Argument and Argumentation

First published Fri Jul 16, 2021; substantive revision Sun Nov 15, 2026

Argument is a central concept for philosophy. Philosophers rely heavily on arguments to justify claims, and these practices have been motivating reflections on what arguments and argumentation are for millennia. Argumentative practices are also pervasive elsewhere; they permeate, among others, scientific inquiry, legal procedures, education, and political institutions. Accordingly, the study of argumentation is an inter-disciplinary field of inquiry, involving philosophers, linguists, legal scholars, cognitive scientists, computer scientists, political theorists, and communication and rhetoric scholars, among others. This entry provides an overview of the literature on argumentation drawing primarily on philosophical sources, but also engaging with relevant sources from other disciplines. An accompanying Historical Supplement presents four influential historical traditions on argumentation.

Argumentation is a multi-faceted phenomenon, and the literature on arguments and argumentation is massive and varied. This entry can only scratch the surface of the richness of this material, and many interesting topics must be left out for reasons of space. When choosing what to include, we considered didactical goals and the topics that have attracted significant interest among argumentation scholars in recent years.

1. Terminological Clarifications

The two central terms discussed here—“argument” and “argumentation”—are subject to the familiar and philosophically significant action-product ambiguity: they can refer to an action (activity, process) undertaken by an agent or to the product of that action (Lewiński 2025). Actions are transient and are describable by dynamic properties: they can be intentional (or not), successful (or not) etc. Products are typically enduring, and are describable by static properties: they can be symmetrical, elegant, heavy, etc. Arguments as actions—something we will consistently call “argumentation”—can be persuasive, heated, or multi-agent. Arguments as products—something we will consistently call “argument”—can be valid, sound, inductive, or defeasible.

Moreover, in both the action and the product sense, arguments can be given (at least) three different ontological statuses (Goddu 2011; Goodman 2018; Hample 1985; Lewiński 2025; O’Keefe 1977; Parsons 1996; Simard-Smith & Moldovan 2011; Walton 1990). They can be understood as: 1. internal mental entities—the processes and products of reasoning, as in psychological or cognitive approaches; 2. external communicative entities—the processes and products of linguistic (or otherwise semiotic) interaction, e.g., speech acts; 3. abstract objects (whether mind-independent or human-made)—as in many formal logical approaches which study arguments as ‘freestanding’ entities, independently from the human mental or communicative activities which produce or entertain them.

Against this background, multiple uses of the terms “argument” and “argumentation” in philosophy and related areas can be distinguished. An argument can be defined as a complex symbolic structure where some parts, known as the premises, offer support to another part, the conclusion. Alternatively, an argument can be viewed as a complex speech act consisting of one or more acts of premising (which assert propositions in favor of the conclusion), an act of concluding, and a stated or implicit marker (“hence”, “therefore”) that indicates that the conclusion follows from the premises (Hitchcock 2007; 2021).[1] The relation of support between premises and conclusion can be cashed out in different ways: the premises may guarantee the truth of the conclusion, or make its truth more probable; the premises may entail the conclusion; the premises may make the conclusion more acceptable (or assertible). For theoretical purposes, arguments may be considered as freestanding entities, abstracted from their contexts of use in actual human activities. But depending on one’s explanatory goals, there is also much to be gained from considering arguments as they in fact occur in human communicative practices.

Argumentation, in turn, can be defined as the communicative activity of producing and exchanging reasons in order to support claims or defend/challenge positions, especially in situations of doubt or disagreement (Lewiński & Mohammed 2016). It is paradigmatically a type of public dialogue, even if one can also “argue” with oneself, in long speeches, in writing (in articles or books) for an intended but silent audience, or in groups rather than in dyads (Lewiński & Aakhus 2023). But argumentation is a special type of dialogue: indeed, many of the dialogues we engage in are not instances of argumentation, for example when asking what time it is, or when someone shares details about their recent vacation. Argumentation only occurs when, upon making a claim, someone receives a request for further support for the claim in the form of reasons, or estimates herself that further justification is required (Jackson & Jacobs 1980; Jackson 2019). In such cases, dialogues of “giving and asking for reasons” ensue (Brandom, 1994; Bermejo Luque 2011). Since most of what we know we learn from others, argumentation seems to be an important mechanism to filter the information we receive, instead of accepting what others tell us uncritically (Sperber, Clément, et al. 2010).

The study of arguments and argumentation is also closely connected to the study of reasoning, understood as the process of reaching conclusions on the basis of careful, reflective consideration of the available information, i.e., by an examination of reasons. According to a widespread view, reasoning and argumentation are related (as both concern reasons) but fundamentally different phenomena: reasoning would belong to the mental realm of thinking—an individual inferring new information from the available information by means of careful consideration of reasons—whereas argumentation would belong to the public realm of the exchange of reasons, expressed in language or other symbolic media and intended for an audience. However, a number of authors have argued for a different view, namely that reasoning and argumentation are in fact two sides of the same coin, and that what is known as reasoning is by and large the internalization of practices of argumentation (MacKenzie 1989; Mercier & Sperber 2017; Mercier 2018; Dutilh Novaes 2020a). For the purposes of this entry, we do not need to take a stance: we can assume a close connection between reasoning and argumentation so that relevant research on reasoning can be suitably included, while focusing primarily on argumentation as public exchange of reasons.

2. Types of Arguments

Arguments can be, and historically have been (see Historical Supplement), classified in various ways. One way is to dichotomize arguments into theoretical and practical arguments, based on the status of their conclusion (see Section 3). Theoretical (or epistemic) arguments support the veracity (or probability or plausibility) of a verifiable claim, as is done across scientific disciplines and philosophy. Practical (or pragmatic) arguments justify the value of a course of action to be taken, and as such make up much of legal and political deliberation and everyday decision-making (see entry on Practical Reason). Another classification, made famous through the legacy of Aristotle (see entries on Aristotle’s Logic and Aristotle’s Rhetoric), divides arguments based on their function and context of use. Logical (or analytic) arguments derive conclusions from true premises and aim to prove the conclusion necessarily for the purpose of (primarily) scientific inquiry. Dialectical arguments work with plausible (reputable, acceptable) premises and aim to rationally convince one’s opponent in an academic or everyday debate. Rhetorical arguments start from opinions accepted by the audience and aim to persuade that audience of the acceptability of a course of action in a context of public or judicial deliberation.

Underlying and crisscrossing such distinctions is another fundamental way of understanding how arguments work. In some of them, the truth of the premises is supposed to guarantee the truth of the conclusion, and these are known as deductive arguments. In others, the truth of the premises should make the truth of the conclusion more likely while not ensuring complete certainty; two well-known classes of such arguments are inductive and abductive arguments (a distinction introduced by Peirce, see entry on C.S. Peirce). Unlike deduction, induction and abduction are thought to be ampliative: the conclusion goes beyond what is (logically) contained in the premises. Moreover, a type of argument that features prominently across different philosophical traditions, and yet does not fit neatly into any of the categories so far discussed, are analogical arguments. In this section, these four particularly influential types of arguments are presented. The section closes with a discussion of fallacious arguments, that is, arguments that seem legitimate and “good”, but in fact are not.[2]

2.1 Deduction

Valid deductive arguments are those where the truth of the premises necessitates the truth of the conclusion: the conclusion cannot but be true if the premises are true. Arguments having this property are deductively valid. A valid argument whose premises are also true is a sound argument. Examples of valid deductive arguments are the familiar syllogisms, such as:

All humans are living beings.
All living beings are mortal.
Therefore, all humans are mortal.

In a deductively valid argument, the conclusion will be true in all situations where the premises are true, with no exceptions. A slightly more technical gloss of this idea goes as follows: in all possible worlds where the premises hold, the conclusion will also hold. This means that, if I know the premises of a deductively valid argument to be true of a given situation, then I can conclude with absolute certainty that the conclusion is also true of that situation. An important property typically associated with deductive arguments, and which differentiates them from inductive and abductive arguments, is the property of monotonicity: if premises A and B deductively imply conclusion C, then the addition of any arbitrary premise D will not invalidate the argument. In other words, if the argument “A and B; therefore C” is deductively valid, then the argument “A, B and D; therefore C” is equally deductively valid.

Deductive arguments are the objects of study of familiar logical systems such as (classical) propositional and predicate logic, as well as of subclassical systems such as intuitionistic and relevance logics. (But note that, in relevance logic, which is a deductive logic with the property of necessary-truth preservation, the property of monotonicity does not hold. It may lead to violations of criteria of relevance between premises and conclusion when a premise is added that is not relevantly related to the conclusion. See entry on relevance logic.) In each of these systems, the relation of logical consequence in question satisfies the property of necessary truth-preservation (see entry on logical consequence). This is not surprising, as these systems were originally designed to capture arguments of a very specific kind, namely mathematical arguments (proofs), in the pioneering work of Frege, Russell, Hilbert, Gentzen, and others. Following a paradigm established in ancient Greek mathematics and famously captured in Euclid’s Elements, argumentative steps in mathematical proofs (in this tradition at least) must have the property of necessary truth-preservation (Netz 1999). This paradigm remained influential for millennia, and still codifies what can be described as the “classical” conception of mathematical proof (Dutilh Novaes 2020a), even if practices of proof are ultimately also quite diverse. (In fact, there is much more to argumentation in mathematics than just deductive argumentation [Aberdein & Dove 2013].)

Indeed, deductive arguments have occupied a special place in philosophy and the sciences, ever since Aristotle presented the first fully-fledged theory of deductive argumentation and reasoning in the Prior Analytics (and the corresponding theory of scientific demonstration in the Posterior Analytics; see Historical Supplement). The fascination for deductive arguments is understandable, given their allure of certainty and indubitability: a deductively valid argument guarantees the truth of the conclusion, if the premises are true. The more geometrico (a phrase introduced by Spinoza to describe the argumentative structure of his Ethics as following “a geometrical style”—see entry on Spinoza) has been influential in many fields other than mathematics. In the twentieth century, the deductive-nomological model of scientific explanation has been particularly influential (see entry on 20th Century Theories of Scientific Explanation, Section 2).

Despite its influential position in philosophical, scientific and mathematical canons, there are a number of pressing philosophical issues pertaining to the justification of deduction. What is the exact nature of the necessity involved in deduction: metaphysical, logical, linguistic, epistemic? None of these options is fully unproblematic (Shapiro 2005). Is it possible to formulate a non-circular foundation for deduction, i.e., a foundation that does not itself presuppose the validity of deduction? (Dummett 1978) Furthermore, the fact that a deductive argument is not ampliative may entail that it cannot be informative, which in turn would mean that its usefulness is limited. This has been described as “the scandal of deduction” (Sequoiah-Grayson 2008): a deductive argument cannot be valid (and thus non-ampliative) and informative at the same time.

Moreover, the focus on deductive arguments at the expense of other types of arguments has arguably skewed investigations on argument and argumentation too much in one specific direction, which is not truly representative of broader argumentative practices (see (Bermejo-Luque 2020) for a critique of deductivism in the study of argumentation). Indeed, in recent decades, the view that everyday reasoning and argumentation by and large do not follow the canons of deductive argumentation has been gaining traction. In psychology of reasoning, Oaksford and Chater were the first to argue already in the 1980s that human reasoning “in the wild” is essentially probabilistic, following the basic canons of Bayesian probabilities (Oaksford & Chater 2018; Elqayam 2018; see Section 4.3 below). Computer scientists and artificial intelligence researchers have also developed a strong interest in non-monotonic reasoning and argumentation (Reiter 1980), recognizing that, outside specific scientific contexts, human reasoning tends to be deeply defeasible (Pollock 1987; see entries on non-monotonic logic and defeasible reasoning). Thus seen, deductive argumentation might be considered as the exception rather than the rule in human argumentative practices taken as a whole (Dutilh Novaes 2020a); if this is the case, then, such a strong focus on deductive arguments in argumentation scholarship may be unwarranted. But there are still those who maintain that the use of deductive reasoning and argumentation is widespread and extends beyond niches of specialists (Shapiro 2014; Williamson 2018), and those for whom deductive validity should continue to be treated as the primary criterion of argument correctness (Groarke 2026).

2.2 Induction

Inductive arguments are arguments where observations about past instances and regularities lead to conclusions about future instances and general principles. For example, the observation that the sun has risen in the east every single day until now leads to the conclusion that it will rise in the east tomorrow, and to the general principle “the sun always rises in the east”. Generally speaking, inductive arguments are based on statistical frequencies, which then lead to generalizations beyond the sample of cases initially under consideration: from the observed to the unobserved. In a good, i.e., cogent, inductive argument, the truth of the premises provides some degree of support for the truth of the conclusion. In contrast with a deductively valid argument, in an inductive argument the degree of support will never be maximal, as there is always the possibility of the conclusion being false given the truth of the premises. Glossing this idea in terms of possible worlds, while in a deductively valid argument the conclusion will hold in all possible worlds where the premises hold, in a good inductive argument the conclusion will hold in a significant proportion of the possible worlds where the premises hold. The proportion of such worlds may give a measure of the strength of support of the premises for the conclusion (see entry on inductive logic).

Inductive arguments have been recognized and used in science and elsewhere for millennia. The concept of induction (epagoge in Greek) was understood by Aristotle as a progression from particulars to a universal, and figured prominently both in his conception of the scientific method and in dialectical practices (see entry on Aristotle’s logic, section 3.1). However, a deductivist conception of the scientific method remained overall more influential in Aristotelian traditions, inspired by the theory of scientific demonstration of the Posterior Analytics. It is only with the so-called “scientific revolution” of the early modern period that experiments and observation of individual cases became one of the pillars of scientific methodology, a transition that is strongly associated with the figure of Francis Bacon (1561–1626; see entry on Francis Bacon).

Inductive inferences/arguments are ubiquitous both in science and in everyday life, and for the most part quite reliable. The functioning of the world around us seems to display a fair amount of statistical regularity, this ensuring the reliability of inductive inferences; this is referred to as the “Uniformity Principle” in the literature on the problem of induction (to be discussed shortly). Moreover, it has been argued that generalizing from previously observed frequencies is the most basic principle of human cognition (Clark 2016).

However, it has long been recognized that inductive inferences/arguments are not unproblematic. Hume famously offered the first influential formulation of what became known as “the problem of induction” in his Treatise of Human Nature (see entries on David Hume and on the problem of induction; Howson 2000). Hume asks what grounds the correctness of inductive inferences/arguments, and posits that there must be an argument establishing the validity of the Uniformity Principle for inductive inferences to be truly justified. He goes on to argue that this argument cannot be deductive, as it is not inconceivable that the course of nature may change. But it cannot be probable either, as probable arguments already presuppose the validity of the Uniformity Principle; circularity would ensue. Since these are (presumably) the only two options, Hume concludes that the Uniformity Principle cannot be established by rational argument, and hence that induction cannot be justified.

A contemporary influential critique of inductive arguments is the one offered in (Harman 1965). Harman argues that either enumerative induction is not always warranted, or it is always warranted but constitutes an uninteresting special case of the more general category of inference to the best explanation (see next section). The upshot is that, for Harman, induction should not be considered a warranted form of inference in its own right. More recently, the use of statistical frequencies for social categories to draw conclusions about specific individuals has become a matter of contention, both at the individual level (see entry on implicit bias) and at the institutional level (e.g., the use of predictive algorithms for law enforcement [Jorgensen Bolinger 2021]). These debates can be seen as reoccurrences of Hume’s problem of induction, now in the domain of social rather than natural phenomena.

Given the centrality of induction for scientific practice, there have been numerous attempts to respond to the critics of induction, with various degrees of success. Among those, an influential response to the problem of induction is Norton’s material theory of induction, according to which inductive inferences are not justified by universal, formal rules but by domain-specific facts (Norton 2003). But even if not conclusively solved, the problem has not prevented scientists and laypeople alike from continuing to use induction widely.

2.3 Abduction

An abductive argument is one where, from the observation of a few relevant facts, a conclusion is drawn as to what could possibly explain the occurrence of these facts (see entry on abduction). Abduction is widely thought to be ubiquitous both in science and in everyday life, as well as in other specific domains such as the law, medical diagnosis, and explainable AI (Josephson & Josephson 1994). Indeed, a good example of abduction is the closing argument by a prosecutor in a court of law who, after summarizing the available evidence, concludes that the most plausible explanation is that the defendant must have committed the crime they are accused of.

Like induction, and unlike deduction, abduction is not necessarily truth-preserving: in the example above, it is still possible that the defendant is not guilty after all, and that some other, unexpected phenomena caused the evidence to emerge. But abduction is significantly different from induction in that it does not only concern the generalization of prior observation for prediction (though it may also involve statistical data): rather, abduction is often backward-looking in that it seeks to explain something that has already happened. The key notion is that of bringing together apparently independent phenomena or events as explanatorily and/or causally connected to each other, something that is absent from a purely inductive argument that only appeals to observed frequencies. (While typical explanations are causal, there can also be structural or statistical explanations.) Cognitively, abduction taps into the well-known human tendency to seek (causal) explanations for phenomena (Keil 2006; Lombrozo 2026).

As noted, deduction and induction have been recognized as important classes of arguments for millennia; the concept of abduction is by comparison a latecomer. It is important to notice though that explanatory arguments as such are not latecomers; indeed, Aristotle’s very conception of scientific demonstration is based on the concept of explaining causes (see entry on Aristotle). What is recent is the conceptualization of abduction as a special class of arguments, and the term itself. The term was introduced by Peirce as a third class of inferences distinct from deduction and induction: for Peirce, abduction is understood as the process of forming explanatory hypotheses, thus leading to new ideas and concepts (whereas for him deduction and induction could not lead to new ideas or theories; see the entry on C.S. Peirce). Thus seen, abduction pertains to contexts of discovery, in which case it is not clear that it corresponds to instances of arguments, properly speaking. In its modern meaning, however, abduction pertains to contexts of justification, and thus to speak of abductive arguments becomes appropriate. An abductive argument is now typically understood as an inference to the best explanation (IBE) (Lipton 1991 [2004]). (However, some authors argue that there are good reasons to distinguish the two concepts, since abduction, as they define it, rests on creative generation of a pool of plausible explanations, while IBE focuses on evaluative selection of the best explanation from that pool (Campos 2011; McAuliffe 2015; Yu & Zenker 2018).) The notion of “the best” explanation highlights the contrastive character of abductive reasoning. Both the fact to be explained—explanandum—and the possible explanation—explanans—are considered against contrast classes of other potential options (Bodlović & Lewiński 2024; Dretske 1972; Lipton 1991 [2004]). Contrast classes thus determine the relevance and granularity of the justifications given: Why did Anne die? “Because they contracted COVID” is a good explanatory reason if Anne is contrasted with someone who never contracted the virus. But if we contrast Anne with another COVID patient who’s alive, then additional explanation such as “because Anne refused vaccination” or “because Anne had advanced diabetes” would have to be produced.

While the main ideas behind abduction may seem simple enough, cashing out more precisely how exactly abduction works is a complex matter (see entry on abduction). In argumentation theory, abductive reasoning is treated as a separate argument scheme whose premises can be carefully laid out in a diagram and hence made ready for evaluation via critical questions (Bodlović & Lewiński 2024; Olmos 2021; Yu & Zenker 2018). While independently important for the understanding and evaluation of abduction, such an approach also paves the way for concrete applications in areas such as medicine, law, and (explainable) AI (Josephson & Josephson 1994; Miller 2019, Walton 2005).

All the same, it is not clear that abductive arguments are always or even generally reliable and cogent. Humans seem to have a tendency to overshoot in their quest for causal explanations, and often look for causality and simplicity where there is none to be found (Vrantsidis & Lombrozo 2025; but see Sober 2015 on the significance of parsimony in scientific reasoning). There are also a number of philosophical worries pertaining to the justification of abduction, especially in scientific contexts; an influential critique of abduction/inference to the best explanation is the one articulated by van Fraassen (Fraassen 1989) (see entry on abduction, Section 3.1), according to whom explanatoriness and truth often come apart. Indeed, a significant concern pertains to the purported connection between explanatory superiority and truth: are we entitled to conclude that the conclusion of an abductive argument is true solely on the basis of it being a good (or even the best) explanation for the phenomena in question? It seems that no amount of philosophical a priori theorizing will provide justification for the leap from explanatory superiority to truth. Instead, defenders of abduction tend to offer empirical arguments showing that abduction tends to be a reliable rule of inference. In this sense, abduction and induction are comparable: they are widely used, grounded in very basic human cognitive tendencies, but they give rise to a number of recalcitrant philosophical problems.

2.4 Analogy

Arguments by analogy are based on the idea that, if two things are (relevantly) similar, what is true of one of them is likely to be true of the other as well (Bartha 2010) (see entry on analogy and analogical reasoning). Analogical arguments are widely used across different domains of human activity, for example in legal contexts (see entry on precedent and analogy in legal reasoning). As an example, take an argument for the wrongness of farming non-human animals for food consumption: if an alien species farmed humans for food, that would be wrong; so, by analogy, it is wrong for us humans to farm non-human animals for food. The general idea is captured in the following schema (adapted from the entry on analogy and analogical reasoning; S is the source domain and T the target domain of the analogy):

  1. S is similar to T in certain (known) respects.
  2. S has some further feature Q.
  3. Therefore, T also has the feature Q, or some feature Q* similar to Q.

The first premise establishes the analogy between two situations, objects, phenomena etc. The second premise states that the source domain has a given property. The conclusion is then that the target domain also has this property, or a suitable counterpart thereof. While informative, this schema does not differentiate between good and bad analogical arguments, and so does not offer much by way of explaining what grounds (good) analogical arguments. Indeed, contentious cases usually pertain to premise 1, and in particular to whether S and T are sufficiently similar in a way that is relevant for having or not having feature Q.

Analogical arguments are widely present in all known philosophical traditions, including three major ancient traditions: Greek, Chinese, and Indian (see Historical Supplement). Analogies abound in ancient Greek philosophical texts, for example in Plato’s dialogues. In the Gorgias, for instance, the knack of rhetoric is compared to pastry-baking—seductive but ultimately unhealthy—whereas philosophy would correspond to medicine—potentially painful and unpleasant but good for the soul/body (Irani 2017). Aristotle discussed analogy extensively in the Prior Analytics and in the Topics (see section 3.2 of the entry on analogy and analogical reasoning). In ancient Chinese philosophy, analogy occupies a very prominent position; indeed, it is perhaps the main form of argumentation for Chinese thinkers. Mohist thinkers were particularly interested in analogical arguments (see entries on logic and language in early Chinese philosophy, Mohism and the Mohist canons). In the Latin medieval tradition too, analogy received sustained attention, in particular in the domains of logic, theology and metaphysics (see entry on medieval theories of analogy).

Analogical arguments continue to occupy a central position in philosophical discussions, and a number of the most prominent philosophical arguments of the last decades are analogical arguments, e.g., Jarvis Thomson’s violinist argument purportedly showing the permissibility of abortion (Thomson 1971), and Searle’s Chinese Room argument purportedly showing that computers cannot display real understanding (see entry on the Chinese Room argument). (Notice that these two arguments are often described as thought experiments [see entry on thought experiments], but thought experiments are often based on analogical principles when seeking to make a point that transcends the thought experiment as such.) The Achilles’ heel of analogical arguments can be illustrated by these two examples: both arguments have been criticized on the grounds that the purported similarity between the source and the target domains is not sufficient to extrapolate the property of the source domain (the permissibility of disconnecting from the violinist; the absence of understanding in the Chinese room) to the target domain (abortion; digital computers and artificial intelligence). A possible conclusion to be drawn from such cases is that there are no universal principles that guarantee the legitimacy of arguments by analogy; rather, they operate on particular cases, and only details of specific cases and contexts can determine whether they are legitimate (Alhambra 2023).

In sum, while analogical arguments in general tend to confer a lesser degree of conviction than the other three kinds of arguments discussed, they are widely used both in professional circles and in everyday life. They have rightly attracted a fair amount of attention from scholars in different disciplines, including argumentation theorists (Woods & Hudak 1989; Juthe 2005; Marraud 2025b) and remain an important object of study (see entry on analogy and analogical reasoning).

2.5 Fallacies

One of the most extensively studied types of arguments throughout the centuries are, perhaps surprisingly, arguments that appear legitimate but are not, known as fallacious arguments (Hamblin 1970). Yet, historically, it was precisely the critical reflection on dubious and possibly manipulative arguments (see entry on the Sophists) that stimulated the development of philosophical method as grounded in clear and distinct reasoning and sound argumentation. A distinctive feature of Plato’s philosophy, the opposition between rational and irrational arguments, has marked philosophical thinking for centuries (also in the Indian, Chinese, and Islamicate traditions – see Historical Supplement). It is not surprising, then, that the investigation of fallacious arguments occupied, from early on, a prominent position side-by-side the development of systems of correct argumentation (whether in the logical, dialectical, or rhetorical sense). This is particularly conspicuous in Aristotelian logical traditions, inspired by his book Sophistical Refutations (see Historical Supplement). The thought is that, to argue well, it is not sufficient to be able to produce and recognize good arguments; it is equally (or perhaps even more) important to be able to recognize bad arguments by others, and to avoid producing bad arguments oneself.

A detailed discussion of fallacies in general, alongside analyses of particular fallacies—from ad hominem attacks to logical errors—can be found elsewhere (see Tindale 2007; Hansen 2026; the entry on fallacies, and the references there), we briefly present here the implications of studying fallacies for understanding argument and argumentation. Beyond their (presumed?) usefulness in teaching argumentation and critical thinking skills, the literature on fallacies raises several important philosophical discussions, such as: What determines when an argument is fallacious or rather a legitimate argument? (See Section 5.3 below on Bayesian accounts of fallacies.) Where should one draw the line between a bad, fallacious argument and no argument at all? (See Goodman 2018). More fundamentally, is the focus on fallacies a useful approach to the study of arguments? (Massey 1981)

Indeed, a key question in studying fallacies is whether: (1) they can be theorized independently or (2) are merely various forms of errors of correct arguments (Hamblin 1970; Massey 1981; van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004). As sketched above, understanding how fallacies function is practically valuable in discovering or better grasping reasonable argumentation. But that does not by itself justify the existence of a well-founded and coherent fallacy theory. The chief objection is that one cannot have a self-standing theory of error, which is infinite in kinds (Hamblin 1970). Massey gives this objection a methodological reading: while “a theory of fallacy presupposes a theory of invalidity (…) there is no method whatsoever of establishing invalidity that has theoretical legitimacy” (Massey 1981, p. 494). Such a would-be method is undermined by the open-endedness of logical systems (which progress and might eventually deem previously suspect arguments as valid) and the general underdetermination in translating instances of natural-language arguments into logical forms. An asymmetry thus arises: the validity of particular arguments can be positively determined when they are shown to instantiate some valid form or inference or another, but the best we can do with suspect arguments is suspend judgment in search for another logical form or better translation.

Such challenges reject (1)—the independence of fallacy theory—as a theoretically viable possibility thus generating a difficult dilemma for the study of argument and argumentation: while (2)—fallacies are errors of correct arguments—is the sensible option to follow, tradition offers no single, overarching theory of rational argumentation that would cover all recognized fallacies as classifiable failures of rationality. As mentioned, this applies to established logical systems where one would hope to find such a theory. For instance, few fallacies are strictly formal: ad hominem and straw man fallacies have little to do with formal rules of inference at all, while begging de question (petitio principii) is even a formally valid inference (“p implies p”). As a result, “the standard treatment” of fallacies as presented in textbooks and typical courses on logic and reasoning is eclectic and often theoretically unfounded (Hamblin 1970; Massey 1981).

One solution to resolve the dilemma is to construct a general theory meant to systematically and comprehensively cover rules for reasonable argument and argumentation, thus treating all fallacies as rule violations (Hamblin 1970; van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004). Another is to embrace a form of argumentative pluralism and construct small-scale, particular theories for different types and contexts of arguments, assuming that fallacies are identifiable as local errors which in another type or context of argument are reasonable (Woods & Walton 1989; Walton & Krabbe 1995; Hansen 2026). While taking different theoretical trajectories, both approaches produce compatible results with respect to two key issues. Firstly, they consider fallacies as erroneous (and typically deceptive) counterparts of otherwise reasonable forms of argument and argumentation. For instance, ad hominem attacks are abuses of justified personal critiques of the traits, capacities, or interests of experts and witnesses, which are relevant whenever arguments from their authority are at issue. Secondly, there are different types of fallacies as much as there are different types of argument and argumentation.

The study of fallacies also raises a number of questions which have attracted concerted theoretical and empirical attention of argumentation scholars. Assuming that people are, overall, quite good at detecting faulty reasoning and argumentation—at least under typical experimental conditions (van Eemeren et al. 2009; Mercier 2020)—how come fallacies succeed as deceptive argumentative devices and continue to be the hallmark of manipulative communication? The theories just discussed give one possible answer: since most fallacious arguments have their “reasonable counterparts”, it is difficult to recognize whether one is dealing with a legitimate or illegitimate version of an argument on a given occasion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004; Walton & Krabbe 1995). Another possibility is that—as in the classic critique of rhetoric as linguistic trickery—many fallacies rely on fine manipulations of the linguistic material in which arguments are couched (Oswald & Herman 2020; Schumann 2025). Yet another explanation posits that fallacies are not meant to fool the victim, that is, the direct target of fallacious manipulation, but rather some other communicative agent, e.g., a third-party audience of public argumentation, who is not aware of the details of the argumentative situation (Aikin & Casey 2022; Lewiński & Aakhus 2023). This recent work, and the fact that fallacies such as ad hominem (Walton 1998) and the straw man (Aikin & Casey 2022; Schumann 2025) have received book-length treatments, show that the concept of fallacies remains central in the study of arguments and argumentation.

3. Functions of Argumentation

When argumentation is understood as an action, then one can ask which function(s) argumentation can have in the various constellations of human practices in which they occur.[3] What’s the point of arguing? While it is often recognized that argumentation may have multiple functions, different authors tend to emphasize specific functions for argumentation at the expense of others. This section offers an overview of three main types of functions frequently attributed to argumentation in the literature: persuasion, theoretical functions, and practical functions, broadly reflecting the distinction between theoretical (epistemic) arguments and practical (pragmatic) arguments. To use the terminology of speech act theory (Austin 1962 [1975]), persuasion is a central perlocutionary goal of argumentation (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984; Popa 2022), the effect to be obtained. By contrast, theoretical and practical functions can be understood as illocutionary components of argumentation, pertaining to the conventionally recognized intentions of the arguers involved. If an arguer uses an argument to justify a constative conclusion, thus influencing what the receiver thinks, then the function in question is theoretical. By contrast, if an arguer uses an argument to justify a performative conclusion, thus influencing what the receiver does, then the function in question is practical. (Naturally, influencing what someone does will often require influencing what they think, and vice versa.) These different functions reinforce the idea that argumentation is a multifaceted phenomenon that has different applications in different circumstances.

3.1 Persuasion

Persuasion is widely held to be the primary perlocutionary (intended) effect of argumentation (Oswald 2023; Popa 2022) (but see (Goodwin 2007) and (Jacobs 2024) for challenges). Compelling arguments are expected to influence the beliefs and behavior of their receivers (Nickerson 2021), who may ‘change their mind’ by the rational force of the argument alone. The persuasive function of argumentation has been highlighted by various authors, including philosophers Arthur Schopenhauer (1831[2006]) and Jürgen Habermas (who speaks of the “unforced force of the better argument” (Allen 2012)), and influential argumentation theorists such as Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), Ralph Johnson (2000), Douglas Walton (2007), Trudy Govier (1985 [2010]), and Frans van Eemeren (2010).

Historically speaking, however, argumentation and persuasion have held somewhat vexed relations. On one common interpretation, what distinguished Socrates, Plato and Aristotle from the Sophists is the fact that the latter aimed solely at persuasion, while the former aimed at the truth. As described in Plato’s dialogue Gorgias, Socrates saw himself as different from the rhetorician who only aims at persuasion and flattery. On this construal, the rational arguments of the dialectician/philosopher are fundamentally different from the discourse of the rhetorician. However, as argued in (Irani 2017) and (Dutilh Novaes 2020a), the dialectician could not simply forego the persuasive function of argumentation, especially in a political and cultural context where discursive skills had very tangible practical consequences (Netz 1999). Thus, on this alternative reading, the rational arguments of the philosopher must both aim at truth and be persuasive, and the presumed opposition between truth and persuasiveness would be a false dichotomy.

Naturally, persuasion can (and often does) occur through non-argumentative means. But argumentation is thought to bring about a special kind of persuasion, namely rational persuasion: when presented with a good argument, an individual will update her beliefs accordingly through rational means. To highlight this special feature, authors such as Susan Stebbing (1939 [2022]) Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), and Frans van Eemeren (2010) distinguish rational, argument-based convincing from possibly manipulative, rhetorical persuading. (Good) arguments (purportedly) speak to our rational faculties, that is, faculties that presumably ‘track the truth’, as opposed to other forms of persuasion that have no commitment to truthful discourse. Moreover, rational arguments are often viewed as respecting the autonomy of the receiver in ways that other kinds of discourse do not. Purportedly, rational arguments are not coercive and manipulative in the way that other kinds of discourse are (Godber & Origgi 2023), allowing for people to make up their own minds autonomously through rational engagement with the reasons offered. But is it really the case that rational arguments are entirely non-coercive? According to some authors (Casey 2020; Nozick 1981), insofar as they aim at persuasion, rational arguments may well infringe on the autonomy of the receiver. (See Sections 4.1 and 4.2 for a discussion of the relations between argumentation, autonomy, and coercion.)

Whether (good) arguments are indeed persuasive—i.e., if they indeed reliably reach the intended perlocutionary effect of persuasion—is to a large extent an empirical question (see [McKenna 2024] for a discussion of the relevant empirical literature). In particular, as increasingly recognized, rhetorical effects are perlocutionary effects that can be studied experimentally (de Oliveira Fernandes & Oswald 2023). There is experimental evidence suggesting that we are in fact often swayed by good arguments (Mercier & Sperber 2017; Mercier 2020), and empirical evidence of argumentation in real-life scenarios, in particular from online argumentation (such as the ‘Change my View’ community on the discussing platform Reddit), suggesting that, while changing people’s minds remains hard-won, “providing facts and evidence may nonetheless be an effective persuasive tactic” (Priniski & Horne 2018) (p. 2279).

But it has also been argued that arguments are in fact largely toothless in changing people’s minds, especially if they concern topics that are perceived as core to one’s identity (such as political, religious or moral convictions), as shown by the research on motivated cognition and identity-protective reasoning (Taber & Lodge 2006; Kahan 2017; McKenna 2019). The thought is that most of our entrenched beliefs, especially those that are (perceived as) identity-defining, are not the product of rational deliberation; rather, they reflect preferences and features of our upbringing that are largely immune to rational challenge. (But see [Coppock 2022] for a critique of the motivated cognition paradigm.)

Ultimately, the actual persuasive effect of a (rational) argument seems intrinsically tied to circumstantial factors (McKenna 2024), including (among others) the topic under discussion (core, identity-affirming beliefs vs. circumstantial beliefs), how entrenched the relevant beliefs are, and how the different interlocutors perceive each other in terms of knowledgeability and trustworthiness. In addition, various linguistic factors—the explicitness/implicitness of an argumentative message, appeal to various pragmatic mechanisms such as implicature or presupposition, or the use of specific connectives—all affect the “rhetorical effectiveness” of argumentative discourse (de Oliveira Fernandes & Oswald 2023; Oswald 2023). While there is evidence showing that, in controlled environments such as lab experiments, good arguments indeed have persuasive force (McRaney 2022; Mercier 2020), circumstances in the complex real world significantly affect how arguments are in fact perceived and processed (Dutilh Novaes 2026). In most concrete scenarios, ‘the force of the better argument’ is undercut and/or neutralized by other forces and powers which interfere with the intended perlocutionary effect of persuasion.

3.2 Theoretical functions

We speak of argumentation as having a theoretical, epistemic function when we take its primary purpose to be that of improving beliefs, increasing knowledge, or fostering understanding. To engage in argumentation can be a way to acquire more accurate beliefs: by examining critically reasons for and against a given position, we would be able to weed out weaker, poorly justified beliefs (more likely to be false) and end up with stronger, suitably justified beliefs (more likely to be true). From this perspective, the primary goal of engaging in argumentation is to learn, i.e., to improve one’s epistemic position by engaging with reasons (as opposed to argumentation “to win” [Fisher & Keil 2016]). In a similar vein, argumentation is often said to be truth-conducive (Betz 2013): the process of arguing brings us closer to the truth, as challenges to existing views will show their weaknesses and flaws.

The idea that argumentation can be an epistemically beneficial process is as old as philosophy itself. In every major historical philosophical tradition, argumentation is viewed as an essential component of philosophical reflection precisely because it may be used to aim at the truth (indeed this is the core of Plato’s critique of the Sophists and their excessive focus on persuasion at the expense of truth (Irani 2017) (see Historical Supplement). Recent proponents of epistemological approaches to argumentation include (Goldman 2004; Biro & Siegel 2006; Lumer 2026). Alvin Goldman captures the general idea in the following terms:

Norms of good argumentation are substantially dedicated to the promotion of truthful speech and the exposure of falsehood, whether intentional or unintentional. […] Norms of good argumentation are part of a practice to encourage the exchange of truths through sincere, non-negligent, and mutually corrective speech. (Goldman 1994: 30)

Of course, it is also possible to engage in argumentation with oneself along these lines, solitarily weighing the pros and cons of a position (Blair 1998; Goddu 2011). But various philosophers, most notably John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor Mill, maintain that interpersonal argumentative situations, involving people who truly disagree with each other, work best to realize the epistemic potential of argumentation to improve our beliefs (a point they developed in On Liberty (1859 [1999]); see entry on John Stuart Mill). When our ideas are challenged by engagement with those who disagree with us, we are forced to consider our own beliefs more thoroughly and critically. The result is that the remaining beliefs, those that have survived critical challenge, will be better grounded than those we held before such encounters. Dissenters, even those holding false views, force us to stay epistemically alert instead of becoming too complacent with our existing, entrenched beliefs. On this conception, arguers cooperate with each other precisely by being adversarial, i.e., by adopting a critical stance towards the positions one disagrees with. (For further discussion on adversariality, see Section 4.2.)

The view that argumentation aims at epistemic improvement is in many senses appealing, but it seems to be at odds with the actual outcomes of argumentation in many real-life situations. Indeed, it seems that, more often than not, we are not Millians when arguing: we typically do not engage with dissenting opinions with an open mind (Gordon-Smith 2019). Indeed, there are various reasons to think that arguments are in fact not a very efficient means to change minds in most real-life situations. People typically do not like to change their minds about firmly entrenched beliefs, and so when confronted with arguments or evidence that contradict these beliefs, they tend to either look away or to discredit the source of the argument as unreliable (Dutilh Novaes 2020c)—a phenomenon also known as “confirmation bias” (Nickerson 1998). Especially arguments that threaten our core beliefs and our sense of belonging to a group (e.g., political beliefs) often trigger forms of motivated reasoning (Taber & Lodge 2006; Kahan 2017) whereby one outright rejects those arguments without properly engaging with their content. In particular, when choosing among a vast supply of options, we tend to gravitate towards content and sources that confirm our existing opinions, thus giving rise to so-called “echo chambers” and “epistemic bubbles” (Nguyen 2020). Even rational attempts at epistemically responsible argumentation might misfire under the conditions of “epistemically polluted environments” characterized by unreliable information and the proliferation of bogus ‘experts’ (Levy 2022).

Furthermore, some arguments can be deceptively convincing in that they look valid but are not (Tindale 2007; see entry on fallacies and section 2.5). Under real-life conditions, most of us are typically not very good at spotting fallacious arguments, especially if they are arguments that lend support to the beliefs we already hold, or if they pertain to topics of which we have limited knowledge. In such cases, engaging in argumentation may in fact decrease the accuracy of our beliefs by persuading us of false conclusions with incorrect but seductive arguments (Fantl 2018). Another type of concern regarding the epistemic import of argumentation pertains to the phenomenon of groupthink, which occurs when a cohesive group prioritizes harmony and consensus, leading members to suppress dissenting opinions and critical thinking and resulting in worse epistemic outcomes (Solomon 2006). In sum, despite the optimism of Mill and many others, engaging in argumentation is no guarantee to improve our beliefs, even if this may occur in specific circumstances. Indeed, whether argumentation can be knowledge-conducive and truth-conducive seems largely to depend on various contextual factors (Dutilh Novaes 2026).

Nevertheless, it may still be argued that an epistemological approach to argumentation can serve the purpose of providing a normative ideal for argumentative practices, even if it is not always a descriptively accurate account of these practices in the messy real world. Moreover, at least some concrete instances of argumentation, in particular argumentation in science (see Section 5.5), seem to offer successful examples of theoretical argumentative practices.

3.3 Practical functions

Finally, argumentative exchanges are thought to be relevant not only in determining what we should think, but also in determining what we should do; from this perspective, arguments would have an essential role for social coordination and conflict management. In particular, many theorists view consensus as the ultimate goal of an argumentative process: to eliminate or resolve a difference of opinion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004). This practical function of arguments is particularly significant in political contexts, especially for democratic deliberation (Zenker et al. 2024).

Consensus-oriented approaches are motivated by the social complexity of human life, and the attribution of a role of social coordination to argumentation. Because humans are social animals who must often cooperate with other humans to successfully accomplish certain tasks, they must have mechanisms to align their beliefs and intentions, and subsequently their actions (Tomasello 2014). Argumentation would be a particularly suitable mechanism for such alignment, as an exchange of reasons would make it more likely that differences of opinion would decrease (Norman 2016). This may happen precisely because argumentation would be a good way to track truths and avoid falsehoods, as discussed in the previous section. However, consensus-oriented views need not presuppose that argumentation is truth-conducive: the ultimate goal of such instances of argumentation is that of social coordination, and for this truth-tracking is not a requirement (Patterson 2011).

In particular, the very concept of deliberative democracy rests on argumentative practices that aim (not exclusively, but crucially) for consensus (Fishkin 2016; see entry on democracy). (For the purpose of discussing the practical function of argumentation, “deliberation” and “argumentation” can be treated as roughly synonymous.) According to influential theories of deliberative democracy, for a decision to be legitimate, it must be preceded by authentic public deliberation, i.e., a wide discussion of the pros and cons of the different options. A prominent theorist of deliberative democracy thus understood is Jürgen Habermas, whose “discourse theory of law and democracy” relies heavily on practices of political justification and argumentation taking place in what he calls “the public sphere” (Habermas 1992 [1996]; 1981 [1984]; see entry on Habermas). He defends the idea that politics allows for the collective organization of people’s lives, including the common rules they will live by. However, critics of Habermas’s account view it as unrealistic, as it presupposes an ideal situation where all citizens are treated equally and engage in public debates in good faith, which in practice hardly ever occurs (Mouffe 1999; Geuss 2019). Moreover, as argued in particular by Nancy Fraser (1990), the Habermasian public sphere is inherently exclusionary, and those excluded then go on to form their own ‘counterpublics’, i.e., their own separate spheres for deliberation.

In practice, it seems that it is only under quite specific conditions that argumentation reliably leads to consensus (as also established by formal modeling of argumentative situations (Betz 2013; Olsson 2013; Mäs & Flache 2013)). In particular, the discussing parties must already have a significant amount of background agreement—especially agreement on what counts as a legitimate argument or compelling evidence—for argumentation and deliberation to lead to consensus. Especially in situations of deep disagreement (Fogelin 1985), it seems that the potential of argumentation to lead to consensus is quite limited. Instead, in many real-life situations, argumentation often leads to the opposite result: people may disagree with each other even more after engaging in argumentation (Sunstein 2002). This is known as the phenomenon of group polarization, which occurs when an initial position or tendency of individual members of a group becomes more extreme after group discussion (Isenberg 1986).

Argumentation may also create or exacerbate conflict and adversariality, instead of leading to the resolution of differences of opinions (Talisse 2019). Engaging in argumentation may make background, inconsequential disagreements more salient, such that people who would otherwise get along may start seeing each other as opponents. Moreover, a focus on consensus may end up reinforcing and perpetuating existing unequal power relations in a society (Goodwin 2007). This general point has been made by a number of political theorists (e.g., Young 2000), who have highlighted the exclusionary implications of consensus-oriented political deliberation (see Section 4.2). The upshot is that consensus may not only be an unrealistic goal for argumentation; it may not even be a desirable goal for argumentation in various situations (e.g., when there are significant power asymmetries).

The consensus-oriented view of argumentation is a special case of conflict-management conceptions of the goals argumentation, based on the assumption that the best way to manage conflict and disagreement is to aim for consensus and thus eliminate conflict. But conflict can be managed in different ways, not all of them leading to consensus; indeed, some authors maintain that argumentation/deliberation may help mitigate conflict even when the explicit aim is not that of reaching consensus (Mouffe 2000). When conflict emerges, people have various options: they may choose not to engage at all and to flee instead; they may go into full-blown fighting mode, which may include physical aggression; or they may opt for approaches somewhere in between the fight-or-flee extremes of the spectrum. Argumentation can be plausibly classified as an intermediate response: “argument is a pacifistic replacement for truly violent solutions to disagreements” (Aikin 2011: 256).

Authors who identify conflict management (or variations thereof) as a function for argumentation differ in their overall appreciation of the value of argumentation. Some take it to be at best futile and at worst destructive,[4] while others attribute a more positive role to argumentation in conflict management. According to these more optimistic assessments, argumentation can be a suitable (albeit imperfect) tool to manage conflict, at least with favorable background conditions and provisions to mitigate escalation in place (Aikin 2011).

Versions of this view can be found in the work of proponents of agonistic conceptions of democracy and political deliberation, for whom conflict and strife are inevitable features of human lives, which cannot be eliminated but can be managed (Wenman 2013; see entry on feminist political philosophy). One of them is political theorist Chantal Mouffe (Mouffe 2000), for whom democratic practices, including argumentation/deliberation, can serve to contain hostility and transform it into more constructive forms of contest. However, it is far from obvious that argumentation by itself will suffice to manage conflict; typically, other kinds of intervention must be involved such as narrative and rhetoric (Young 2000), as the risk of argumentation being used exclusively to exercise power (see Section 4.2 below) rather than as a tool to manage conflict always looms large (van Laar & Krabbe 2019).

3.4 Conclusion

From these observations on the different functions of argumentation, a pluralistic picture emerges: argumentation, understood as the exchange of reasons to justify claims, seems to have different applications in different situations. At the same time, it is not clear that some of the goals often attributed to argumentation such as epistemic improvement and reaching consensus can in fact be reliably achieved in many real-life situations. Does this mean that argumentation is useless and futile? Not necessarily, but it may mean that we need to temper our expectations of what argumentation can in fact do for us.

4. Ethics, Politics, and Practices of Argumentation

Among the topics that have recently attracted the interest of argumentation scholars figure issues pertaining to what might be described as the ethics and the politics of argumentation, to which we turn now. This section also discusses the literature on argumentative practices in one specific type of environment, namely online environments. Online argumentation is now a common experience for many of us; accordingly, the literature on the topic has been growing steadily.

4.1 Ethics of Argumentation

The intricate relations between ethics and argumentation have been recognized in various ancient philosophical traditions. As is well known, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle each examined the place of reason in moral deliberation as well as the ethical perils of possibly deceptive rhetorical argumentation. Three main lines of inquiry can be distinguished. The first one can be called “argumentation in ethics” as it focuses, in line with the Ancient Greek tradition just mentioned, on the distinct forms of reasoning and argument in ethical thought and action (Broome 2013; McHugh and Way 2022), with Aristotle’s “practical syllogism” still being the paradigm form (Rödl 2024). The ways to understand, discuss, and resolve moral dilemmas through reasoning and argumentation are also examined (Mason 1996). On a somewhat different scale, this line of inquiry also seeks the ultimate grounds for ethical claims in rational argumentation. Habermas’ discourse ethics is the most prominent among such attempts (Habermas 1983 [1990]; see entry on Habermas, especially § 3). For Habermas, valid ethical claims are grounded in reasonable—that is, intersubjectively recognized, transparent, and inclusive—forms of communicative action geared towards mutual understanding and, eventually, consensus (as noted above in Section 3.3). In turn, the reasonableness and acceptability of communicative action rests on a justified argumentative product, namely, the “validity claims” to sincerity, truth, and rightness established via a normatively regulated process and procedure for argumentation.

The second line of inquiry—which we call “ethics in argumentation”—studies, inversely, the place of ethical concerns in understanding the concepts of argument and argumentation. Recent work by Stevens (2026) epitomizes such inquiry. Her point of departure is the idea that argumentation is a form of influence that affects other people’s thoughts, emotions, and actions. Since this influence can be exerted either in a transparent, mutually agreeable, and respectful way or not, argumentative actions are, inescapably, ethical actions. Stevens develops this point by stipulating the normative “function claims” for both arguments and argumentation as inherently including moral considerations such as “open presentation of reasons” or “meaningfully reciprocal exchange of reasons.” Argumentative practices which fall short of pursuing these functions—notably, fallacies such as the straw man (Stevens 2021; Aikin & Casey 2022)—are inherently deceptive and, as such, constitute moral harm.

Finally, one can also speak of “ethics of argumentation”, a broad field of inquiry which takes into scrutiny varied ethical concerns regulating, one way or another, the practices of argumentation. One prominent approach is virtue argumentation theory (Aberdein 2010; Gascón 2016) which shifts from the traditional focus on arguments and argumentation to the arguers that produce them. Developed as an adaptation of virtue epistemology (see entry on virtue epistemology), virtue argumentation theory emphasizes the importance of intellectual virtues—open-mindedness in collecting and appraising evidence, fairness in evaluating the arguments of others, or willingness to modify one’s own position when faced with a better argument—for understanding what good, and fallacious, argumentation is. Presumably, virtuous arguers produce good arguments while vicious arguers resort to fallacies. But the intricate relations between individual reasoning and argument and the multi-agent practices of argumentation complicate the picture. As noted above (Section 3), even groups of otherwise virtuous arguers can generate detrimental groupthink and echo chambers. Perhaps even more puzzling are situations where individual argumentative vices such as dogmatism contribute to improving collective argumentative results, for instance by bringing in epistemic diversity to an arguing group, thus stimulating further intellectual effort (Smart 2018; Lewiński & Aakhus 2023, Ch. 6). Such considerations challenge the traditional “individualist bias” in the study of reasoning and argumentation (see also Section 5.3).

Two other issues in the ethics of argumentation have attracted concerted scrutiny—both of them inspired by questions of broader philosophical interest. First is the issue of charitable interpretations of arguments by one’s interlocutors. Inspired by Quine’s and Davidson’s concept of the Principle of Charity in radical translation and interpretation, argumentation scholars investigate the specifics of applying the principle to argument reconstruction, including its ethical underpinnings and consequences. On the one hand, overly critical, uncharitable interpretations can constitute “humiliation and harm” of the interpretee but, on the other hand, being excessively charitable in taking what others’ arguments mean can amount to a form of “cultural imperialism” or “logical paternalism” (Govier 1987; Lewiński 2026; Stevens 2021).

Second is the issue of argumentative injustice directly inspired by Fricker’s (2007) groundbreaking work on epistemic injustice (see entry on feminist epistemology and philosophy of science). The relevant question is whether there might be instances of epistemic injustice pertaining specifically to argumentation, which may be described as argumentative injustice, and which would be notably different from other recognized forms of epistemic injustice such as testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. Bondy (Bondy 2010) presented a first articulation of the notion of argumentative injustice, modeled after Fricker’s notion of epistemic injustice and relying on a broadly epistemological conception of argumentation. However, Bondy’s analysis does not take into account some of the structural elements that have become central to the analysis of epistemic injustice since Fricker’s influential work (Anttila 2025). For example, in situations of disagreement, epistemic injustice can give rise to further obstacles to rational argumentation, leading to deep disagreement (Lagewaard 2021). Further, the role of fallacious moves such as ad hominem or poisoning the well arguments (when adverse information about an arguer is preemptively shared with an audience to discredit or ridicule anything that target is about to say) in silencing one’s interlocutor’s argumentative voice has been investigated (Yap 2013; Almagro Holgado & Haro Marchal 2025). The topics of “The Principle of Charity in Argumentation” and of “Argumentation and (In)Justice” have recently been discussed in dedicated special issues of Topoi: see Stevens (ed. 2025) and Baumtrog & Arroyo (forthcoming), respectively.

While some theorists of ethics of argumentation might choose, as Stevens (2026) explicitly does, to limit their exposition to small-scale argumentative exchanges, it is clear that all such ethical concerns relate, more or less directly, to broader questions of power and politics, to which we turn now.

4.2 Argumentation and Power

Traditionally, the philosophical literature on argumentation has tended to bracket away issues pertaining to power, even if arguments are clearly also instruments of power (Forst 2015). Indeed, the power of reasons is but one kind of power permeating social reality, and it is a pressing task to investigate how the power of reasons is systematically affected by other kinds of power: strategic, economic, political, epistemic, social, emotional etc. Moreover, argumentation can also be used as an instrument of domination and oppression, used to overpower and denigrate an interlocutor (Nozick 1981), especially an interlocutor of “lower” status in the context in question (Moulton 1983). From this perspective, argumentation may also be used to reinforce and exacerbate injustice, inequalities and power differentials, rather than to equalize them (Goodwin 2007).

While not explicitly problematizing power, a question that has received much attention in the literature of the past decades pertains to whether the activity of argumentation is primarily adversarial or primarily cooperative. This is a question not only of theoretical but also of great practical significance. A case in point: in recent years, a number of far-right Internet personalities have advocated that argumentation can be used to overpower one’s opponents, as argued by, among others, the white supremacist S. Molyneux. Such aggressive practices reflect a vision of argumentation as a kind of competition or battle, where the goal is to “score points” and “beat the opponent”. (Overly) adversarial conceptions of argumentation have been criticized not only for their ethical and political shortcomings; they have also been found to lead to worse epistemic results, for example when knowledgeable participants are silenced by more truculent participants. Authors who have criticized (overly) adversarial practices of argumentation include (Moulton 1983; Gilbert 1994; Cohen 1995; Rooney 2012; Hundleby 2013; Bailin & Battersby 2016). Many (but not all) of these authors formulated their criticism specifically from a feminist perspective (see entry on feminist perspectives on argumentation).

By contrast, others have argued that adversariality, when suitably understood, can be seen as an integral and in fact desirable component of argumentation (Govier 1999; Aikin 2011; Casey 2020). A common theme is the need to draw a distinction between (excessive) aggressiveness and adversariality as such. Govier, for example, distinguishes between ancillary (negative) adversariality and minimal adversariality (Govier 1999). The thought is that, while the feminist critique of excessive aggression in argumentation is well taken, adversariality conceived and practiced in different ways need not have the detrimental consequences of more extreme versions of belligerent argumentation. Moreover, for these authors, adversariality in argumentation is simply not optional: insofar as argumentative practices deal with disagreement, adversariality is an intrinsic feature thereof, even if these practices also require a background of cooperation and agreement regarding, e.g., the accepted rules of inference.

Another question that has attracted the attention of scholars in recent years is who gets to determine what counts as a good argument (in specific situations or in absolute terms). This is an issue that also pertains to power relations; typically, those with more power in a society will have the ability to impose their preferred canons as the “correct” ones, to which everyone else should adhere. For example, as shown in the work of argumentation scholar Tempest Henning (2021; 2025), argumentative practices common among African Americans are typically perceived by outsiders as hostile, irrational, and as not adhering to the “correct” norms of argumentative engagement. But the disdain with which communicative styles common among African Americans is viewed is a reflection of the lesser societal standing of this group (which, of course, is the legacy of a long history of slavery). Instances of power relations affecting what is perceived as “appropriate” argumentation and who is perceived as a “good” arguer still await further investigation, in particular as they intersect with the phenomenon of epistemic/argumentative injustice.

A related topic that has interested argumentation scholars in recent years are patterns and mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion in argumentative practices. Indeed, at least in some contexts, most importantly in democratic deliberation, exclusionary practices are widely thought to be detrimental to the functioning and goals of argumentation. But theorizing argumentative inclusion and exclusion requires a focus on the conditions of possibility for argumentative encounters to occur at all, i.e., what happens before people are in a position to argue. Nancy Fraser’s (1990) influential critique of Habermas’ concept of the “public sphere” highlighted the structural exclusions of a “public sphere” that emerged in 18th century bourgeois academies, cafés and salons, spaces from which women and working-class people were largely excluded. In political theory, Iris Marion Young (2000) and others have showed that an exclusive focus on rational arguments in democratic deliberation ends up having significant exclusionary effects (Goodin 2018). While, traditionally, the literature on argumentation tended to focus on argumentative situations as they are already unfolding, a number of argumentation scholars have now been investigating the stages prior to argumentative encounters (Hample 2018; Dutilh Novaes 2026). In particular, the concept of “argumentative exclusion” has been explicitly articulated by Anttila and Domínguez-Armas (2025), who also argue that some forms of argumentative inclusion can also be detrimental, for example when those producing hate speech are allowed to participate in argumentative encounters.

Finally, the framework that Dutilh Novaes and colleagues have been developing in recent years (Dutilh Novaes 2026; Ivani & Dutilh Novaes 2022; Dutilh Novaes & Dede 2025; Hunsicker & Rittberg 2022) is intended precisely to theorize how the power of arguments interact with other dimensions of power in complex social arrangements. For example, they interrogate the role of the structure of argumentative networks for the successful uptake of arguments, recognizing that those more centrally located within the network will typically command more attention and thus will be able to expose larger numbers of receivers to their arguments. Similarly, Dutilh Novaes points out that those who are perceived as more knowledgeable and more trustworthy will also typically enjoy more uptake for their arguments (Dutilh Novaes 2020c). But here too, more work on how power and reason interact in argumentation is needed, and we expect this to be a lively topic of research in the coming years.

4.3 Argumentation and the Internet

So far, we have not yet explicitly considered the question of the different media through which argumentation can take place. Most conspicuously, argumentation can unfold orally in face-to-face encounters—discussions in parliament, political debates, in a court of law—as well as in writing—in scientific articles, on the Internet, in newspaper editorials. Today, as various Internet technologies become an ineliminable element of our daily communicative experiences, one may wonder whether research on the specific relations between argumentation and the Internet remains relevant: aren’t nearly all argumentative practices related, more or less directly, to the workings of digital technologies, such as social media, websites, search engines, AI chats, blogs, etc.? Still, for both historical and structural reasons, it is important to pay close attention to the relation between argumentation and the Internet, in particular to how the affordances of digital technologies transform argumentative practices. On the whole, Internet technologies greatly reduce the entry costs for would-be participants in argumentative interactions, as it fundamentally alters communicative structures by making them (at least in theory) more inclusive.

In the 1990s (when Internet technologies became more widely accessible), there was much hope that online spaces, supposed to act as the great equalizer in the worldwide marketplace of ideas, would finally realize the Millian ideal of free exchange of ideas (Mill 1859 [1999]) or the Habermasian ideal of a democratic public sphere for political deliberation (Hindman 2009). Online, everyone’s voice would have an equal chance of being heard, everyone could contribute to ongoing conversations, and everyone could simultaneously be a journalist, news consumer, engaged citizen, advocate, and activist (or so was hoped).

A few decades later, these hopes for argument-driven, democracy-enhancing “virtual public sphere” have not quite materialized. It is quite possible that most people now argue more than before—in social media, blogs, chat rooms, discussion boards, with AI assistants etc.—but it is much less obvious that they argue better. Indeed, rather than enhancing democratic ideals, some have gone as far as claiming that instead, the Internet is “killing democracy” (Bartlett 2018). There is very little oversight when it comes to the spreading of propaganda and disinformation online (Benkler, Faris, & Roberts 2018), which means that citizens are often being fed faulty information and arguments. Moreover, it has been argued that online environments may lead to “intellectual arrogance” (Lynch 2019) and to increased polarization when polemic topics are being discussed (Yardi & boyd 2010). Some have argued that online discussions lead to more overly emotional engagement when compared to other forms of debate (Kramer, Guillory, & Hancock 2014). Now that the Internet is largely controlled by big tech corporations aiming at profit (thus moving away from the utopian ideals of the early developers of the World Wide Web) (Hindman 2018), the overall online infrastructure does not seem particularly conducive to careful, nuanced, truthful argumentative engagement.

But not everyone is convinced that the Internet has only made things worse when it comes to argumentation, or in any case that it cannot be suitably redesigned so as to foster rather than destroy democratic ideals and deliberation; perhaps the democratic potential of Internet technologies can still be realized with suitable design interventions (Sunstein 2017; Forestal 2022). In structural terms, Internet technologies bring to the fore the fact that communication and argumentation rely on the infrastructure of particular design solutions: whether arguers are anonymous or not; whether they interact in real-time or asynchronically; whether their exchanges are one-to-one, one-to-many, or many-to-many; whether their arguments can be only linguistic or multi-modal (including sounds, pictures, and videos), are all factors that impact the shape and quality of argumentative interactions (for discussion, see [Lewiński & Aakhus 2023] and [Lewiński & Dutilh Novaes 2025]). Overall, different environments present different kinds of affordances for arguers (Halpern & Gibbs 2013; see entry on embodied cognition for the concept of affordance). Indeed, if the Internet represents a fundamentally novel cognitive ecology (Smart, Heersmink, & Clowes 2017), then it will likely give rise to different forms of argumentative engagement (Lewiński 2010). Whether these new forms will represent progress (according to some suitable metric) is however a moot point.

The investigation of argumentation and the Internet extends beyond such descriptive and normative inquiries and ventures into the prescriptive task of designing argumentation technologies. The key point is that argumentation powered by the fast-evolving information and communication technologies is amenable to design interventions (Jackson & Jacobs 2026), which make it possible to shape some of the affordances and constraints of argumentative exchanges (Aakhus 2017; Lewiński & Aakhus 2023; see Forestal 2022 for the broader political implications of the design perspective). Recent public debates on the technological and legal regulation of harmful, often AI-generated, content on social media and other online spaces explicitly demonstrate this point.

Be that as it may, the Internet is here to stay, and online argumentation—today, often algorithm-driven and AI-aided—is a pervasive phenomenon that argumentation theorists have been studying and will continue to study for years to come. In fact, if anything, online argumentation is now more often investigated empirically than other forms of argumentation, among other reasons thanks to the development of argument mining computational techniques (see Section 5.2) which greatly facilitate the study of large corpora of textual material such as those produced by online discussions.

5. Argumentation in Other Disciplines

Argumentation is practiced and studied in many fields of inquiry; philosophers interested in argumentation have much to benefit from engaging with these bodies of research as well. This section presents short literature reviews of how argumentation is investigated in various disciplines, which may serve as a starting point for philosophers interested in looking beyond their own discipline.

5.1 Argumentation theory

Argumentation theory is now a semi-detached field of inquiry, involving philosophers as well as communication theorists, linguists, and political theorists (among others). To understand the emergence of argumentation theory as a specific field of research in the twentieth century, a brief discussion of preceding events is necessary. In the nineteenth century, a number of textbooks aiming to improve everyday reasoning via public education emphasized logical and rhetorical concerns, such as those by Richard Whately (see entry on fallacies). John Stuart Mill also had a keen interest in argumentation and its role in public discourse (Mill 1859 [1999]), as well as an interest in logic and reasoning (see entries on Mill and on fallacies). But with the advent of mathematical logic in the final decades of the nineteenth century, logic and the study of ordinary, everyday argumentation came apart, as logicians such as Frege, Hilbert, Russell etc. were primarily interested in mathematical reasoning and argumentation. As a result, their logical systems are not particularly suitable to study everyday argumentation, as this is simply not what they were designed to do.[5]

Nevertheless, in the twentieth century, a number of authors took inspiration from developments in formal logic and expanded the use of logical tools to the analysis of ordinary argumentation. A pioneer in this tradition is Susan Stebbing, who (alongside her scholarly work in analytic philosophy) wrote books aimed at general audiences addressing every-day and public discourse from a philosophical/logical perspective (see Gunawardane 2025 and the entry on Susan Stebbing). Her 1939 book Thinking to Some Purpose, which can be considered as one of the first textbooks in critical thinking, was widely read at the time, but did not become particularly influential for the development of argumentation theory in the decades to follow.

By contrast, Stephen Toulmin’s 1958 book The Uses of Argument has been tremendously influential in a wide range of fields, including critical thinking education, rhetoric, speech communication, and computer science (perhaps even more so than in Toulmin’s own original field, philosophy). Toulmin’s aim was to criticize the assumption (widely held by Anglo-American philosophers at the time) that any significant argument can be formulated in purely formal, deductive terms, using the formal logical systems that had emerged in the preceding decades (van Eemeren, Garssen, et al. 2014: ch. 4). While this critique was met with much hostility among fellow philosophers, it eventually gave rise to an alternative way of approaching argumentation, which is often described as “informal logic” (see entry on informal logic). This approach seeks to engage and analyze instances of argumentation in everyday life; it recognizes that, while useful, the tools of deductive logic alone do not suffice to investigate argumentation in all its complexity and pragmatic import. In a similar vein, Charles Hamblin’s 1970 book Fallacies reinvigorated the study of fallacies in the context of argumentation by re-emphasizing (following Aristotle) the importance of a dialectical-dialogical background when reflecting on fallacies in argumentation (see entry on fallacies).

Around the same time as Toulmin, in Belgium, Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca were developing an approach to argumentation that emphasized its persuasive component. To this end, they turned to classical theories of rhetoric, and adapted them to give rise to what they described as the “New Rhetoric”. Their book Traité de l’argumentation: La nouvelle rhétorique was published in 1958 in French, and translated into English in 1969. Its key idea mirrors Aristotle’s understanding of rhetoric: “since argumentation aims at securing the adherence of those to whom it is addressed, it is, in its entirety, relative to the audience to be influenced.” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958 [1969: 19]) They also introduced the influential distinction between universal and particular audiences: while every argument is directed at a specific individual or group, the concept of a universal audience serves as a normative ideal encapsulating shared standards of agreement on what counts as legitimate argumentation (see van Eemeren, Garssen, et al. 2014: ch. 5).

The work of these pioneers provided the foundations for subsequent research in argumentation theory. One approach that became influential in the following decades is the pragma-dialectics tradition developed by Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984; 2004). They also founded the journal Argumentation, one of the flagship journals in argumentation theory. Pragma-dialectics was developed to study argumentation as a discourse activity, a complex speech act that occurs as part of interactional linguistic activities with specific communicative goals (“pragma” refers to the functional perspective of goals and the descriptive adequacy grounded in pragmatic approaches to language, while “dialectic” to the interactive normative element encapsulated in the rules of a reasonable argumentative exchange termed “critical discussion”). For these authors, argumentative discourse is primarily directed at the reasonable resolution of a difference of opinion by means of a merit-based critical testing of standpoints in question. Thanks to pragma-dialectics’ combination of a descriptive as well as a normative component, the theory offers tools both for the analysis of concrete instances of argumentation and for the evaluation of argumentative correctness and success (van Eemeren, Garssen, et al. 2014: ch. 10).

Another leading author in argumentation theory is Douglas Walton, who pioneered the argument schemes approach to argumentation that borrows tools from formal logic but expands them so as to treat a wider range of arguments than those covered by traditional logical systems (Walton, Reed, & Macagno 2008). Walton also formulated an influential account of argumentation in dialogue in collaboration with Erik Krabbe (Walton & Krabbe 1995). Ralph Johnson and Anthony Blair further helped to consolidate the field of argumentation theory and informal logic by founding the Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation, and Rhetoric in Windsor (Ontario, Canada), and by initiating the journal Informal Logic. Their textbook Logical Self-Defense (Johnson & Blair 1977) has also been particularly influential.

Argumentation theory continues to be a thriving field of research benefitting from a broadly interdisciplinary interest in argument, argumentation, and reasoning. Since 2023, the journal Topoi has a section devoted to “Philosophy of Argument” which explores, via its dedicated topical collections, topics of interest to the broader philosophical audience such as the place of argumentation in social epistemology, relations of argumentation to virtue and speech act theories, or the role of the principle of charity in understanding language and argumentation. Recent developments in philosophy-oriented argumentation theory (see also Wagemans 2022) further include monographs on the cultural foundation of argumentation (Tindale 2021), on argumentation within a complex “polylogical” ontology of communication (Lewiński & Aakhus 2023), on the dialectical construction of reasons in logic (Marraud 2025), on the relations between philosophy and rhetoric (Scott 2025), between argumentation and ethics (Stevens 2026), as well as between argumentation and power (Dutilh Novaes 2026). The Routledge Handbook of Argumentation Theory (Aikin et al. 2026) showcases the state-of-the-art of the discipline, as of this writing.

5.2 Artificial intelligence and computer science

The study of argumentation within computer science and artificial intelligence (see Rahwan & Simari 2009 and van Eemeren, Garssen, et al. 2014: ch. 11 for overviews of its history) is a fast-growing and particularly impactful field of research, with dedicated journals such as Argument and Computation and regular conference series such as COMMA (International Conference on Computational Models of Argument) and annual Argument Mining workshops at the major conferences in Natural Language Processing, namely ACL, EMNLP and Coling (proceedings available here).

The historical roots of argumentation research in artificial intelligence can be traced back to work on non-monotonic logics (see entry on non-monotonic logics) and defeasible reasoning (see entry on defeasible reasoning). Since then, three main different perspectives have emerged (van Eemeren, Garssen, et al. 2014: ch. 11): the theoretical systems perspective; the artificial systems perspective; and the natural systems perspective.

The theoretical systems perspective places the focus on theoretical and formal models of argumentation (following the tradition of philosophical and formal logic). Foundational in this perspective is the pioneering work of Dung (1995) in developing abstract argumentation frameworks, in which the focus is placed on attacks between arguments and sets of arguments, and how such attacks are defended against, forming a calculus of opposition (Modgil & Prakken 2014). Systems built on these foundations have been used, for example, in developing explainable AI (Sklar & Azhar 2018; Čyras et al. 2021).

The artificial systems perspective aims to exploit theories of argumentation to build computer systems that model or support argumentative tasks. Also known as argument technology, the area has produced, for example, dialogue games that support decision-making, multi-agent systems that protect privacy, argument authoring assistants, and interactive maps of large-scale debates (Atkinson et al. 2016; Bex et al. 2017).

Argument technology has more recently further developed the third perspective that focuses on natural systems. Here, the focus is on argumentation in its natural form using computational techniques to, for example, automatically identify argumentative structures through argument mining (for overviews of this large area, see Stede & Schneider 2019; Lawrence & Reed 2019; Hautli-Janisz 2026). Argument mining systems have been used to support the identification of fake news (Visser et al. 2020), to recognize fallacies in political discourse (Goffredo et al. 2025) and to tackle IBM’s third Grand Challenge, Project Debater (Slonim et al. 2021).

In recent years, machine learning techniques have become increasingly present in the computational study of argumentation. As the rise of Large Language Models (LLMs) dominates the landscape of AI today, argumentation has a critical role to play in understanding the boundaries of what AI is capable of. Reasoning of all kinds, including planning (Valmeekam et al. 2023), logical deduction (Ariyani et al. 2025) and natural argumentation (Gemechu et al. 2025), all seem to require capabilities that are currently beyond the state of the art of even the most sophisticated LLMs. While this may well change in the (near) future, the current consensus is that expert argumentation simply cannot be fully delegated to LLMs.

5.3 Cognitive science and psychology

Argumentation is also a topic of investigation within cognitive science and psychology—even if, as argued in (Paglieri 2026), psychological and cognitive research on argumentation remains largely marginal within the argumentation theory/argumentation studies community. Researchers in cognitive science and psychology are predominantly interested in the descriptive question of how people in fact engage in argumentation, rather than in the normative question of how they ought to do it (although some of them have also drawn normative conclusions, e.g., Hahn & Oaksford 2006; Hahn & Hornikx, 2016). Controlled experiments are one of the ways in which the descriptive question can be investigated (Collins & Hahn 2023).

Systematic research specifically on argumentation within cognitive science and psychology has significantly increased over the last 10 years. (Recall that, as noted at the end of Section 1, in this entry we focus primarily on argumentation as pertaining to the public exchange of reasons.) Before that, there had been extensive research on reasoning conceived as an individual, internal process, much of which had been conducted using task materials such as syllogistic arguments (Dutilh Novaes 2020b). But due to what may be described as an individualist bias in cognitive science and psychology (Mercier 2018), these researchers did not draw explicit connections between their findings and the public acts of “giving and asking for reasons”. It is only somewhat recently that argumentation began to receive sustained attention from these researchers. The investigations of Hugo Mercier and colleagues (Mercier & Sperber 2017; Mercier 2018; 2020) and of Ulrike Hahn and colleagues (Hahn & Oaksford 2007; Hornikx & Hahn 2012; Collins & Hahn 2018) have been particularly influential. (See also Paglieri, Bonelli, & Felletti 2016, an edited volume containing a representative overview of research on the psychology of argumentation.) Another interesting line of research has been the study of the development of reasoning and argumentative skills in young children (Köymen & Tomasello 2020).

Mercier and Sperber defended an interactionist account of reasoning, according to which the primary function of reasoning is for social interactions, where reasons are exchanged and receivers of reasons decide whether they find them convincing—in other words, for argumentation (Mercier & Sperber 2017). They review a wealth of evidence suggesting that reasoning is rather flawed when it comes to drawing conclusions from premises in order to expand one’s knowledge. From this they conclude, on the basis of evolutionary arguments, that the function of reasoning must be a different one, indeed one that responds to features of human sociality and the need to exercise epistemic vigilance when receiving information from others. This account has inaugurated a rich research program which they have been pursuing with colleagues over the last decades, and which has delivered some interesting results—for example, that we seem to be better at evaluating the quality of arguments proposed by others than at formulating high-quality arguments ourselves (Mercier 2018).

In the context of the Bayesian (see entry on Bayes’ theorem) approach to reasoning that was first developed by Mike Oaksford and Nick Chater in the 1980s (Oaksford & Chater 2018), Hahn and colleagues have extended the Bayesian framework to the investigation of argumentation. They claim that Bayesian probabilities offer an accurate descriptive model of how people evaluate the strength of arguments (Hahn & Oaksford 2007) as well as a solid perspective to address normative questions pertaining to argument strength (Hahn & Oaksford 2006; Hahn & Hornikx 2016). The Bayesian approach allows for the formulation of probabilistic measures of argument strength, showing that many so-called “fallacies” may nevertheless be good arguments in the sense that they considerably raise the probability of the conclusion. For example, deductively invalid argument schemes (such as affirming the consequent (AC) and denying the antecedent (DA)) can also provide considerable support for a conclusion, depending on the contents in question. The extent to which this is the case depends primarily on the specific informational context (which is captured by the prior probability distribution), not on the structure of the argument. This means that some instances of, say, AC, may offer support to a conclusion while others may fail to do so (Eva & Hartmann 2018). The Bayesian approach has also been used to study argument exchange in discursive networks (Assaad et al. 2025). Thus seen, Bayesian argumentation represents a significantly different approach to argumentation from those inspired by logic (e.g., argument schemes), but they are not necessarily incompatible; they may well be complementary perspectives (see also [Zenker 2013]).

5.4 Language and communication

Argumentation is primarily (though not exclusively) a linguistic phenomenon. Accordingly, argumentation is extensively studied in fields dedicated to the study of language, such as rhetoric, linguistics, discourse analysis, communication, and pragmatics, among others (see van Eemeren, Garssen, et al. 2014: chs 8 and 9; Oswald 2023; 2026). Researchers in these areas develop general theoretical models of argumentation and investigate concrete instances of argumentation in specific domains on the basis of linguistic corpora, discourse analysis, and other methods used in the language sciences (see the edited volumes Boogaart, Jansen, & van Leeuwen [2021] and Andone et al. [2025], and the special issue Oswald [2022] for a sample of the different lines of research). Overall, research on argumentation within the language sciences tends to focus primarily on concrete occurrences of arguments in a variety of domains, adopting a largely descriptive rather than normative perspective (though some of these researchers also tackle normative considerations, see Oswald 2023; Jacobs 2024; Haro Marchal 2025). Increasingly, language and communication scholars also take a keen interest in studying multimodal—that is, visual, auditory, and nonverbal—argumentation (see Kišiček 2026 for an overview of this growing field).

Some of these analyses approach arguments and argumentation primarily as text or self-contained speeches, while others emphasize the interpersonal, communicative nature of “face-to-face” argumentation (see van Eemeren, Garssen, et al. 2014: section 8.9). One prominent approach in this tradition is due to communication scholars Sally Jackson and Scott Jacobs. They have drawn on speech act theory and conversation analysis to investigate argumentation as a disagreement-relevant expansion of speech acts that, through mutually recognized reasons, allows arguers to manage disagreements despite the challenges they pose for communication and coordination of activities (Jackson & Jacobs 1980; Jackson 2019; Jacobs 2024). Moreover, they perceive institutionalized practices of argumentation and concrete “argumentation designs”—such as a deliberative processes for producing evidence-based health guidelines created by the UK’s National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE)—as interventions aimed at improving methods of disagreement management through argumentation (Jackson & Jacobs 2026).

Another communication scholar, Dale Hample, has further argued for the importance of approaching argumentation as an essentially interpersonal communicative activity (Hample 2006, 2018). This perspective allows for the consideration of a broader range of factors, not only the arguments themselves but also (and primarily) the people involved in those processes: their motivations, psychological processes, and emotions. It also allows for the formulation of questions pertaining to individual as well as cultural differences in argumentative styles.

Another illuminating perspective views argumentative practices as inherently tied to broader socio-cultural contexts (Amossy 2009). The Journal of Argumentation in Context was founded in 2012 precisely to promote a contextual approach to argumentation. Once argumentation is no longer only considered in abstraction from concrete instances taking place in real-life situations, it becomes imperative to recognize that argumentation does not take place in a vacuum; typically, argumentative practices are embedded in other kinds of practices and institutions, against the background of specific socio-cultural, political structures. Discourse-analytical methods, characterized by qualitative and situated rather than quantitative and decontextualized approaches to studying argumentative discourse (see Andone et al. 2025), are particularly suitable for such a broader perspective on argumentation, as shown by the work of Ruth Amossy (2002) and Marianne Doury (2009), among others.

5.5 Argumentation in specific social practices

Argumentation is crucial in several specific organized social practices, in particular in politics, science, law, and education. The relevant argumentative practices are studied in each of the corresponding knowledge domains; indeed, while some general principles may govern argumentative practices across the board, some are specific to particular applications and domains.

As already mentioned, argumentation is typically viewed as an essential component of political democratic practices, and as such it is of great interest to political scientists and political theorists (Habermas 1992 [1996]; Young 2000; Landemore 2013; Fishkin 2016; Bächtiger et al. 2018; see entry on democracy). (As mentioned in Section 3.3, in this context the terms “deliberation” and “argumentation” can be viewed as roughly synonymous.) General theories of argumentation such as pragma-dialectic and the Toulmin model can be applied to political argumentation with illuminating results (Wodak 2016; Mohammed 2016). More generally, political discourse seems to have a strong argumentative component, especially if argumentation is understood more broadly as not only pertaining to rational discourse (logos) but as also including what rhetoricians refer to as pathos and ethos (Zarefsky 2014; Amossy 2026). But critics of argumentation and deliberation in political contexts also point out the limitations of the classical deliberative model (Sanders 1997; Talisse 2019), in particular its exclusionary implications (Young 2000) and its neglect of self-interest and power relations (Mansbridge et al. 2010).

Scientific communities also offer good examples of (largely) well-functioning argumentative practices. These are disciplined systems of collective epistemic activity, with tacit but widely endorsed norms for argumentative engagement for each domain (which does not mean that there are not disagreements on these very norms). The case of mathematics has already been mentioned above: practices of mathematical proof are quite naturally understood as argumentative practices (Dutilh Novaes 2020a). Furthermore, when a scientist presents a new scientific claim, it must be backed by arguments and evidence that her peers are likely to find convincing, as they follow from the application of widely agreed-upon scientific methods (Longino 1990; Weinstein 1990; Rehg 2008; see entry on the social dimensions of scientific knowledge). Other scientists will in turn critically examine the evidence and arguments provided, and will voice objections or concerns if they find aspects of the theory to be insufficiently convincing. Thus seen, science may be viewed as a “game of giving and asking for reasons” (Zamora Bonilla 2006). Certain features of scientific argumentation seem to ensure its success: scientists see other scientists as prima facie peers, and so (typically at least) place a fair amount of trust in other scientists by default; and science is based on the principle of “organized skepticism” (a term introduced by the pioneer sociologist of science Robert Merton (1973), which means that asking for further reasons should not be perceived as a personal attack (though of course, sometimes it can become one). These are aspects that distinguish argumentation in science from argumentation in other domains (Mercier & Heintz 2014), even if idealized accounts of scientific practice tend to overlook the fact that scientists are also ‘busy people’ managing scarce resources (Dutilh Novaes & Dede 2025). Ultimately, scientists are part of society as a whole, and thus the question of how scientific and political argumentation intersect becomes particularly relevant (Kitcher 2001).

Another area where argumentation is essential is the law (Shecaira 2026), which also corresponds to disciplined systems of collective activity with rules and principles for what counts as acceptable arguments and evidence. In litigation (in particular in adversarial justice systems), there are typically two sides disagreeing on what is lawful or just, and the basic idea is that each side will present its strongest arguments; it is the comparison between the two sets of arguments that should lead to the best judgment (Walton 2002). Legal reasoning and argumentation have been extensively studied within jurisprudence for decades, in particular since Ronald Dworkin’s (1977) and Neil MacCormick’s (1978) responses to HLA Hart’s highly influential The Concept of Law (1961). A number of other views and approaches have been developed, in particular from the perspectives of natural law theory, legal positivism, common law, and rhetoric (see Feteris 2017 for an overview). Overall, legal argumentation is characterized by extensive uses of analogies (Lamond 2014), abduction (Askeland 2020), and defeasible/non-monotonic reasoning (Bex & Verheij 2013). An interesting question is whether argumentation in law is fundamentally different from argumentation in other domains, or whether it follows the same overall canons and norms but applied to legal topics (Raz 2001). One response by legal argumentation scholars is that “the law—and the jurists—are exemplary models of argumentative virtue that play a particularly relevant role in the theory and praxis of argumentation” (Amaya 2025, p. 813).

Finally, the development of argumentative skills is arguably a fundamental aspect of (formal) education (Muller Mirza & Perret-Clermont 2009; Siegel 2013). Ideally, when presented with arguments, a learner should not simply accept what is being said at face value, but should instead reflect on the reasons offered and come to her own conclusions. Argumentation thus fosters independent, critical thinking, which is viewed as an important goal for education (Siegel 1995; Bailin & Battersby 2026; see entry on critical thinking). A number of education theorists and developmental psychologists have empirically investigated the effects of emphasizing argumentative skills in educational settings, with promising results (Kuhn & Crowell 2011). There has been a particular emphasis on argumentation in science education, based on the assumption that argumentation is a key component of scientific practice (as noted above); accordingly, it is commonly thought that this feature of scientific practice should also be reflected in science education (Driver, Newton, & Osborne 2000; Erduran & Jiménez-Aleixandre 2007).

6. Conclusion

Argument and argumentation are multifaceted phenomena that have attracted the interest of philosophers as well as scholars in other fields for millennia, and continue to be studied extensively in various domains. This entry presents an overview of the main strands in these discussions, while acknowledging the impossibility of fully doing justice to the vast literature on the topic.

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Other Internet Resources

[Please contact the authors with suggestions.]

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Merel Talbi, Solmu Anttila, César dos Santos, Hein Duijf, Silvia Ivani, Caglar Dede, Colin Rittberg, Andrew Aberdein, Malcolm Keating, Maksymillian Del Mar, Steve Oswald, Chris Reed, Annette Hautli-Janisz, and the anonymous referees for suggestions and/or comments on earlier drafts. This research was supported by H2020 European Research Council [771074-SEA].

Copyright © 2026 by
Catarina Dutilh Novaes <c.dutilhnovaes@vu.nl>
Marcin Lewiński <m.lewinski@fcsh.unl.pt>

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