownership to the party planning to use the embryo to try to achieve a pregnancy.

Property rights claims have also been used to protect private spaces (Thomson 1975). In addition to the claims to solitude and to protections against invasion of the body discussed in Section 4, medical privacy may also defend homes against public health searches for people who might harbor infections. The possibility that searches might result in evictions, however, raises serious issues of distributive justice and policing the poor (Moran-McCabe et al. 2018).

6. Decisional Privacy

Privacy has also been applied to decisions about intimate personal matters, including health. Feminist philosophers have widely defended this right as including the reproductive control essential to women’s equality while recognizing that protection of the private sphere has historically confined women to traditional roles of daughter, wife and mother (Allen 2000; MacKinnon 1984). Illustrations of decisional privacy include reproduction, end of life decisions, vaccination and measures to reduce disease spread such as masking, and unhealthy lifestyles. Health care workers’ ability to refuse care on the basis of conscience is a decisional matter that can affect the health care people receive.

Choices about contraception, assisted reproductive technologies, abortion, and gender affirming care have all been discussed under the umbrella of decisional privacy. These topics are treated more fully elsewhere in this Encyclopedia, as linked above, and will only be considered here as matters of decisional privacy

6.1 Reproductive Privacy

In US constitutional law, rights to contraception and abortion were originally couched as rights to privacy in intimate personal decisions (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965; Roe v. Wade, 1973). These were understood as rights against interference by the state, not as rights to the means to exercise them such as insurance coverage for contraception (Salganicoff et al. 2024). As opposition to abortion mounted, the US Supreme Court gradually chipped away at the right, changed the overarching analytical frame from privacy to liberty, and finally overruled the right to choose abortion in Dobbs (2022).

Although the Dobbs majority insisted that the decision would not have implications for other intimate choices such as contraception and marriage, the minority of the Court remained decidedly unconvinced. In 2025, the Court upheld the constitutionality of state bans on gender affirming care for minors as passing the lowest tier of equal protection scrutiny, rational basis review (United States v. Skrmetti). In 2026, the Court issued rulings disfavoring transgender rights in cases involving a free speech challenge to a state ban on conversion therapy (Chiles v. Salazar) and Title IX challenges to a state ban on participation of transwomen in school sports (Little v. Hecox). Commentators argue that these cases impinge on families making choices about intimate matters in perhaps inconsistent ways.

The privacy right to reproductive choice has also been argued to encompass reproductive justice. Reproductive justice includes not only the right to decide not to have children but also the right have the children one wants and to raise those children in safe and sustainable environments (Ross and Solinger 2017). Reproductive justice thus supports choices about infertility treatment including assisted reproductive technologies. Whether this should extend to surrogate parenthood remains controversial. Critics argue that surrogacy involves wrongful commodification of women while supporters defend the importance of reproduction for people who are either medically or socially infertile.

6.2 Decision-making at the End of Life: refusing care, withdrawing care, and medical aid in dying (MAID)

Decision making at the end of life has also been treated under the right to privacy. The development of bioethics as a field (Beauchamp 2000) was famously influenced by the case of Karen Quinlan, which characterized the right of a comatose woman’s family to refuse life-saving treatment on her behalf as a “right to privacy” (Jonsen 1998). The U.S. Supreme Court later characterized this right as a liberty right of patients to refuse medical care such as artificial respiration and tube feeding (Cruzan 1986).

Moral philosophers have also used the right to decisional privacy to defend choices about medical aid in dying (MAID) (Washington v. Glucksberg, Quill v. Vacco 1997). As of 2026, thirteen US states and the District of Columbia, along with many countries across the globe, had authorized MAID. Debates are continuing about whether aid in dying should be extended beyond terminal illness to “intolerable suffering,” including suffering due to mental health conditions. Defenders of these extensions argue that people should be able to make these choices of momentous importance to them. Critics worry about the social conditions under which life might no longer seem worth living, especially when people with disabilities do not have access to resources needed to live outside of institutions.

6.3 Medically Unhealthy Lifestyles

Whether decisional privacy encompasses the right to make unhealthy lifestyle choices is also a matter of philosophical debate. John Stuart Mill, in his famous essay On Liberty (1869) gave an emphatic “yes” to the extent that these choices are self-regarding behaviors that do not harm others. Mill’s anti-paternalism rested in the utilitarian view that individuals are better judges of their own interests than is the state. Reaching a similar conclusion by a different route, a libertarian perspective condemns the “nanny state” that fails to treat citizens like conscientious adults (Harsanyi 2007: 41).

On the other side are arguments that a focus on individual health behavior ignores the social conditions in which the behavior occurs. Individuals’ choices may be unduly influenced by advertising or social media (McGee 1999). Theorists of the social determinants of health point out structural conditions such as food deserts or dangerous public spaces where exercise would be unsafe. If individuals do not freely choose health behaviors, they may be unfairly blamed for poor health. Behavior also may be difficult to change. If healthier food costs more, purchasing it will disproportionately burden people in poverty. Avoiding coercion, policy makers have introduced incentives such as additional health insurance premiums for smokers or for people who do not attend weight loss programs. “Nudges” have been defended as consistent with autonomy, so long as they meet criteria such as comporting with patient preferences and being easily resisted (Engelen 2019). Concerns about nudges include whether incentives are too high for refusal to be reasonable, whether incentives unfairly disadvantage people who lack resources, and whether surreptitious nudging may adversely impact the physician-patient relationship (Blumenthal-Barby and Burroughs 2012).

6.4 Compelled Treatment

Reproductive care, mental health care, vaccination, and contagious disease management are areas presenting contemporary examples of compelled treatment. The justification for compulsion is primarily protection of others although as with vaccination may also include benefits for individuals themselves. Critics of interventions argue for the importance of decisional privacy with respect for the body and the risk that compulsion may be imposed in a discriminatory manner.

Reproductive care is one example of compulsory interventions that raise decisional privacy concerns, even outside the context of abortion. Women have been forced to undergo caesarean sections or drug treatment. Protection of the fetus is the stated justification for these interventions. But compelled surgery is an especially significant interference with the body of the pregnant women, one that comes with significant risks. Moreover, evidence suggests that in the US racial differences play an independent role in rates of caesarean section (Corredor-Waldron et al. 2026). In the US and elsewhere, mandatory sterilizations have notoriously harmed people with disabilities, people in poverty, and people of color by depriving them of the capacity to reproduce.

Whether persons with mental health conditions, including substance use disorders, can be compelled to undergo treatment also raises issues about the moral limits of private choice. One concern is decision making capacity: some mental health patients lack capacity to make their own treatment decisions, but the vast majority do not. For capacity determinations, the critical question is individual functional ability, not diagnosis. Competent patients with conditions that primarily affect themselves may plausibly argue that the benefits of medications are not outweighed by their risks.

Compulsory treatment for contagious diseases and compulsory vaccination are examples of interventions into the body justified by protection for public health. Tuberculosis is a contagious disease for which people have been isolated or required to undergo treatment. Incomplete treatment of tuberculosis can result in multidrug resistant—and deadly—disease passed on to others, creating the need to strike a difficult ethical balance between the benefits of protection and individual liberty (Selgelid 2005). In the US, vaccination requirements for children entering school or for health care workers have met with increasing resistance especially after COVID. Decisions to forego vaccination may rest on religious grounds or on assertions of control over what goes into one’s body. False claims about relationships between vaccines and autism pervade social media. Philosophers have also explored how vaccine refusals may stem from mistrust of physicians and the sense that women particularly have been epistemically silenced (Navin and Attwell 2023). Still, refusal is particularly difficult to justify when parents make decisions on behalf of their children or when herd immunity is in jeopardy as with the measles epidemic in the United States in 2026.

7. Public Figures and Medical Privacy

As human beings, public figures have the same interests in privacy as anyone else. On the other hand, the public may have important interests in knowing about their health. This interest is strongest when the public figure is in a position of political power or seeking to obtain elective office. If so, members of the public legitimately may wish to know about fitness to hold office. Questions about presidential health have surfaced periodically in the US. When providers treat public figures, they must balance fiduciary responsibility to patients with responsibilities to the public (Crigger 2020). The public may also need to know about susceptibility to future conditions that could affect conduct in office; this could include genetic information (Brown 2008).

Members of the public may also have interests when the public figure is in a position of economic power. This would be true if the public figure’s health could affect legitimate concerns of others; for example, if Steve Jobs’s illness could have had a significant impact on the fortunes of Apple, a publicly traded company at the time, arguably people responsible for managing the company in the interests of shareholders ought to have been aware of his illness to the extent necessary to plan for succession. Although people may care a great deal about the health of other famous people—sports people or entertainment celebrities for example—these desires do not affect sufficiently important interests to warrant public knowledge. In the interests of fair competition, however, professional or college leagues could have sufficient justification for openness about injury status and player availability.

Patients may also wish to know about the health conditions of their providers. Early in the HIV/AIDs pandemic, there were calls for physicians to reveal their HIV status. Patients have also sought to hold physicians liable for failures to disclose their experience with procedures. The generally accepted conclusion to these conflicts is that providers should not be required to disclose personal information to patients but could be held liable in malpractice for not using universal precautions to protect patients or for performing procedures for which they have not been appropriately trained.

8. Conclusion

Philosophers have identified and debated many meanings of “privacy” deployed in medical contexts. These include informational privacy (Section 3), physical and mental privacy (Section 4), proprietary privacy (Section 5) and decisional privacy (Section 6). There is wide philosophical consensus about the importance of medical confidentiality, modesty and bodily integrity in all health settings; but there is also substantial philosophical disagreement about the limits of personal autonomy or individual choice in fields relating to contagious diseases, human reproduction and genetics, and medical research. As digital medical data technologies, artificial intelligence, mobile health care apps, telemedicine, public health surveillance, and brain imaging technologies expand, the range and complexity of important privacy questions in medicine will continue to expand as well.

Bibliography

  • Adams, Tim, Colin Birkenbihl, Karen Otte, Hwei Geok Ng, Jonas Adrian Rieling, Anatol-Fiete Näher, Ulrich Sax, Fabian Prasser, Holger Frölich, and Alzheimer’s Disease Neuroimaging Initiative, 2025, “On the Fidelity versus Privacy and Utility Trade-Off of Synthetic Patient Data”, iScience, 28(5): 112382. doi:10.1016/j.isci.2025.112382
  • Allen, Anita, 2000, “Gender and Privacy in Cyberspace”, Stanford Law Review, 52(5): 1175–1200.
  • –––, 2003, Privacy Isn’t Everything: Feminist Reflections on Personal Accountability, Lanham: Roman and Littlefield.
  • –––, 2011, Unpopular Privacy: What Must We Hide?, New York: Oxford University Press.
  • –––, 2014, “Privacy in Health Care”, in Encyclopedia of Bioethics, 4rd edition, Bruce Jennings (ed.), New York: MacMillan Reference Books, pp. 2064–2073.
  • –––, 2015a, “Health Data Privacy in the Balance, Evolving Values and Priorities”, Aspen Institute Health Strategy Group, 55–80. [Allen 2015a available online]
  • –––, 2015b, “Compliance Limited Health Privacy Laws”, in Social Dimensions of Privacy, Beate Roessler and Dorota Mokrosinska (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 261– 277.
  • –––, 2016, “Protecting One’s Own Privacy in a Big Data Economy” Harvard Law Review Forum, 130: 71–80.
  • –––, 2026, “Defining Away Our Privacy”, in Conceptions of Data Protection and Privacy, Elisa Orrù and Ralf Poscher (eds.), Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 15–29.
  • Allen, Anita, and Marc Rotenberg (with contributions by Rok Lampe), 2016, Privacy Law and Society, 3rd edition, Minneapolis: West Academic Publishing.
  • Allen, Anita, and Jennifer E. Rothman, 2024, “Postmortem Privacy”, Michigan Law Review, 123(2): 285–354.
  • American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM), 2026, “Posthumous Reproduction: An Ethics Committee Opinion”, Fertility and Sterility, published online 29 September 2026. doi:10.1016/j.fertnstert.2026.08.1130
  • Annas, George J., S.S. Crosby, and L.H. Glantz, 2013, “Guantanamo Bay: A Medical Ethics-free Zone?” New England Journal of Medicine, 369: 101–103.
  • Antommaria, Armand H.M., 2016, “Conscientious Objection: Widening the Temporal and Organizational Horizons”, Journal of Clinical Ethics, 27(3): 248–250.
  • Appel, Jacob M., 2022, “Gender-Based Requests for Physician Care”, American Family Physician, 105(3): 315–316.
  • Aylsworth, Timothy, 2022, “Autonomy and Manipulation : Refining the Argument Against Persuasive Advertising”, Journal of Business Ethics, 175(4): 689–99. doi:10.1007/s10551-020-04590-6
  • Battin, Margaret P., Leslie P. Francis, Jay A. Jacobson, and Charles B. Smith, 2021, The Patient as Victim and Vector: Ethics and Infectious Disease, New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Beauchamp, Tom, 2000, “The Right to Privacy and the Right to Die”, Social Policy and Practice, 1(2): 276–292.
  • Beauchamp, Tom, and James Childress, 2008, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 6th edition, New York: Oxford.
  • Blaauw, C.B., J.J. van den Dobbelsteen, F.W. Jansen, & J.H. Hubben, 2014, “Privacy Aspects of Video Recording in the Operating Room”, in J. van den Hoven, N. Doorn, T. Swierstra, B.-J. Koops, and H. Romijn (eds.), Responsible Innovation 1, Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 293–300
  • Blumenthal-Barby, Jennifer, and Hadley Burroughs, 2012, “Seeking Better Health Outcomes: The Ethics of Using the ‘Nudge’”, American Journal of Bioethics, 12(2): 1–10.
  • Bok, Sissela, 1982, Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation, New York: Pantheon Books.
  • Bridges, Khiara, 2017, The Poverty of Privacy Rights, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
  • Brown, Teneille R., 2008, “Double Helix, Double Standards: Private Matters and Public People”, Journal of Health Care Law and Policy, 11(2): 295–376.
  • Brown, Teneille, Sarah Duensing, and Bob Wong, 2024, “Forensic Genetics in the Shadows”, Journal of Law and the Biosciences, 11(2): lsae028. doi:10.1093/jlb/lsae028
  • Bublitz, Jan Christoph, and Marc Jonathan Blitz (eds.), 2021, The Law and Ethics of Freedom of Thought, Volume 1: Neuroscience, Autonomy, and Individual Rights, London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
  • –––, 2026, The Law and Ethics of Freedom of Thought, Volume 2: Cognitive Liberty, Mental Privacy, and International Law, London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
  • Burr, Chandler, 1999, “The AIDS Exception: Privacy vs. Public Health”, in Dan E. Beauchamp and Bonnie Steinbock (eds.), New Ethics for Public Health, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 212–224.
  • Calo, M. Ryan, 2011, “The Boundaries of Privacy Harm”, Indiana Law Journal, 86(3): 1131–1162.
  • Carnes, Neal, Linda J. Koenig, Aisha L. Wilkes, Deborah Gelaude, Yamir Salabarría-Peña, and Marie Johnston, 2025, “Addressing Stigma and Privacy Through Telemedicine: Qualitative Findings on Enhancing HIV Care Engagement Among Racial and Ethnic Minority Groups”, Journal of Racial and Health Disparities, 13: 1106–1114. doi:10.1007/s40615-025-02319-7.
  • Caulfield, Timothy, Blake Murdoch, and Ubaka Ogbogu, 2020, “Research, Digital Health Information and Promises of Privacy: Revisiting the Issue of Consent”, Canadian Journal of Bioethics, 3(1): 164–171.
  • Chadwick, Ruth, Mairi Levitt, & Darren Shickle (eds.), 2014, The Right to Know and the Right Not to Know: Genetic Privacy and Responsibility, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Citron, Danielle Keats, 2022, The Fight for Privacy: Protecting Dignity, Identity and Love in the Digital Age, New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
  • Corredor-Waldron, Adriana, Janet Curry, and Molly Schnell, 2026, “Drivers of Racial Differences in C-Sections”, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 32891. Corredor-Waldron et al. 2026 available online]
  • Coyner, Aaron S., Praveer Singh, James M. Brown, Susan Ostmo, R.V. Paul Chan, Michael F. Chiang, Jayashree Kalpathy-Cramer, J. Peter Campbell, Imaging and Informatics in Retinopathy of Prematurity Consortium, 2023, “Association of Biomarker-Based Artificial Intelligence with Risk of Racial Bias in Retinal Images”, JAMA Opthalmology, 141(6): 543–552.
  • Crigger, Elliott J., 2020, “The Ethics of Treating the President”, The Hastings Center for Bioethics. [Crigger 2020 available online]
  • Dahlquist, Jacklyn M., Christi J. Guerrini, Jill O. Robinson, Whitney Bash-Brooks, Amy L. McGuire, and Stephanie M. Fullerton, 2025, “Forensic Investigative Genetic Genealogy and Public Trust”, Journal of Forensic Sciences, 70: 2113–2116.
  • DeCew, Judith, 2000, “The Priority of Privacy for Medical Information”, Social Policy and Practice, 1(2): 213–234.
  • de Zulueta, Paquita, 2000, “The ethics of Anonymized HIV Testing of Pregnant Women: a Reappraisal”, Journal of Medical Ethics, 26(1): 16–21.
  • Dresser, Rebecca, 2025, “Food and Drug Administration v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine: How Conscience Protections Preserved Mifepristone Access”, Hastings Center Report, 55(2): 6–8
  • Dugdale, Lydia S., Kari L. Esbensen, and Lois Snyder Sulmasy for the ACP Ethics, Professionalism and Human Rights Committee, 2023, “Ethical Guidance on Family Caregiving, Support, and Visitation in Hospitals and Residential Health Care Facilities, Including During Public Health Emergencies: an American College of Physicians Position Paper”, Journal of General Internal Medicine, 38: 1986–1993.
  • Dworkin, Ronald, Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, Judith Jarvis Thomson, and T.M. Scanlon, 1997, “Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers’ Brief”, The New York Review, March 27, 1997. [Dworkin et al. 1997 available online]
  • El Emam, Khaled, and Ester Moher, 2013, “Privacy and Anonymity Challenges When Collecting Data for Public Health Purposes”, The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 41: 37–41.
  • Eliazar, Austin, James Thomas Brown, Sara Cinamon, Murat Kantarcioglu, and Bradley Malin, 2026, “Re-identification Risk for Common Privacy Preserving Patient Matching Strategies when Shared with De-identified Demographics”, Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association, 33(2): 336–346.
  • Engelen, Bart, 2019, “Ethical Criteria for Health-Promoting Nudges: A Case-by-Case Analysis”, American Journal of Bioethics, 19(5): 48–59.
  • Englehardt, H. Tristram, 2000, “Privacy and Limited Democracy, the Moral Centrality of Persons”, Social Policy and Practice, 1(2): 120–140.
  • Epstein, Richard A., 2004, “In Defense of the ‘Old’ Public Health: The Legal Framework for the Regulation of Public Health”, Brooklyn Law Review, 69: 1421–1470.
  • Erickson, Blake R., Elizabeth Bromley, and Paul S. Appelbaum, 2026, “Serious Mental Illness, Dependence, and Care: California’s Legal Initiatives on Grave Disability”, Psychiatric Services, 77(1): 74–77.
  • Faden, Ruth, Tom Beauchamp, and Nancy King, 1986, A History of Informed Consent, New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Fairchild, Amy L., Lance Gable, Lawrence O. Gostin, Ronald Bayer, Patricia Sweeney, Robert S. Janssen, 2007a, “Public Goods, Private Data: HIV and the History, Ethics, and Uses of Identifiable Public Health Information”, Public Health Reports, 122 (Supplement 1): 7–15.
  • Fairchild, Amy L., Ronald Bayer, James Keith Colgrove, and Daniel Wolfe, 2007b, Searching Eyes: Privacy, the State, and Disease Surveillance in America, Berkeley: University of California Press.
  • Farahany, Nita A., 2012, “Incriminating Thoughts”, Stanford Law Review, 64: 351–408.
  • –––, 2023, The Battle for your Brain: Defending the Right to Think Freely in the Age of Neurotechnology, New York: St. Martin’s Press.
  • Farronato, Chiara, 2025, “Data as the New Oil: Parallels, Challenges, and Regulatory Implications”, National Bureau of Economic Research. [Farronato 2025 available online]
  • Fiala, Christian, Joyce Arthur, and Amelia Martzke, 2025, “Origin of ‘Conscientious Objection’ in Health Care: How Care Denials Became Enshrined into Law Because of Abortion”, Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 53: 89–97.
  • Foucault, Michel, 1977, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Alan Sheridan (trans.), New York: Pantheon.
  • Francis, John G., and Leslie P. Francis, 2021, Sustaining Surveillance: The Importance of Information for Public Health, New York: Springer Nature.
  • Francis, Leslie P., 2008, “Privacy and Confidentiality: the Importance of Context”, Monist, 91(1): 52–67.
  • Francis, Leslie P., and John G. Francis, 2017, “Privacy and Health Information”, in Privacy: What Everyone Needs to Know, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 62–101.
  • Francis, Leslie P., Margaret P. Battin, Jay Jacobson, and Charles Smith, 2009, “Syndromic Surveillance and Patients as Victims and Vectors”, Journal of Bioethical Inquiry, 6(2): 187–195.
  • Freedman, Benjamin, 1978, “A Meta-Ethics for Professional Morality”, Ethics, 89(1): 1–19
  • Frey, R.G., 2000, “Privacy Control and Talk of Rights”, Social Policy and Practice, 1(2): 45–67.
  • Gallifant, Jack, Joe Zhang, Maria del Pilar Arias Lopez, Tingting Zhu, Luigi Camporota, Leo A. Celi, and Federico Formenti, 2022, “Artificial Intelligence for Mechanical Ventilation: Systematic Review of Design, Reporting Standards, and Bias”, British Journal of Anaesthesia, 128(2): 343–351.
  • Gandy, Oscar H., 2021, The Panoptic Sort: A Political Economy of Personal Information, 2d ed., New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Gates John J., and Bernard S. Arons, eds., 2000, Privacy and Confidentiality in Mental Health Care, Baltimore: Paul H. Brookes Pub. Co.
  • Goering, Sara, 2015, “Stimulating Autonomy: DBS and the Prospect of Choosing to Control Ourselves Through Stimulation”, AJOB Neuroscience, 6(4): 1–3.
  • Goering, Sara, Andrew I. Brown, and Eran Klein, 2024, “Brain Pioneers and Moral Entanglement: An Argument for Post-trial responsibilities in Neural-Device Trials”, Hastings Center Report, 54(1): 24–33.
  • Goffman, E., 1959, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
  • –––, 1963, Behavior in Public Places, New York: Free Press.
  • Guerrini, Christi J., Jill O. Robinson, Norah L. Crossnohere, Mary A. Majumder, Kathryn Maxson Jones, Whitney Bash Brooks, Sameer A. Sheth, and Amy L. McGuire, 2025, “Privacy in Perspective: Research Participants’ Priorities and Concerns Related to Sharing Data Generated in Human Neuroscience Studies”, Neuroethics, 18(2): 37.
  • Gutierrez, Amanda M., Jacob D. Hofstetter, Emma L. Dishner, Elizabeth Chiao, Dilreet Rai, and Amy L. McGuire, 2020, “A Right to Privacy and Confidentiality: Ethical Medical Care for Patients in United States Immigration Detention”, Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 48: 161–168.
  • Harsanyi, D., 2007, Nanny State: How Food Fascists, Teetotaling Do-Gooders, Priggish Moralists, and other Boneheaded Bureaucrats are Turning America into a Nation of Children, New York: Broadway Books.
  • Henderson, Heather, Jason Wilson, Bernice McCoy, Megan Sarmento, and Asa Oxner, 2025, “Anonymous Opt-Out HIV and Hepatitis C Screening at a Syringe Services Program in Florida”, Harm Reduction Journal, 22(1): 30. doi:10.1186/s12954-025-01182-3
  • Ho, Anita, 2023, Live Like Nobody Is Watching: Relational Autonomy in the Age of Artificial Intelligence Health Monitoring, New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Holm, Rochelle H., Lauren B. Anderson, Heather D. Ness, A. Scott Lajoie, and Ted Smith, 2024, “Towards the Outbreak Tail, what is the Public Opinion about Wastewater Surveillance in the United States”, Journal of Water Health, 22(8): 1409–1418.
  • Hoofnagle, Chris Jay, Jennifer King, Su Li, and Joseph Turow, 2010, “How Different are Young Adults From Older Adults When it Comes to Information Privacy Attitudes & Policies?”, SSRN eLibrary. [Hoofnagle et al. 2010 available online]
  • Jonsen, A., 1998, The Birth of Bioethics, New York: Oxford.
  • Keogh, Louisa A., Douglass Fisher, Sherri Sheinfeld Gorin, Sheri D. Schully, Jan T. Lowery, Dennis J. Ahnen, Judith A. Maskiell, Noralane M. Lindor, John L. Hopper, Terrilea Burnett, Spring Holter, Julie L. Arnold, Steven Gallinger, Mercy Laurino, Mary-Jane Esplen & Pamela S. Sinicrope for the Colon Cancer Family Registry, 2014, “How Do Researchers Manage Genetic Results in Practice? The Experience of the Multinational Colon Cancer Family Registry”, Journal of Community Genetics, 5: 99–108.
  • Kilbride, Madison, and Jason Iuliano, 2015, “Neuro Lie Detection and Mental Privacy”, Maryland Law Review, 75(1): 163–193.
  • Kohn, Nina A., Wendy Jiang, Fuad Abujarad, Marie-Therese Connolly, Kathy Greenlee, Alison Hirschel, Larry Jia, Elizabeth Loewy, and Laura Mosqueda, 2025, “Mandated Reporting of Elder Abuse: An Evaluation and Call to Action”, The Elder Law Journal, 33(1): 167–222.
  • Laurie, Graeme T., 2002, Genetic Privacy: A Challenge to Medico-Legal Norms, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Lee, Sangil, Runxuan Nie, Lusha Zhu, Andrew S. Kayser, and Ming Hsu, 2024, “Distinguishing deception from its Confounds by Improving the Validity of fMRI-based Neural Prediction”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, 121(50): e2412881121, doi:10.1073/pnas.2412881121
  • Ligthart, Sjors, 2025, “Mental Privacy as Part of the Human Right to Freedom of Thought?”, in The Law and Ethics of Freedom of Thought, Volume 2: Cognitive Liberty, Mental Privacy, and International Law, Jan Christoph Bublitz, and Marc Jonathan Blitz (eds.), London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 191–215
  • Lin, Laura, and Bryan A. Liang, 2005, “HIV and Health Law: Striking the Balance between Legal Mandates and Medical Ethics”, AMA Journal of Ethics, 7(10): 687–692.
  • Lott, Bradley E., Celeste Campos-Castillo, and Denise L. Anthony, 2020, “Trust and Privacy: How Patient Trust in Providers is Related to Privacy Behaviors and Attitudes”, AMIA Annual Symposium Proceedings Archive, 2019: 487–493.
  • MacKinnon, C., 1984, “Roe v. Wade: A Study in Male Ideology”, in Abortion: Moral and Legal Perspectives, J. Garfield and P. Hennessy (eds.), Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, pp. 45–54.
  • Macklin, Ruth, 1998, “Ethical Relativism in a Multicultural Society”, Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 8(1): 1–22.
  • Maddox, Neil, 2017, “Property, Control and Separated Human Biomaterials”, European Journal of Health Law, 24(1): 24–45.
  • Magee, Patrick, Marcello Ienca, and Nita Farahany, 2024, “Beyond Neural Data: Cognitive Biometrics and Mental Privacy”, Neuron, 112(18): 3017–3028.
  • Maher, Brendan, 2023, “How Genetics Unmasked the Golden State Killer—and the Uncomfortable Ethical aftermath”, Nature, 614: 217–218.
  • Makary, Martin A., 2013, “The Power of Video Recording: Taking Quality to the Next Level”, Journal of the American Medical Association, 309: 1591–1592.
  • Marmor, Andrei, 2015, “What is the Right to Privacy?”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 43(1): 3–26.
  • Marshall, Patricia, and Barbara Koenig, 2004, “Accounting for Culture in a Globalized Bioethics”, Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 32: 252–266.
  • Marx, Gary T., 2007, “Privacy and Social Stratification”, Knowledge, Technology & Policy, 20(2): 91–95.
  • McArdle, Edward, Karen L. Teelin, and Adrienne Borschuk, 2024, “When Parents Request Nondisclosure: Rights of Adolescents to Access Their Health Information and Implications of the 21st Century Cures Act Final Rule”, Journal of Clinical Ethics, 35(2): 85–92.
  • McClain, Linda C., 2025, “Do Bans on Conversion Therapy Impose a Governmental ‘Orthodoxy’ about Sex and Gender?”, Boston University Law Review, 105: 1263–1293.
  • McCullough, Laurence B., 2011, “Was Bioethics Founded on Historical and Conceptual Mistakes about Medical Paternalism”?, Bioethics, 25(2): 66–74.
  • McGee, Glenn, 1999, Pragmatic Bioethics, Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press.
  • McGraw, Deven, Sarah M. Greene, Caroline S. Miner, Karen L. Staman, Mary Jane Welch, and Alan Rubel, 2015, “Privacy and Confidentiality in Pragmatic Clinical Trials”, Clinical Trials, 12(5): 520–529, doi:10.1177/1740774515597677
  • McGuire, Amy L., Jessica Roberts, Sean Aas, and Barbara J. Evans, 2019, “Who Owns the Data in a Medical Information Commons?”, Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 47(1): 62–69.
  • Mello, Michelle M., and Leslie E. Wolf, 2010, “The Havasupai Indian Tribe Case—Lessons for Research Involving Stored Biologic Samples”, New England Journal of Medicine, 363(3): 204–207.
  • Metzger, Tai, Tina Izad, Zeeshan Javed, and Zaheen Hossain, 2025, “Organ Donation Ethics: A Casuist Analysis of Routine-Salvage Versus Opt-in Models”, Linacre Quarterly, epub. doi:10.1177/00243639251394196
  • Mill, John Stuart, 1869, On Liberty, D. Bromwich and G. Kateb (eds.), New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003.
  • Mohapatra, Seema and Lindsay F. Wiley, 2020, “Feminist Perspectives in Health Law,” Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics, 47(4): 103–115.
  • Moran-McCabe, Katie, Abraham Gutman, and Scott Burris, 2018, “Public Health Implications of Housing Laws: Nuisance Evictions”, Public Health Reports, 133(5): 606–609.
  • Moskop, John C., Joel M. Geiderman, Kenneth D. Marshall, Jolion McGreevy, Arthur R. Derse, Kelly Bookman, Norine McGrath, and Kenneth V. Iserson, 2019, “Another Look at the Persistent Moral Problem of Emergency Department Crowding”, Annals of Emergency Medicine, 74(3): 357–364.
  • Navin, Mark C., and Katie Attwell, 2023, America’s New Vaccine Wars: California and the Politics of Mandates, New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Nelson, Alondra, 2025, “An ELSI for AI: Learning from Genetics to Govern Algorithms”, Science, 11: 389.
  • Nissenbaum, H., 2009, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy and the Integrity of Social Life, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
  • Oberlander, Jonathan, and Sara E. Gollust, 2026, “Public Health Under Siege”, Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 51(2): 125–145.
  • O’Callaghan, Patrick, Olga Cronin, Brendan Kelly, Bethany Shiner, Joel Walmsley, and Simon McCarthy-Jones, 2024, “The Right to Freedom of Thought: An Interdisciplinary Analysis of the UN Special Rapporteur’s Report on Freedom of Thought”, International Journal of Human Rights, 28(1): 1–23.
  • O’Callaghan, Patrick, and Bethany Shiner (eds.), 2025, The Cambridge Handbook of the Right to Freedom of Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • O’Callaghan, Patrick, and Bethany Shiner, 2021, “The Right to Freedom of Thought in the European Convention on Human Rights”, European Journal of Comparative Law and Governance, 8(2-3): 112-145.
  • Pereira, Stacey, Amanda M. Gutierrez, Jill Oliver Robinson, Kurt D. Christensen, Casie A. Genetti, Carrie L. Blout Zawatsky, Rebecca Hsu, Bethany Zettler, Melissa Kurtz Uveges, Richard B. Parad, Alan H. Beggs, Ingrid A. Holm, Robert C. Green, and Amy L. McGuire on behalf of The BabySeq Project Team, 2023, “Parents’ Decision-Making Regarding Whether to Receive Adult-Onset Only Genetic Findings for their Children: Findings from the BabySeq Project”, Genetics in Medicine, 25(3): 100002.
  • Pierce, Robin, 2018, “Medical Privacy: Where Deontology and Consequentialism Meet”, in Bart van der Sloot and Aviva de Groot (eds.), The Handbook of Privacy Studies: An Interdisciplinary Introduction, Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam Press, pp. 327–332.
  • Pillai, Drishti, Samantha Artiga, Alice Burns, and Jennifer Tolbert, 2026, “Potential Implications of the New Medicaid Data Sharing Agreement Between CMS and ICE”, San Francisco: KFF (formerly: Kaiser Family Foundation). [Pillai et al. 2026 available online]
  • Pongiglione, Francesca, and Shanna Slank, 2025, “On the Normative Complexity of Covid-19 Vaccine Refusal”, Topoi, 44: 221–233.
  • Poppe, Christopher, and Bernice S. Elger, 2024, “Brain-Computer Interfaces, Completely Locked-In State in Neurodegenerative Diseases, and End-of-Life Decisions”, Journal of Bioethical Inquiry, 21(1): 19–27.
  • Powers, Madison and Ruth Faden, 2008, Social Justice: The Moral Foundations of Public Health and Health Policy, New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Prero, Moshe Y., Meghan Strenk, Jeremy Garrett, Ann Kessler, Jonathan M. Fanaroff, and John D. Lantos, 2019, “Disclosure of Misattributed Paternity”, Pediatrics, 143(6): e20183899.
  • Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, 2012, Privacy and Progress in Whole Genome Sequencing. [Presidential Commission 2012 available online]
  • Prosser, W., 1960, “Privacy”, California Law Review, 48(3): 383–423.
  • Rachels, J., 1975, “Why Privacy is Important”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4(3): 323–333.
  • Radden, Jennifer (ed.), 2004, The Philosophy of Psychiatry, A Companion, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Radin, Margaret Jane, 1987, “Market-Inalienability”, Harvard Law Review, 100(8): 1849–1937.
  • Ren, Dongning, Wen Wei Lohy, Joanne M. Chung, and Mark J. Brandt, 2025, “Person-Specific Priorities in Solitude”, Journal of Personality, 93: 12–30.
  • Rhodes, Rosamond, 1998, “Genetic Links, Family Ties, and Social Bonds: Rights and Responsibilities in the Face of Genetic Knowledge”, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 23(1): 10–30.
  • Richards, Neil, 2022, Why Privacy Matters, New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Robins, Robert S. and Henry Rothschild, 1988, “Ethical Dilemmas of the President’s Physician”, Politics and the Life Sciences, 7(1): 3–11.
  • Rosenberg, Alexander, 2000, “Privacy as a Matter of Taste and Right”, Social Policy and Practice, 1(2): 68–90.
  • Røseth, Idun, Eva Sommerseth, Anne Lyberg, Berit Margrethe Sandvik, and Bente Dahl, 2024, “No One Needs to Know! Medical Abortion: Secrecy, Shame, and Emotional Distancing”, Health Care for Women International, 45(1): 67–85.
  • Ross, Loretta J., and Rickie Solinger, 2017, Reproductive Justice: An Introduction, Berkeley, California: University of California Press.
  • Rothstein, M. (ed.), 1997, Genetic Secrets: Protecting Privacy and Confidentiality in the Genetic Era, New Haven: Yale University Press.
  • Salganicoff, Alina, Laurie Sobel, Ivette Gomez, and Amrutha Ramaswamy, 2024, “Issue Brief: The Hyde Amendment and Coverage for Abortion Services Under Medicaid in the Post-Roe Era”, San Francisco: KFF (formerly: Kaiser Family Foundation). [Salganicoff et al. 2024 available online]
  • Scanlon, Thomas, 1975, “Thomson on Privacy”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4(4): 315–322.
  • Schleiter, Kristin E., 2009, “A Physician’s Duty to Warn Third Parties of Hereditary Risk”, AMA Journal of Ethics, 11(9): 697–700.
  • Segal, Natalya, Zeev Kalyuzhner, Sergey Agdarov, Yafim Beiderman, Yevgeny Beiderman, and Zeev Zalevsky, 2025, “AI-Powered Remote Monitoring of Brain Responses to Clear and Incomprehensible Speech via Speckle Pattern Analysis”, Journal of Biomedical Optics, 6: 067001. doi:10.1117/1.JBO.30.6.067001
  • Selgelid, Michael J., 2005, “Ethics and Infectious Disease”, Bioethics, 19(3): 272–289.
  • Shahawy, Sarrah, Lobna Raya, and Leen Al Kassab, 2024, “Caring for Muslim Patients”, Obstetrics and Gynecology Clinics, 51(1): 57–67.
  • Siegel, Riva B., 2023, “Memory Games: Dobbs’s Originalism as Anti-Democratic Living Constitutionalism—and Some Pathways for Resistance”, Texas Law Review, 101: 1127–1204.
  • Skinner-Thomson, Scott, 2020, Privacy at the Margins, London: Cambridge University Press.
  • Skloot, Rebecca, 2010, The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks, New York: Crown Publishing.
  • Solove, Daniel, 2004, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age, New York: NYU Press.
  • –––, 2008, Understanding Privacy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
  • Terry, Nicolas, and Leslie P. Francis, 2007, “Ensuring the Privacy and Confidentiality of Electronic Health Records”, University of Illinois Law Review, 2007: 681–735.
  • Thomson, Judith Jarvis, 1975, “The Right to Privacy”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4(3): 295–314.
  • Tsosie, Rebecca, 2010, “Cultural Challenges to Biotechnology: Native American Genetic Resources and the Concept of Cultural Harm”, Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics, 35(3): 396–411.
  • Tuerkheimer, Deborah, 2025, “Threats to Contraception”, Stanford Law Review Online, 78: 104–120.
  • United Nations, 2025, “Foundations and Principles for the Regulation of Neurotechnologies and the Processing of Neurodata from the Perspective of the Right to Privacy” (Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy, Ana Brian Nougrères), General Assembly, A/HRC/58/58. [United Nations 2025 available online]
  • van der Sloot, Bart, 2018, Privacy as Virtue: Moving Beyond the Individual in the Age of Big Data, Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam Press.
  • Vandersluis, Robert, and Julian Savulescu, 2024, “The Selective Deployment of AI in Healthcare: An Ethical Algorithm for Algorithms”, Bioethics, 38(5): 391–400.
  • Véliz, Carissa, 2020, Privacy is Power: How and Why You Should Take Back Control of Your Data, London: Penguin Random House.
  • –––, 2020a, “Not the Doctor’s Business: Privacy, Personal Responsibility, and Data Rights in Medical Settings”, Bioethics, 34(7): 712–718.
  • Waldman, Ari E., 2018, Privacy as Trust: Information Privacy for an Information Age, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Walsh, Ross, Emma C. Kearns, Alice Moynihan, Sara Gerke, Mindy Duffourc, Marcelo Corrales Compagnucci, Timo Minssen, and Ronan A. Cahill, 2023, “Ethical Perspectives on Surgical Video Recording for Patients, Surgeons and Society: Systematic Review”, British Journal of Surgery Open, 7(3): zrad063. doi:10.1093/bjsopen/zrad063
  • Warren, Samuel D., and Louis D. Brandeis, 1890, “The Right to Privacy”, Harvard Law Review, 4(5): 193–220.
  • Weaver, Meaghann, 2016, “The Double Helix: Applying an Ethic of Care to the Duty to Warn Genetic Relatives of Genetic Information”, Bioethics, 30(3): 181–187.
  • Westin, A., 1967, Privacy and Freedom, New York: Atheneum.
  • Whelan, Allison, 2024, “Dobbs and the Destabilization of Clinical Trials”, Vanderbilt Law Review, 77(5): 1381–1467.
  • Whittington, Jan, and Chris Jay Hoofnagle, 2012, “Unpacking Privacy’s Price”, North Carolina Law Review, 90: 1327–1370.
  • Winkler, Eva Caroline, and Bartha Maria Knoppers, 2022, “Ethical Challenges of Precision Cancer Medicine”, Seminars in Cancer Biology, 84: 263–270.
  • Wiest, Isabella C., Marie-Elisabeth Leßmann, Fabian Wokf, Dyke Ferber, Marko Van Treeck, Jiefu Zhu, Matthias P. Evert, Christoph Benedikt Westphalen, Martin Wermke, and Jakob Nikolas Kather, 2025, “Deidentifying Medical Documents with Local, Privacy-Preserving Large Language Models: The LLM Anonymizer”, NEJM AI, 2(4). doi:10.1056/Aldbp2400537
  • Wolf, Leslie E., and Laura M. Beskow, 2021, “Certificates of Confidentiality: Mind the Gap”, Utah Law Review, 2021: 937–950.
  • Wolf, Leslie E., Natalie Ram, Jorge Contreras, and Laura M. Beskow, 2024, “Certificates of Confidentiality: Privileging Research Data”, Journal of Law and the Biosciences, 11(1): 1–21.
  • Wolf, Leslie E. and Jolanta Zandecki, 2006, “Sleeping Better at Night: Investigators’ Experiences with Certificates of Confidentiality”, IRB: Ethics and Human Research, 28(6): 1–7.
  • Wong, L.S., S.L. Scahill, E. Barton, X.Y. Lim, J. Hikaka, J. Boey, D.J. Exetor, M. Hudson, A Nu’u, and Sanyogita (Sanya) Ram, 2025, “Conscientious Objection in Pharmacist Codes of Ethics: An International Comparison Through Document Analysis”, Exploratory Research in Clinical and Social Pharmacy, 18: 100609.
  • Wright, Megan, 2022, “Resuscitating Consent”, Boston College Law Review, 63: 887–956.
  • Zhang, Ju, 2025, “A Trust-Oriented Approach to Ethical Mediation in Multicultural Healthcare”, Journal of Clinical Ethics, 36(4): 353–362.
  • Zuboff, Shoshana, 2019, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power, New York: Public Affairs Press.

Other Internet Resources

Acknowledgments

The author and editors would like to thank Anita Allen, for permission to include a few sentences and sentence fragments from her entry on Privacy and Medicine, which was the previous entry covering this topic and is now available only in the SEP archives [see the link in the Other Internet Resources section above].

Copyright © 2026 by
Leslie Francis <francisl@law.utah.edu>

Open access to the SEP is made possible by a world-wide funding initiative.
The Encyclopedia Now Needs Your Support
Please Read How You Can Help Keep the Encyclopedia Free